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ABSTRACT 
Lack of common understanding of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in 
South Africa has attracted a lot of interest in this aspect of the mining industry. The 
recent Marikana Massacre in the platinum belt in the Rustenburg area at Lonmin 
Mine in 2012, together with on-going debates on resource nationalisation and 
negative relations between mine communities and diamond mining companies 
have prompted the call for more research in reputation management in the mining 
industry in South Africa.  The purpose of this research is to define the meaning of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry, to understand key perceptions of the 
diamond industry, to identify key effects of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry and to evaluate key management approaches to corporate reputation in 
the diamond industry from multi-stakeholder perspectives.  
Mixed methods research methodology was used in this study, comprising 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and data analysis. Key findings include 
that there is no one single definition of corporate reputation. Each stakeholder has 
his/her unique definition which is based on his/her own assessments of the 
organisation, the past and future actions of the corporation, and their experience 
and perception of the organisation. Poor relations between mine communities and 
diamond companies; prospects for the collapse of the Kimberley Process (KP); 
violent strikes; environmental issues, including rehabilitation of old mines; poverty 
and high unemployment in the mining communities; failure of BEE transactions in 
delivering real value to the mine employees and local communities; illegal mining; 
the rise of synthetic un-natural diamonds and negative perceptions of the diamond 
industry in South Africa are the current major challenges and risks affecting the 
diamond industry in South Africa.  
This study concludes that positive corporate reputation would result in improved 
investor confidence, higher levels of attracting and retaining top level talent in the 
organisation, improved attraction of customers, better relations with communities 
and improved stakeholder relations. The study did not find evidence proving that a 
positive reputation will result in higher prices for diamond products.  It found that 
corporate reputation management initiatives in the diamond industry are not well 
understood and, as a result, they are not delivering the full results as expected. 
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Effective stakeholder relations management with a special focus on community 
engagement including youth groups’ involvement in the mining towns; targeted 
social investment programmes with special focus on enterprise development and 
effective management of industry perceptions are identified as the most critical 
steps to be adopted in the diamond industry in order to improve its reputation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
The advent of global markets has resulted in a plethora of product choices, retail 
channels, ethical consumerism and promotional activities. The increased 
competition in a globalised economy has promoted the pro-active, innovative and 
holistic identification of drivers of sustainable competitive advantage.  According to 
Flynn (2006), Schwaiger (2004) and Deloitte (2014), the extensive search for 
these drivers is no longer restricted to tangible assets, but has also reached the 
field of intangible assets. The importance of intangible assets in general, and the 
significance of corporate reputation have grown significantly over the past few 
years (Hall, 1993; Prager, 2014; Feldman, Bahamonde & Bellido, 2014). There is 
empirical evidence, supported by many corporate reputation experts, academics 
and public relations practitioners worldwide, that strong positive corporate 
reputation contributes directly to profitability (Eberl & Schwaiger, 2005; Podony, 
1993; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Shapiro, 1983) and long-term business success 
(Doney & Cannon, 1997; Einwiller, 2003; Hall, 1993; Farooq, 2016).   
Corporate reputation in the mining industry has gained unprecedented significance 
in South Africa and around the world. According to Shabangu (2013), the 
Marikana massacre in Rustenburg in the North West Province, South Africa where 
44 people were killed during the illegal strike at Lonmin Mines, is the single most 
significant reputational challenge ever faced by any mining house in recent history 
after the enactment of the democratic government in South Africa.  According to 
Bone (2012), Brand (2012) and Parsons, Lacey and Moffat (2014), in today’s 
sensitive, acutely competitive market, companies need to both understand and 
respond to the shifting values and continuously rising expectations of their 
stakeholders, especially their local community groups (especially the youth 
groups), employees, investors, regulators and customers. It is no longer sufficient 
to focus on the internal processes and bottom-line issues; businesses of today are 
expected to follow an holistic approach in managing all aspects of their 
businesses, including corporate reputation (Regester & Larkin, 2005; Bone, 2012).  
According to Kilgore, Linnane, Johnson and Booton (2014), seven big American 
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companies, such as the retail giant Target, lost significant value because of bad 
media publicity and General Motors also suffered a backlash from many current 
and future clients in 2013 when it recalled thousands of cars. This also includes 
the recent VW environmental scandal in USA, where the American authorities 
found that VW misrepresented their emission statistics, which were found to be 
much higher than the prescribed minimum (News 24, 2015). This shows that 
corporate reputation management lies at the heart of business success in a 
modern society.   
The South African diamond industry is not an exception to this reality because it, 
too, depends on reputation for its continued success (Bieri, 2010; Lussier, 2014) in 
terms of maintaining positive relationships with its stakeholders and increasing its 
financial returns for its shareholders. Diamonds are a luxury product with unique 
attributes distinct from other commodities like gold and platinum, among others.  
According to Penny (2009), Diamond Insight Report (2014), Mellier (2014) and 
Lussier (2015), consumers buy diamonds purely because of their reputation value 
and nothing else. From a consumer’s perspective, diamonds have both emotional 
and physical attributes which influence purchase behaviour. Diamond jewellery 
competes with other discretionary services and products for a share of the 
consumers’ wallets (Lussier, 2015). Because of their aspirational and discretionary 
nature, diamonds are more vulnerable to reputational threats than other raw 
materials (Penny, 2009; Prager, 2014; Cutifani, 2015). For example, blood 
diamonds, i.e. those sourced from conflict regions and other unethical contexts 
can ruin a corporation and even a country’s image (Bone, 2014). The diamonds 
from Chiadzwa in Zimbabwe were shunned because of associated human rights 
abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2011).  In South Africa, in the wake of the 
Marikana tragedy, according to Digby (2015) and Brand (2012), there have been 
complaints by many stakeholders, especially government and local communities, 
about the failings of the country’s mining industry and its associated perceived 
lack of progress in achieving sustainability and stable community relations. 
The reputation of the diamond industry, as a custodian of diamonds, a luxury 
product, relies primarily on brand profile, public perceptions, social license to 
operate and clean governance (Guyon, 2004; Nguyen, 2007; Lussier, 2014). 
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Within the luxury goods industry, there is substantial competiveness for market-
share but, given the high margins and the customer’s perception about the ethics, 
public opinions and price, the competition is not based on price alone, but rather 
on quality and the image perceptions of different stakeholders (Kaul & Chaudhri, 
2015), as well as on the ability to attract and retain customers (Penny, 2009; 
Mellier, 2014).  According to Guyon (2004) and Lussier (2014), selling expensive 
goods to people who can afford them may sound simple and easy but when it 
comes to parting with customer’s hard-earned wealth, the luxury goods market 
can be very competitive.   
A recent global reputation survey found that the most important issue for CEOs 
after market performance is corporate reputation (Deloitte, 2014). According to 
Flynn (2006) and Dowling (2016), a firm's reputation is one of its most valued 
intangible assets. Scientific and managerial interest in corporate reputation has 
grown steadily over the last 20 years. Fombrun (1996:72) defines reputation as “a 
perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that 
describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to 
other leading rivals”. Other authors define corporate reputation as an emotional 
reaction of external and internal stakeholders to an organisation (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, Ponzi & Newberry, 2015; Gotsi & Wilson, 2001; 
Sequeira, Da Silva, Ramos & Alwi, 2015), as well as the knowledge they hold 
about the organisation’s characteristics through their experiences and 
relationships with the organisation (Levitt, 1965; Rindova, Petkova & Server, 2005; 
Oppenheimer, 2012).   
According to the Reputation Institute (2016), companies such as BMW, Google, 
Walt Disney and other companies making up its list of top 100 most reputable 
companies, significantly benefit from a positive reputation which drives their 
profits. As such, successful organisations are aware of the importance of having a 
good reputation. According to Mellier (2014); Penny (2009); Einwiller (2003); 
Fombrun (1996) and Shapiro (1983), a positive reputation brings trust, confidence 
and sales, which are ultimately reflected in revenue growth and profitability, while 
a bad reputation can lead to a decrease in consumer confidence and, in turn, a 
reduction in revenue and profits. A company benefits from a favourable reputation 
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by becoming the first choice of customers, investors, suppliers and employees 
(Eberl & Schwaiger, 2005; Caroll 2015; Reputation Institute, 2015). It also helps to 
enhance competitive advantage by differentiating the company in the marketplace 
(Prager, 2013). A favourable reputation with customers creates a degree of brand 
equity since people are more likely to be loyal to reputable companies (Lussier, 
2014; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Sohn & Lariscy, 2015). Customers will have more 
confidence and loyalty to products and services of a company with a positive 
reputation. Similarly, a favourable reputation with employees can help attract 
better staff, spur productivity and enhance profitability (Lotz, 2014; Hall, 1993; 
Owen & Kemp, 2013). Moreover, the strategic positioning of a company with a 
positive reputation may be strengthened through closer relationships with other 
key influential stakeholders like journalists, analysts, politicians and investors 
(Eberl & Schwaiger, 2005; Martinez, Russell, Maher, Brandon-Lai & Ferris, 2016). 
In fact, a bad corporate reputation can ruin a company and force it out of business 
(Dhir & Vinen, 2005).  
While interest in the concept of corporate reputation has gained steady 
momentum during the past decades, little research has been undertaken into 
understanding its effects on the diamond industry in emerging economies such as 
South Africa. This research seeks to contribute to studies of corporate reputation 
through an understanding of the meaning of corporate reputation, evaluation of 
the key drivers of corporate reputation, key reputational issues in the diamond 
industry and their effects on corporate reputations in the South African diamond 
industry from a multi-stakeholder perspective. It achieves this by using a mixed 
methodological framework that combines in-depth, semi-structured interviews and 
quantitative data analyses tools.  
1.2 Context of the study 
The context of this study is motivated by an increasing number of high profile 
companies that are suffering from bad reputations to the point of collapse. Media 
reports like these: “Operations at Richards Bay Minerals (RBM) [a subsidiary of 
Rio Tinto] in northern KwaZulu-Natal have been suspended after community 
members blockaded roads leading to the mine’s entrance”, “Residents of 
KwaSokhulu and KwaMbonambi are demanding permanent jobs and ‘equal’ 
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business opportunities ... [A community youth leader] said the protests were a 
result of unequal treatment by RBM of its host communities. ‘We want to be 
treated the same as host communities. If the other community is getting business 
opportunities, we must also get them,’” he said. “Over the last few weeks RBM has 
faced a series of disruptions as a result of community protests and road blockages 
... According to the company spokesperson, After numerous engagements with 
relevant community structures, the situation remains volatile ... operations are 
suspended until further notice”, the company said in a statement (Shabalala, 
2016); Another report by Stoddard (2016) said, “The world’s largest open-pit 
platinum mine, Mogalakwena was shut for two weeks last year when residents of 
the surrounding shanty towns rioted, protesting against the government’s failure to 
provide services and the mine’s failure to provide jobs” and the consumer boycott 
which was led by Survival International (a multi-national Human Rights Non-Profit 
Organisation) which was staged in one of the De Beer’s high profile diamond 
stores in London (Bond Street) in 2007 against the alleged human rights abuse 
incident whereby the Bushman (indigenous dwellers of the Kalahari in Botswana) 
were forced to relocate from their ancestral homelands to make way for the 
establishment of a diamond operation in a project called Gope. As a result of this 
campaign, De Beers was forced to sell its diamond deposit at Gope. This 
campaign had made Gope “a problematic asset for De Beers”. It was estimated 
that De Beers was no longer going to benefit from an estimated $2.2 billion-worth 
of diamonds (Bone, 2014). 
Within the broad field of marketing, reputation-induced failure heightened interest 
in the corporate reputation debate (Dhir & Vinen, 2005; Einwiller, 2003; Fombrun 
et al, 2000, Owen & Kemp, 2013; Lussier, 2014). Experts like Dowling (1994), Dhir 
and Vinen (2005), Podony (1993), Farooq (2016) and Dowling (2016) argue that a 
favourable reputation can establish, protect and enhance competitive advantage 
over others through effective stakeholder confidence, while a tarnished reputation 
can set an enterprise on a cycle of decline through reduced sales, loss of profits, 
no confidence among investors, difficulties in accessing credit, lower morale and 
poor relationships with key stakeholders.   
This brings into focus the unprecedented significance of corporate reputation and 
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stakeholder-focused marketing. According to Fombrun and Van Riel (2012), 
because there is a lack of systematic attention to corporate reputation as a 
discipline, many academics and practitioners have adopted different emphases 
including an economic view, organisational view, strategic view, sociological view, 
accounting view and marketing view. Like many other disciplines, corporate 
reputation can be traced back to the marketing discipline (Fombrun & Rindova, 
1996). Marketing, since its establishment as a discipline, continuously evolves 
and, in the process, it has invented and reinvented itself. However, some of the 
elements of modern marketing predate the establishment of the discipline of 
marketing itself. For example, the importance of customer-focused approaches to 
business was long recognised by Frank Taussig, a former President of the 
American Economic Association in 1912, who stated “we must accept the 
consumer as the final judge” (Dolphin 2004:22). Subsequently, the 1920s saw an 
increased focus on company-wide consumers but the formalisation of marketing 
as a discipline with distinctive philosophies and approaches only became 
prominent during the 1950s and 1960s (Greyser, 1997). It is universally 
acknowledged that researchers, such as Drucker (1954), Kotler and Levy (1969), 
and Levitt (1960), were among the pioneers of this approach. They had the 
prescience to maintain that the concept of marketing should be broadened to 
include the overall reputation of the company.   
Since the 1950s, various concepts about corporate-wide marketing have captured 
the imagination of scholars and practitioners (viz., corporate identity, corporate 
branding, corporate image, corporate reputation and corporate communications). 
Each of these concepts has its own intellectual roots and practice-based 
adherents (Balmer, 2001). The interest in the study of corporate reputation is not 
of recent origin. According to Dhir and Vinen (2005), Fortune Magazine, the US-
based business publication, has published its annual surveys of corporate 
reputation for nearly three decades. In recent years, however, trends associated 
with the evolving knowledge, worker age and globalisation, have heightened the 
value of corporate reputation and have brought more complexities to the subject 
(Dowling, 2016). Many scholars and practitioners argue that there are no universal 
approaches to corporate reputation research.  
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There is documented evidence that organisational success is determined by its 
stakeholders’ provision of resources in response to the organisation’s actions.  
According to Neville, Bell and Menguc (2004), Harrison and Wicks (2013), Farooq 
(2016) and Massey (2016), a stakeholder’s decision to either cease or provide 
resources to the organisation is a result of complex considerations that coalesce 
within an overall evaluation of the organisation’s reputation. Stakeholders are 
uniquely placed to affect the firm’s long-term success or otherwise, whether 
through providing or withholding financial resources (e.g. shareholders), effort 
(e.g. employees and designers), licence to operate (e.g. authorities and 
governments), cash flow (e.g. customers), media profile (e.g. media houses), just 
to mention a few. 
An organisation’s reputation is defined as the admiration and respect a person 
holds of an organisation at a point in time (Dowling, 2016). Many scholars have 
confirmed that corporate reputation affects many outcomes that are directly 
related to business success and long-term sustainability. In the past decade, 
especially in the United States, company managers recognised that intangible 
assets may provide companies with a more stable basis for competitive advantage 
than tangible assets, such as patents and technologies (Flynn, 2006; Barnett & 
Leih, 2016). Hence, companies are now investing extensively in their public 
relations (PR) activities, stakeholder relations, employee engagement, corporate 
identity and corporate communications in order to improve their corporate 
reputation.  
The origin of the debate on corporate reputation can be traced to the 1950s but it 
has only gained momentum in the last twenty or so years (Dolphin, 2004; Feldman 
et al, 2014).  From its inception, the corporate reputation research paradigm was 
based on traditional and conventional approaches where reputation was an 
accessory and not an essential for corporate survival (Ind, 1997). In fact, by the 
late 1980s, Olins (1989:29) was still arguing that “corporate identity is only 
effective and capable of reaching people’s consciousness if it is well-articulated, 
heavily backed, and visually appealing”. Nowadays, corporate reputation is how a 
well-established business variable tackled through a multi-pronged approach in 
areas such as strategic management, public relations and, among others, 
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marketing and media exposure. In South Africa, reputation is also increasingly 
becoming significant given the many stakeholders associated with key industries, 
such as mining, at home and abroad. These stakeholders, such as employees, 
communities, investors, governments, human rights groups and media houses 
watch developments in mining with interest. A number of companies in the mining 
industry have lost value when stakeholders raised issues about their failure to 
comply with environmental laws (e.g. Vele Colliery saga) (Conway-Smith, 2012), 
sustained industrial action (e.g. The AMCU strike in the platinum belt) (Bisseker, 
2015) and many other factors which demonstrate that reputation cannot be 
ignored, regardless of the cost. 
The context informing this research is based on the understanding that most of the 
corporate reputation academic studies have been very broadly focused on general 
public perceptions and customer satisfaction surveys. These studies have mainly 
been undertaken in developed economies with limited research, if any, on the 
diamond industry in general and, particularly in South Africa, with a special focus 
on the multi-stakeholder perspective.  
1.3 Purpose of the study 
Globally, companies continue to demonstrate a growing interest in integrating 
corporate reputation into their strategies with the aim of achieving long-term 
business success. This interest originates from a belief that good corporate 
reputation enhances competitive advantage and thereby contributes to the long-
term success of a business (Feldman et al, 2014; Martinez et al, 2016). There is 
overwhelming evidence, supported by many studies worldwide, that a good 
corporate reputation enhances profitability (Oppenheimer, 2012; Eberl & 
Schwaiger, 2005; Podony, 1993; Shapiro, 1983; Reputation Institute, 2016) and 
contributes positively to long-term business (Hall, 1993; Prager, 2014; Sirsly & 
Lvina, 2016). A satisfactory corporate reputation is an important driver of 
successful organisational relationships with its key stakeholders, which can have a 
significant impact on the business performance (Einwiller, 2003). According to 
Fombrun (1996), Houser and Wooders (2000), and Dowling (2016), a positive 
reputation brings trust, confidence and sales, which are ultimately reflected in 
revenue growth, profitability and long-term business success. Experts in the 
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corporate reputation field believe that positive reputation is an asset that is 
invaluable in dealing with a very broad range of stakeholders in the diamond 
industry (Oppenheimer, 2012; Dowling, 2016; Dashwood, 2014). According to 
Davies (2005) and Sequeira et al (2015), if a company is reputable, many 
stakeholders will be more willing to trust them and to take at face value what they 
recommend. Customers will be attracted and retained (Brady, 2002; Fombrun et 
al, 2000; Podony, 1993; Yuksel & Cintamur, 2016). On the other hand, a bad 
reputation can lead to a decrease in consumer confidence and, in turn, a reduction 
in revenue, profits and loss of licence to operate (Dolphin, 2004; Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Owen & Kemp, 2013; Moffat & Zhang, 2014). The understanding 
of the interface between corporate reputation and business success is very 
important in the diamond industry. This is because the diamond industry is 
associated with diamond exploration in remote areas, diamond mining in deep 
rural areas, cutting and polishing, and retail in major luxury goods outlets around 
the world.  
Diamonds, as a consumer facing luxury product, has clear association with 
resource extraction from poor countries for the enjoyment of communities or 
consumers mostly based in the richer nations. The diamond industry is always 
under the spotlight of multiple stakeholders from employees to community groups, 
human rights activists, regulatory authorities at all levels and due restrictions  
around the world (Lussier, 2014; Prno & Slocombe, 2012). This makes corporate 
reputation a key strategic element of the diamond industry throughout its value 
chain. The purpose of this research is to describe various constructs of corporate 
reputation, identify key industry reputational challenges and risks, evaluate key 
effects of corporate reputation and, finally, review the effectiveness and relevance 
of the existing corporate reputation management initiatives in the diamond industry 
in South Africa.  
1.4 Problem statement 
Scientific and managerial interest in corporate reputation has grown at a rapid 
pace during the past decades in many industries. The debate on resource 
nationalisation in South Africa, the on-going rift between mine communities and 
mining companies, and the violent illegal strikes in the mining industry, including 
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the Marikana massacre in Rustenburg, South Africa, are the key developments 
requiring more focus on reputational studies in the mining industry. The South 
African diamond industry is associated with serious legacy issues, particularly 
those related to its association with historical perceptions of unethical and 
unregulated genesis in the Kimberley area. It is widely claimed that in the years up 
to 1900, worker exploitation was rife while safety and health were totally neglected 
(Even-Zohar, 2007; Davenport, 2013:56; Greater Kapa Bokone Community Trust, 
2015). The number of people who lost their lives during the diamond rush in 
Kimberley is not known. According to the Benchmarks Foundation (2009), as the 
20th century unfolded, the industry continued to thrive with perceived little benefit 
to the workers and with little contribution to the host communities. In areas such as 
Kimberley, the Big Hole is one of the reminders of a once powerful industry which 
made mining magnets such as Rhodes, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer and those who 
followed them very wealthy amidst worker and local community poverty. According 
to the Center for Environmental Rights (2014), the environmental impact of 
diamond mining is another point of concern, particularly after mining has ceased in 
areas like Jaggerfontein, Marsfontein and Namaqualand. All these legacy issues 
have created a situation where various stakeholders are demanding more 
community and environmental responsibility, transparency and good governance 
in diamond extraction to ensure that the long-marginalised societies benefit.  
It is believed that very little is known about the meaning of corporate reputation, its 
key drivers, key perceptions, key risks and the effects of corporate reputation in 
the diamond industry in South Africa (Dubois, Laurent & Czellar, 2001; Bone, 
2012). Many corporate reputation practitioners in the diamond industry have 
argued that, given the size of the diamond industry of more than US$120 billion 
globally, one might expect this industry to be regularly surveyed and analysed by 
the image barometers, which are frequently used in many other sectors of 
consumer products (Penny, 2009; Bone, 2012). According to Dowling (2016), 
Lussier (2014), Penny (2009), Griffin (2008), Schwaiger (2004) and Sequeira et al 
(2015), although there are a number of tools and methods to assess corporate 
reputation in most consumer markets, an acceptable theoretical base with special 
focus on the meaning of corporate reputation from a stakeholder perspective in 
the diamond industry in South Africa, key risks and various management 
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interventions, is lacking. It is believed that very little detailed empirical research, if 
any, has been directed to exploring the effects of corporate reputation in this near 
150-year-old diamond industry in South Africa. This study aims to unpack the 
stakeholders’ perspectives of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in 
South Africa.  
The following five key research questions apply: 
Research Question One  
What is the meaning of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in South 
Africa? 
Sub-questions: 
1. What is an acceptable definition of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry? 
2. What are the key components of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry? 
3. What are the key drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry? 
Research Question Two 
What are the key stakeholder perceptions of the diamond Industry?  
Research Question Three.  
What are the current and future key reputational risks and challenges in the 
diamond industry? 
Research Question Four  
What are the key effects of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in the 
following key strategic focus areas? 
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Sub-questions: 
1. The effect of corporate reputation on investor confidence? 
2. The effect of corporate reputation on employee engagement, talent 
attraction and retention? 
3. The effect of corporate reputation on purchase decisions for diamond 
jewellery? 
4. The effect of corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty? 
5. The effect of corporate reputation on community relations? 
6. The effect of reputation on government relations and other external 
stakeholders like suppliers, media and authorities? 
Research Question Five 
What are the appropriate managerial actions and approaches to manage 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry? 
1.5 Conceptual and methodological framework 
Given the high number of stakeholders interested in reputation management from 
economists, strategic managers, public relations professionals, to investors, 
employees and NGOs (Fombrun, Gardberg & Sever, 2013; Lussier, 2014), this 
research uses a multi-dimensional conceptual framework (see Figure 1) based on 
a systemic and multi-directional interaction between different stakeholders’ 
expectations, perceptions, experiences, corporate actions and legitimacy to realise 
corporate success or failure.  In this framework, public perceptions, stakeholder 
expectations (experiences), the diamond industry image, its ability to secure the 
license to operate through stakeholder trust and acceptance are the key attributes 
forming the corporate reputation of the industry, which could be good or bad and 
will have an impact on the success of the diamond industry in South Africa. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model for understanding corporate reputation in the Diamond 
Industry 
Based on this conceptual framework, a mixed methodology was designed to 
capture perceptions of different stakeholders. These were grouped into categories 
such as regulatory authorities, corporate reputation experts, investors, community 
groups, customers and, amongst others, human rights groups, unions and 
environmentalists. In terms of data gathering, a convergent parallel mixed 
method was used whereby questionnaires were circulated to key stakeholder 
groups by diamond industry insiders and to host communities and regulatory 
authorities. The questionnaires were designed to capture responses from 
stakeholder groups using Likert scales. The responses from the questionnaire 
were analysed quantitatively to get an insight into stakeholder perceptions and 
expectations in a stepwise process, from basic descriptive statistics to factor 
analyses and regressions depending on the nature of the question. Statistical 
manipulations were performed in Stata Software, Version 13. Concurrent with 
quantitative analyses, in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
selected stakeholder representatives to provide primary data, supported by 
content reviews of various community impacts workshops together with a focus 
two-day workshop with youth groups from the mining towns to provide secondary 
14 | P a g e  
 
data to supplement the interview results. This resulted in a robust qualitative 
understanding of corporate reputation in the South African diamond industry.  
1.6 Significance of the study and potential contributions to knowledge 
The diamond industry is a long-term business requiring large amounts of 
investments from its shareholders with long-term payback periods. It is associated 
with significant complex environmental, geo-political and socio-economic issues 
(Even-Zohar, 2007; Govindan, Kannan & Shankar, 2014; Lussier, 2014; Lane, 
Guzek & Van Antwerpen, 2015). Many corporate reputation practitioners such as 
Stephen Lussier and Andy Bone, and various other scholars in the corporate 
reputation literature argue that, while scientific interest in corporate reputation 
grows at a rapid pace in the marketing and strategic management literature, very 
little is known about the meaning and effects of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. The outcome of this study is very significant in the 
understanding and management of corporate reputation in the South Africa given 
the history of the industry. This includes recent media statements involving 
community disruptions (Shabangu, 2013; Davis & Franks 2014), consumer 
boycotts against blood diamonds and human right abuses in Zimbabwe (Bone, 
2012) and the uniqueness of this industry as a custodian of branded high end 
luxury products in global markets such as the USA, Europe and China (Even-
Zohar, 2007; Penny, 2009). A study by Hamann and Kapelus (2004) argues that 
the South African mining industry lacks a full appreciation of corporate reputation. 
This is heavily influenced by the country’s colonial and apartheid history resulting 
in the resistance of mining companies to adopt socially motivated change despite 
the increasing prominence of CSR policies and sustainability reports. According to  
Deloitte’s corporate reputation survey in South Africa (Deloitte, 2014), many 
executives have a fuzzy understanding of the quality of their firm’s reputation.  
There is a lack of a clear framework on how reputations are formed and there is 
no acceptable, uncontested measure of corporate reputation from a stakeholder 
perspective (Dowling, 2016; Lussier, 2014). Griffin (2008), Even-Zohar (2007), 
Davenport (2013) and Hass and Hansen (2005) argue that the return on 
investment (ROI) on corporate reputation building initiatives like corporate 
advertising, corporate communications, among others, is not fully understood in 
the diamond industry. The lack of full appreciation and the complete 
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understanding of corporate reputation and its construct in the South African 
diamond industry as shown by various academics and practitioners above 
highlight the need, relevance and justification for this research.  
This research aims to fill the following two major gaps in the understanding of 
corporate reputation which are its effects and management of corporate reputation 
in the diamond industry in South Africa. Firstly, it aims to establish a common 
definition of corporate reputation, its drivers, perceptions and key challenges in the 
context of the diamond industry. It also aims to review the effects of corporate 
reputation and to recommend management actions to improve corporate 
reputation in driving corporate success. 
The results of the study are expected to have managerial, policy and theoretical 
implications for the study of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in South 
Africa and the wider South African Mining Industry. 
1.7 Delimitations and limitations 
The boundaries for this research relate specifically to the industry of focus and the 
level of interpretation of data points. The study focused on the South African 
diamond industry with special focus on the mining, cutting and polishing, and retail 
sectors. This industry was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, the history of 
the diamond industry in South Africa is over 150 years long since the first diamond 
was discovered in 1866 on a farm near Hopetown, south of Kimberley (Even-
Zohar, 2007; Davenport, 2013).  Secondly, this industry comprises firms like De 
Beers, Petra Diamonds, Transhex, Rosy Blue Manufacturing and Zlotowski, to 
name a few, which are largely dependent on intangible assets like community 
acceptance, employee engagement, government support for approvals of mining,  
export permits and customer loyalty in order to achieve commercial success 
(Griffin, 2008; Regester & Larkin, 2005; Lussier, 2014).  Thirdly, according to 
Even-Zohar (2007) and the South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator 
(2015), the South African diamond industry is worth more than US$1 billion and is 
therefore a significant sector in the world’s economies. They further argue that 
there is a wealth of information available about the sector which provides fertile 
ground from which to draw research data relevant for this study.  
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The researcher limited this study to focus on the generic and high-level 
understanding of corporate reputation to the exclusion of other factors in the field 
of corporate reputation such as econometric effects, financial effects and 
sustainability implications of corporate reputation.  The study did not attempt to 
uncover the antecedents of successful implementation and evaluation of good 
versus bad corporate reputations.   
The nature of data collection tools used in this research included questionnaire 
responses and individual in-depth interviews. Combined with time constraints, this 
means that the development of a detailed understanding of the corporate 
reputation is not possible – only certain key perspectives in line with the research 
questions were probed. Lastly, while the outcome of this study has significant 
implications for the rest of the mining industry in South Africa, it does not attempt 
to represent all the mining industry issues. 
Assumptions of the study 
The current study assumed a constructivist ontology in the study of corporate 
reputation.  It assumed that there is no consensus regarding the core meaning 
and the building blocks of corporate reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Gotsi 
& Wilson, 2001; Rayner, 2003; Roberts & Dowling, 2002, Dowling, 2016) even 
though there is an agreement about the importance of corporate reputation as an 
intangible asset (Flynn, 2006; Hall, 1993; Shapiro, 1983; Abiodun, Adeyemi, 
Oyeniyi & Olayiwola, 2015).  It assumed that all knowledge about corporate 
reputation is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and 
transmitted within an essentially social context (Dolphin, 2004; Dowling, 1994). It 
asserts that corporate reputation is interpreted as an attitudinal construct that only 
exists in the minds of individuals (Fombrun, 1996; Wartick, 2002).  It further 
assumed that scientific methods alone, as a research approach in the 
understanding of stakeholder perspectives, could not contribute to the 
development of strategic management approaches.  This belief is supported by 
Yeatman (1991) who claims that scientific methods lack a situationalist view of 
knowledge, in which all knowledge claims are evaluated in relation to their specific 
historical and cultural contexts. Lastly, this study assumed that different 
stakeholders in the diamond industry in South Africa do not act solely on the basis 
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of symbolic communication, rationality and the ecosystemic contexts in which they 
are embedded, but are often emotional and irrational, driven by feelings, 
perceptions and moods (Gotsi & Wilson, 2001; Griffin, 2008; Even-Zohar, 2007; 
Prager, 2014).   
Definition of Terms 
Given the complexity and the relative infancy of the selected field of study, 
definitions are important. Terms such as social license to operate, branding, 
corporate reputation, corporate image and identity, Kimberley Process, conflict 
diamonds, sustainable development, cartel and corporate social responsibility, 
amongst others, are yet to achieve unified or common meanings in this field of 
study. The approach taken is to provide a working definition of the key terms that 
are used in this thesis. A list of the definitions of key terms is outlined in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1: Definition of Terms 
Term Meaning References 
Brand The constructed visualisation of the 
company’s value proposition. It is a “customer-
centric” concept that focuses on what a 
product, service or company has promised to 
its customers and what that commitment 
means to them. 
Rindova et al, 
2005 
Brand Awareness The description of how well the brand is 
known in the market place. 
Olins, 1989 
Cartel Groups that bond together to avoid the effects 
of competition. 
Even-Zohar, 
2007 
Conflict diamonds Stones (diamonds) that are produced in areas 
controlled by rebel forces that are opposed to 
internationally recognised governments. The 
rebels sell these diamonds and the money is 
used to purchase arms or to fund their military 
actions. 
Even-Zohar, 
2007 
Corporate 
Communication 
 
This relates to the various outbound 
communications channels deployed by 
organisations to communicate with customers 
and other constituencies. 
Dolphin, 2004 
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Corporate reputation “A relatively stable, issue specific aggregate 
perceptual representation of a company’s past 
actions and future prospects, compared 
against some standard”. 
Walker, 2010  
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
It is a firm’s allegiance to and fulfilment of the 
responsibilities to the greater community. 
Albinger & 
Freeman, 2000 
Forevermark Forevermark is a new diamond brand from the 
De Beers family of companies that is set to 
dramatically redefine the diamond industry. 
Forevermark diamonds come only from 
sources that are committed to rigorous 
environmental and ethical standards. 
Lussier, 2014 
Identity “The set of values and principles employees 
and managers associate with the company” 
Fombrun, 1996  
Image “The way an organisation presents itself to its 
publics, especially visually” 
Bromley, 2000 
Intangible resources Firm specific resources which are hard to 
measure, such as employee know-how, 
culture, efficient procedures or brand name. 
Dowling, 2016 
Kimberley Process This is a procedure which requires each 
diamond producing nation to certify that all 
rough diamond exports are produced through 
legitimate mining and sales activity. All rough 
diamonds exported from these nations are to 
be accompanied by certificates. 
Bone, 2012 
Reputation The holistic viewpoint in which an organisation 
is internalised by its stakeholders.  It is a 
“company-centric” concept that focuses on the 
credibility and respect that an organisation has 
among a broad set of constituencies, including 
customers, employees, investors, regulators, 
journalists and local communities.   
Levitt, 1960  
Social License to 
Operate 
A set of meaningful relationships between 
operational stakeholders based on mutual 
trust and a set of demands and expectations 
for how business will operate by local 
stakeholders and broader civil society. 
Warhurst, 
2001; 
Gunningham, 
Kagan & 
Thornton, 2004 
Stakeholder Any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected (or interested) by the achievement of 
the corporate goals and objectives. 
Freeman, 1984 
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Stakeholder Theory It explains the theoretical basis or meaning of 
stakeholders and the motivation for 
organisations to seek the support and 
approval of the stakeholders for their 
continued existence and adjust their activities 
to gain their acceptance. 
Gray, Kouchy & 
Lavers, 1995 
Sustainability 
Development 
It is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs 
World 
Commission on 
Environmental 
and 
Development, 
1987 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the 
introduction; Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the literature review; Chapter 4 presents 
the research methodology; Chapter 5 presents the results of the quantitative 
analyses; Chapter 6 presents the results of the qualitative research analysis; 
Chapter 7 presents a summary of discussions of both quantitative and qualitative 
results and Chapter 8 presents conclusions, recommendations, contribution to 
knowledge, areas for further research, weaknesses and limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CORPORATE REPUTATION 
2  
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate reputation is now one of the most fundamental factors that determines 
not just the success but also the failure of any business at local, regional and 
global levels (Fombrun et al, 2015; Caroll, 2015; Dowling, 2016). According to 
marketing experts, corporate reputation theorists and public relations 
professionals in these kinds of market situations, companies with good reputations 
are likely to attract investors, top talent and more customers (Doney & Cannon 
1997; Einwiller, 2003; Lussier, 2014; Reputation Institute, 2016). In keeping with 
the idea that an organisation’s reputation may be viewed as an asset (Eberl & 
Schwaiger, 2005; Fombrun, 1996; Podony, 1993; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; 
Shapiro, 1983, Prager, 2014), there has been a emergence of literature 
concerning “reputation management” (Fombrun et al, 2013; Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Miller, 2003; Reputation Institute, 2015) to the extent that an academic 
journal, Corporate Reputation Review, was launched in 1997 and a practitioner 
trade publication, Reputation Management, was started in 1998. While reputation 
management is a relatively new term, much of what is involved in reputation 
management has traditionally been classified under public relations and, more 
recently, corporate communications, corporate image, corporate relations, external 
affairs, corporate affairs and other similar terms such as Public and Corporate 
Affairs (Miller, 2003; Bone, 2012).  
This chapter is organised as follows: initially, it provides brief theoretical 
considerations, followed by a detailed discussion on the definition and meaning of 
corporate reputation and outlines the key drivers of corporate reputation in 
general. It then reviews the effects of corporate reputation on profitability and long-
term business success and finally discusses selected tools to measure corporate 
reputation.   
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Theoretical Considerations 
Corporate reputation is universally recognised as a valuable intangible asset by 
many authors. According to Bensebaa (2004), Shamma (2012) and Moffat and 
Zhang (2015), the role and potential impact of corporate reputation on the success 
and/or failure of a firm can be reported in line with many distinct theories. The 
main theory for this research was the stakeholder theory and corporate reputation 
theory. In supporting these two main theories, this research utilises a body of 
complimentary theories such as resource theory and license to operate theory 
which will be described in detail below. 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory originated as a guide or tool for public relations and other 
marketing practitioners to respond to stakeholders’ demands. In the development 
of organisational strategies, mining companies are responsible to numerous 
internal and external stakeholders.  The stakeholder concept can be traced back 
to 1963 where it was first mentioned by name in a Stanford Research Institute 
Memorandum (Freeman, 1984). The concept has since gained increasing use in 
strategy development literature and other academic research studies (Polonsky, 
1995).  
Stakeholder theory has infiltrated into many disciplines in useful ways. During their 
academic literature review, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar and De Colle 
(2010), found that many recognised scholars world-wide use this theory in finance, 
public policy, marketing, public relations and corporate social responsibility and 
other fields. A stakeholder is any individual, group or organisation that can affect 
or can be affected by another organisation (Kok, Pay & Balaji, 2015). According to 
Polonsky (1995), each stakeholder group has a different set of expectations and 
demands relating to an organisation’s performance.  According to Harrison et al 
(2015), stakeholder theory promotes an efficient, ethical and practical way to 
manage corporations in a highly complex and turbulent business environment with 
wide stakeholder interests. It is believed that happy stakeholders tend to 
reciprocate their happiness with positive attitudes and behaviours in many ways 
including giving the company a social license to operate (all), buying products and 
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services (customers), providing better financial terms (financiers), working hard 
and remain loyal to the organisation (employees).  According to Harrison et al 
(2015), stakeholder theory is a useful perspective for addressing complex 
business issues. Fombrun (1996) and Rindova et al (2005) further stated that 
corporate reputation reflects the judgments of different observers as influenced by 
the firm’s actions. Stakeholder theorists believe that reputation management is 
one of the most reliable mechanisms to judge performance and stakeholder 
confidence. A successful stakeholder management programme should consider 
the stakeholder salience in the relationship between the stakeholder and the 
organisation. Kok et al (2015) and Neville et al (2004) define salience as the 
priority with which corporate reputation practitioners consider the stakeholder’s 
claim; it is determined by stakeholders’ power, legitimacy, interest, proximity, 
network and urgency. Power describes the stakeholders’ potential influence by 
using normative (symbolic), utilitarian (financial or informational), or coercive 
(physical) means (Etzioni, 1964; Rajablu, Marthandan & Wan Yusoff, 2015). 
Interest describes the stakeholder’s particular interest in the organisation.  
According to Wicks, Freeman and Parmar (2011), interest based perspective is 
capable of mobilising a stakeholder group and influencing the focal organisation 
independent from power, not urgency. Legitimacy, according to Rajablu et al 
(2015), is a socially constructed concept or norm with ownership title, moral rights, 
interest (self or moral), legal, contractual and exchange relationships. Urgency 
refers to how urgent stakeholders’ claims are.  These are normally based on time 
sensitivity and criticality (Mitchel, Agle & Wood, 1997). Proximity evaluates 
stakeholders’ relationship based on their close ties with specific mining activities 
and processes (Bourne & Walker, 2006). Network refers to stakeholder 
relationship networks. Frooman and Murrell (2005) state that stakeholder influence 
can be determined by the interdependence of the stakeholders in the 
organisational network and the positions of stakeholders in the wider stakeholder-
organisational network. Rajablu et al (2015) developed a stakeholder classification 
framework which classifies stakeholders based on their type of effect (negative or 
positive) and their level of influence (high or low) on business success (Figure 2). 
In this framework, stakeholders are classified into four quadrants.  Quadrant one 
represents stakeholders with a positive quality of interest that can highly contribute 
to business success.  These stakeholders are recommended for empowerment. 
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Quadrant two represents stakeholders with positive qualities of network, legitimacy 
and proximity with low to moderate contribution to mining operations or business 
success.  These stakeholders are also suggested for empowerment. Quadrant 
three represents stakeholders with negative weights of urgency that can highly 
disturb business success.  It is recommended that these stakeholders are 
controlled. Quadrant four represents stakeholders with negative weight of power 
that can disturb a mine’s wellbeing or business success but, if utilised under 
legitimate channels as authority, can positively contribute to a project’s success.  It 
is recommended that these stakeholders are also controlled.  This is a very useful 
management tool to classify stakeholders and to recommend appropriate 
management actions. 
 
Negative (Influence) Positive (influence)    
High (level of Influence) 
 
Urgency 
 
Interest 
 
Power 
Proximity 
Network 
Proximity 
 Low (level of influence) 
   Control (strategy)  Empower (strategy) 
 
Figure 2: Typology of Stakeholder Influential Attributes  
(Source: Rajablu et al, 2015) 
 
Many scholars have argued that stakeholder engagement strategies are also 
critical in managing stakeholder relations. Luoma-aho (2015) has done extensive 
research in the area of stakeholder engagement and has classified different 
stakeholder groups into various forms of stakeholder relationships as follows: 
faithholders, hateholders and fakeholders. Faithholders are those stakeholders 
who are positively engaged in the organisation or industry, hateholders are those 
stakeholders who are negatively engaged in the industry while fakeholders are 
opinions, socio-bots and artificially generated stakeholders by either individuals or 
persona-creating software and algorithms to either oppose or support an issue. 
Fakeholders’ examples can be found on several customer review sites through 
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fake reviews. 
According to Dolphin (2004), a reputation is bestowed upon a company by 
stakeholders and it is formed on the basis of direct and indirect stakeholder 
experiences.  Research by Dowling (2016) concludes that organisations and 
stakeholders do not always see issues in the same light. In many cases, 
organisations view themselves as champions of community upliftment and 
engagement, an assumption which is always challenged by its stakeholders 
(Wartick, 2002). That is why this research is based on a multi-stakeholder 
perspective which allows different stakeholders to express their views and 
opinions about the diamond industry. 
Social License to Operate 
Phokathaba Platinum employs more than 1000 local community members in 
Mandashoek, and spends more than R5 million on its SLP per year on 
community programs. We still face work interruptions from the communities 
we help. Obviously the money, local procurement opportunities we give to 
local business people and employment opportunities do not buy us goodwill 
we need, I have no idea where we are missing the mark. (Statement by Mine  
Manager, Abel Mbuli, September, 2016) 
In South Africa and around the world, mining companies are increasingly battling 
to obtain, maintain, retain or renew social licences to operate from governments, 
local communities and consumers. Social license is a relatively new concept and 
has not received enough attention from the corporate reputation scholars and/or 
public relations practitioners (Owen & Kemp, 2013; Parsons et al, 2014).  Meeting 
regulatory requirements, such as Social and Labour Plans (SLPs), Environmental 
Management Plans and other relevant legislations, is no longer enough (Moffat & 
Zhang, 2014; Parsons et al, 2014; Lane et al, 2015) to guarantee community 
acceptance of the existence of mining operations in their areas. In places where 
mining projects have not satisfied the demands of civil society and local 
communities, especially the youth groups, shutdowns and slow-ups have 
frequently occurred.  In some instances, mining licences have been revoked by 
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government authorities. For example, Minister of Mineral Resources in South 
Africa, then Minister Susan Shabangu, cancelled the mining permit for the 
Johannesburg – and London-listed – Central Rand Gold (CRG), a gold mining 
company in 2014.  In a letter that was addressed to its CEO, Mr Du Toit, she stated 
that the company did not comply with various prescripts of the mining legislation 
including complying with the approved Mine Works Plan and its Social and Labour 
Plan. 
According to Bridge (2004) and Prno and Slocombe (2012), a Social Licence to 
Operate exists when a mining operation is seen as having the broad, ongoing 
approval and acceptance of society to conduct its activities. It is widely believed 
that securing an SLO is one of the most significant challenges mining companies 
now face (Lussier, 2014, Lane et al, 2015). Thomson and Boutilier (2011) have 
identified three normative components of the SLO, namely, legitimacy, credibility 
and trust and four levels of social license, namely, withdrawal, acceptance, 
approval and identification with the project scientifically.  They further state that 
moving from legitimacy, through credibility, to full trust, is an exercise and a long 
journey of building and balancing the social capital in the relationship between the 
firm and its stakeholders. 
Resource Theory 
An organisation with a positive overall reputation possesses a valuable asset 
(Deloitte, 2014; Eberl & Schwaiger, 2005; Caruana, 1997).  Barney (1991) 
identified resources as firms’ assets, capabilities, organisational processes, 
attributes, information and know-how.  Following this definition, Massey (2016) 
classified these assets as both tangible and intangible.  Tangible assets are the 
firm’s fixed or current assets, the resources recorded in the company statements. 
These can be financial capital such as bank deposits, contracts, cash in the bank 
or physical capital such as firm’s equipment and physical infrastructure such as 
roads and buildings. Intangible assets broadly encompass the routines and 
interactions taking place in the organisation; they are not physical nor are they 
recorded in the firm’s ledger. According to Feldman et al (2014) and Abiodun et al 
(2015), developing ways to gain competitive advantage is dependent on intangible 
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assets, the main one being reputation.   
A positive reputation is a critical intangible resource because of its potential for 
value creation as well as the fact that it is difficult for the competition to replicate 
(Dowling, 2016). Resource theory postulates that a good reputation affords a 
competitive advantage to a business (Amit & Schoemaker, 1994; Peteraf, 1993; 
Raithel, 2015). Apart from giving significant and sustainable competitive 
advantage to the firm, corporate reputation may not be transferred, traded or 
substituted. Therefore, once reputation is acquired, it becomes self-perpetuating.  
Corporate Reputation Theory 
Corporate reputation is a study with roots embedded in different disciplines, which 
makes any research in this field very complex. Those disciplines include strategic 
management, marketing, branding and social sciences (Dowling, 2016; Walker, 
2010; Feldman et al, 2014).   
According to Caruana and Chircop (2000), early research on corporate reputation 
started with corporate image, corporate identity, and personality. This is evidenced 
by Olins’ (1989:54) advice that “corporate identity is only effective and capable of 
reaching people’s consciousness if it is well-articulated, heavily backed, and 
visually appealing”.  Between the 1950s and the 1970s (Dolphin, 2004), the focus 
was primarily on the image that external stakeholders held of a firm or store. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, corporate identity, corporate personality and 
strategy became salient.  From the late 1980s, the focus shifted to corporate 
reputation (Fombrun & Rindova, 2000). Fortune Magazine, the US based 
publication, has published its annual survey of corporate reputation for nearly 
three decades (Dhir & Vinen, 2005). In recent years, trends associated with the 
evolving knowledge economy and globalisation have heightened the value of 
corporate reputation, making it more complex.   
Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty (2006) point out that image, identity and reputation 
are concepts that are often used interchangeably. Walker (2010), summarised the 
differences between these terms after a systematic 27 year-long review of 
corporate reputation literature (Figure 3).  
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 Organisational 
Identity 
Organisational 
Image 
Corporate 
Reputation 
Stakeholders: Internal or 
External 
Internal External Internal and 
External 
Perceptions: Actual or 
Desired 
Actual Desired Actual 
Emanating from inside 
or outside the firm 
Inside Inside Outside 
Positive or negative 
perception of the firm 
possible 
Positive or 
negative 
Positive Positive and 
negative 
Relevant question “Who/what do 
we believe we 
are?” 
“What/who do 
we want others 
to think we 
are?” 
“What are we 
seen to be?” 
 
Figure 3: Differences between organisational identity, corporate image and 
corporate reputation  
(Source: Walker, 2010) 
 
In Figure 3, it is shown that corporate reputation is built on external and internal 
stakeholders’ current perceptions which are either positive or negative. According 
to Feldman et al (2014), the concept of corporate reputation is differentiated from 
concepts such as organisational image and corporate identity which are 
conceptualised only from one type of stakeholder (identity from internal 
stakeholders while image is from external stakeholders). 
Since its inception in the 1950s, corporate reputation theory has been grounded in 
the behavioural sciences and quantitative methods (Dolphin, 2004; Doney & 
Cannon, 1997; Einwiller, 2003; Fombrun, et al, 2000; Griffin, 2008; Ind, 1997; 
Tracey, 2014).  The subject has been dominated by the logical empiricist 
paradigm which stresses positivistic rationality and measurement.  This thesis 
uses mixed methods in order to introduce a post-positivist perspective to the study 
of corporate reputation.   
There are three schools of thought in the corporate reputation paradigm. They are 
impressional, evaluative and relational (Chun, 2005; Griffin, 2008). The differences 
between them relate to which stakeholders are considered, rather than their 
subject area. Stakeholders can typically be grouped as internal (i.e. executives, 
mine managers) and external (i.e. consumers, bankers). Whereas the “evaluative” 
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and “impressional” schools are concerned mainly with single stakeholder interests 
or expectations, the relational school of thought is based upon stakeholder theory 
which recognises that different stakeholders may have different expectations of a 
company (Harrison et al, 2015; Freeman, 1984). The relational school focuses on 
the views of both “internal” and “external” stakeholders and appears to provide a 
relatively progressive, pragmatic new lens for the development of the corporate 
reputation paradigm.  This research is based on the relational multi-stakeholder 
perspective. 
In summary, many scholars in the field of corporate reputation emphasise that 
corporate reputation is a strategic, intangible asset making it a resource  for the 
organisation (resource theory).  It is about observers’ perceptions based on 
company image, past actions and experiences of the stakeholders (stakeholder 
theory). According to Feldman et al (2014), a corporate reputation is a construct 
closely linked to stakeholder theory.  It has been defined as a perceptual 
representation or assessment of a firm by its different stakeholders (Fombrun, 
1996).  According to Dowling (2016), corporate reputation is about admiration, 
attractiveness, acceptance, legitimation and respect a person may hold of the 
organisation (which gives it a social license to operate). This thesis embraces 
these three theories because they are particularly useful within the South African 
context where there are multiple stakeholders’ expectations and demands from 
investors, local communities, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), labour 
unions, media houses, suppliers, contractors and government, whose perceptions 
and acceptance of the mining operation are critical for its continued success.  
2.2 Definition of corporate reputation 
Corporate reputation is increasingly viewed by many organisations and executives 
as an invaluable asset, however, recent reviews of scholarly literature suggest that 
there is no clear and widely accepted definition of what is meant by corporate 
reputation (Dowling, 2016; Caruana, Said, Williams & Krentler, 2015). Many 
scholars, for instance, Dolphin (2004), Schwaiger and Cannon (2011) and Tracey 
(2014), argue that the definition of corporate reputation remains a matter for 
ongoing debate. In order to describe this form of ongoing debate and the differing 
perspectives, a number of examples are provided below to illustrate the need for a 
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more universal definition of corporate reputation: 
In German business parlance, reputation is a synonym for esteem and being 
renowned (Schwaiger, 2004). Schwaiger uses Fombrun’s analysis in Fombrun 
(2001:24) which characterises corporate reputation in the following context to 
explain the different uses of the term “corporate reputation”: 
 A kind of goodwill in the field of accounting; 
 The manifestation of a corporate identity in the field of organisation theory; 
 A signal about future actions and behaviour, a pledge that justifies and 
promotes expectations of a principal about the actions of the agent in the 
field of principle agent theory; 
 The results of corporate branding in the field of marketing; and 
 A potential market entry barrier in the field of management. 
Flynn (2006:15), Massey (2016) and Shamma (2012) believe that corporate 
reputation can be conceptualised according to the following key themes:  
 Identity 
The internal traits of the firm which are critical to its distinctiveness and 
longevity. 
 Image 
The perceptions and associations that are constructed by the purchaser of 
the product/service. 
 Brand 
The constructed visualisation of the company’s value proposition. 
 Reputation 
The holistic viewpoint in which an organisation is internalised by its 
stakeholders. 
Gotsi and Wilson (2001) reviewed the studies on corporate reputation and merged 
the different aspects into the following definition:  
A corporate reputation is a stakeholder’s overall evaluation of a company over 
time. This evaluation is based on the stakeholder’s direct experience with the 
company, any other form of communication and symbolism that provides 
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information about the firm’s action and/or a comparison with other leading 
rivals (Gotsi & Wilson, 2001: 29). 
Research based on this definition (i.e. Fortune 500 and Reputation Quotient) have 
defined overall estimations of corporate reputation with an emphasis on financial 
and economic performance. Even though the Fortune Most Admired Corporations 
and Reputation Quotient are heavily criticised for being non-academic, invalid and 
unreliable, they are still seen as acceptable measures of corporate reputation 
(Griffin, 2008). 
According to Levitt (1965), corporate reputation can be defined in terms of a 
number of attributes that form a buyer’s or stakeholder’s perception as to whether 
or not a company is well-known, good or bad, reliable, trustworthy, reputable and 
believable. 
Corporate reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions, 
as well as future prospects, which describes the firm’s overall appeal to all of its 
key constituents/stakeholders, when compared with other leading rivals (Rayner, 
2003). Rayner (2003) further recommends that perceptions of a company’s image 
and its beliefs are often built over a period of many years, for example, each 
mention in the media, every contact, every rumour and every piece of gossip plays 
a part in forming an overall impression of an organisation’s reputation. 
Barnett et al (2006) reviewed many definitions of corporate reputation and 
categorised them according to their similarities and differences (see Table 2). In 
their review, these authors found that there is no single accepted and commonly 
used definition of corporate reputation within the available literature. Overall, they 
identified three distinct clusters of meaning in the definitional statements which 
define reputation as an “asset”, as a “state of awareness” and as “an assessment”. 
They defined reputation as follows: 
The observers’ collective judgments of a corporation based on assessments 
of the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the corporation 
over time (Barnett et al, 2006). 
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Table 2: Inventory of Definitions of Corporate Reputation 
Cluster Citation Meanings 
Assets 
Flynn (2006); Pfarrer, Pollock & 
Rindova (2010); Shamma 
(2012) 
An intangible resource 
Harvey, Morris & Santos (2016); 
Fombrun (2001) 
Economic asset 
Long-term investment value 
Quality of products or services 
Innovativeness 
Ability to attract and retain talent 
Quality Management 
Wise use of corporate assets 
Assessment 
evaluations 
Wartick (2002) The aggregation of single stakeholders 
Fombrun & Rindova (2000) Gauge of the firm’s relative standing 
Fombrun (1998); Feldman et al 
(2014) 
Describes the firm’s overall 
attractiveness 
Fombrun (2001); Walker (2010) 
Subjective, collective assessment 
Judgment of firm’s effectiveness 
Aggregate of judgments 
Fombrun & Rindova (2000); 
Tracey (2014) 
General esteem 
Regard in which the firm is held 
Lasting, cumulative, global assessment 
Dowling (1994); Reputation 
Institute (2016) 
An evaluation (respect, esteem, 
estimation)  
Awareness 
Fombrun (1998); Sequeira et al 
(2015) 
Collective representation of past actions 
Fombrun (2001); Abiodun et al 
(2015) 
Collective representation of past actions 
and future prospects 
Individual perceptions and 
interpretations 
Fombrun & Rindova (2000); 
Walker (2010) 
Aggregate of perceptions 
What stakeholders think and feel about 
the firm 
Balmer (2001); Van der Merwe 
& Puth (2014) 
Latent perception of the organisation 
Levitt (1965); Van der Merwe & 
Puth (2014) 
A buyer’s perception of how well- 
known, good/bad, reliable, trustworthy, 
reputable and believable a firm is. 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction, based on literature review) 
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Walker (2010) found that, out of more than 20 academic articles which discuss the 
definition of corporate reputation, more than half of those articles referred to 
Fombrun's (1996) and Rayner’s (2003) definitions which emphasised perceptions, 
stakeholders, firm and appeal (which could be positive or negative).   
Dowling (2016) further expressed frustration about the constructs of corporate 
reputation.  He identified four critical elements that must be included in the 
definition.  Those are object, rater entity, stability, attributes of judgement and 
central conceptual theme. He described his mini-theory as follows: 
Object – while his definition focuses on one organisation, he believes it can easily 
accommodate the reputations of its peers or competitors.  
Rater entity – the definition must refer to a person rather than a group. 
Stability – the definition must be anchored at a point in time. This is because 
corporates are likely to be affected by different issues in different times. 
Attributes of judgement or assessment – respect and admiration are 
expressions of Fombrun’s definition.  It must touch the emotions of the rater agent 
or groups.  
Central conceptual theme – in the definition, the conceptualised theme must be 
generalised favourable other than being known for something. 
Dowling (2016) established this definition of corporate reputation backed by the 
logic above and the fact that it could differ across different groups. He believes 
that corporate reputation is the admiration and respect a person holds of an 
organisation at a point in time.   
In summary, corporate reputation has four main elements: rater, past actions, 
object-specific components and net emotional reaction. Rater (Dowling, 2016) is 
an entity group or person responsible for rating the organisation; past actions 
(Fombrun et al, 2015; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) refer to corporate reputation as a 
set of economic and non-economic attributes ascribed to a firm and inferred from 
the company’s past behaviour; object-specific components (Brown, 1995) are an 
assessment of the organisation which is based on the fact that the organisation is 
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known, which could be good or bad; and net emotional reactions (Fombrun, 1996; 
Fombrun et al, 2013), which is based on the overall estimation in which the 
organisation is held by its constituents. Based on this review, the definition of 
corporate reputation for the purpose of this research is therefore about the 
perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of stakeholders. It can be a set of attributes 
ascribed to a firm inferred from past actions. It is concerned with how people feel 
about a company as a result of whatever information or misinformation they have 
on company activities, the workplace and past, current and future prospects. 
Based on the above arguments, a good corporate reputation is an asset that can 
have value when dealing with a broad range of stakeholders, i.e. employees’ 
eagerness to retain the prestige jobs that a firm is perceived to be offering.  
2.3 Components of corporate reputation 
In the research on corporate reputation, the attention of many scholars has been 
focused on the following concepts as key components of corporate reputation: 
corporate brand, corporate identity, corporate image, corporate legitimation, and 
reputation management (Bromley, 2002; Flynn, 2006; Fombrun, 1996; Lloyd, 
2007; Kaul & Desai, 2015). 
2.3.1 Corporate Image 
Senior managers of many firms have realised that an organisation cannot detach 
itself from its internal and external stakeholders (Herstein, Mitki & Jaffe, 2008; 
Harrison et al, 2015). Over the past decade, management of corporate image has 
become an essential strategy for many organisations. Corporate image can be 
defined as the sum of experiences that a person has with an organisation (Stuart, 
1999; Sequeira et al, 2015). Alvesson (1990) defines corporate image as the 
holistic and vivid impression held by a particular group towards a corporation, 
partly as a result of information processing carried out by the group’s members 
and partly by the aggregated communication as part of the corporate 
communications function. Corporate image is central to the stakeholder’s overall 
impression of the company. This is further supported by Barich and Srinivasan 
(1993) who define it as the way customers view the company’s overall marketing 
offer, marketing mix, and whether the firm is a desired/desirable/sought-after 
employer and is a responsible citizen in terms of its corporate social responsibility.   
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Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetton (2006) define corporate image as mental 
associations that members of organisations believe others outside the 
organisation hold about the organisation, while corporate reputation is about the 
mental associations about the organisation held by others outside the 
organisation. Corporate image is therefore a reflection of an organisation’s identity 
and its corporate brand (Balmer, 2001). It can be concluded that these definitions 
do not provide sufficient clarification of the differences.  
2.3.2 Corporate Legitimation 
Sources on corporate legitimation (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Phillips, 2006; 
Suchman, 1995; Kaul & Desai, 2015) argue that it is important to acquire and 
maintain organisational legitimacy because it increases a firm's chances of 
securing from its environment the resources that it needs to survive, including 
stakeholder relations. Corporate legitimacy (sometimes called credibility) refers to  
the generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an organisation 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Deephouse, Bansai & Carter, 
1997:16).  
In other words, an organisation is considered to be legitimate within a particular 
society or constituency if it complies with the society's norms and values. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the acquisition and maintenance of 
organisational legitimacy does not automatically lead to superior performance, 
loss of organisational legitimacy could eventually lead to organisational failure, as 
the firm would become unable to acquire the environmental resources necessary 
for its survival. 
In addition, Suchman (1995) identified three types of organisational legitimacy: 
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive. Moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative 
evaluation of the organisation and its activities (Suchman, 1995:79). Moral 
legitimacy therefore depends on societal beliefs about whether or not such 
behaviour is “the right thing to do”. Pragmatic legitimacy reflects the self-interested 
calculations of an organisation's most immediate constituencies or audiences 
(Suchman, 1995:78). The firm's audiences scrutinise its behaviour in order to 
determine the consequences for themselves and, in this way, decide on their 
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actions towards the firm (Fombrun, 1996; Freeman; 1984; Suchman, 1995; Wood, 
1999, Dowling, 2016). Cognitive legitimacy refers to the “taken-for-grantedness” 
and comprehensibility of a firm's behaviour. This kind of legitimacy stems from the 
fact that the firm’s various constituents cannot conceive of a situation where the 
firm's behaviour could be other than what it is. Legitimation therefore involves 
granting authorities or organisational entities the power to define the congruence 
between the organisation and the accepted values, norms and expectations of  
society.  
2.3.3 Corporate Brand 
The rise of branding as a powerful tool to attract and retain customers has seen 
wide-ranging discussions occurring in marketing and public relations literature 
(Aaker, Kumar & Day, 2003). According to Wood (1999), and Melewar and 
Saunders (2002), in consumer marketing, brands often provide the primary points 
of differentiation between competitive offerings and, as such, they can be critical to 
the success of companies. Aaker et al (2003), Flynn (2006) and Wood (2000) 
argue that corporate brands should be managed as valuable, long-term corporate 
assets. The American Marketing Association (1960:34) defines corporate brand 
from a corporate point of view as:  
A name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them, intended to 
identify the goods or services of one seller or group of sellers and to 
differentiate them from those of competitors.  
 
Ambler (1992:19) takes a consumer-centric approach in defining corporate brand 
as: 
The promise of the bundles of attributes that customers buy and provide 
satisfaction and self-gratification. The attributes that make up a brand may be 
real or illusory, rational or emotional, tangible or invisible. 
Corporate brand therefore conveys expectations of what the company will deliver 
in terms of customer experience, products and services (Balmer, 2001; Lloyd, 
2007; Lussier, 2014) while corporate image can be defined as the sum of 
experiences that a person has with an organisation (Stuart, 1999; Sequeira et al, 
2015).   
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2.3.4 Reputation Management 
Reputation management is the collective representation of multiple constituencies’ 
images of a company, built up over time and are based on a company’s identity 
programmes, its performance, its leadership qualities and how constituencies 
perceive its behaviour (Flynn, 2006; Fombrun, 1996; Van Riel, 1995; Dowling, 
2016). According to Feldman et al (2014), reputation management involves the 
identification of areas of reputational risks; the identification of relevant 
stakeholders of the business in line with identified reputational risks and the 
establishment of systems that evaluate the relative position of each group of 
critical stakeholders.  It then becomes possible to prioritise the weak reputational 
areas and develop action plans to deal with them and schedule continuous re-
evaluation.  
2.3.5 Corporate Identity 
Corporate identity is widely recognised as an effective strategic instrument and as 
a means to achieve competitive advantage (Schmidt, 1995; Barnett & Leih, 2016).  
Corporate identity is interpreted by many authors as a strategic manifestation of 
corporate-level vision and mission, underpinned by the strategic goals, principles 
and values which a corporation employs in going about its business (Melewar & 
Wooldridge, 2001). A strong emphasis is placed on ethical and cultural values as 
well as on organisational history and philosophy. There is a lack of agreement 
regarding the relationship between corporate image and corporate identity (Stuart, 
1999). Corporate identity consists of the firm’s defining attributes, such as its 
products, people, and services (Prager, 2013; Lloyd, 2007; Balmer, 2001). 
2.4 Summary 
The literature reviewed almost unanimously makes profound links between 
corporate image, corporate brand, corporate personality, corporate legitimacy, 
reputation management actions, corporate leadership integrity and corporate 
identity by stating that image is the collective perception that stakeholders have of 
corporate identity and therefore is the value ascribed to the corporate’s reputation. 
It is now necessary to explore the relationship of these components within the 
diamond industry from a stakeholder’s perspective.   
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2.5 Drivers of Corporate Reputation 
In identifying the factors or drivers that can have a positive or negative impact on 
the perception of a company’s brand, Fombrun (1996) and Schwaiger (2004) 
argue that drivers of corporate reputation can constitute the underlying source of 
competitive advantage and can make competitive advantage operational.  
According to Rayner (2003), there are seven drivers of corporate reputation: 
above average financial performance and long-term investment value; workplace 
talent and culture; regulatory compliance; delivering on customer promises; proper 
corporate governance and leadership; Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
communication and crisis management. The Fortune Magazine annual survey 
provides an index based on an assessment of companies with regard to the 
following key drivers (Lloyd, 2007): degree of innovativeness; product quality; 
management quality; financial soundness; ability to develop and keep key people; 
asset use; investment value; and community and environmental friendliness.   
These key drivers are explained by Flynn (2006) as the following with minor 
additions: relationships; trust/emotional appeal; quality of product and services; 
satisfaction – employees and customers; performance – financial and 
organisational; responsibility/citizenship; word of mouth/credible source; 
governance and compliance – rules/regulations and leadership in terms of the 
organisational vision and leadership visibility. In Flynn’s definition, relationship, 
trust and emotional appeal are identified as the key drivers for corporate 
reputation.  
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Figure 4: RepTrak™ 
(Source: Fombrun, Ponzi & Newberry, 2015) 
The Reputation Institute (2016) developed the RepTrak™ model which consists of 
seven dimensions and 23 attributes found, through qualitative and quantitative 
research, to best explain what constitutes the reputation of a company (Figure 4) 
and to define the drivers of a corporate’s reputation. In this RepTrak model, 
innovation is added to the list of drivers of reputation. 
In summary, based on commonalities and findings from different authors as shown 
in the bottom of Table 3 below, this study focuses on the following key drivers of 
corporate reputation: financial performance; community and environmental 
responsibility; customer loyalty; stakeholder relations; employee engagement and 
culture; corporate governance and leadership; communication and crisis 
management and regulatory compliance. These are explained in detail in the 
following section.  
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Table 3: Inventory of Drivers of Corporate Reputation and commonalities between different authors  
Author Financial 
Performance 
based driver 
Social 
Performance 
based driver 
Product and 
Services 
Performance 
based driver 
Employee Value 
Proposition 
based driver 
Leadership 
based driver 
Corporate 
Activity based 
driver 
Relational 
Based driver 
Governance 
Based driver 
Flynn (2006) Financial 
performance 
Responsibility/
citizenship 
Quality of 
product and 
services 
Satisfaction of 
customers and 
employees 
Leadership, 
vision and 
visibility 
Crisis 
management 
Relationships 
and trust 
Governance and 
compliance 
Rayner (2003) Above 
average 
financial 
performance 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Delivering 
customer 
promise 
Workplace 
talent and 
culture 
Quality of 
leadership 
Communication 
and crisis 
management 
 Governance 
Deloitte (2014) Financial 
Performance 
Corporate 
Social 
responsibility 
Quality 
standards 
  Innovative and 
crises response 
Safety and 
security 
Ethics and 
integrity 
Reputation 
Institute (2016) 
Performance 
(profitable) 
Corporate 
Citizenship 
Product and 
services 
Workplace 
(employee 
wellbeing) 
Leadership Innovation  Governance 
The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
(2005) 
Financial and 
operating 
performance 
Social 
Responsibility 
and 
community 
involvement  
Quality of 
product and 
services 
Ability to recruit 
and retain talent 
Quality of 
management 
Crisis 
management 
Corporate 
stakeholder 
relations and 
trust 
Exposure to 
non-ethical 
practices 
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Barnett et al 
(2016) 
Financial 
soundness 
Community 
and 
environmental 
responsibility 
Quality of 
goods and 
services 
Ability to attract, 
develop and 
keep talented 
people 
Wise use of 
company 
assets 
Innovativeness  Long-term 
investment 
value 
Pharoah (2003) Financial 
performance 
Social and 
environmental 
breaches 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Ability to recruit 
and retain 
employees 
Execution of 
strategy 
Crisis 
management 
and 
communication 
Strengthened 
public and 
government 
relations 
Better 
compliance and 
disclosure 
standards and 
processes 
 Financial 
soundness 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Quality of 
product and 
services 
Ability to attract, 
develop and 
retain talent 
Quality of 
management 
Innovation Stakeholder 
relations 
Corporate 
governance 
Schwaiger 
(2004) 
Dowling (1994) Financial 
soundness 
Community 
and 
environmental 
responsibility 
Quality of 
product and 
services 
Ability to attract, 
develop and 
retain talent 
Quality of 
management 
Innovativeness Stakeholder 
relations 
Good corporate 
governance 
practices 
Commonalities Financial 
Performance 
Community 
and 
Environmental 
Responsibility  
Quality of 
product and 
services 
Employee 
Engagement 
Quality of 
leadership 
Communication 
and crisis 
management 
Stakeholder 
relations 
Strong 
adherence to 
good 
governance 
practices and 
legal 
compliance 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction based on literature review)
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2.5.1 Financial Performance 
Literature on corporate reputation makes it clear that financial performance of a 
company is intricately linked to its reputation (Schwaiger 2004; De Beers 
Reputation Study, 2007, Feldman et al, 2014). Companies that achieve above 
average financial performance are normally sought after by investors and 
employees.  Above all, they also contribute more to the government. However, the 
operating environment also affects the financial performance of a company, for 
example, the 2008 global financial crisis affected the financial performance of 
many companies but sound company stewardship enabled many companies to 
stay afloat. The ongoing labour disputes in South Africa are another example. The 
ability of companies to weather the storms of many economic environments 
impacts positively on their reputation in the eyes of stakeholders.  
2.5.2 Employee Engagement 
The literature on employee attraction and retention clearly emphasises the 
importance of positive corporate reputation and its effects on the acquisition of top 
talent, employee motivation and general human resources development (Lotz, 
2014; Coldwell, Billsberry, Van Meurs & Marsh 2008; Dolphin, 2004). Employee 
engagement is an important part of successful organisations. Employee 
engagement was conceptualised by Kahn (1990) as the harnessing of 
organisational members’ belief systems in alignment with their work roles. Cawe 
(2006) describes employee engagement as a progressive combination of 
satisfaction, motivation, commitment and advocacy resulting from employees’ 
movement up the engagement pyramid (see Figure 5). According to Cawe 
(2006:21): 
satisfaction is what gets employees to go to work, while motivation enables 
the employee to want to go the extra mile, commitment enables employees to 
become better ambassadors of the organisation and advocacy enables 
employees to proactively speak positively about the organisation and lastly 
engagement is the combination of all these factors. 
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Figure 5: Engagement Pyramid 
(Source: Cawe, 2006:9) 
Employee engagement is the emotional attachment between an employee and his 
or her workplace (Harter & Wagner, 2008). It is the level of commitment and 
involvement an employee extends towards the organisation and its values 
(Vazirana, 2007). According to Vazirana (2007), engaged employees will employ 
and express themselves physically, cognitively and emotionally during their 
delivery of strong work performances. The Development Dimensions International 
Report (2007) believes that employee engagement is the extent to which people 
enjoy and believe in what they do and feel valued for doing it. Employee 
engagement includes the enthusiasm, fulfilment and commitment of employees 
when it comes to their work. In most organisations, there are three different types 
of employees according to Vazirana (2007), namely, 
1. the engaged employee; 
2. not engaged employee; and 
3. actively disengaged employee. 
The engaged employees are known to be “builders”. They are passionate about 
what they do and say. They want to know the desired expectations for their role so 
they can meet these and outperform them. They are passionate about everything 
about the organisation and everything around them internally and externally 
(Wellins, Bernthal & Phelps, 2008). They are easily excitable; they are committed 
and fully in the present; they inspire others; they work harder with enthusiasm and 
drive continuous business improvement and the long-term sustainability of their 
. 
Advocacy 
Commitment 
Motivation 
Satisfaction 
Engagement 
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organisations (Robinson, Perryman & Hayday, 2004).  
The “not engaged” employees tend to do what they are expected to do without 
innovation and a drive for outperformance. According to Vazirana (2007), they 
focus on accomplishing tasks versus achieving an outcome with excellence. The 
“actively disengaged” employees are known to be the “cave dwellers”. They are 
always negative about the organisation and towards everything about the 
organisation.  According to Vazirana (2007:5), they sow seeds of negativity at 
every opportunity with which they are presented. Studies across various industries 
have shown that, on average, only 29% of employees are actively engaged in 
their jobs (feel a profound connection to their company), 54% are not engaged 
(“sleepwalking through the day”) and 17% are actively disengaged (“acting out 
their unhappiness”). According to Wellins et al (2008) and Lane et al (2015), 
multiple studies in different countries and across industries reveal that there are 
very few employees comparatively who are passionate and fully committed to their 
organisations. Figure 6 illustrates some of the worldwide statistics on the 
employee engagement phenomenon.   
Disengaged
Moderately 
engaged
Highly 
engaged
24% 62% 14%
US
15-27% 64-70% 8-15%
UK
 
Figure 6: Engaging employees: A worldwide problem  
(Source: Goddard’s presentations on Employee Engagement, 2008:4) 
There is a proven direct correlation between employees who are fully engaged in 
terms of their morale and performance. Various studies have confirmed that fully 
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engaged employees work with passion and feel a profound connection to their 
companies. They move the organisation forward. According to Robinson et al 
(2004) and Tracey (2014), actively engaged employees believe they can make a 
positive impact on the following aspects in their organisation: 
 Exceptional representation of their organisation’s products or services; 
 Brilliant customer interface and service excellence; 
 Support company strategy, values and vision; and 
 Strong emotional bonds to the organisation that employs them and strong 
brand loyalty. This can be associated with people demonstrating willingness 
to recommend the firm to others and commit time and effort to help the 
organisation succeed. 
The global economic crisis had a significant impact on many companies in 2008 
but the greatest impact was on employees. According to Harter & Wagner 
(2008:37): 
In good times, employee engagement is the difference between being good 
and being great, in bad times it’s the difference between surviving and not. 
2.5.3 Regulatory Compliance 
Regulatory compliance refers to a firm’s behaviour, which respects the essence 
and the spirit of the laws under whose jurisdiction the organisation falls (Visser, 
Matten, Pohl & Tolhurst, 2007). Accordingly, companies must comply with all the 
relevant laws and regulations. These include general applicable laws such as tax, 
employment legislation, human rights protocols, competition laws, environmental 
protection laws and intellectual property laws (Joosub, 2006; Davis & Franks, 
2014). It is common knowledge that failure to comply will have a significant impact 
on the success of the firm. Examples of punitive damages against a non-compliant 
company include loss of licence to operate and fines.  It has also been reported 
that non-compliance with applicable laws can lead to litigation, which, in turn, 
leads to harmful publicity and a diminished share price. This could also have a 
negative impact on shareholder confidence and the possible loss of licence to do 
business (Joosub, 2006; Parsons et al, 2014).  A court case due to perceived non-
compliance can result in reputational damage, with media and NGOs escalating 
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the issue beyond the company’s sphere of control (Joosub, 2006). The main 
challenge with a court case is that the stakeholders may believe that the company 
is probably guilty, even before the case is finalised. 
2.5.4 Consumer Relations 
Brand names and corporate reputation are becoming increasingly important to 
consumers since the amount of time consumers have available to shop is slowly 
diminishing. Therefore, consumers are relying more on established brand names 
and the images they convey when purchasing products (Nguyen, 2007; Barnett & 
Leih, 2016). From the manufacturer’s point of view, brand reputation/integrity 
builds customer loyalty, which in turn generates repeat business.  
The development and maintenance of customer loyalty towards a firm’s products 
or services is seen as the central thrust of marketing activities (Hsieh & Li, 2008; 
Abiodun et al, 2015) particularly for luxury goods businesses, which need to attract 
new customers while trying to keep existing customers. Hsieh & Li (2008) prove 
that higher customer loyalty implies a higher market share and an ability to 
demand relatively higher prices compared to those of competitors. Increased 
customer loyalty can lower marketing costs and solicit more customers. According 
to Lussier (2014) and Caruana et al (2005), in a market that inundates consumers 
with advertising campaigns and lifestyle and fashion messages, a positive 
corporate reputation is a powerful weapon. 
Excellence in delivering customer promise can foster positive word-of-mouth 
promotion and improved customer loyalty (Joosub, 2006; Farooq, 2016). Poor 
customer service is one of the biggest challenges for many companies in today’s 
fast-changing expectations of consumers. This has a direct bearing on corporate 
reputation. According to Rayner (2003) and Barnett and Leih (2016), attracting 
customers is only part of the challenge, retaining them and enjoying their repeat 
custom is another part. In today’s fast-paced consumerism, customers are faced 
with wide and varied choices. It is therefore easy for them to turn to alternative 
suppliers if they lose confidence in their current suppliers (Nguyen, 2007). 
Hsieh and Li (2008) claim that cognitive psychologists believe that memory is 
extremely durable because once information has been stored in it, its strength of 
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association decays very slowly. In terms of customer loyalty and attraction, if 
customers have committed to a favourable corporate reputation because of 
excellent delivery of customer promise, such a perception is expected to guide the 
integration of new information (Hsieh & Li, 2008). Beckwith and Lehmann (1976) 
state that this mental/cognitive integration is called the “halo effect”. They further 
claim that, in marketing literature, there are two types of halos. The first type 
asserts that the response to a particular attribute can be influenced by the general 
impression of the overall object. The second type asserts that the evaluation of a 
dominant attribute can influence the response to other attributes. This means that 
when customers have a favourable product or service experience, this could lead 
to a positive influence over other messages related to the organisation. In other 
words, the halo effect reflects the individual’s tendency to maintain cognitive 
consistency and to avoid cognitive dissonance (Beckwith & Lehmann, 1976; 
Lussier, 2014). 
It is believed that consumer satisfaction is a good, if not the best, indicator for a 
firm’s future profits (Fornell, 1992; Kotler, 1991; Tracey, 2014). This has been 
established by Fornell (1992) who stated that attracting new consumers is much 
more expensive than keeping old ones. This explains the corporate drive toward 
increased consumer satisfaction research initiatives (Anton, 1997; Fornell & 
Wernerfelt, 1987). Recently, it has also been demonstrated through econometric 
models that consumer satisfaction is predictably associated with financial returns 
and the long-term success of companies (Anderson, Fornell & Lehmann, 1994; 
Edvardsson, Johnson, Gustafsson & Strandvik, 2000) together with improved 
productivity levels (Anderson, Fornell & Rust, 1997; Huff, Fornell & Anderson, 
1996). The clear importance of consumer satisfaction drives companies to conduct 
consumer satisfaction surveys and reports to understand the extent of their 
consumers’ satisfaction with or without the help of marketing.  
2.5.5 Corporate Governance 
The last decade or so has seen an astonishing proliferation in corporate codes of 
conduct, often linked to reporting requirements by many sustainability indices.  
According to Regester and Larkin (2005), voluntary governance and reporting 
standards such as FTSE4Good, AA 1000, ISO 14001 and the Global Reporting 
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Initiative are adding pressure to the need for greater transparency, better 
integrated internal issue management controls and a much stronger commitment 
to responsible/transparent/effective corporate governance. 
Corporate governance is defined as the system whereby entities are managed 
and controlled (King Report, 2002).  According to Joosub (2006) effective 
corporate governance is fundamental to effective risk management and a tool to 
protect corporate reputation and shareholder confidence. He stresses that it is 
important to get the basic corporate governance framework right. According to 
Joosub (2006) and Rayner (2003), the following considerations regarding 
corporate governance are highly advisable: 
 Responsible, responsive and accountable leadership; 
 Comprehensive risk and issues management; 
 Comprehensive internal controls with robust oversight and assurance 
provision through the internal and external audit function; 
 Appropriate reward, remuneration and incentives; 
 Relevant and effective board committees; 
 Effective board and executive committees; 
 Appointment of independent, challenging and pro-active non-executive 
directors to the board;  
 Effective stakeholder relationship management; and 
 Compelling vision and strategy. 
Effective corporate governance can only be achieved through effective 
enforcement of the above principles with clear policies, standards and procedures, 
supported by regular reviews and audits to ensure continued compliance.  
2.5.6 Quality of Management 
According to Klein and Leffler (1984), research has shown that the reputation of a 
CEO accounts for 48% of an organisation’s reputation. This is supported by the 
Reputation Institute Report (2006), which revealed that the company CEO or 
chairman is accountable for more than 40% of corporate reputation. Financial 
executives believe that a CEO’s reputation would influence their decisions to 
purchase shares in the organisation. A CEO’s reputation could play a significant 
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role in attracting more investors, clients, work applicants and trust in corporate 
decisions (Le Roux, 2003; Govindan et al, 2014). Therefore, leadership profile is 
very important in the management of corporate reputation. 
2.5.7 Community Relations and Environmental Compliance 
In April, Anglo American Platinum announced a deal to set up a 175 million 
rand ($11 million) community trust for the local Mapela tribe to kick-start 
development and investment in neglected villages. 
The trust’s aim is “to improve the living conditions and quality of life of 
members of the Mapela Traditional Community”. 
“It is the crown jewel in the portfolio and so managing risk and community 
relations around the asset are very important,” said Hanre Rossouw, fund 
manager at Investec Asset Management, which holds shares in Amplats and 
Anglo American. 
But the gesture has been greeted with anger by some residents, who say the 
amount is too little and complain that while their traditional leader was 
consulted, communities were not (Stoddard, 2016). 
According to Hopkins (2003), Regester and Larkin (2005) and Parsons et al 
(2014), over the past two decades the pressure on business to become 
accountable and to perform a social and environmental role has increased 
dramatically. They claim that whether or not organisations are enthusiastic about 
embracing greater social and environmental accountability, many authors have 
confirmed that there is a business imperative to manage community relations and 
environmental compliance in the mining industry (Owen & Kemp, 2013; Sirsly & 
Lvina, 2016).  
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
are the developments that are attracting serious attention from financial analysts, 
NGOs, authorities and institutional investors as the common initiatives used by 
most corporates to describe social performance and environmental stewardship.  
These two main programmes are described in detail below. SRI is an investment 
strategy that takes into account a company’s ethical, social and environmental 
performance, as well as its financial performance. According to Regester and 
Larkin (2005), banks’ asset managers and term assurers are screening their 
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shareholdings in favour of companies that demonstrate commitment to social and 
environmental programmes and against those that are associated with activities 
deemed unethical to society and detrimental to the environment. Corporate Social 
Responsibility is an emerging phenomenon used by some as a fashion statement 
through glossy stakeholder or sustainable reports and websites and by others as a 
possible framework for demonstrating a more responsible, ethical approach to 
doing business (Regester & Larkin, 2005; Arya & Bassi, 2011; Barnett & Leih, 
2016). The best conceptualisations of CSR remain embryonic; there is no 
universal acceptable definition of corporate social responsibility. It has been 
commonly defined as “the degree of moral obligation that may be ascribed to 
corporations beyond simple obedience to the laws of the state” (Kilcullen & 
Kooistra, 1999:58). It can also be described as “a concern by a firm in treating its 
stakeholders ethically or in a responsible manner, noting that the term 
‘stakeholders’ includes the natural environment as well as people, both within and 
outside the corporation” (Hopkins, 2003:10). In summary, CSR includes ethical 
and responsive dealings with customers, suppliers, the general public and 
communities and includes corporate governance and philanthropic and charitable 
activities, as well as socio-political goals such as poverty eradication, health and 
education in disadvantaged communities, environmental protection, including 
energy conservation and pollution control, fair trade and ethical investments 
(Hopkins, 2003; Arya & Bassi, 2011). 
Carroll and Buchholtz (2000) offer a theoretical model indicating the relationship 
between actual and expected corporate social performance over time as depicted 
in Figure 7. The gap indicated in Figure 7 has been widening since the sixties as 
public expectations of corporate social performance have increasingly begun to 
outstrip actual business social behaviour.  This conclusion is also supported by a 
study conducted by Mason, Paxton, Parsons, Parr and Moffat (2014) involving 
forty-five mining communities in Australia, where communities acknowledged the 
role the mining companies are making but stated that their needs and 
expectations far outweigh what the mining companies could offer in meeting their 
expectations. 
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Figure 7: Society’s expectations versus business’s actual social performance 
(Source: Carroll & Buchholtz, 2000:8) 
2.5.8 Communication 
Empirical work by Fombrun and Rindova (2000:43) on reputation management 
approaches and strategies of leading UK/US firms led them to conclude that  
[i]n sum, these analyses demonstrate that communication benefits may result 
not only from the amount and frequency of communications but from the 
variety of issues about itself that a firm reveals through its communications 
and public appearance.  Communications that make a firm transparent enable 
shareholders to appreciate the firm’s operation better, and so facilitate 
ascribing it a better reputation. 
This means that communication can play a strategic, pivotal role in corporate 
reputation and strategic positioning (Van der Merwe & Puth, 2014; Parsons et al, 
2014). According to Bickerton (2000) and Massey (2016), in order to achieve 
effective communications, there are three building blocks to be considered: 
1. The need for a clear typology of communications. The establishment of the 
appropriate communication typology can be in three forms: management, 
marketing and organisational (Balmer, 1997). It is recommended that 
communications be co-ordinated across the organisation in order to 
develop “common starting points” (CSPs).  
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2. A more robust approach to segmenting stakeholder audiences.  Davidson 
(1999:12) defines corporate stakeholders as those who have an economic 
impact (customers, opinion formers, regulators, legislators) or an economic 
interest (employees, partners, suppliers and shareholders). 
3. Identification of the interfaces with each of these audiences.  According to 
Balmer (1997), identity/image interface is a crucial point of contact between 
the company and its stakeholders. 
These three building blocks can be combined into a single model that defines the 
communication mix and can also be used to map out the key communications 
interfaces with the key stakeholder audience (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Modelling the communications mix, stakeholder typology and 
communication interface concepts 
(Source: Bickerton, 2000:44) 
According to Arnold (1998), Feldman et al (2014) and Sequeira et al (2015), the 
company’s success, competitiveness and long-term survival are dependent on 
effective communications strategies and tactics in the following five crucial areas: 
 Enhancing the brand profile and organisational image by adding desirability 
to the value and efficacy of services and products; 
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 Building commercial value in the marketplace, minimising take-over 
appetite from the competition and maximising sustainable investor return on 
investment; 
 Strengthening employee morale, joy and brand loyalty, thereby enhancing 
productivity and ultimately profitability; and 
 Sharing core values that facilitate cohesion and unity in action between 
different company sections and functions into a cohesive whole stronger 
than the sum of its parts. 
2.5.9 Crisis Management 
Crises are events that cause the firm to become the subject of widespread, 
potentially unfavourable attention from the international and national media and 
other groups such as trade unions, environmental pressure groups, customers, 
opinion formers, employees and shareholders who have a vested interest in the 
activities of the organisation (Regester & Larkin, 2005). According to Kaul and 
Chaudhri (2015), Yilmaz and Kucuk (2010), Joosub (2006), Coombs (2014), and 
Regester and Larkin (2005), business stereotypes such as fires and explosions, 
accounted for less than 17% of the crisis news stories in recent times. They 
concluded that crises of reputation revolve around white-collar crime, labour 
disputes, social media, community unrest, confrontations with human rights and 
environmental NGOs, competition issues and company mismanagement. They 
revealed that the fastest growing categories in the US were class-action lawsuits, 
executive dismissals, hostile takeovers and sexual harassment – all of which had 
doubled since 1990.  In South Africa, corporate crisis news today does not differ 
much from the above.  According to Lussier (2014) and Davis and Franks (2014), 
corruption, illegal mining, fatal safety incidents, illegal strikes, community activism 
and service delivery protests are among the key crisis issues affecting the mining 
industry in South Africa. 
It is widely believed that every crisis contains within itself the seeds of success, as 
well as the roots of failure. According to Regester and Larkin (2005) and Kaul and 
Chaudhri (2015), finding, cultivating and harvesting the potential success are the 
essence of crisis management.  This is summarised below as key considerations 
in a crisis management exercise: 
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 Recognise the potential crisis situation; 
 Be seen to take the appropriate pro-active actions; 
 Be heard to say the right things at the right time; 
 Remember television is the most important medium because it is real and 
live; 
 Do not blame the media for the problems, they can be your best friends in 
managing the crisis; 
 Remember that peoples’ anger can often lead to product boycotts, fall in 
share price and more demanding restrictions and penalties; 
 First things first, be sympathetic – talk about people first, then the 
environment and property and finally, money; 
 Anticipate a void of information and be prepared to fill it with great speed; 
 Lead from the front; and 
 Remember that “media pollution” can outlast environmental pollution and 
can be more damaging economically. 
2.5.10 Stakeholder Relations 
Stakeholder relationships are a form of intangible asset (Flynn, 2006; Freeman, 
1984; Davis & Franks 2014) and, according to Phillips (2006), Feldman et al 
(2014) and Tshivase and Kleyn (2016), there is a significant body of evidence that 
identifies intangible assets as a major driver in the 21st century global economy, 
corporate survival and success.  Stakeholders can be defined as any enterprise’s 
interested parties that have a vested interest in it and have a key influence on its 
ability to achieve strategic and other business objectives (Institute of Directors, 
2003). Freeman (1984:52) states that stakeholders are “groups and individuals 
who can affect or are affected by, the achievement of an organisation’s mission”. 
According to the Institute of Directors (2003), stakeholders can be defined as 
those whose relations to the enterprise cannot be completely contracted for, but 
upon whose co-operation or endorsement and creativity the company/enterprise 
depends for its survival and prosperity. In other words, they are the groups that 
may be internal or external to the organisation with a direct or indirect impact on 
the organisation. Organisational stakeholders can be arranged under four broad 
groupings: 
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 The state – as legislator, policy maker and regulator of the economy 
generally and specific sectors; 
 Shareholders as providers of capital; 
 Parties that have contractual arrangements with the organisation, i.e. 
customers, employees, subcontractors and business partners. They could 
be the providers of input or the purchasers of output from the organisation; 
and 
 Parties that have a non-contractual nexus with the organisation, but provide 
it with its licence to operate. Those stakeholders could be media, non-
governmental organisations, community based organisations or civil society 
in general.  
Relationships with key stakeholders are the key to unlocking all the corporate 
value that is associated with corporate reputation. The movement towards 
stakeholder-relationship value has grown over the past three decades in both 
corporate governance and reporting (Phillips, 2006; Luoma-aho, 2015). The 
importance of healthy stakeholder-relations was also emphasised by the British 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt, Member of Parliament, 
when she called for all corporations to have “successful relationships with a range 
of stakeholders because of their crucial role in creating stable, long-term 
performance and shareholder value” (Hewitt, 2004:24). In support, Hillman and 
Keim (2001:13), Davenport (2013) and Rajablu et al (2015) assert that  
[b]uilding better relations with primary stakeholders like customers, suppliers, 
employees, and communities could lead to increased shareholder wealth by 
helping firms develop intangible, valuable assets which can become a great 
source of competitive advantage. 
In South Africa, the King Report (2002) and King Three Report (2010) also 
advocate for a stakeholder-inclusive approach to governance that recognises that 
a wide range of stakeholder concerns and their motivations need to be considered 
when developing and guiding the strategy and operations of an organisation. The 
first step in managing stakeholder relations, with the opportunity to drive the 
consequential value, comes from the ability to identify key stakeholders within and 
external to the organisation. Phillips (2006), and Harrison and Wicks (2013) assert 
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that stakeholder analysis should identify the nature of the relationship and whether 
it is important, influential, good or bad from the perspective of either the 
corporation or the stakeholder.  Figures 9 and 10 illustrate various matrixes that 
could be used to manage stakeholder relations according to its influence and 
significance. Figure 9 showcases an example of issues on the basis of their level 
of concern and the general attitude whether negative, neutral or positive in the 
project execution. In this example, the local NGOs, environmental groups and 
social movements have a negative attitude towards the project and have serious 
concerns about the project. Figure 10 showcases a similar trend on the basis of 
level of concern vs level of influence. For example, local regulatory agencies are 
shown as having a high degree of influence and also have high concerns. This is 
because they hold the key in terms of various approvals required for the project.  
They can swing the project in different ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Example of Stakeholder Management Matrix highlighting Level of Concern 
and Stakeholder Attitude 
(Source: Business Case for Stakeholder Relations, presentation by Ngcobo, 2007) 
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Figure 10: Example of Stakeholder Management Matrix highlighting Level of 
Concern and Degree of Influence 
(Source: Business Case for Stakeholder Relations, presentation by Ngcobo, 2007) 
Gilfeather and Carroll (2005) have developed a stakeholder relationships audit 
based on the following key factors: 
 Opinion and perceptions – what key people think – of the organisation, 
specifically what key stakeholders such as customers, employees, analysts, 
regulators, media, etc. think and how they feel about the organisation. 
 Discourse – what influential people say – such as leading financial and 
industry analysts, politicians, government officials, NGOs and institutions. 
 Awareness is also a key factor, as high quality perceptions are of little 
benefit if they exist in only a small proportion of stakeholders or if many 
stakeholders are not aware of what the company does and what products 
or services it markets.   
 Public profile – research shows a strong correlation between high profile 
and corporate reputation (positive or negative). If an organisation does not 
have a public profile, its corporate reputation is usually limited or confined 
to niche markets. 
These audits can be implemented in order to ascertain the feelings and 
perceptions of various stakeholders as part of stakeholder management. 
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2.6 Effects of Corporate Reputation 
Futuregrowth, a South African Equity Investment Fund announced that it will stop 
lending to six South African state owned firms because of poor reputation of these 
firms (Reuters, 2016). 
A study by Ernst & Young (2003) found that 85% of the market value of America’s 
leading brands comprised perceptions of value of intangible assets, with 15% from 
tangible assets. Intangible assets are a “claim to future benefits that do not have a 
physical or financial component” (Flynn, 2006:56; Martinez et al, 2016). The 
intangible value of a good reputation is a view professed and researched by both 
public relations practitioners and academics.  
According to Eberl and Schwaiger (2005), Roberts and Dowling (2002) and Tracey 
(2014), a company benefits from a favourable reputation by becoming the first 
choice of customers, investors, suppliers and employees. It also helps enhance 
competitive advantage, by differentiating the company in the marketplace. 
Economic theory makes a good case that, in markets with asymmetric information 
(inadequate information provided to consumers about a product), a good 
reputation allows firms, not only to attract new consumers, but also to keep the 
existing ones (Fombrun et al, 2000). A favourable reputation with customers 
creates a degree of brand equity, since people are more likely to be loyal to 
reputable companies (Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Lotz, 2014). Similarly, a 
favourable reputation with employees can help attract better staff, spur productivity 
and enhance profitability.   
2.6.1 Positive Effects of Corporate Reputation 
Luoma-aho (2007) argues that a good corporate reputation held by a firm’s 
stakeholders is understood as reputational capital. This capital is claimed to 
contribute to reduced transaction costs, employee loyalty, easier recruitment and 
general legitimacy of the organisation (Einwiller, 2003; Shapiro, 1983; Deloitte, 
2014).  Corporate reputation is known to help attract good employees, who 
themselves are likely to be leading ambassadors of the good reputation that 
attracted them to the organisation regardless of their remuneration (Cherenson, 
2001; Dowling, 1994; Shamma, 2012). An academic study that was commissioned 
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by the British United Provident Association (BUPA) involving 1,000 employees 
across Britain found that positive corporate reputation helps to attract, motivate 
and improve employee engagement and retain top talent (Coldwell et al, 2008).  
Another study conducted by Cherenson (2001) consisting of more than 800 
respondents, aged 18 and over, found that 78% of the respondents said they 
would prefer to work for an ethical and reputable company than receive a higher 
salary.   
Dhir and Vinen (2005), Yilmaz and Kucuk (2010), and Yuksel and Cintamur (2016) 
claim that a favourable reputation can establish, protect and enhance a 
competitive position, while a tarnished reputation can set an enterprise onto a 
cycle of decline through disengaged employees leading to lower morale, 
consumer boycotts, loss of operating licences, among others, as seen in the 
recent examples of ABB, Arthur Anderson, Enron, General Electric and 
WorldCom. The real value of a company is often derived from its intangible assets 
however the value of its intangible assets cannot be made explicit in the normal 
market transactional sense.  Unlike fixed assets, intangible assets are both owned 
and not owned by the company. 
Research conducted by Rindova et al (2005), Slawson (2005) and Feldman et al 
(2014) concluded that a good reputation could allow seller organisations to charge 
higher premiums for their products compared to companies with less favourable 
reputations. They further argue that there is a common belief that a consumer may 
judge the quality of a product or a service not only by its cost, but also in terms of 
the reputation of the manufacturer or service provider.  They also concluded that 
an increasing number of firms are recognising that a good overall reputation is a 
valuable asset. 
Corporate reputation is a complex subject because it is difficult to conceptualise 
and it does not lend itself to discrete measurements (Dolphin, 2004).  Many 
scholars have argued that employees form a critical part of corporate reputation, 
since it is their responsibility to protect and to enhance it.  Most Human Resources 
executives have argued that bright, dynamic, independent and creative employees 
want to feel that corporate values are in harmony with their own (Lotz, 2014). 
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A study by Fombrun and Shanley (1990), Deloitte (2014) and Dowling, (2016) 
found strong links between a good corporate reputation and financial 
performance.   
Tomasz and Krzysztof (2007) and Williams et al (2005) argue that good corporate 
reputation reduces information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, and 
thereby allows buyers to reduce uncertainty and concerns about their product or 
service quality. Dowling (2016) argues that there is evidence in the literature that a 
good corporate reputation is valuable because, if an organisation has a good 
reputation, it can always be used to support the organisation’s business success. 
He also argues that it is wise and cost-effective to pro-actively fix a bad reputation.  
Companies that promote only their product brands and not the company profile, 
find it hard to compete with companies with good brand images, for instance, 
Procter and Gamble found it hard to compete with Pampers which had a well-
established brand equity or brand recognition (Dowling, 1994). Corporate 
reputation plays an important role in supporting marketing initiatives therefore it 
should be used to support the marketing efforts. 
A study by Fombrun and Rindova (2000) and Reputation Institute (2016) of 
prominent UK/US multinational companies found that those with a more positive 
reputation appeared to project their core mission and identity in a more systematic 
and consistent fashion than those with lower corporate reputations. They further 
found that those companies with good reputations impart significantly more 
information, not only about their products, but also about a range of other issues 
relating to their business such as community involvement, historical significance 
and corporate identity. 
Research by Houser and Wooders (2000) provides a solid body of evidence about 
the value of corporate reputation. They analysed auctions of Pentium processors 
and gold coins, and concluded that, during the auctions, there was a significant 
relationship between corporate reputation and the price that consumers were 
willing to pay. They found that a good reputation leads to higher prices and a bad 
reputation leads to lower prices. 
Good corporate reputation emerges as a result of information flows and the 
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organisation’s social status, which, in turn, gives the firm visibility and prominence 
that attracts partners, customers and investors (Tomasz & Krzysztof, 2007). 
Superior consumer satisfaction has many benefits for the firm, such as increased 
consumer loyalty, enhanced firm reputation, reduced price elasticities, lower costs 
of future transactions and higher employee efficiency and loyalty (Anderson et al, 
1994; Fornell, 1992; Lussier, 2014). 
Podony (1993) identifies an inverse relationship between status and costs, 
wherein high-status firms have lower costs (e.g. transactional, financial, 
advertising and employee costs) providing an incentive for such firms to enhance 
their reputations further. This indicates that, once a company develops a good 
reputation, it will reap benefits, which will, in turn, further improve the reputation. 
But it is unclear how well this is actually done by companies and if the realisation 
of benefits occurs in practice. 
In summary, a strong and positive corporate reputation could result in the following 
positive effects: It could attract talent, foster employee retention and full employee 
engagement (Lotz, 2014; Dolphin, 2004; Yuksel & Cintamur, 2016) and enhance 
the company’s ability to charge a premium price for goods and services offered 
(Rindova et al, 2005; Houser & Wooders, 2000; Slowson, 2005; Fombrun & Van 
Riel, 2012). In addition, it could: 
 Increase customer confidence in products and services, advertising claims 
and in buying decisions leading to better customer attraction and customer 
loyalty thereby facilitating differentiation in a crowded marketplace and 
increasing corporate brand equity; 
 Crystallise a firm’s status and subsequent creation of competitive barriers, 
strengthening the company’s strategic position in the competition and 
providing better access to capital markets, which has a direct impact on 
decreasing the capital cost and on lowering procurement rates (Dhir & 
Vinen, 2005; Van der Merwe & Puth, 2014); 
 Facilitate better relationships with key external stakeholders, i.e. media, 
analysts, communities, opinion formers, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs); attract and retain key stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, top 
employees and customers and provide advantages in conducting 
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negotiations with stakeholders (Lotz, 2014); 
 Provide a buffer zone of reputational capital to insulate against 
unintentional failures, i.e. economic crises (Cherenson, 2001; Podony, 
1993); and 
 Reduce operational costs such as marketing. According to Brady (2002), a 
good example is Marks and Spencer who did not feel the need to advertise 
during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s boom period because of their 
reputation. The same applies to Claire’s Accessories, the American clothing 
accessories chain which experienced rapid global growth even though it 
had no advertising because it relied on experience based on word of 
mouth. 
2.6.2 Counter-arguments against positive Corporate Reputation 
Hass and Hansen (2005) argue that accumulation of intangible resources, for 
example, knowledge can hurt organisational performance. This is because the 
development of corporate reputation can be very expensive in terms of opportunity 
cost and “sunken” costs, and this can also hurt the overall return on performance. 
A number of researchers such as Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad and Reeves 
(2000), in the correlation between corporate reputation and the price that 
consumers are willing to pay, concluded that a good reputation does not allow 
sellers to increase their price levels.  
The “law of falling marginal utility” applies to the corporate reputation concept.  
According to Tomasz and Krzysztof (2007), the value of corporate reputation is not 
static; it changes depending on the gap between the leading players and the 
followers. The buyers will value the unit of reputation to maximum level if the 
distance is small and will lower its valuation as the distance increases. 
A study conducted in the UK on the value of corporate reputation suggests that a 
good reputation brings increased sales, but does not always enable companies to 
charge premium prices for their goods or services (Dolphin, 2004).  It is further 
argued that a good reputation is an asset of value even though there are still 
companies who are uninterested in the concept. He further maintains that most 
companies view corporate reputation as an intangible asset and fear that it is not 
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easy to measure and to replicate. He also contends that there is empirical 
evidence that different stakeholders will hold differing views about the 
organisation, but that it is still one single reputation. 
A study by Satir (2006) to assess whether corporate reputation can be analysed or 
not, found that corporate reputation cannot be explained by only one experience, 
contact or impression. Corporate reputation consists of various components (sub- 
dimensions). Also, there is a difference within the perceived components (sub- 
dimensions) to explain reputation. 
According to Inglis, Morley and Sammut (2006), empirical research on the 
relationship between corporate reputation and organisational performance 
concluded that there is no causal relationship between corporate reputation and 
financial performance (in either direction) i.e. reputation does not affect financial 
performance nor does financial performance affect reputation. This is in line with 
findings in other countries, especially the work by Rose and Thomsen (2004). 
Their findings are that reputation may not have a significant impact on 
performance in Australia. There may be weaknesses in the existing measure of 
reputation, or the findings may be due to unobserved variability in the intervening 
variable of managerial exploitation of the reputation. 
A study by Meyer and Rowan (1977) points out that there is no evidence to 
suggest that acquiring a good reputation leads to economic benefits. Further 
research by Staw and Epstein (2000), and Davis and Franks (2014) found that 
companies using popular management techniques, such as the implementation of 
programs focusing on empowerment, team building and total quality management, 
were viewed more positively than others but that these practices could not be 
associated with economic performance. 
In summary, the following are the key arguments against corporate reputation 
management: 
 Development of corporate reputation can be very costly and does not bring 
a direct return on investment; 
 There is no relationship between positive or high reputation and price.  In 
other words, consumers will not pay a premium price for a product because 
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of high corporate reputation; 
 There are no causal relations between corporate reputation and financial 
performance; and 
 There is no evidence to suggest that acquiring reputation leads to economic 
benefits. 
To sum up, there are differing views about whether or not good corporate 
reputation has a direct impact on corporate business success. This further 
supports the justification for this study as illustrated at the “significance of the 
study” in Chapter one, section 1.6. 
2.7 Management of Corporate Reputation 
Management of corporate reputation is not the responsibility of a public relations 
department or marketing department, but a responsibility of the senior executives 
of a business (Dowling, 1994). The enhancement of corporate reputation is the 
responsibility of every employee (Kaul & Desai, 2015). 
The concept of assigning value to companies naturally leads to the question of 
whether or not the valuations assigned by the market to companies depend in part 
on a good or poor corporate reputation. The main determinants of company 
valuations will naturally be the current and expected future financial performance. 
But are the perceived strengths in areas such as marketing skill, financial 
management and the ability to recruit and retain staff also factors, over and above 
their direct effect on the financials? According to Luoma-aho (2007), and Fombrun 
and Van Riel (2012), different tools for measuring the effects of corporate 
reputation, including ranking lists, quotients and barometers, have been 
developed and tested widely. The rankings and barometers have contributed to a 
greater appreciation of corporate reputation globally (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
According to Schwaiger (2004), since its inception in 1984 until 1997, Fortune 
Magazine: America’s Most Admired Companies Survey was restricted to US firms. 
It was the only reputation-ranking medium available on a global scale. In 1997, 
this survey was extended to other countries and was then named The Global Most 
Admired Companies Survey. Germany’s Manager Magazine rating which has 
been conducted bi-annually since 1987 was another example of a management 
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tool. The following section describes various tools that have been developed and 
implemented worldwide to measure the value of corporate reputation. In this 
study, the Fortune: America’s Most Admired Companies, the Harris-Fombrun 
Reputation Quotient, the RepTrakScorecard by the Reputation Institute and the 
John Dalton Reputation Measurement Model are described because of their wide 
use in the corporate reputation literature. 
2.7.1 Fortune Magazine: America’s Most Admired Companies 
More than 8 000 people were interviewed via phone and mail on a regular basis 
as part of the Fortune magazine’s survey (Schwaiger, 2004:43). The respondents 
were mainly senior executives, outside directors and industry analysts. 
Respondents were asked to name the leading firms in their economic sectors 
within a specific industry and they were asked to rate those companies on each of 
the following nine attributes: 
 Quality of Management; 
 Employee Talent; 
 Use of Corporate Assets; 
 Long-term Investment Value; 
 Innovativeness; 
 Quality of Products and/or Services; 
 Social Responsibility; 
 Global Business Acumen; and 
 Financial Soundness. 
The Overall Reputation Score (ORS) is the arithmetic mean of the attributes 
respondents provided on eight-point scales. Out of these nine equally weighted 
key attributes of reputation, two relate explicitly to financial performance. 
Therefore, financial performance may be twice as important as the other indicators 
when viewed from the perspective of a contemporary businessman/woman 
(Brady, 2002). Many corporate reputation experts criticise this survey mechanism 
on the basis of lack of conciseness (Bromley, 1993), high influence from past 
financial performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) and lack of broader stakeholder 
input (Brady, 2002). Wiedmann and Walsh (2004) argue that an important 
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assumption of the approach is that these nine dimensions are perceived differently 
by different stakeholders. The same criticism was applied to other similar surveys 
such as: 
 Gesamtreputation Published by the German Magazine 
 Fortune’s Global Most Admired Companies 
 Financial Times (2007): World’s (Europe’s) Most Respected Companies 
 Management Today: Britain’s Most Admired Companies 
 Burson-Marsteller: Maximizing Corporate Reputation 
 Corporate Branding LLC: Corporate Branding Index 
 Asian Business: Asia’s Most Admired Companies 
 Far Eastern Economic Review: Review 200 
 Delahaye Medialink: Delahaye Medialink Corporate Reputation Index 
 RepMap by Aluala and Heinonen, 2002 
 Fombrun’s Reputational Capital. 
2.7.2 Harris-Fombrun Reputation (SM) Quotient (RI) by Fombrun et al 
(2000) 
New York University professor, Charles Fombrun, working in parallel with a 
research firm called Harris Interactive, has attempted to delineate corporate 
reputation and has developed a method to measure it (Brady, 2002). The 
Reputation Quotient (RQ) is a multi-stakeholder measure that was developed after 
criticism was levelled against the practitioner ratings. This integrative approach 
assumes that a corporate reputation can be explained by six central reputation 
dimensions that influence stakeholders’ behaviour and a company’s long-term 
success.  According to Fombrun et al (2000:23), these dimensions are: 
 Emotional appeal (have a good feeling about the company, admire and 
respect, and trust the company a great deal);  
 Vision and leadership (has excellent leadership, has clear vision for its 
future, recognises and takes market opportunities);  
 Workplace environment (is well managed, looks after its people, good 
company to work for, has good employees);  
 Product and services (develops innovative products and services, offers 
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high value for money and high quality products and services);  
 Social and environmental responsibility (supports good causes, 
environmentally responsible company, maintains high standards in the way 
it treats people); and  
 Financial performance (has a strong record of profitability, strong prospects 
for growth, and excellent performance against its rivals).   
2.7.3 RepTrak scorecard by Reputation Institute 
The RepTrak scorecard is designed to measure the health of a company’s overall 
reputation. It measures people’s esteem, good feelings, trust and admiration for 
companies with which they are familiar. It focuses on consumers by inviting them 
to rate the largest companies in their home market. The results provide a relative 
assessment of a company’s local reputation and enables comparisons against the 
home market reputations of the world’s largest companies. 
2.7.4 John Dalton’s Reputation Measurement Model 
The John Dalton model is shown in Figure 11. It focuses on two indicators, the 
financial indicators and sustainability indicators. The financial indicators focus on 
cash flow, earnings, costs, capital expenditure and market growth. The 
sustainable indicators include society, partners, shareholders, customers and 
employees. 
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Figure 11: Measuring the Value of Corporate Reputation 
(Source: Dalton, 2005:15) 
This John Dalton model has identified the following key attributes as the basis for 
measuring corporate reputation: social and environmental responsibility which 
includes a company’s support for community projects and environmental 
stewardship; levels of employee engagement which is informed by employee 
wellbeing and the perception that it is a good company to work for; 
innovativeness; strong leadership and financial stability. 
2.8 Summary 
A literature survey revealed that corporate reputation is now one of the most 
significant attributes essential, not just for business success, but also for failure. 
The process of operating a business results in the interaction of various 
stakeholders with different interests. Therefore, a company must ensure that its 
reputation is positive to enable it to derive maximum benefit from stakeholders. 
Although the definition of corporate reputation is elusive, there is unity of thought 
amongst authorities that it is the sum of past actions (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988; 
Dowling, 2016), past behaviour and future prospects. There are numerous drivers 
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Measur ing the  Value  of 
C o r p o r a t e  R e p u t a t i o n
Indicators
• Cash flow
• Earnings
• Costs
• Capital expenditure
• Market growth
Financial 
performance
Sustainability
Indicators Shareholders
• Number of shareholder resolutions
• Results of shareholder satisfaction 
survey
Customers
• Satisfaction survey
• Customer complaints
• Third-party ratings and awards
Employees
• Employee turnover
• Employee profiles (ability, gender, 
race)
• Employee satisfaction
Society
• Boycotts, marches, incidents
• License to operate 
• Direct action
• Media reports
Partners
• Quantity of partnerships accepted, 
sanctioned or rejected on basis of 
stewardship criteria
• Health and safety records of partners
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of corporate reputation which, when well-managed, impact positively on 
stakeholder perception of a company. Virtually all the available models and 
scorecards for measuring corporate reputation are based on these drivers, singly 
and in combination. As such, for the purposes of this research, focused on South 
Africa’s diamond industry, generic questions were developed encompassing most 
of the scorecards and tools that are used to measure the effects of corporate 
reputation. The next chapter provides an historical background to the South 
African diamond industry and associated reputational issues.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW: SOUTH AFRICA’S DIAMOND 
INDUSTRY AND KEY RISKS AND CHALLENGES 
There is nothing intrinsically beautiful or highly valuable about diamonds. In 
fact, diamonds are fairly common (Bieri, 2010: 3). 
The diamond industry is built on reputation (Lussier, 2014:9). 
3  
3.1 Introduction 
Although corporate reputation’s significance cannot be questioned, the importance 
of reputation and its link to business success depends, to some extent, on the 
type of industry and nature of the business (Gotsi & Wilson, 2001; Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002; Caruana et al, 2015). For example, industries that produce 
necessities are traditionally less likely to be affected by reputation when compared 
to businesses that specialise in luxury items such as the multi-billion dollar 
diamond industry (Bieri, 2010; Lussier, 2014). However, the increasing 
significance of corporate reputation drivers, such as corporate governance, 
corporate social responsibility and stakeholder engagement, also means that even 
companies that do not deal with luxuries are concerned about their reputations 
(Prager, 2014; Dowling, 2016). Although natural diamonds are mined much like 
other commodities such as gold, copper or platinum, they are actually not a 
commodity, but are regarded as luxury goods (Penny, 2009). People purchase 
diamonds for their aesthetic, symbolic and status value, for emotional and 
subjective reasons (Bieri, 2010; Lussier, 2014). In the context of luxury goods, 
diamonds fit into a broader product pool that includes jewellery and watches, high-
end apparel, fragrances and cosmetics, and accessories such as leather bags, 
shoes and designer eyewear (Bain, 2011).  
The location and nature of deposits determines the mining method used to extract 
diamonds from the ground. Diamonds found deep in the earth are extracted 
through open-pit and underground methods and alluvial mining methods are 
employed to extract diamonds from deposits of sand, gravel and clay. Diamonds 
located in the seabed are mined through marine mining techniques (Penny, 2009). 
Diamonds are unique because of their physical properties of hardness, thermal 
conductivity and brilliance through optical dispersion, which make them popular as 
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gemstones and industrial tools. As such, diamonds serve two main functions 
today: jewellery and industrial uses. Slightly more than 55 percent of the volume of 
diamonds extracted becomes gemstones for jewellery, yet they account for more 
than 95 percent of the total value of all mined diamonds. Because polished 
diamonds are considered among the world’s most precious gemstones, they 
account for more than 40 percent of all jewellery manufacturing with engagement 
rings being the largest category of diamond jewellery (Bain, 2011; Even-Zohar, 
2007). Jewellers usually set the diamonds in precious metals such as gold or 
platinum to emphasise the sparkle of the stones. Demand for diamond gemstones, 
like the broader market for luxury goods, tracks overall economic performance and 
stakeholder concerns and interests.  
This luxury status means that reputation is very important in the diamond industry 
(Bieri, 2010), particularly that of southern Africa which has historically been mired 
in controversies and which today supports many stakeholders, from local 
communities to central governments. Although the South African diamond industry 
has created significant amounts of wealth in the world, its origins are associated 
with the exploitation of workers and little meaningful local economic development 
in mining areas such as Kimberley, Koffiefontein, Jaggersfontein and 
Namaqualand. The diamond industry was one of the principle supporters of 
apartheid system in South Africa (Thompson, 2001; Worden, 2011; Pandey, 
2012). However, stakeholders such as governments, NGOs and local 
communities are now demanding more benefits from extractive industries. In 
response to this, diamond mining giants, such as De Beers, are committed to key 
principles of Best Practice aimed at ensuring that their stakeholders derive 
maximum benefit from diamond mining. These principles include creating value for 
producers, maximising transparency in governance and revenue sharing, 
commitment to fulfilling compliance and legislative requirements, mining 
sustainably and promoting local and national economic growth (Penny, 2009). 
Therefore, as dictated by stakeholder theories of reputation, the southern African 
diamond industry’s success or failure is based on meeting or failing to meet 
stakeholder expectations.  
Because of stakeholder pressure and the fact that diamonds were fuelling 
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corruption and conflict in numerous African countries such as Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and the DRC, the concept of “blood diamonds” drew international attention 
to the ethics, transparency and integrity of the processes of diamond mining and 
trading (Bieri, 2010; Bone, 2012). One such initiative is the Kimberley Process 
Certification System (KPCS) which created a platform for governments, 
representatives of the diamond industry and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), to grapple with the problem of “conflict diamonds” – the diamonds traded 
by rebel armies. Under the KPCS, all member countries agree to certify that any 
rough diamonds being exported from their territory are conflict-free and to disallow 
the import of any diamonds that are not accompanied by a similar certificate from 
another participating government (Bain & Company, 2011; Bone, 2012). 
According to Penny (2009), this move was precipitated by the fact that powerful 
anti-blood diamond stakeholders were waging successful campaigns that tore into 
the heart of diamonds and associated symbolism and myths.  
The South African diamond industry is both local and international. Given the 
significance of issues such as climate change, green economy and corporate 
social responsibility, and the multiple stakeholders in the diamond industry, a good 
reputation is an extremely valuable asset (Penny, 2009; Bain & Company, 2011). 
As a luxury and a stakeholder-expectation fuelled industry, reputation is a 
necessity for the sustainable continuity of the diamond industry. However, very 
little research has been done to explore the drivers of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry, which is the focus of this thesis.  
3.2 The importance of the Mining Industry in South Africa 
Many authors have articulated the strategic significance of the mining industry in 
South Africa on the back of its contributions to South African fiscus and socio-
economic development.  According to the recent Chamber of Mines Report 
(2014), the mining industry already addresses some of the key objectives of the 
South African 2030 National Development Plan. This is exemplified in the 
contribution the industry makes towards the economy.  According to The Chamber 
of Mines Report (2015), the key focus areas are:  
 Economic growth; 
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 Employment creation and healthcare; 
 Social protection; 
 Beneficiation; 
 A low-carbon economy and the environment; 
 Education and training; and 
 Infrastructure development.  
3.2.1 Economic Growth  
According to Baxter (2015), the mining industry has played a key role in South 
Africa’s economic development for many years and will continue to play a 
significant role for many more years to come. According to The Chamber of Mines 
Report (2015), the mining industry has contributed to transforming South Africa 
into the most industrialised country on the African continent. The contribution that 
mining makes to the South African economy is extensive and overlaps other 
economic sectors. This is because of the many linkages that mining has to other 
sectors of the economy (Beneficiation Strategy for Minerals Industry Report, 
2011). Thus, mining has provided the critical mass for the development of a 
number of industries that either supply the mining sector or use its products. This 
cluster of ancillary industries includes: energy, financial services, water services, 
engineering services, specialist seismic, geological and metallurgical services, to 
name only a few. The mining sector is inextricably linked to the “multiplier 
industries” which means that, when mining contributes to the economic activity of 
the country, many other activities are stimulated in the process, adding impetus to 
economic growth. In Table 4, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which indicates 
the extent to which goods and services are produced in the country per year, 
clearly shows the economic stimulation of the mining sector on the other sectors.  
Table 4: Mining Industry Contribution to Gross Domestic Product 
MINING INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTION TO GDP (%) 
YEAR DIRECT INDIRECT 
2009 8,8 19 
2010 8,6 18 
2011 8,8 19 
2012 8,3 17 
(Source: Chamber of Mines facts and Figures, 2013:24) 
73 | P a g e  
The mining sector alone contributes on average 8.6% to the country’s GDP.  
According to the Chamber of Mines Report (2015), the contribution of the mining 
industry more than doubled to about 20% on average when the mining supplier 
industries, downstream industries that use mining outputs and the spending 
multipliers of mining, are included.  Cutifani (2015) indicated that the mining 
industry contribution is further expressed in the foreign exchange earnings which 
have a direct impact on the economic development of South Africa.  He further 
elaborated that, in 2012, mining accounted for 35% of the country’s total 
merchandise exports. This excludes the value of secondary beneficiated exports 
such as ferro-alloys, chemicals, plastics, polymers, steel, aluminium, the value of 
platinum used in making catalytic converters, among others. If the impact of the 
secondary beneficiated exports are included, then the contribution of the minerals 
complex to merchandise exports rises to over 50%.  According to Chamber of 
Mines Report (2014), mining acts as a magnet for direct foreign investments on 
the basis of South Africa’s $2.5 trillion in situ mineral resource base. Indeed, South 
Africa is the world’s largest reserve holder of platinum group metals, manganese, 
chrome, gold and alumina-silicates.  
3.2.2 Employment creation and healthcare 
According to The Chamber of Mines Report (2014), the mining industry employs 
more than 500 000 people. This includes skilled and a large percentage of semi-
skilled and unskilled people. If the industries that supply goods and services to the 
mining sector and those that use mining products for downstream value addition 
are taken into account, then the mining industry easily creates jobs for over 
1 000 000 people.  
Most of the mining companies have a wellness programme which provides 
treatment and care for employees and their families who suffer from HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and other diseases. The mining industry focuses on strengthening 
healthcare systems in under-serviced rural areas and on improving access to 
good quality healthcare. 
3.2.3 Education and Training 
The mining industry recognises that education and training are the key to 
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accessing employment and enhancing the earnings potential and career mobility 
of employees. The mining industry trains in excess of 10 000 students at 
universities and universities of technology in addition to providing bursaries and 
study assistance to students. The mining industry also ensures that its employees 
are equipped with skills and are trained beyond their normal working dues. 
According to Lotz (2014), in 2010, a total of 7324 bursaries or study assistance 
packages were awarded to employees in the mining industry in South Africa. In 
the period 2011-2012, 67 768 skills certificates were presented to employees. 
Mining houses also concentrate on the foundation level of education, which gives 
aspiring students the base for higher education. An example of this is the ABET 
programme which is a basic adult education programme focusing on literacy. The 
programme starts from pre-ABET level to ABET 4 level which is equivalent to 
Grade 9 or NQF level 1. 
3.2.4 The Environment and a Low Carbon Economy 
According to the Chamber of Mines, in mining, extracting and processing minerals 
can disturb land and generate waste and pollutants. The MPRDA requires that all 
mining companies ensure optimal land management in terms of protecting the 
ecosystems and natural resources, and supporting biodiversity. The mining 
industry is required to contribute to protecting natural habitats, tackling emissions 
and pollution, managing biodiversity and creating opportunities on the land for 
local communities and stakeholders through the Social and Labour Plans (SLPs) 
as well as the Environmental Management Plans as per the prescripts of the 
Mining Charter. A prime example of this is when mined land is rehabilitated to 
enable farming of fruit and vegetables for the community and to sell to the 
markets. These endeavours also assist in eliminating poverty (Prager, 2013). In 
terms of fresh water use, and management and conservation of scarce water 
resources, the NDP recommends that this be funded by the users. The mining 
industry has taken a lead in understanding the baseline and setting the target for 
water conservation and water demand management in the mining industry. 
According to Baxter (2015), the mining industry has also been innovative in 
addressing acid mine drainage issues through the construction of treatment plants 
which convert polluted water into potable water. These treatment facilities offer 
both direct and indirect jobs. The mining industry has also formed partnerships 
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with the Department of Water Affairs, DMR and local municipalities in the 
development of water infrastructure projects aligned with their SLP projects and 
wider social responsibility programmes. 
According to The Chamber of Mines Report (2014), in terms of low carbon 
economy, the mining industry has made some significant strides in implementing 
energy efficient technologies and other climate change mitigation measures which 
have resulted in innovation and job creation in green technology industries in 
support of the country’s aspirations for a transition to a low carbon economy.  
3.2.5 Beneficiation 
Beneficiation entails the transformation of a mineral to a higher value product (SA. 
Department of Mineral Resources, 2013/14; Beneficiation Strategy for Minerals 
Industry Report, 2011). The government of South Africa, represented by the 
Departments of Mineral Resources and Trade and Industry, is concerned about 
the lack of commitment by the mining industry in supporting beneficiation (SA. 
Department of Mineral Resources, 2010).  This resulted in the promulgation of the 
Beneficiation strategy document in 2011.   
The mining industry in South Africa has initiated a number of beneficiation 
initiatives.  According to the Chamber of Mines (2015), coal is converted into liquid 
fuels, plastics, polymers, waxes, fertilisers and other products, whereas iron ore is 
converted into steel. According to Griffith (2015), in the PGM sector, 43 tons of 
platinum group metals were converted into catalytic converters in 2012, creating 
5000 jobs and more than R20 billion in value. Furthermore, in supporting first 
stage beneficiation, if the side-stream value added is taken into account, then 
industries such as transport, power, manufacturing, heavy engineering, financial 
services, legal and stock markets are the result of mining. DMR is currently 
considering setting export taxes to promote beneficiation (Baxter, 2015).   
3.2.6 Infrastructure development 
The mining industry accounts for about 94% of the electricity generation in terms 
of primary energy supply and over 30% of liquid fuel production. According to the 
Chamber of Mines, in 2013, the mining industry supplied about 119 million tons of 
coal for electricity generation and 39 million tons of the resource for synthetic 
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fuels. According to The Chamber of Mines Report (2014), the mining industry also 
influences the development of rail transportation.  This can be seen by the fact 
that most of Transnet Freight Rail’s business stems from mining products such as 
cement, chrome, iron ore, coal, manganese and magnetite. Thus, the 
transportation sector therefore also benefits from mining.  Furthermore, as many 
communities are built near mines that are often situated in underdeveloped and 
remote areas, most of the mines partner with municipalities and other local 
businesses to support the socio-economic wellbeing of these communities. This is 
done by building infrastructure such as roads, schools, houses and clinics, and in 
supplying clean water and proper sanitation to enhance the communities’ standard 
of living. This combination of mining efforts aids the National Development Plan’s 
(NDP’s) objective of minimising inequality in the country. 
3.3 The History of South Africa’s diamond industry 
South Africa’s diamond mining industry has a very controversial history stretching 
back for close to 150 years (Allen 2003; Worden 2011).  
The diamond plays a big role in marriage proposals in today’s world, but this 
tradition only goes back a few decades (Lussier, 2014). Even though in 1377, 
Emperor Maximilian gave the first reported diamond engagement ring to Mary of 
Burgundy, diamonds were mostly beyond the public’s reach until the discovery of 
diamonds near Hopetown, south of Kimberley in South Africa, which gave birth to 
the modern diamond industry. It is universally acknowledged that a farm labourer’s 
son discovered a very important diamond in 1867 on the banks of the Orange 
River near Kimberley in South Africa’s current day Northern Cape Province 
(Worden, 2011). This unwitting discovery of the “Eureka” diamond sparked a rush 
that saw 30 000 prospectors from all over the world descend on Kimberley and 
surrounding areas in pursuit of their fortunes.  
Initially, the living conditions at Kimberley were intolerable with no decent water 
and sanitation facilities (Shillington, 1985). To support a growing appetite for 
diamonds, black labour from all over southern Africa was brought in in large 
numbers (in some cases, the workers reached over 50 000) (Thompson, 2001). 
These workers were ill-treated and lowly paid while safety was a minor issue and 
many miners lost their lives. In addition, the discovery of diamonds led to various 
77 | P a g e  
Tswana and Griqua communities losing their land to the prospectors and miners 
who were a law unto themselves (Worden, 2011). By the 1880s, Cecil John 
Rhodes had managed to form De Beers Consolidated Mines which is today one of 
the largest diamond mining companies in the world (Appendix 1). Rhodes 
transformed De Beers into a monopoly so that, by 1902, it accounted for 90 
percent of the world’s rough diamond production and distribution 
(www.sahistory.com). This monopoly situation lasted for almost 90 years. 
Throughout the 20th century until 2012, the Oppenheimer family played an 
important role in the metamorphosis of De Beers into a global diamond empire. In 
addition, the increased mechanisation of diamond mining gradually reduced the 
number of workers in the diamond industry (Allen, 2003).   
Throughout the 20th century, South Africa was a leading diamond producer in the 
world with mines being routinely opened in its various provinces. Currently, South 
Africa contributes 5% to global diamond production and ranks 7th in the world in 
terms of rough diamond production as shown in Figure 12.  Russia is the biggest 
producer of diamonds and the De Beers Group of companies is the biggest 
producer of rough diamonds in the world (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Rough Diamond Production in the World  
(Source: Diamond Insight Report, 2014:12) 
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Diamonds are mined across South Africa, with mines in five of the country’s nine 
provinces – including the North West, Gauteng, Free State, Limpopo and the 
Northern Cape provinces. Open pit, underground and alluvial mining methods are 
used and thousands of local workers are employed in this industry (Bone, 2012). 
Overall, De Beers Consolidated Mines produces most of South Africa’s total 
diamond output making its mines a great contributor to the local and global 
economies. Additionally, diamonds are also mined offshore in the Atlantic Ocean 
near the mouth of the Orange River in the Northern Cape. Diamond mining has 
also transformed the economies of countries such as Botswana and Namibia 
(Bain & Company, 2011; Penny, 2009).  
It is believed that approximately 130 million carats (26,000 kg (57,000 lb)) of 
diamonds are mined annually, with a total value of nearly US$13 billion (Even-
Zohar, 2007; Penny, 2009).  About 50% of the world diamonds originate from 
central and southern Africa, although significant sources of the mineral have been 
discovered in Russia, Canada, India, Brazil and Australia (De Beers Report to 
Society, 2013). The bulk of the world diamonds are mined from kimberlite and 
lamproite volcanic pipes (Even-Zohar, 2007).  
The diamond value chain is characterised by eight stages (see Figure 13) 
beginning with the exploration of a potential diamond deposit and ending with the 
demand for diamonds by millions of consumers around the world (Lussier, 2014). 
During the exploration stage, producers seek commercially viable diamond 
resources, usually by finding and evaluating kimberlite and lamproite pipes that 
might contain diamond ore. When a promising site is located, producers develop 
and construct new mines. The process of obtaining diamondiferous ore out of the 
ground through various methods of mining is known as production. After mining, 
producers sell rough diamonds at various markets within the sight-holder system, 
where a select group of verified buyers are allowed to purchase the rough product 
(Bieri, 2010). The rough diamonds are then cut and polished into finished gems. 
Polished diamonds are sold to jewellery manufacturers who, in turn, sell the 
finished products through retail channels. The diamond industry is fuelled by 
consumer demand, which is driven by millions of people around the world who 
want to own diamond jewellery. At either end of the value chain, a handful of well-
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known public companies such as De Beers operate. Because of a very long value 
chain, the diamond industry is associated with multiple stakeholders, each with 
their own expectations.  
 
Figure 13:  A diamond value chain overview: A journey “from mine to finger”  
(Source: Diamond Insight Report, 2014:16) 
De Beers is a major player in the diamond industry value chain. Figure 14 shows 
the company’s participation in the diamond pipeline.  De Beers is responsible for 
about 40% of the global rough diamond production in the world. It is responsible 
for about 60% of rough diamond production from its mines in South Africa.  
Venetia Mine is the biggest producer in both value and production in South Africa.  
The second biggest producer in South Africa is Petra Diamonds, the biggest 
beneficiary of De Beers mine disposal strategy during the years 2007 and 2015.  
De Beers is the market leader in exploration, rough diamond mining and in the 
distribution of rough stones. According to Bone (2012), in the 1990s, De Beers 
was responsible for the distribution of more than 90% of the world diamond 
production. 
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Figure 14: Diamond Pipeline highlighting De Beers Presence across the pipeline 
(Source: De Beers Group Report, 2009) 
According to Penny (2009), different stages in the diamond value chain are 
associated with different values (see Figure 14). According to De Beers 
Sustainability Report (2013), in 2010, global diamond production was worth 
US$12 billion, escalating by less than 1% in value between the production stages, 
production sales, cutting and polishing, and polished diamond sales by dealers. It 
is only the transition from the polished diamond sales to the jewellery 
manufacturer sales where value increases by 16.8% and the shift from the 
jewellery manufacturer to retail where value increases by 25 percent. Given this 
major increase, retail diamond sales constitute a significant percentage of the 
value of the diamond value chain. Given that most of the production takes place in 
countries such as South Africa and that the majority of retail sales take place in 
the developed world, this diagram shows that producer regions must meaningfully 
participate in the jewellery manufacturing and retail sales if they are to benefit 
more from the value of diamonds. This places local beneficiation as a key 
consideration in producer nations.  
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3.4 Diamond Industry and the Luxury goods industry 
The diamond industry is part of the luxury goods industry in South Africa and in 
the world. The luxury goods industry is a very wide industry comprising products 
such as jewellery, perfumes, wines, yachts, pens, watches, tableware, spirits, 
luxury cars, designer handbags, designer shoes and various items of designer 
clothing (Nguyen, 2007; KPMG, 2014). There is no particular definition of luxury 
products. How the utility of a product is perceived and how much is spent on that 
product are some of the parameters that define a luxury product (Nguyen, 2007; 
Lussier, 2014). Luxury products are identified as expensive in relative and 
absolute terms; some consider them to be “trivial” products, without any clear 
functional advantage over their non-luxury counterparts (Dubois, 1993). The label 
“luxury goods” is in itself a paradox. This is because retailers want to sell as many 
of their products as possible, however, proclaiming their products as luxury goods 
implies exclusivity (Hagg & Preiholt, 2006; KPMG, 2014). This is seen in 
companies like Prada, Gucci and LVMH in Sandton, South Africa. The impressive 
growth in sales volumes demonstrates to shareholders that the right balances 
between the four parameters, the timeless, modern, fast growing and highly 
profitable, have been found.  
The 2008 global economic crisis resulted in the slowdown of economic activities in 
the mature markets for luxury goods in Europe and North America. In regions such 
as Africa, economic growth has been very high, creating a market for the luxury 
goods industry. There are many luxury goods companies that operate in Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria and many other African countries outside the mature luxury goods 
markets of South Africa, Morocco and Egypt. Ranked by country, according to a 
KPMG Report (2014), in 2012, South Africa had 48,800 dollar millionaires, the 
largest of any country on the continent. As such, it is a well-developed market for 
luxury goods by African standards. Luxury goods companies are dependent on 
their brands, customers and designers in order to succeed (Hagg & Preiholt, 
2006).  Buyers are willing to pay a premium price for a high-profile brand. A 
Euromonitor Report (2015) on luxury goods in Africa revealed that South Africa 
remains a prime shopping destination on the continent. Luxury goods shoppers 
from other African states regularly visit the country to access the wide selection of 
luxury brands available at prestigious shopping malls in the country. In South 
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Africa itself, the sustained growth of the middle class who aspire to owning luxury 
goods is the back-bone on which the future luxury industry is based. Foreign 
visitors to South Africa significantly contribute to the local luxury goods industry 
(Deloitte Report, 2015). These visitors are often enticed by the weak rand and by 
the existing tax rebates to visitors to South Africa.  
The Euromonitor Report (2015) states that luxury products targeting female 
consumers continue to see growth in volume sales and have performed very well 
across various categories in South Africa. The success of such products is largely 
driven by the larger numbers of women who have become actively involved in the 
economy, giving them better access to well-paying jobs. Categories such as luxury 
accessories and luxury timepieces have greatly benefitted from this trend as more 
female consumers in South Africa are embracing global fashion trends. These 
manifest in South Africa in a variety of ways, ranging from reality TV to fashion 
magazines, as well as travel to other parts of the world. The luxury goods market 
in South Africa is still highly placed in terms of volume sales as well as the level of 
retailer concentration, relative to other markets. Most successful luxury brands in 
South Africa often have their own stores which exclusively sell their own brand 
and distribution is limited to these specialist stores. The luxury market remains a 
high risk business in South Africa and therefore requires retailers with adequate 
funding, which helps ease the pressure to have quick sales as most luxury items 
move slowly and such a business is generally not sustainable for retailers with 
limited funding (Euromonitor, 2015). This remains a major barrier to entry for new 
players. Most of South Africa’s luxury retailers are housed in two major shopping 
malls, namely, V&A Waterfront in Cape Town and Sandton City in Johannesburg, 
where consumers of luxury goods generally do their shopping. The distribution of 
luxury products is also restricted to exclusive boutiques with the exception of a few 
brands and products, such as super premium beauty and personal care products, 
which are sold through different types of retailers ranging from specialist stores to 
department stores and apparel retailers. 
Diamond jewellery is also an important component of the luxury goods market in 
South Africa and abroad. A survey by Research International (2008) and by De 
Beers Key Account Managers (KAM) in 2014 (Lussier, 2014) concluded that 
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diamond jewellery remains the “point of reference” in the luxury industry because 
of the following attributes: 
 Diamond jewellery was the most popular gift for the holidays in 2008 and in 
2013 – twice as popular as consumer electronics and other luxury goods. 
 Women want fewer, better things.  62% of women would strongly prefer 
one wonderful gift – like a diamond – than several small ones.   
 Men want to be the hero. 80% of men agree that “nothing else shows her I 
love her” like a diamond compared to other luxury goods. 
 Diamonds have an enduring value. 66% of women agree that it is wonderful 
to hand jewellery down to the next generation.   
 Diamond jewellery is a smart purchase. It is worn every day – it never 
wears out. It is considered to be a safer store of value than many other 
items today. 
The study further concluded that women in most luxury goods markets prefer 
diamond jewellery as the first choice of a gift. Although several years have passed 
since these observations were made, they are still valid. The worth of diamonds as 
jewellery comes largely from the perceptions of those very few who buy and wear 
them. This perception has been carefully structured as part of the extensive 
generic marketing by De Beers over the last two centuries, building on the 
glamour of history, positioning diamonds at the peak of Maslow’s famous 
Hierarchy of Needs as a luxury whose cost is low compared to its value.   
Diamonds are positioned as a gift of love where the larger and finer the diamond, 
the greater the love, as a perceived scarcity and as a symbol of enduring love. 
According to Lussier (2009), the marketing slogan, “a diamond is forever” has 
become a part of modern language, a concept that, in popular imagination, links 
the symbolism of the indestructible diamond to the ideal of eternal love, as 
enduring as the precious stone it describes. This carefully constructed reputation 
fuels the continued consumption of diamonds as luxury goods.  
Tiffany is a good example of a diamond jewellery business with a big retail 
presence especially in the US and in other major markets.  Tiffany has stores in 
more than 20 countries world-wide and there are more than 150 Tiffany & Co. 
stores and boutiques serving customers in the US and international markets. Its 
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retail activities focus on up-market customers, high quality-products, premium 
prices, sophisticated promotions, extensive services, fashionable locations and it 
has a prestige image in many countries where it operates (Bertsch & Wiseman, 
2004). It offers more than 2,000 products. Its major product lines are in jewellery 
which accounts for approximately 80% of its retail sales revenue and most of that 
comes from diamond jewellery. Other product lines are in crystal, sterling 
silverware, timepieces, writing instruments, fragrances and fashion accessories 
(Tiffany & Co., 2009).  
According to Bertsch and Wiseman (2004), Tiffany is known for selling 
merchandise under manufacturers’ brand names, its own brand names and 
various designer collection names. It offers approximately 100 brands from other 
companies including: Back to Glamour, American Garden, Atlas, Faraone, Lucida, 
1837 Collection, Tesoro and Fireworks.  It also uses trade names and trademarks 
that are based on the company name, i.e. Tiffany Blue, Tiffany for Men and Tiffany 
Classics (Tiffany & Co., 2009). Tiffany has operating units in mining, processing 
(cutting and polishing of rough diamonds), producing, designing, testing, 
distribution and retailing (Tiffany & Co., 2009). Tiffany is one of the De Beers sight 
holders (Simson, 2009). The other diamond jewellery retailers in South Africa are 
Shimansky, Browns and many others who are concentrated in high end shopping 
malls at Sandton, Hyde Park and at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in Cape 
Town. Often, the exclusive glamour of these luxury stores and shopping malls 
contrasts with the poverty and squalor of the communities where diamonds are 
mined. This is another reason why this study is relevant in the South African 
context with high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment. 
3.5 Key Risks and Challenges affecting corporate reputation of the 
diamond Industry in South Africa 
“It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think 
about that, I am sure you’ll do things differently” (Warren Buffet, 2014) 
The diamond industry, like all other industries, is affected by factors such as 
economic cycles, consumer perceptions and concerns about ethics and human 
rights issues. According to Delage (2009), in times of uncertainty, consumers will 
look for certainty, for inspiration and for brands that lead their categories and will 
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make more informed and considered purchasing decisions. These trends are also 
influenced by wider and deeper stakeholder concerns about issues relating to 
environmental scandals, ethics, crisis management, corporate citizenship and 
corporate reputation. Gaetano Cavalieri, the President of the World Jewellery 
Confederation, supported the ethical considerations of consumers by saying “The 
diamond market is today increasingly driven by trust, balance and legitimacy, 
integrity and honesty” (Ledbury Research Report, 2007:11). This trend is driven by 
global NGO activism on issues of sustainable development and global media 
coverage. The luxury goods industry in general, and the diamond industry in 
particular, now takes these concerns more seriously than almost any other sector 
because luxury today is typically high-profile and celebrity-driven and so will 
continue to be under far greater public scrutiny (Euromonitor, 2015; Lussier, 
2014). Today, brand value is not only built through public relations and marketing, 
but is also dependent on the quality of the product or service and the reputation of 
the company behind it. As Rae (2009:12) emphasises,  
Something that is beautifully made, finely crafted, made out of rare materials 
and well designed, will account for nothing if it is also equated in the public 
mind with abuse of human rights and environmental destruction.  
This is why the blood diamonds campaign shook the diamond industry to the core, 
resulting in massive changes such as the introduction of the Kimberly Process and 
Best Practice Principles (Bone, 2012; Bieri, 2010). More importantly, this 
demonstrates the significance of corporate reputation in the diamond industry.  
The complex regulatory, geo-political and socio-economic changes that have 
influenced South African corporations since the formal abolition of apartheid in 
1994 render its mining industry a fertile one in which to explore the extent to which 
contextual variables influence stakeholder perceptions of corporate reputation 
(Tshivase & Kleyn, 2016).  While the country battles with high unemployment, 
poverty and inequality, diamond mining companies grapple with a shortage of 
skilled workers, often attributed to the legacy of educational policies that 
discriminated against black learners under conditions of apartheid. It is widely 
acknowledged that, since the formal abolition of apartheid in 1994, the 
Department of Mineral Resources has introduced several policies through various 
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charters and regulations to encourage mining companies to actively consider their 
role in redressing socio-economic inequality in South African society through 
active investment in corporate social responsibility as well as in the development 
of appropriate policies, charters and practices (Chamber of Mines, 2014; Davis & 
Franks, 2014). The sections below outline some of the key challenges and risks 
affecting the corporate reputation in the South African diamond industry. 
3.5.1 Financial performance and global economic cycles 
The diamond industry, like any other industry, is affected by “booms and busts” in 
the global economy. During recession, economic activity slows down, in some 
cases banks go out of business, while commodity prices fall sharply. For example, 
the 2008 global economic downturn hit the US consumers, which represent 
approximately 50% of worldwide diamond jewellery sales by value globally 
(Penny, 2009; Prager, 2014).  According to Lussier (2014), almost 40% of those 
sales are made between the Thanksgiving and December holidays in the lead up 
to Christmas as shown in Figure 15. This demonstrates that consumer demand is 
affected by various seasons in different markets. For example, the US wedding 
season is between July and September.  The engagement season is between 
January and March. While in India, the wedding season is between September 
and May.  In China, most of the demand for diamond jewellery is between 
December and March.  The Chinese Valentine’s day is in August compared to the 
US which celebrates Valentine’s day in February, as in South Africa. 
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Figure 15: Seasonality of Consumer Demand in the Diamond Jewellery  
(Source: Diamond Insight Report, 2014:22) 
In October 2008, the US economy shed about 240,000 jobs (Lamb, 2009).  House 
repossessions (foreclosures), which were responsible in large measure for the 
crisis, continue across the US.  The diamond jewellery business was impacted by 
the 2008 global recession and continues to be challenged by world economic 
forces such as other commodities and it remains unpredictable. According to 
Penny (2009), between September and December 2008, the US jewellery sales 
trend dropped to below 20% and did not recover until almost the end of 2009.  
Almost all the mining companies experienced a serious reduction in their sales 
because of the 2008 global recession.  According to Penny (2009), many smaller 
diamond companies perished during this period, for example, the African 
Romance in South Africa.  
According to Penny (2009), while the economic crisis presented challenges for the 
luxury goods category as a whole, diamonds quickly rebounded owing to medium-
term supply issues. The basis of the demand rests on the fact that people 
continue to get married and their financial value remains relatively stable. A good 
reputation will increase customer loyalty enabling consumers to prefer a certain 
company’s products even when the economic environment is uncertain. Demand 
for diamonds has been consistently increasing for many years and this is expected 
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to continue in the long term – particularly as higher net-worth individuals emerge in 
the developing markets (Ledbury Research Report, 2007; Lussier, 2009).  
According to the Diamond Insight Report (2015), diamond values have 
consistently recovered as the world economies recover. 
3.5.2 Gem Quality Diamonds Vs Synthetics Diamonds 
About 40 years ago, the first cases and reports of brand and product 
counterfeiting emerged (Eisend & Schuchert-Güler, 2006). At that time, only a few 
manufacturers of very highly priced and very prestigious products like textiles, 
jewellery and accessories were affected and it was assumed that this 
phenomenon would be of minor significance. Since then, however, counterfeiting 
has become widespread and has developed into an economic problem of 
international significance. Recent figures estimate that 7% of the world’s 
merchandise trade in 2004 may be based on trade in counterfeit products (Eisend 
& Schuchert-Güler, 2006) and this global economy for illicit goods is growing.  
In the diamond jewellery business, synthetics are regarded as the counterfeits.   
Synthetics are not new. In 1954, General Electric successfully produced the first 
synthetic dust from a 400 ton press which put carbon under extremely high 
pressure in an attempt to mimic natural geological conditions. The vast quantities 
of electricity and time required meant that the end result was more expensive than 
a natural diamond. Over the last few decades, manufacturing processes have 
evolved and synthetics are increasingly being produced for industrial purposes. In 
the 1990s, synthetic techniques progressed to make better colours and quality 
material which could potentially be used in jewellery. However, the production 
costs are still relatively high (Prager, 2014). There are currently only minimal 
amounts of synthetic material available for use in jewellery, partly because there 
are significant technical barriers to overcome.  There are a number of companies 
who have declared their intent to supply the jewellery market with synthetics using 
two different manufacturing techniques, carbon vapour deposition (CVD) and high 
pressure high temperature (HPHT).   
According to Penny (2009) and Lussier (2014), these have the potential to 
radically erode natural diamond sales in many ways.  This can be through 
undifferentiated entry into the diamond jewellery market as an affordable and 
89 | P a g e  
“cleaner” substitute, especially in the emerging markets where a diamond 
jewellery sales culture is emerging. According to Even-Zohar (2007), this could 
result in undermining consumer confidence in the integrity of the category; 
skewing the existing supply/demand dynamic; and will undermine both the 
emotional and value (rarity, timelessness) propositions that sustain demand for 
natural diamonds (Penny, 2009).  Synthetics could also be positioned as a 
cheaper, better or ethically sound alternative to natural diamonds thereby 
cannibalising sales, reducing demand and collapsing the diamond jewellery price 
(Simpson, 2007).  According to Penny (2007), the gem quality of synthetic 
diamonds has been available for sale in the USA in small quantities since 2003. 
Despite the initial buzz surrounding their launch, the continuous improvement in 
the quality and a commensurate reduction in production costs, synthetic diamonds 
have made no significant inroads into the natural diamond market. As much as 
this is indicative of the resilience of the natural diamond market and its enduring 
strength as a product category, the diamond industry needs to take the view that it 
is only a matter of time before a large scale low-cost producer of synthetics enters 
the marketplace. As such, reputation then becomes a key driver of customer 
loyalty which is essential for business survival.  
Consumer awareness of synthetics is currently low, as commercial availability of 
synthetic jewellery is extremely limited (Penny, 2009).  However, there have been 
a number of high profile articles in the consumer media about synthetics which 
have positioned them as an alternative to diamonds.  Claims include that 
synthetics look exactly the same to the naked eye, do not have the ethical and 
environmental concerns of diamonds and will be cheaper in the future. In addition, 
coverage has positioned synthetics as a challenge to De Beers’ historical 
reputation as a monopoliser of the diamond industry and has highlighted the 
potential threat of undisclosed synthetics entering the supply chain. According to 
Lussier (2009), many articles have also acknowledged the technological and 
industrial potential for synthetics. 
Extensive independent consumer research demonstrates that people want “the 
real thing”. Specifically, research shows that people want diamonds and that 
machine-made synthetics are not an adequate substitute. People often buy 
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diamonds to mark significant milestones and achievements in their lives and, for 
these purchases, only diamonds will satisfy the consumers’ requirements.  
Furthermore, De Beers is confident that synthetics will not have the same 
emotional and financial value as diamonds because the value of diamonds is 
inextricably linked to how they were naturally formed billions of years ago. 
According to Penny (2009), the vast majority of synthetics will be manufactured for 
industrial drill bits and abrasives, and not for jewellery consumption. The 
manufacturing process means a potentially limitless supply of synthetic material 
which can be used to meet other innovative technical applications, such as laser 
technology, medical and scientific equipment. If synthetics do enter the jewellery 
market over time, production costs will fall, and synthetics will probably occupy a 
similar position in the market place to Cubic Zirconia, Moissanite and other such 
materials.  
3.5.3 Mine Closures 
Reputational damage arising from mine closures and disposals of marginal mines 
by most diamond mining companies creates negative perceptions in some 
stakeholders, particularly the powerful labour unions. The labour unions fight for 
their members to keep jobs in the medium to long term. When De Beers 
announced the disposal of Cullinan Mine in South Africa, this was opposed by the 
labour union (Penny, 2009). A company that closes mines and retrenches workers 
is unlikely to have its reputation untainted by the unions, media houses and 
community groups, including NGOs. News of the proposed closure of the 
Namaqualand Mine in 2011 generated heated debate amongst various 
stakeholders (Salgado, 2011). In particular, local communities felt that legacy 
issues were not being addressed in De Beers’ mine closure plan.  
3.5.4 Illegal Mining 
Illegal mining is a common feature in the diamond industry. Creamer (2009) 
reported that more than 600 illegal miners have been arrested in some diamond 
mines in South Africa. Illegal mining is mostly carried out by artisanal miners who 
want participation in the diamond value chain. There is a need to effectively 
manage the scourge of illegal mining and its effect on diamond smuggling and the 
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associated black market. Communities, regulators and NGOs must benefit from 
mining to reduce this problem.  
Illegal mining also requires strong governance on the part of regulatory authorities. 
In Zimbabwe, lack of a robust governance regime resulted in 40 000 artisanal 
miners descending on the Marange diamond fields. The government used force, 
precipitating deaths which resulted in the diamonds being temporarily termed as 
blood diamonds (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
3.5.5 Inability to secure Mining and Water licenses 
Many diamond companies have identified the inability to secure various regulatory 
permits, such as mining and water licences, as a problem for their operations 
(Penny, 2009). This becomes problematic, given the proliferation of NGOs and 
community groups interested in environmental justice and sustainable 
development. Companies must ensure that their operations take sustainability into 
account when designing mining methods. Junior diamond miner, DMI Minerals, 
developed a method of simultaneously mining and rehabilitation, limiting top soil 
removal to selected areas showing that the future of diamond mining lies in 
sustainable methods (SA. Department of Mineral Resources, 2010).  
3.5.6 Compliance with mining, environmental and heritage legislation 
Sharp increases in the cost and supply continuity of commodities remains a threat 
to most diamond companies’ profitability, which could result in the inability to meet 
all the mining licences’ requirements. The mining legislation mandates that 
communities must benefit from mining activities. Also, there are a number of 
powerful NGOs that are advocating environmental rights (Tshivase & Kleyn, 2016) 
while investors, consumers and governments are increasingly calling for 
environmentally compliant mining. In mining areas near World Heritage sites, 
UNESCO and IUCN are also very powerful stakeholders who demand compliance 
with local and international heritage laws and conventions. The share price of Coal 
of Africa, which mines coking coal near the Mapungubwe World Heritage site lost 
a significant percentage of its value when NGOs, under the banner of Save 
Mapungubwe Coalition, took it to court for failure to comply with the National 
Environmental Management Act, the World Heritage Act of 1999 and the National 
92 | P a g e  
Heritage Resources Act of 1999 (Conway-Smith, 2012).  
3.5.7 Mine Safety Incidents and Community Health 
Mine safety incidents are a serious reputational risk in the diamond industry. 
According to Oppenheimer (2012), failure to ensure that safety incidents do not 
occur can have a negative impact on company reputation (see De Beers’ safety 
performance in Figure 16). For instance, Massey Energy is currently facing 
accusations by mine worker unions that it traded safety for profit. This was in light 
of the accident at its coal mine in April 2010 which resulted in the deaths of 29 
workers.  
 
Figure 16: De Beers’ Safety Performance from 1999 to 2008  
(Source: De Beers Safety Presentation, 2009:13) 
In terms of community health, one of the major challenges that communities living 
around the mining towns are faced with, is the scourge of HIV/AIDS. According to 
The Chamber of Mines Report (2015), mining towns in South Africa are regarded 
as highly contagious areas of HIV/AIDS because of the historic hostel system of 
mine workers’ dwellings. Government and mining companies have invested 
millions of Rands to create awareness, but the changing perceptions and 
behaviours of the population is critical in curbing the spread of the disease, 
especially among the youth. In contrast to the successful clinical interventions, 
there is much to be done in changing the behaviour around HIV and AIDS but this 
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is not the sole responsibility of the state and the mining companies.  
According to Shisana, Rehle, Simbayi, Zuma, Jooste, Jungi, Labadarios and 
Onoya (2014), changing behaviour and addressing the underlying social and 
structural drivers of HIV/AIDS is now essential, given that the number of people 
living with HIV has increased from 5.2 million in 2008 to a staggering 6.4 million in 
2012 (HSRC Household Survey). This increase is due to people living longer on 
treatment but also reflects a high number of new infections.  
Some of the interventions that the mining companies must actively promote 
include the promotion of safe sex or the consistent use of condoms; the 
dissemination of correct knowledge about the transmission of HIV and 
Tuberculosis, as well as increasing the number of safe circumcisions countrywide. 
In a country with a high incidence of HIV, the use of condoms is one of the most 
effective ways of preventing the transmission of HIV. As such, there was an 
increase in the use of condoms at last sexual encounter from 2002 (27.3%) to 
2008 (62.4%), followed by a slight decline in 2012 (59.9%). The sharp 
improvements in the use of condoms among those 15 years and older can be 
attributed to the positive behavioural changes and enhanced communication 
programmes.  
3.5.8 Land Disputes 
Land disputes are serious issues in the diamond industry and can affect its ability 
to secure mining and social licences. According to Prager (2014), obtaining a 
social licence to operate can sometimes be difficult when land disputes arise 
between mining and metals companies and local communities. Such disputes can 
delay or even prevent projects from proceeding.  
3.5.9 Employee engagement in the diamond Industry 
Level of employee engagement is identified as a key challenge as most diamond 
mining companies are reducing their overheads in order to remain profitable 
(Creamer, 2007). The diamond industry has been undergoing a major 
restructuring following the announcement in 2007 by De Beers of its intention to 
dispose of some of its mines (Benchmarks Foundation, 2009). This was followed 
by the sale of Finsch Mine to Petra and the sale of Cullinan Mine also to Petra in 
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2010.  High potential and critical employees are in demand outside the diamond 
industry and even outside the mining industry. Employees are an organisation’s 
most important asset. Health and safety of employees is therefore critical. Happy 
employees have a higher employee engagement level and they are motivated, 
hardworking and passionate about producing more output.  
3.5.10 Perception of Exploitation 
As mentioned earlier, the South African diamond industry emerged from a context 
of exploitation of local people in the early colonial period, particularly in the 1860s 
and throughout most of the colonial period when “natives” were scarcely protected 
by labour laws (Tshivase & Kleyn, 2016). Even today, more benefits from the 
diamond industry accrue at the top end of the value chain located outside South 
Africa and other producer regions (Bain & Company, 2011). Not surprisingly, the 
producing countries often call for an equitable share of profits from the industry 
with countries such as Botswana often being cited as an example of a successful 
private-public partnership that brought positive social change to the country. 
According to Diamond Insight Report (2015), the central reputation threats to the 
diamond industry are those posed by the perception of exploitation in the producer 
countries and across the value chain. 
It is widely believed that since the release of the film “Blood Diamond” in 2006, the 
diamond industry has taken a high profile proactive approach to divorce itself from 
the historical beliefs by many that diamonds are associated with exploitation (Bieri, 
2010).  According to Bone (2012), exploitation can take many forms, including: 
 Exploitation of workers (poor working conditions, HIV/AIDS); 
 Exploitation by African governments (disproportionate profit-taking); 
 Exploitation of rural communities; 
 Exploitation of consumers by artificial inflation of diamond jewellery prices; 
 Exploitation of the environment (climate change, degradation, water); and 
 Exploitation of consumers/trade (monopoly/anti-trust). 
There are some South African political players such as the Economic Freedom 
Fighters and some unions that advocate the nationalisation of mines (Baxter, 
2015). The ANCYL alleged that the diamond industry is often associated with the 
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apartheid regime in South Africa which was coupled with racism and 
discrimination.  This is manifested by many historic policies including the hostel 
accommodation which was based on racial lines (Prager, 2013). There is a 
general belief that the diamond industry is known to be a very controversial, fairly 
secretive industry with a tainted past. The industry has been associated with cartel 
industry, monopoly capital and is therefore not transparent to many people 
(Appendix 3). Not surprisingly, nationalisation is seen as a way of raising 
communities in mining areas out of poverty. The ANCYL discussion paper of 2011 
argues that mining companies should do more to build roads, provide safe and 
clean water, electricity and proper housing. Also, diamond beneficiation should 
contribute to local job creation and economic emancipation of the local 
communities.  
The ANCYL was, at one point, extremely concerned about the high levels of 
poverty and unemployment in most mining towns of South Africa. It argued that 
the South African Mining Charter has led to mining communities becoming poorer 
than ever before. In recent times, this debate is now being handled by the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF Manifesto 2014 Elections). These perceptions 
negatively affect the corporate reputation of the diamond industry in South Africa.  
The opinion of the general public about the mining industry remains a key driver of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry. There are those within and outside 
the diamond mining sector who believe that the South African Mining Charter has 
failed to correct the ownership imbalances of the past despite the conclusion of 
many empowerment transactions for exactly this purpose (Benchmarks 
Foundation, 2009). There is also a feeling that diamond mining companies can do 
more to ensure that the socio-economic difficulties and inequalities afflicting many 
South Africans are successfully mitigated (SA. Department of Mineral Resources, 
2013/14; Chamber of Mines Report, 2014).  The more a company attempts to 
change these perceptions, the more its reputational challenges escalate.  
However, good reputation alone should not come at the expense of business 
viability (Penny, 2009). Prager (2014) argues that operations that are not 
managed to maximise their contribution to local growth and capacity building, 
undermine the company’s licence to operate and the diversification of the 
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economy that will ensure long-term economic stability and viable post-mining 
futures. De Beers’ approach to supporting development is to work in partnership 
with host governments to create shared value from diamonds. According to Penny 
(2009:19),  
our partnership approach extends to national and local communities in our 
producer countries. Working in this way maximises the economic value of our 
production, reduces our operating risk and helps support the creation of skills 
and capacities for a diversified post-mining economy. 
The company supports enterprise development through dedicated investment 
funds, and undertakes traditional social investment projects (for example, 
supporting local infrastructure, education and health). 
3.5.11 Conflict diamonds 
In the mid-1990s, about 10% to 15% of the world’s supply of diamonds came from 
African war zones, such as Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone (Hayden, 2000, 
Bone, 2012). In these countries, diamond mines were owned and operated by the 
warlords, who used the revenues from the sale of diamonds to fund their 
revolutionary efforts. For example, Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front sold 
more than US$630 million in diamonds to Liberia in exchange for weapons that 
were responsible for the genocide in Sierra Leone during the war. 
Several attempts have been made to stop this illicit and unethical trade. Those 
initiatives include the Kimberley Process and international agreements designed 
to eliminate the illicit trade in diamonds (Penny, 2007). According to Bieri (2010), 
the campaign against conflict diamonds tore into the heart of the carefully 
constructed reputation of the diamond industry. For example, some NGOs 
attacked concepts such as “a diamond is forever”, and the myths and mysticism 
associated with diamonds, linking those to shadowy dealings with rebel armies 
that killed millions. This powerful campaign encouraged more ethical conduct on 
the part of major players in the industry.  
3.5.12 Cartels 
According to the Diamond Insight Report (2014) in 1888, after Cecil Rhodes had 
consolidated South Africa’s diamond mines into one company, De Beers 
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Consolidated Mines, he formed a cartel with the ten largest merchants.  Each 
merchant would be guaranteed a certain percentage of diamond output in return 
for data about the market. This system enabled De Beers to match supply to 
demand, thereby ensuring a steady control of prices. The merchants have now 
been replaced by sight holders, but the basic principle remains the same 
(Diamond Insight Report, 2014). 
3.5.13 Corporate Social Responsibility 
According to Hopkins (2003), corporate social responsibility can be summarised 
as the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and to contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their 
families, as well as of the local community and society at large. The evidence base 
for responsible corporations is growing. This shows that successful companies 
operate in relative harmony with the needs, values and, more importantly, the 
aspirations of stakeholders.  Once this balance is achieved, it can enhance 
reputation, performance and shareholder value. Therefore, CSR must be 
imbedded into the organisational DNA through its operational business principles 
and company values.  The communities surrounding the South African Diamond 
industry are beset with high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality 
(Department of Mineral Resource Report, 2013/14).  These are the major causes 
of community activism and the protests that are currently dominating the mining 
industry in South Africa.  The high number of unemployed is further exacerbated 
by the recent restructuring of De Beers diamond mines in South Africa, which has 
resulted in De Beers reducing its production from a peak of 15 million carats in 
2007 to the current 5 million carats in 2014.  This is accompanied by a number of 
mine closures, such as Oaks Mine, the sale of mines and reduced production in 
many operations. The Table 5 shows the number of jobs lost between 2003 and 
2012 as at June 2013. 
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Table 5: Labour history by commodity 
 Year Gold PGMs Iron Ore Copper Chrome Mang-
anese 
Diamonds Coal Aggregate 
and Sand 
Other 
Mines and 
Quarries 
2003 198 465 127 672 5 961 4 952 5 784 2 623 17 949 47 239 3 801 21 182 
2004 179 964 150 630 7 142 4 042 6 765 3 243 21 186 50 327 4 080 21 530 
2005 160 634 155 034 7 493 3 746 7 893 3 336 22 033 56 971 5 210 21 782 
2006 159 782 168 530 8 859 3 993 7 899 3 332 19 686 57 778 5 133 21 345 
2007 169 057 186 411 13 858 N/A 9 796 3 240 19 471 60 439 5 833 27 045 
2008 166 063 199 948 13 256 N/A 12 279 3 976 18 474 65 484 6 428 32 821 
2009 159 925 184 163 13 727 N/A 10 966 5 003 11 602 70 791 6 852 28 765 
2010 157 019 181 969 18 216 N/A 13 982 5 879 11 468 74 025 7 009 29 339 
2011 144 799 194 745 22 361 N/A 16 911 7 460 12 046 78 579 7 123 28 854 
2012 142 201 197 847 23 380 N/A 19 758 8 726 12 176 83 240 7 544 29 760 
      (Source: SA. Department of Mineral Resources, 2013/14:29)
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Unemployment is a major challenge in South Africa.  According to Brand (2012), 
only four out of ten adults work in South Africa while, in the rest of the world, 
seven out of ten adults work. That means that only 7.3 million out of 32.9 million 
adults work in South Africa. This number is very low compared to other countries 
with similar GDP numbers.  
3.5.14 Transformation in the Mining Industry in South Africa 
There is a wide belief among local community groups, especially the youth groups, 
that the mining industry is not transformed.  This belief has also found resonance 
in various government departments including DMR, unions, political formations 
and various community based organisations.  “South Africa will burn if past mining 
‘ills’ are not addressed” (quote from Joseph Mathunjwa, president of the 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union [AMCU]).  This debate has 
been exacerbated by the dispute between the Chamber of Mines and the DMR on 
the interpretation of the Mining Charter Reports (Prager, 2014; Seccombe, 2015) 
and several stand-offs between local communities, especially in the Limpopo 
province of South Africa in the Sikhukhune Land, Burgersfort Area.  The DMR, 
together with mining unions notably AMCU and NUM, and most local 
communities, believe that the industry is not doing enough to fight the plight of the 
poor in South Africa (Benchmarks Foundation, 2009). According to the South 
African Chamber of Mines Report (2014), the mining industry has achieved Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) on ownership of 37.7% (22.8% BEE 
entrepreneurs or individuals, 10.8% communities and 4.2% Employee Share 
Ownership Programme (ESOPs) with weighting based on the value of the assets.  
The ownership structure has benefited 60% BEE entrepreneurs, 29% communities 
and 11% ESOPs, and an estimated 7 million individuals. In terms of volumes 
weighting (production and revenue), the industry has achieved BEE ownership 
level of 38.8% (24.3% BEE entrepreneurs, 9.1% communities and 5.4% ESOPs).  
The industry has created a net value of between R155 320 million and R282 018 
million representing a return of 200% as stipulated in the Mining Charter. The 
diamond sector has a net value of between R616 million and R5 290 million, 
representing a change of between -56% and 282%.    
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3.5.15 Mining Strikes 
According to Brand (2012), when comparing South Africa against all European 
countries between 2005 and 2009, in Europe, on average, 30.6 working days 
were lost per 1000 employees with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 159.4; 
while South Africa lost 507 working days per 1000 employees with a minimum of 
36 and maximum of 1593 over the period 2006 to 2011.  This is the highest loss of 
working days in the world and most of these strikes are associated with the 
highest violence rate in the world.  Figure 17 demonstrates that, according to Levy 
(2015), the South African mining industry lost 11.8 million working days due to 
labour strikes compared to 5.2 million in 2013 and 1.7 million working days in 
1996. This sharp rise in 2014 is due to the platinum industry strike coupled with 
the engineering strike called by NUMSA.  According to Lotz (2014), these two 
strikes accounted for more than 95% of the total working days lost.  
 
 
Figure 17: Workdays Lost to Strike Action 1996 to 2014  
(Source: Andrew Levy Employee Relations Report, 2015:6) 
According to Levy (2015), the key triggers the South African strikes are due to 
wages which make up more than 95% of the reasons (Figure 18).  The wage issue 
remains a major challenge in the recent mining industry and in South Africa in 
general. 
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Figure 18: Working Days Lost due to Wage dispute in South Africa  
(Source: Andrew Levy Employee Relations Reports, 2015:7) 
3.6 Summary of Literature Review 
The South African diamond industry is now almost a century-and-a-half old. 
However, the industry has been affected by serious legacy challenges, particularly 
in its early days and throughout the colonial period.  This literature review has 
revealed a number of definitional issues relating to corporate reputation as a 
subject; key challenges in the industry as well as the effect of corporate reputation 
and, lastly, the corporate reputation management framework.  In terms of the 
meaning of corporate reputation, the literature review has demonstrated that there 
are many angles that we can use to understand corporate reputation and that 
there has been very little research undertaken into corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry in South Africa, focusing, in particular, on reputation 
management.  There has also been limited research into understanding the key 
components that are the drivers of corporate reputation, which are perceptions of 
the diamond industry, key challenges and the effects of corporate reputation on 
the diamond industry.  Although the literature does provide a generic perspective 
of what reputation is and the various challenges driving corporate reputation and 
its effects, there is limited detailed analysis of these variables in the South African 
context. 
The literature review prompted an awareness of these challenges including 
perceptions of secrecy that cloud the entire diamond industry; poverty and high 
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unemployment in the host communities; beneficiation expectations by the 
producer governments; lack of transformation and poor relationships between the 
mining companies and their key stakeholders such as unions and local 
communities. This literature review has shown that the diamond industry plays an 
important role in the development of, not just Southern Africa, but also of the 
world. It was revealed that the diamond industry is ultimately a luxury goods 
business, which is based on tastes and perceptions of upper and middle classes. 
This means that reputation is important in all stages of the diamond value chain, 
from exploration, through production up to retail sales. A bad reputation results in 
the shunning of diamonds by the world market. For example, the human rights 
abuses in the diamond fields at Chiadzwa in Zimbabwe attracted a lengthy 
investigative process by the Kimberley Process (Bone, 2012).  
This literature review confirmed the relevance of the following key five research 
questions and sub-questions: 
Research Question One  
What is the meaning of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in South 
Africa? 
Sub-questions: 
1. What is an acceptable definition of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry? 
2. What are the key components of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry? 
3. What are the key drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry? 
Research Question Two 
What are the key stakeholder perceptions of the diamond Industry?  
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Research Question Three  
What are the current and future key reputational risks and challenges in the 
diamond industry? 
Research Question Four  
What are the key effects of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in the 
following key strategic focus areas? 
Sub-questions: 
1. The effect of corporate reputation on investor confidence? 
2. The effect of corporate reputation on employee engagement, talent 
attraction and retention? 
3. The effect of corporate reputation on purchase decisions for diamond 
jewellery? 
4. The effect of corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty? 
5. The effect of corporate reputation on community relations? 
6. The effect of reputation on government relations and other external 
stakeholders like suppliers, media and authorities? 
Research Question Five  
What are the appropriate managerial actions and approaches to manage 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry? 
The next chapter focuses on the methodology used to elicit responses from 
different stakeholders in the South African diamond industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4  
4.1 Introduction 
A literature survey has revealed that, from a stakeholder point of view, a good 
corporate reputation is as essential to the survival of business as the bottom line. 
Despite this unity of thought, authorities do not agree on the most acceptable 
definition of corporate reputation. Naturally, this is an outcome of the fact that 
different stakeholders and academics view corporate reputation from their different 
positions. According to Fombrun et al (2013:24), economists, accountants, 
strategists, organisational theorists, communication experts and corporate 
strategists all view reputation using different lenses. This has precipitated a 
profusion of tools and methodologies designed to explore corporate reputation. 
Within the local South African context, a number of large consulting firms offer 
services in corporate reputation, but when compared to the global situation, there 
has been little academic engagement with corporate reputation (for exceptions 
see Le Roux, 2003 and Joosub, 2006). Not surprisingly, the local literature survey 
found very little corporate engagement regarding corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry by academics. It is only the major consulting companies such as 
Bain & Company and Globescan that have commented on reputational aspects of 
the diamond industry in general. Using stakeholder theory as the main theory for 
this study, this thesis represents one of the first major attempts to explore 
corporate reputation in the South African diamond industry, which, as we have 
seen, is often accused of being secretive and exploitative (Center for 
Environmental Rights, 2014). The presence of multiple stakeholders dictates that 
a multi-dimensional methodology is the most appropriate.  
This chapter presents the research methodology used in this study. It begins with 
a brief description of the research design, which is based on Creswell’s (2013) 
three framework elements. It covers philosophical knowledge claims or research 
paradigms relevant to a study, a mixed method research methodology, including a 
quantitative questionnaire survey and qualitative semi-structured interviews. The 
subsequent sections of the chapter address the reliability and validity of 
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procedures used for data collection and analysis.  
Research Design 
The research design process utilised in this study follows Creswell’s (2013) 
approach that stipulates that a research design should have three framework 
elements. Those elements are “knowledge claims or a research paradigm” which 
is a philosophical assumption about the study; the “strategies of inquiry” which is 
made up of general procedures of research; and “methods” which is made up of 
detailed procedures of data collection, analysis and writing (Creswell, Plano Clark, 
Guttmann & Hanson, 2003).  The ontological orientation of this research is the 
constructivist worldview. The epistemological orientation is the interpretive 
subjectivist approach.  The strategy of enquiry is a mixed-method research 
approach which combines quantitative with qualitative analyses involving a 
detailed questionnaire and semi-structured interviews.  The section below 
provides a detailed background and justification motivation of the research design, 
methods and a detailed procedure of data collection and analysis.  
Research Paradigm 
As demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, interest in the study of corporate reputation 
is not of recent origin worldwide. From the 1950s until the present, various 
concepts about corporate reputation have captured the imagination of many 
scholars and practitioners. During this period, corporate reputation studies were 
dominated by the logical empiricist paradigm that stresses a positivist framework 
of rationality and empirical measurement (Lloyd, 2007; Griffin, 2008). This flowed 
from the belief that academic research activities should seek to validate 
knowledge (Kuhn, 1962; Kline, 1998; Dolphin, 2004). The search for valid 
knowledge stems from community acceptance, which is an agreement on a set of 
values which have produced knowledge claims that have withstood the test of time 
and this, according to Kuhn (1962), is a research paradigm. A research paradigm 
is a cluster or grouping of beliefs which dictate what should be studied within a 
particular discipline, how research should be done and how results should be 
interpreted (Bryman, 2004; Creswell, 2014).  
In other words, according to Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) and Creswell and 
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Plano Clark (2011), research paradigms represent opposing belief systems or 
worldviews that are a reflection of the researcher’s views and guide the decisions 
that researchers make in the social and behavioural sciences.  These have 
traditionally fallen into two camps “positivist” and “constructivist”, or “scientific” and 
“naturalistic” (Armitage, 2007; Guba & Lincoln, 1988; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
Researchers have identified numerous research paradigms as described in the 
next section. 
It is acknowledged in many research philosophical studies that, although 
paradigms do mutate, evolve and/or get discarded completely, this does not 
happen quickly due to the already existing cumulative tradition behind which a 
pace is set (France, 2007).  According to Chen and Sadeque (2007), the paradigm 
can be explained in terms of its ontological and epistemological orientation. 
Ontological orientation describes the nature of reality (Maurer, 1999).  It focuses 
on whether the reality and related relationships should be considered as a given 
which will then be investigated by the researchers from a distance (objectivism) or 
that the reality is affected by the perceptions and actions of the social actors 
(constructivism) and therefore is constantly under construction (Chen & Sadeque, 
2007).  
The first step of the research design is the ontological philosophical context of the 
study.  The philosophical context justifies the paradigm that is to be leveraged in 
order to address the research questions. According to Creswell (2013), there are 
four distinct types of research paradigms. The first one is the post-positivism 
knowledge claim which refers to postmodernist thinking which succeeded 
positivism. It is about challenging known truth and acknowledges that researchers 
cannot be “positive” about claims of knowledge when studying the behaviours and 
actions of humans (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Creswell, 2013). The second is 
the socially constructed knowledge claim, which assumes that individuals develop 
subjective meanings of engaged experiences and these meanings are multiple, 
pluralistic and varied. The focus is on understanding the complexity of views and 
phenomena. The third is the advocacy/participatory knowledge claim that 
assumes that enquiry needs to be situated within the relevant macro and micro 
political discourses. The focus for the researcher is to make changes taking 
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account of wider societal requirements. The fourth, which is the pragmatic 
knowledge claim, can appear in many forms, depending on the type of research 
settings. It is known to arise out of actions, situations and consequences rather 
than from antecedent conditions as in post-positivism. According to Creswell 
(2013), the pragmatist researchers design their inquiry to look into the “what” and 
“how” to research intended consequences (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Four Worldviews  
(Source: Creswell, 2014:6) 
 
The current study was approached from a constructivist worldview. According to 
Lincoln, Lynham and Guba (2011), a constructivist worldview believes that 
individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live in and work. 
Constructivism assumes that the social and physical world is not a “given”, but 
constructed through the actions and interactions of humans (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991; Rajablu et al, 2015).  This worldview has been adopted because the 
constructivist paradigm is based on the premise that there is no fixed set of 
principles or processes that underlie human thought and behaviour – their 
psychology and philosophy is conditional; and that people's understanding of the 
world is based on what is being said and discussed about the world – their 
categories affect human understanding of the world and those understandings 
influence their choices, which, in turn, modify the world and necessitate a change 
in human understanding (Creswell, 2014).  
The choice of this paradigm is informed by the view that all knowledge about 
corporate reputation is contingent upon human practices being constructed in, and 
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transmitted within an essentially social context (Rayner, 2003, Dowling, 2016). 
Also, there is no one reality to explore – stakeholders or constituencies do not 
behave in a certain and generalisable way when making corporate reputation 
decisions. This is supported by a number of researchers in the field of corporate 
reputation that interpret corporate reputation as an attitudinal construct that only 
exists in the minds of individuals (Doney & Cannon 1997; Einwiller, 2003; 
Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun et al, 2000; Rayner, 2003; Farooq, 2016). As Wartick 
(2002:16) emphasises, “reputation, be it corporate or otherwise, cannot be argued 
to be anything but purely perceptual”.   
The epistemological orientation is about the acquisition of knowledge and the 
relationship between the researcher and the researched (Maurer, 1999). There 
are two broad epistemological stances (Chen & Sadeque, 2007), namely, 
interpretive epistemology and positivist epistemology. In a positivist epistemology 
orientation, stakeholders are considered as rational, knowledgeable entities and 
stable (Maurer, 1999; Pachauri, 2002). An interpretive epistemological orientation 
assumes that stakeholders are free-thinking and autonomous and can describe 
their own experiences and assign meaning to their actions rather than passively 
responding to the environment.  Given the focus of this research and the differing 
arguments in the corporate reputation literature, an interpretive subjectivist 
epistemology is adopted. This is underlined by the notion of subjectivity of the 
social world, as there is a possibility of multiple interpretations of social contexts in 
the study of corporate reputation; the impact of the researcher on the 
phenomenon being studied, as knowledge and human interests, is interrelated 
and the researcher, being human, is not unbiased; and the existence of multiple 
realities due to the multiple different interpretations of the same phenomenon 
under study (France, 2007; Kaul & Desai, 2015). 
The epistemology of this research is based on the interpretive approach which 
uses the argument that subjectivity, social media reports and public perceptions 
play an important role in the assessment of corporate reputation (Dhir & Vinen, 
2005; Parsons et al, 2014; Massey, 2016). It is acknowledged by many industry 
practitioners that most stakeholders in the diamond industry often rely on public 
perceptions in making assessments of corporate reputation (Lussier, 2014; 
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Prager, 2014; Sirsly & Lvina, 2016). The other argument for an interpretive 
approach is that the diamond industry is a unique and very complex industry; it 
relies strictly on marketing and promotion to sell products to a specified group of 
people (Even-Zohar, 2007; Mellier, 2015). According to Euromonitor Report 
(2015), it is common knowledge that a select few are able to afford diamond 
jewellery products and the vast majority of people who are exposed to 
advertisements for certain products generally have aspirations of being able to 
own these products.   
4.1.1 Mixed-Method Research Approach 
A mixed-method research approach which combines quantitative with qualitative 
analyses is used in this study. According to Creswell (2014), mixed methods 
research involves the collection and mixing of both qualitative and quantitative 
data in a single study.  The limitations of using only quantitative research to the 
exclusion of qualitative research and vice versa have been spelt out in the 
literature (see, for example, Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2002). The 
goal of mixed methods research is not to replace either of these approaches but 
rather to draw from their strengths and to minimise the weaknesses of both the 
quantitative purists’ paradigm and the qualitative purists’ paradigm in single 
research studies and across studies (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). As 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) argue, a mixed methods research approach is a 
legitimate endeavour to legitimatise the use of multiple approaches in answering 
research questions, rather than restricting or constraining researchers’ choices.  
The reasons for choosing a mixed methods research approach for this study are: 
 to generate deeper, in-depth and broader insights of corporate reputation 
and its constructs including key issues and management approaches 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011); 
 to enhance the convergence of qualitative and quantitative research 
outcomes to produce collaborated findings and conclusions (Creswell, 
2014); 
 to gain data from many diverse key stakeholders from different locations, 
experiences and interests within the diamond industry (Kumar, 1996); 
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 to facilitate a better understanding of the relationship between variables 
(Creswell, 2014); 
 to enhance the significance, authenticity and credibility of this study to allow 
for transferability and generalisability (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009); and 
 to create opportunities that allow for unexpected developments and insights 
(Neuman, 2011). 
4.1.2 Mixed-Method Design 
In keeping with the constructivist ontology and interpretivist epistemology that was 
discussed in the previous section and, in line with the purpose of this study and its 
research questions, a survey design using both quantitative and qualitative 
methods was deemed to be appropriate for this study. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
(2007) argue that the researcher must make two primary decisions when 
producing a mixed research design: (a) whether to operate largely within one 
dominant paradigm or not, and (b) whether to conduct the phases concurrently or 
sequentially. Figure 20 shows the three basic mixed methods design approaches. 
Those are convergent parallel mixed methods, explanatory sequential mixed 
methods and exploratory sequential mixed methods. The present study did not 
choose one dominant paradigm, rather a convergent parallel mixed method 
approach. The decision to opt for a parallel mixed method was informed by the 
nature of this research which is attempting to reach out to many stakeholders via a 
questionnaire while providing an opportunity to engage on deep and in-depth 
conversations in open-ended semi-structured interviews (see interview protocol in 
Appendix 5) with a selected number of stakeholder representatives. According to 
Creswell (2014), a convergent parallel mixed method design is the most common 
of the basic and advanced mixed methods strategies. In this design, a researcher 
collects both quantitative and qualitative data, analyses them separately and then 
compares the results to confirm or disprove each other.  The choice for this 
research design allows an opportunity to gather quantitative responses from a 
large-scale quantitative stakeholder survey (involving the collection of data from 
about 555 individuals in different categories of stakeholder segments around the 
major diamond mining towns in South Africa, while collecting qualitative data 
through the in-depth qualitative semi-structured stakeholder interviews, document 
analysis and focus group workshop. 
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Figure 20: Three Basic Mixed Methods design  
(Source: Creswell, 2014:220) 
4.2 Procedures for Mixed-Method Data Collection 
Based on the literature review (Chapters 2 and 3), significant information was 
generated relating to the definitions, drivers and the measurement of corporate 
reputation. Based on this data from the literature review, important stakeholders in 
the South African diamond industry were identified and defined (Table 6).  
  
Quantitative Data Collection 
and Analysis (QUAN) 
Qualitative Data Collection 
and Analysis (QUAL) 
Compare or 
Relate 
Interpretation 
Quantitative Data Collection 
and Analysis (QUAN) 
Qualitative Data 
Collection Analysis 
(qual) 
Interpret
ation 
Follow 
up 
with  
Qualitative Data Collection 
and Analysis (QUAL) 
Quantitative Data 
Collection and 
Analysis (quan) 
Interpre
tation 
Builds 
to 
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Table 6: Stakeholder Group Profiles and Characteristics 
Stakeholder group Characteristics 
Consumers of diamond 
jewellery products. 
Consumers of diamond jewellery together with 
prospective consumers or potential customers 
Employees in the 
diamond industry. 
People that are currently employed in various 
segments of the diamond industry including mining, 
cutting and polishing, marketing and retail stores 
Funding providers. Loan-providers in the diamond industry including 
banking institutions investment advisors, bank 
analysts, private investors and bank economists 
Media house 
representatives. 
Editors and journalists of mining and diamond-
related publications  
Mining Town 
communities. 
Consumers of diamond jewellery together with 
prospective consumers or potential customers 
Lobby groups and 
union representatives. 
Multinational and country based Non-Governmental 
Organisations involved with advocacy and 
developmental programmes in the diamond mining 
communities including the representative bodies of 
employees working in the diamond industry 
Regulatory authorities. Diamond industry regulatory authorities from 
different government departments including 
Department of Mineral Resources, Department of 
Environmental Affairs, Provincial Departments and 
Local government authorities (municipalities). 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction, based on literature review and extensive 
experience in the diamond industry) 
In terms of data collection, a quantitative questionnaire survey was held together 
or in parallel with an in-depth semi-structured interview targeting 22 stakeholder 
representatives in the South African diamond industry. In terms of secondary data 
collection, Socio-economic Assessment Toolbox reports for various mining 
companies were reviewed as well as the focus group method where a two day 
workshop was held with 48 youth groups from various diamond villages in South 
Africa (see Appendix 10). The questionnaires were developed through two pilot 
studies, resulting in the development of the final version which was circulated to 
stakeholders (Appendix 2). In line with Creswell’s (2014) recommendation, the key 
aim of the chosen design was to collect both qualitative and quantitative forms of 
data using the same or parallel variables and constructs.  
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4.3 Questionnaire design 
The closed-format questionnaire (Appendix 2) that only permitted prescribed 
responses was designed to capture all the answers essential for addressing the 
thesis’s research questions. The closed format makes it easy for respondents to 
provide answers because alternatives are provided and the limited number of 
possible answers facilitated the efficient coding and effective analysis of the 
responses. Forced answering software prevented internet respondents from 
skipping and possibly failing to answer questions in the survey. The development 
of the questionnaire passed through three iterations or amendments after 
analysing responses from two separate pilot surveys. As is clear from the final 
questionnaire, the survey captured all the information deemed essential in 
addressing the research questions. It contained the following information:  
a. Biographical Information 
Question 1 requested information on company, country, representation and 
contact details. Information on age, gender and level of education was excluded in 
order to reduce the length of the survey and was also deemed inappropriate after 
the initial pilot survey. Question 2 focused on the categorisation of the 
stakeholders into the following categories: banking institutions, community 
representatives (including Community Based Organisations), employees in the 
diamond industry, investors, human rights and lobby groups, corporate reputation 
experts, labour unions; prospective consumers of diamond products, senior 
executives in the diamond industry, consumers in the diamond industry, regulatory 
authorities, suppliers in the diamond industry and media houses.  Question 2 
allowed the researcher to separate categories of stakeholders in order to allow in-
depth analysis of each stakeholder’s perspectives. 
b. Definition of Corporate Reputation and Characteristics 
Questions 3, 4 and 5 captured the respondents’ understanding of the definition of 
corporate reputation, its components and the various drivers of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry. Question 3 was intended to assist in identifying 
possible differences in the way stakeholders were confronted with specific 
decisions in defining corporate reputation.  In this question, all the respondents 
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were asked to rank the level of importance of each of the given definitions of 
corporate reputation.  The respondents were expected to rank the importance 
from their specific context informed by their decision-making requirements. 
Question 4 outlined the components of corporate reputation and asked 
respondents to rank the importance of each of the 10 components from their 
individual perspectives. Question 5 outlined the different drivers of corporate 
reputation and requested the respondents to rank the top drivers from their 
perspectives. 
c. Perceptions of the Diamond Industry and Key Reputational Issues 
Questions 6, 7 and 8 were designed to elicit generic stakeholder perceptions on 
the diamond industry, the level of compliance with global ethical best practices as 
well as the current and future reputational issues. Question 8 was intended to 
identify current and future key reputational issues affecting the diamond industry. 
This question was open-ended to allow new issues to surface. Respondents were 
asked to rank several issues that were identified during the literature review using 
the 7-point Likert scale. An opportunity was provided for respondents to air new 
issues.  
c. Effects of Corporate Reputation 
Question 9 established the effects of corporate reputation in the diamond industry 
using the 7-point Likert scale. Special focus was given to employee relations, 
customer loyalty, stakeholder relations, brand positioning, community relations 
and general regulatory approvals. 
d. Management of Corporate Reputation 
Questions 10 and 11 established the programmes that are being implemented to 
address corporate reputation in the diamond industry and their effectiveness. The 
programmes include the Kimberley Process (KP), social investment in rural areas 
where diamond mines are found, beneficiation of diamonds in the producer 
countries and compliance with global best practices in ensuring credible 
stewardship of the diamond product. Question 10 established the level of 
awareness by different stakeholders of various interventions that are being 
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implemented by various industry players in managing corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry using a 4-point Likert scale where “Great Deal” = 1; “Fair 
Amount” = 2; “Just a Little” = 3; and “Nothing at All” = 4; while question 11 looked 
at the effectiveness levels using a 5-point Likert scale where “Not at all Effective” = 
1; “Not Effective” = 2; “Fairly Effective” = 3; “Very Effective”= 4; and “I don’t Know” 
= 5. 
e. Diamond Jewellery Purchasing Decision-Making 
Question 12 ranked key considerations that different stakeholders take into 
account in making purchasing decisions. Forced ranking was implemented in 
order to establish the respondents’ top priority out of the 11 statements from their 
stakeholder group’s perspective. 
f. Measurement Tools for Corporate  Reputation 
Question 13 outlined a number of different tools used to measure corporate 
reputation. Using the 7-point Likert scale, respondents were asked to prioritise the 
most effective tools for consideration. Table 7 below presents a summary of the 
survey format. 
Table 7: Summary of Survey Format 
Construct Question Number Scale 
Definition of Corporate Reputation 
and Characteristics 
Question 3 Multiple choice 
Question 4 and 5 7-point Likert scale 
Perceptions of the Diamond 
Industry and Key Reputational 
Issues 
Question 6, 7, 8 7-point Likert scale 
Effects of Corporate Reputation Question 9 7-point Likert scale 
Management of Corporate 
Reputation 
Question 10  4-point Likert scale 
Question 11 5-point Likert scale 
Diamond Jewellery Purchasing 
Decision-Making 
Question 12 Ranking 
Measuring Tools for Corporate 
Reputation 
Question 13 7-point Likert scale 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction based on research questionnaire) 
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It was important that all respondents with varying backgrounds and levels of 
education understood the language used in the questionnaire and were motivated 
to complete the survey. The use of clear and simple English in the questionnaire 
made this possible. Rossiter and Bellman (2005) claim that the Likert response 
format is the most effective research tool to ensure that time is minimised in 
completing the survey and that there is a solid presentation of results and 
analysis. After completing the questionnaire, a conclusion was written in a way 
that expressed an appreciation of time and required effort from the respondents.  
4.4 Questionnaire survey 
Based on the literature review, the survey population consisted of different 
stakeholder groups as presented in Table 8. These include consumers of the 
jewellery products, diamond industry employees, community representatives, 
labour union representatives and investors within the diamond industry. Random 
sampling is the most preferred sampling method because each member of the 
population has an equal opportunity of being selected for the sample (Creswell, 
2014; Zikmund, 2003). This was not possible in this research, as the researcher 
did not have equal access to all the stakeholders in the diamond industry. The 
sampling method for this research was non-probability, purposive and therefore 
not random. The choice of the key stakeholders to be interviewed or to receive the 
questionnaire was deliberate in order to get a balanced spread of representation 
across different stakeholders within the diamond industry.  
Questionnaires were distributed to stakeholders electronically or in print. The 
response rate towards a corporate reputation study in South Africa is unknown. 
Figure 21 shows the multiple methods of distributing questionnaires and collecting 
responses in this research.   
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Figure 21: Self-administered questionnaire distribution method  
(Source: Zikmund, 2003:15) 
Traditionally low response rates on internet surveys encouraged the researcher to 
include the additional distribution channels for the survey.  An email containing an 
introductory covering letter was sent to all the potential respondents, with the 
questionnaire web-link to Survey Monkey. The explanatory and invitation letter 
(Appendix 3) described the context and purpose of the study, and the need for the 
questionnaire to be completed accurately, in time and with a guarantee of 
anonymity for respondents who participated or consented to participate.  A 
commitment to share the results of the study with the respondents was also 
included in the covering letter. 
The printed questionnaires were made available to various stakeholders through 
face-to-face engagements. Such stakeholders mainly included those who did not 
have access to internet, especially the community representatives and low level 
employees in the diamond industry value chain. 
The survey was subjected to pre-testing in order to determine validity and 
reliability of the data collected. Two pilot studies were given to different test groups 
to allow the groups to make their comments and suggestions concerning the 
direction, recording procedure and ease of use of the survey.  The test group was 
Self 
Administered 
Questionnaires 
Printed 
Questionnaires 
Fax 
Face-to- 
Face/facilitated 
completion 
Electronic 
Internet 
(Survey 
Monkey) 
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asked to comment on the questions and indicate which, if any, items confused 
them, the time it took to complete the survey and whether the words or language 
used were difficult to understand. Changes were implemented in light of these 
responses and suggestions, and with regard to the relevant theory base. The 
completed questionnaires were captured in a spreadsheet format, before being 
subjected to statistical analysis in the programme Stata version 13. Table 8 shows 
the number of responses from the different stakeholder groups.  
Table 8: Target Audience 
Target Audience Characteristics 
 
Number of 
participants 
Consumers of 
diamond jewellery 
products 
Consumers of diamond jewellery together 
with potential customers 
100 
Employees in the 
diamond industry 
People (including senior executives) who are 
currently employed in various segments of 
the diamond industry including mining, cutting 
and polishing, marketing and retail stores 
200 
Funding Providers Loan-providers in the diamond industry 
including banking institutions, investment 
advisors, bank analysts, private investors and 
bank economists. 
30 
Media house 
representatives 
Editors and journalists of mining and 
diamond-related publications  
20 
Mining town 
communities 
Community bodies that are directly affected 
by the diamond mining operations, including 
community-based organisations and civic 
organisations. 
150 
Lobby groups and 
union 
representatives 
Multinational and country based non-
governmental organisations involved with 
advocacy and developmental programmes in 
the diamond mining communities including 
the representative bodies of employees 
working in the diamond industry. 
100 
Regulatory 
authorities 
Diamond industry regulatory authorities from 
different government departments including 
Department of Mineral Resources, 
Department of Environmental Affairs, 
Provincial Departments and Local 
government authorities (municipalities). 
50 
          Total: 650 
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4.5 Quantitative Data Integrity 
4.5.1 Validity, Reliability, Sensitivity and Survey Errors 
Validity and reliability of the outcomes of this research is an essential part of this 
study.  According to Neuman (2011) and Creswell (2014), validity and reliability 
establish the truthfulness, credibility, or believability of the research results. 
Validity refers to the accuracy of the study, while reliability refers to how 
consistently a technique measures concepts so that the results may be replicated 
by other researchers (Kumar, 1996; Leedy & Ormrod, 2001; Neuman, 2011).  In 
this research, validity is divided into internal and external validity.  Management of 
sensitivities and systematic errors were also a critical part of this research in order 
to enhance the credibility of this study. 
Internal validity 
The internal validity of the mixed-method based study is essential in order to 
replicate the findings of this study. Internal validity of this study is the extent to 
which its design and the data that it yields allows the researcher to draw accurate 
conclusions (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005; Creswell, 2014). In this study, internal validity 
was achieved by developing the questionnaires based on extensive literature 
review, intensive discussions with various diamond industry experts including 
investors, senior executives, regulators and community representatives to obtain 
their views and opinions. It was also achieved by piloting the questionnaire to 
ensure that the questions were not complicated and confusing and that 
respondents understood the questionnaire and that the responses address the 
main research questions.  
External validity 
External validity refers to the extent to which the study results could be applied to 
situations beyond the study itself or be generalised (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The 
fact that this study involved more than 600 respondents whose profile extends 
from the diamond industry to beyond the diamond industry, enhances the 
generalisability of this study.  The use of a mixed method approach further 
enhances the adequacy and potential to generalise the outcome of this study.   
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Reliability 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001), the study reliability refers to the 
consistency with which a measuring instrument yields a certain result when the 
entity being measured has not changed. Kumar (1996) stated that reliability refers 
to the extent to which a measurement scale is dependable, consistent, predictable 
and stable.   
The reliability of this study was achieved by the use of a standardised 
questionnaire which was piloted to eliminate any ambiguity and to test the quality 
of the results.  Scale purification was done by subjecting the instrument to the 
computation of coefficient alphas as recommended by Cronbach (1951).  The 
reliability coefficient of the first pilot was 0,51 which, according to Hinton, 
Brownlow, McMurray and Cozens (2004), indicates a scale of low reliability. The 
second pilot revealed a reliability of 0.73 after adjusting some of the questions. 
This was considered acceptable evidence of the reliability and consistency of the 
instrument to proceed with the survey in line with Hinton et al’s (2004) assertion 
that an alpha score between 0.5 and 0.75 indicates a moderately reliable scale 
and is generally acceptable.  
The reliability of the research findings is also dependent on the internal validity of 
the questionnaire. 
Sensitivity 
According to Zikmund (2003), dichotomous response categories of agree or 
disagree do not always allow the recording of subtle attitude changes.  In order to 
capture these hidden nuances, a more sensitive measure, with numerous items on 
a scale is required. Stacey (2005) recommends that one should score items with 
seven scale response categories. In this study, this recommendation was 
achieved by expanding the response options to include a 7-point Likert scale 
where “strongly agree”, “agree”, “slightly agree”, “neutral”, “slightly disagree”, 
“disagree”, “strongly disagree” were added as possible categories to increase the 
scale’s sensitivity. 
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Survey Errors 
The researcher paid full attention to removing systematic errors from the survey in 
order to ensure the integrity of the findings.  According to Zikmund (2003), survey 
errors that cause response errors are a result of imperfections in the research 
design. Errors can also occur as a result of mistakes in the implementation and 
execution of the research.  In this study, the following key possible survey error 
factors were considered: 
 Sample selection error which is the administrative error caused by improper 
sample selection. This study uses a non-probability, purposive sampling 
method which has limitations especially when the number of responses is 
limited.  This research achieved 548 responses which is more than 85% of 
the expected responses; 
 Data processing error which can be caused by incorrect data entry, 
incorrect computer programming and other associated errors during the 
data analysis. In this research, all internet and electronic responses were 
automatically downloaded into a table for analysis by the credible, widely 
used, and highly recommended survey software provider 
SurveyMonkey.com. This eliminated the possibility of any form of data 
capture errors. The print responses were captured in the same format as 
the electronic tables. 
 Interviewer cheating which is a practice of filling in fake answers in the 
questionnaires.  In this study most of the responses came from the Survey 
Monkey. Interviewer error can be caused by failure of an interviewer to 
record responses correctly. This study was not administered by the 
interviewer, in cases where face-to-face engagement with respondents 
occurred, especially those who did not have access to computers, the 
standardised format of the questionnaires was followed strictly. 
4.6 Quantitative Data Analysis 
This section outlines the data analysis strategy used in this research to examine 
the responses to the quantitative stakeholder survey.  According to Malhotra 
(1996), the selection process of an appropriate data analysis strategy needs to 
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take into account the context of the study, purpose of the study, research 
questions and the key assumptions of the statistical techniques to be utilised.  
Various statistical tools are used for most of the data analysis in this quantitative 
section. This is because most of the responses to the survey questionnaire were 
in the form of ordinal data, as the 7-point Likert scale was used in questions 4 to 
13.  The responses varied from Strongly Disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Slightly 
Disagree = 3; Neutral = 4; Slightly Agree = 5; Agree = 6; and Strongly Agree = 7.  
The parameter estimation method included the estimation of threshold values for 
the entire set of items in the Likert scale as well as two additional local and spread 
parameters for each item.   
Factor analysis, which often covers principal component analysis as well as 
exploratory factor analysis, is a broad subject area that includes "a variety of 
statistical techniques whose common objective is to represent a set of variables in 
terms of a smaller number of hypothetical variables" (Kim & Mueller, 1978:9). 
Principal component analysis and exploratory factor analysis are both used in this 
study’s analysis of results. Principle component analysis is used by researchers 
mainly as a variable reduction tool (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003). In the same vein, 
principle component analysis is used in cases where the main aim is to create a 
single composite measure with the fewest possible number of variables to 
measure the isolated themes (see, for example, sections 5.7 and 5.8). Exploratory 
Factor Analysis is used to identify and quantify latent variables or themes within 
the data (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003).  For this current study, exploratory factor 
analysis is used in sections where the items are suspected of being driven by 
latent themes (see, for example, section 5.9). An oblique factor rotation technique 
is used in situations where the themes are correlated.  For the main data analysis, 
a factor analysis was conducted in order to reduce the items under analysis to 
lower redundancy. Principal component analysis was used with promax rotation 
(an oblique rotation technique) in order to extract the relevant number of factors as 
well as the factor loadings. The number of factors was selected using the Kaiser 
criterion (Kaiser, 1960) and Cattell's Scree test (Cattell, 1966). The Kaiser criterion 
involves a selection of factors with eigenvalues greater than one while the Cattell's 
Scree test (Cattell, 1966) involves an inspection of the screeplot to detect the 
discontinuity which then helps to identify the separation between the relevant and 
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irrelevant factors. The rotated factor loadings were then used to create indices. 
These indices were then analysed in order to assess the general themes in the 
entire dataset as well as the differences between the relevant groups. Additional 
analysis in the form of regression analysis was conducted. The regression 
analysis was based on a combination of the indices. The procedure for the 
regression analysis is explained as follows: Regression analysis examines the 
relationship between a variable (dependent variable) and a set of variables 
(independent variables). In this study, regression analysis was used to examine 
the nature of the differences in the perceptions between the stakeholder groups.  
The assumptions underlying regression analysis were tested in order to ascertain 
whether the results were valid or not. The tests included testing for 
hetroskedasticity, normality of the residuals, sample size adequacy as well as an 
inspection for very influential cases/outliers. The dependent variable is a 
composite index that was created based on stakeholder views on the 
effectiveness of a set of reputation management initiatives. Three different 
dependent variables were established and examined against various independent 
variables. The construction of the three indices that represent each of the 
dependent variables is explained in sections 5.6.1. to 5.7.3. The factor loadings 
computed in the factor analysis section (section 5.6.16) using exploratory factor 
analysis were used as the weights in constructing the respective indices which 
represent the aforementioned three different dependent variables. Each index was 
established to measure the extent to which stakeholders perceive a set of 
initiatives in terms of their effectiveness in managing corporate reputation. The 
values of each index range from 0 to 100, where 0 represents completely 
ineffective and 100 represents very effective.  Eight regression models were set 
up to examine the relationships between the stakeholder perceptions on the 
effectiveness of a set of initiatives and the stakeholder categories and groups. 
Seven of eight regression models use dummy variables for the relevant 
stakeholder category or individual stakeholder group at each level while one of the 
eight regression models only uses awareness as a control variable. As explained 
above, the awareness index represents the control variable that is used for the 
analysis. The awareness index was generated using the weighted average of the 
variables relating to the levels of awareness an individual has shown for the 
various initiatives covered by the dependent variable. Three awareness indices 
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were created, one for each of the three sets of initiatives used to create each 
dependent variable. The weights are identical to those used in generating the 
perception index. The values for each Index range from 0 to 100, where 0 
represents completely unaware of all the initiatives, while 100 represents a high 
level of awareness of all the initiatives. 
4.7 Qualitative Stakeholder Representative Individual Semi-structured In-
depth Interviews 
Based on the purpose of this research, literature review results and research 
questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the 
diamond industry. According to Guba and Lincoln (1987) and Patton (1999), a key 
informant is a person who has unique skills or a professional background related 
to the issue/intervention being studied, is knowledgeable about the project 
participants or has access to other information of interest to the researcher. In this 
study, the interviews were conducted with the different stakeholders as shown in 
Table 10. Criteria used in selecting these stakeholders for the face-to-face semi-
structured in-depth interviews were based on the key informant’s description and 
assumptions. Creswell (2002) emphasised the importance of selecting 
respondents who will provide rich and complex responses to questions. The 
interviewees were chosen on the basis of their extensive expertise and deep 
knowledge of corporate reputation and the diamond industry in southern Africa. 
They were spread across a number of areas and geographies to provide a more 
holistic understanding of the impact of corporate reputation on the diamond 
industry with special focus on the mining, cutting and polishing, and diamond retail 
sales, including marketing.  A five step procedure approach was used in the 
selection of interviewees as designed by Hatcher and Corton (2007) as shown in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9: Procedure for Selection of Interviewees 
Step Procedure  Results 
Step 1 Review applicable literature and consult with 
corporate reputation practitioners, mine 
managers and media analysts to compile a list 
of potential panel members. 
List of names and contact 
details. 
Step 2 Check presentations or articles (or other 
recommendations from the public relations 
managers in the diamond industry) for evidence 
of knowledge of corporate reputation or the 
diamond industry in general. 
Mark evidence of 
knowledge and expertise in 
the field. 
Step 3 Evaluate potential stakeholder representatives 
as to their contributions to the discussion and/or 
subject(s) under investigation.  
Rate potential stakeholder 
representatives on a 
suitability-to-the-study scale 
of 1 to 3 (1¼ not useful, 2¼ 
moderately useful, 3¼ very 
useful to the study). 
Step 4 Present evidence of potential stakeholder 
representatives’ expertise to the supervisor for 
review and sign off. 
Develop a final list of 
potential stakeholder 
representatives to invite to 
participate and a list of 
possible substitutes. 
Step 5 Telephone or email each potential stakeholder 
representative to explain the purpose and scope 
of the study, with invitation to participate. 
Follow-up with each 
participant committed to the 
study with a letter. 
(Source: Adapted from Hatcher and Corton, 2007:35) 
4.7.1 Qualitative Data Collection 
The two most prominent data collection methods used in qualitative research are 
participants’ observations and unstructured or semi-structured interviews (Bryman, 
1989; Gibbs, 2007). Bryman (1989) argues that, in an organisational research, 
document analysis should also be used. Qualitative research seeks depth rather 
than breadth, it is about why, how, reasoning, perspectives, interpretation, 
motivation and perceptions (Ambert, Adler & Adler, 1995; Bryman, 1989; Creswell, 
2014). This is because the qualitative researcher seeks to explore and acquire in-
depth and intimate information on a smaller sample of people instead of drawing 
from a large, representative sample of a greater population. Qualitative research 
can be interpreted as that which is more appropriate for use as a discovery rather 
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than a verification mode of enquiry. Therefore, new information may reflect new 
practices or behaviours; there could be new forms of social structures, practices, 
new ways of thinking or new ways of interpreting processes of change. For the 
purpose of this study, the main aim of using qualitative methods is to study and 
learn about how and why people think in a specific way, behave and make 
conclusions.  Bryman (1989) argues that the most central characteristic of 
qualitative research is its emphasis on the perspective of the individuals being 
studied.   
In marketing research, the main purpose of qualitative research is to find out what 
is in a consumer’s mind (Aaker et al, 2003) in order to access and to get different 
perspectives on the complexities of different phenomena.  Qualitative data is 
collected in order to get a deep understanding of things which otherwise could not 
be observed directly and measured, for example, feelings, thoughts, intentions, 
and behaviour that took place in the past are things that can only be obtained 
through qualitative research methods (Foucault, 1980).   
According to Aaker et al (2003:189), Creswell (2014) and Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000), the basic assumption behind qualitative research methods is that an 
individual’s organisation of a relatively unstructured stimulus indicates the person’s 
basic perceptions of the phenomenon and his or her reaction to it. 
The more unstructured and ambiguous a stimulus is, the more subjects can 
and will project their emotions, needs, motives, attitudes, and values.  The 
structure of a stimulus leaves very little choice: the subject has unambiguous 
choice among clear alternatives. A stimulus of low structure has a wide range 
of alternative choices. 
Based on the above detailed description of the subject, the qualitative research 
approach can be defined as a method of enquiry which focuses on participants’ 
perceptions and their perspectives, interpretation of the situation and their 
emotional expressions (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Neuman, 2011).  It is based on 
multiple forms of empirical materials such as case studies, introspection, life story, 
personal experience, interviews, historical data, observations and visual texts 
(Merriam, 2002).  It is a complex field of enquiry which cuts across various 
disciplines, fields and subject matters.  It is made up of a number of complex, 
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interconnected terms and many assumptions in relation to the effects of corporate 
reputation on business success. 
This study involved, in part, in-depth interviews. The sampling method used in this 
study was a purposive non-probability technique that builds on the results of the 
literature review. Interviews were conducted with a diversified number of different 
stakeholder groups in line with research questions. According to Aaker et al, 
(2003) and Creswell (2014), qualitative methods are effective in gaining more 
insight into the topics than might otherwise be difficult to pursue with structured 
research methods. In this study, quantitative analyses yielded patterns that 
motivated follow-up interviews.  The latter is used in this research following the 
extensive quantitative stakeholder survey.  
4.7.2 Stakeholder Representative Individual Semi-structured In-depth 
Interviews 
Individual face to face semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 
stakeholder representatives in the diamond industry in South Africa. In order to 
facilitate ease of processing the data obtained, Dictaphone recordings of the 
interviews were transcribed verbatim. According to Lofland and Lofland (1995) and 
Patton (1999), in-depth interviews are interviews that are conducted face-to-face 
with the respondent, in which the subject matter of the interview is explored in 
detail.  According to Bryman (1989) and Patton (1999), individual in-depth 
interviews are characterised by extensive probing and open-ended questions. 
Many authors claim that there are two types of in-depth interviews.  They are non-
directive and semi-structured, and their differences lie in the amount of guidance 
the interviewer gives during the interview (Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Gibbs, 2007). 
In a non-directive interview, the respondent is given maximum freedom to 
respond, within the bounds of topics of interest to the interviewer.  Success in this 
type of setting is heavily dependent on the relationship between the researcher 
and the respondent and the ability of the researcher to probe for elaborations as 
part of the conversation. This setting also relies on the skills and experience of the 
researcher in guiding the discussions and the time available for this intensive 
engagement. The semi-structured interview allows the interviewer to cover a 
specific list of topics or sub-areas. This mode of interviewing is highly 
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recommended for use when dealing with busy executives, industry experts and 
senior government officials. In this research, the semi-structured interview process 
approach was used (aligned with research questions to ensure that all the relevant 
topics were covered). The three techniques as suggested by Aaker et al (2003) 
were used in formulating the structure of various questions. Those are: firstly, 
laddering whereby questioning progresses from product characteristics to user 
characteristics; secondly, there is the technique that uses hidden-issue 
questioning, whereby the questioning focus is not on socially shared values, but 
rather on personal “sore spots” – not on general life styles, but on deeply felt 
personal concerns; and thirdly a technique is used that is referred to as symbolic 
analysis, whereby questioning attempts to analyse the symbolic meanings of 
objects and meanings by comparing them with their opposites. These techniques 
were observed in the development of the semi-structured questions. 
Interviewees included investors, employees, senior executives from the diamond 
industry, representatives of NGOs, trade unions, community representatives, 
customers, senior banking officials, senior government officials, trade 
associations, industry experts and corporate-reputation practitioners. A total of 22 
interviews (Table 10) were conducted during October 2012 and June 2013 with 
conversations lasting up to one hour on average. 
Table 10: List of Stakeholder Representatives in the diamond industry 
Number Stakeholder Segment Role in the Diamond Industry 
1 Investor Ernest Oppenheimer & Sons (De Beers 
Shareholder) 
2 Investor  Ponohalo (Black Economic 
Empowerment Partner in the De Beers 
Consolidated Mines in South Africa) 
3 Chief Executive Officer Diamond Mining Company 
4 Chief Executive Officer  Diamond Trading Company 
5 Senior Banking Official 
Practitioner 
Diamond Industry  
6 Union Representative National Union of Mine Workers, South 
Africa 
7 Union Representative and a 
community activist 
National Union of Mine Workers, South 
Africa 
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8 Politician and community 
activist 
African National Congress Youth 
League 
9 Diamond Beneficiation 
Practitioner 
Diamond Trading Company 
10 Senior Mine Manager Diamond Mining Company 
11 Senior Community 
Relations Practitioner 
Diamond Mining Industry  
12 Diamond Customer Sandton, South Africa 
13 Diamond Customer Bryanston, South Africa 
14 Diamond Customer Northcliff, South Africa 
15 Non-Governmental 
Organisation 
Representative 
Community and Environmental issues 
16 Senior Community relations 
Practitioner 
Limpopo Province, South Africa 
17 Senior Communications 
Practitioner 
Communications and Public Affairs 
18 Senior Human Resources 
Practitioner 
Diamond Industry  
19 Senior Community 
Relations Practitioner 
Northern Cape 
20 Senior Government Official South African Department of Mineral 
Resources 
21 Senior Government Official South African Department of Mineral 
Resources (responsible for 
Transformation and compliance with 
Mining Charter) 
22 Community Activist Greater Kapa Bokone Community trust, 
Kimberley, Northern Cape South Africa 
4.8 Qualitative Data Quality and Trustworthiness 
Scholars in qualitative research have argued the need to demonstrate that the 
research is credible not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative research 
(Golafshani, 2003; Gibbs, 2007). Creswell (2014) proposes the use of the 
following eight approaches to ensure validity in the qualitative research: 
 Triangulation of different data sources of information by examining 
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evidence from the sources and using it to create a coherent justification for 
themes. 
 Use member checking to determine the accuracy of the qualitative findings 
through taking the final report or themes back to participants and 
determining whether these participants feel that they are accurate. 
 Use of rich, thick description to convey findings. This description may 
transport readers to the actual setting and give the discussion an element 
of shared experience. 
 Clarify the bias the researcher brings to the study. This self-reflection 
creates an open and honest narrative that will resonate well with the 
readers. 
 The presentation of negative or discrepant information that runs counter to 
the themes.  This reflects a real life setting which is composed of different 
perspectives that do not always coalesce. 
 Spend prolonged time in the field so that the researcher develops an in-
depth knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon that is being 
studied and can convey practical details about the site and various 
dynamics. 
 The use of peer debriefing to enhance the accuracy of the findings. This 
practice involves locating a person who reviews and asks questions about 
the qualitative study to ensure resonance with other people, not just the 
researcher. 
 Use an external auditor to review the entire research project. As distinct 
from a peer debriefer, this auditor is not familiar with the researcher or the 
project and can provide an objective assessment of the project throughout 
the research process. 
Gibbs (2007) proposes four reliability strategies in the qualitative research project 
as follows: 
 The transcripts must be checked to make sure that they do not contain 
obvious mistakes made during transcription. 
 Cross-check codes developed by different researchers by comparing 
results that are independently derived. Creswell (2014) proposes several 
procedures be mentioned in a proposal and that single researchers find 
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another person who can cross-check their code for what is called 
“intercoder agreement”. This agreement could be based on whether two or 
more coders agree with codes used for the same passage of text and 
whether another coder will use the same code. 
 Researcher must make sure that there is not a drift in the definition of 
codes or a shift in the meaning of the codes during the process of coding. 
 In terms of team research, coordination of the communication among the 
coders by regular documented meetings and by sharing the analysis. 
Some qualitative researchers have questioned the relevance of the terms validity 
and reliability in the qualitative research (Huberman & Miles, 2002; Tobin & 
Begley, 2004). They suggest that terminology such as dependability, 
confirmability, trustworthiness, verification, transferability and credibility be used in 
qualitative research studies. The data quality and trustworthiness of the qualitative 
part of this research was ensured by applying the following criteria in line with both 
Creswell (2014), and Huberman and Miles’s (2002) proposals which are 
authenticity, dependability, credibility and confirmation. 
Authenticity 
The development of the interview questions was based on a substantive 
theoretical basis in line with research questions and the literature review.  The 
interview questions were tested in a pilot study before the roll-out in order to 
ensure authenticity of this study.  
Dependability 
Care was taken to ensure that the research process was clearly documented. An 
electronic data recording device was used supported by extensive note-taking 
during the research and an experienced research assistant was employed to 
assist with the note-taking and with securing access to relevant documents 
required for this study.  This contributed to improving the dependability of 
information and cut out possible bias. 
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Credibility  
According to Lofland and Lofland (1995) and Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), 
information from in-depth interviews, supported by extensive document analysis 
and focus group research, can be regarded as credible.  Therefore, careful 
documentation of the data collection procedures and the questions asked of the 
respondents is important.  In this study, careful consideration was given to the 
documentation of the entire research process in line with Riessman’s (1993) 
narrative analysis approach in qualitative research projects in marketing. The use 
of member checking strategy was adopted to determine the accuracy of the 
findings. 
Confirmation 
Several strategies and tactics were employed in order to guarantee confirmability 
of this research. Those include: the researcher conducted separate interviews with 
at least two individuals in the same stakeholder segment.  This provided an 
opportunity to cross-check the evidence which was gathered from each set of 
respondents.  This was particularly important in gathering perspectives from 
governments, employees and communities. The verification of different themes 
(see Appendix 3) by the interviewees (at least by two representatives across the 
spectrum) were used and there was triangulation of data collection methods. The 
audit or verification process was implemented in order to ensure that the data and 
interpretations of the findings were sound and confirmed the findings. 
4.8.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis is defined as the process of bringing order, structure and 
meaning to a mass of collected data (Creswell, 1998; Patton, 1999). Huberman 
and Miles’s model of qualitative data analysis is widely used in sociological and 
organisational studies (Aaker et al, 2003). This approach analyses the data by 
implementing data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and verification. 
In this study, the pattern-matching method was used in analysing the data (Yin, 
2003; Gibbs, 2007). The cross-case search strategy was used in order to search 
for patterns. Categories or dimensions were used to look for within-group 
similarities, coupled with inter-group differences.  For each of the interview results, 
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documented information and group discussions, evidence was grouped under four 
foci of the study – firstly, the understanding of the concept “corporate reputation” 
and its drivers; secondly, the drivers of corporate reputation and key reputational 
issues affecting the diamond industry; thirdly, the effects of corporate reputation 
on long-term business success; and lastly, to elicit recommendations and tools to 
manage corporate reputation.  
4.9 Summary of Chapter Five 
A robust methodology based on a mixed-methodology, which flexibly incorporates 
elements of various research tools and techniques, was adopted in this research. 
Based on the leads from the literature review, questionnaires were developed and 
improved through pilot studies and associated iterations. The quantitative data 
was analysed to gain an insight into the perceptions of various stakeholders. 
Using the results of the quantitative analyses, interviews were conducted with 
stakeholders in the diamond industry to probe patterns and leads emerging out of 
quantitative analyses. This generated useful data from those who are immersed 
and embedded in the diamond industry and provided real-world knowledge about 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry. 
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CHAPTER 5 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
5  
5.1 Introduction 
The overall objective of this study is to define the meaning of corporate reputation 
and its constructs; identify key industry reputational challenges and risks; evaluate 
key effects of corporate reputation; and finally review the effectiveness and 
relevance of the existing corporate reputation management initiatives in the 
diamond industry in South Africa.  In order to achieve this objective in line with 
research questions, a questionnaire (Appendix 2) was used for data collection. 
There were 650 questionnaires that were distributed, of which 548 were returned, 
reflecting a response rate of about 85%.  The high response rate indicates the 
high interest in the study and is attributed to the support given by study assistant 
in assisting various study participants that did not have access to internet. 
This chapter is structured in line with research questions. Firstly, it provides a 
quantitative analysis of the views of a wide range of stakeholders in the diamond 
industry, based on their understanding of the meaning of corporate reputation. 
Secondly, it presents stakeholders’ perceptions about the various key components 
and determinants of corporate reputation. Thirdly, it presents an analysis of 
reputational issues, both current and future, that affect corporate reputation. 
Fourthly, it presents an analysis of the key effects of corporate reputation on the 
diamond industry, based on the perceptions of relevant or specific stakeholder 
groups. Fifthly, this section presents perceptions of key stakeholders in the 
diamond industry. Lastly, this section presents perceptions of key stakeholders of 
various corporate reputation management initiatives and their effectiveness. 
5.1.1 Stakeholders’ view of an acceptable definition of corporate 
reputation 
Literature survey revealed the presence of different conceptualisations of 
“corporate reputation” (Helm, 2007:238); Fombrun et al, 2013 Barnett et al, 2006). 
To examine whether there are any differences in the meaning of corporate 
reputation in the South African diamond industry, stakeholders were presented 
with six different definitions of corporate reputation from which to select the one 
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that best suited their understanding. Those were as follows: 
Definition 1: Corporate reputation is an overall estimation of a corporation by its 
stakeholders, which is expressed by the net effect of the reactions from 
customers, investors, employees, and the general public. 
Definition 2: Corporate reputation is a stakeholder’s overall evaluation of a 
company over time. This evaluation is based on the stakeholder’s direct 
experience with the company, any other form of communication and symbolism 
that provides information about the firm’s action and/or a comparison with other 
leading rivals. 
Definition 3: Corporate reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s 
past actions, as well as future prospects, which describes the firm’s overall appeal 
to all of its key constituents/stakeholders, when compared with other leading rivals 
Definition 4: Corporate reputation is the observers’ collective judgments of a 
corporation based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental 
impacts attributed to the corporation over time. 
Definition 5: Corporate Reputation is public’s effective evaluation of a firm’s name 
relative to other firms. 
Definition 6: Corporate reputation can be defined in terms of a number of 
attributes that form a stakeholder’s perception as to whether a company is well-
known, good or bad, reliable, trustworthy; reputable and believable. 
Table11 presents the findings on how various stakeholder groups understand or 
interpret the term corporate reputation individually and in combination. The 
stakeholder groups were divided into internal (within the business) and external 
(outside the business) (Table 11). Four internal stakeholder groups were: 
employees, senior executives, suppliers and corporate reputation experts were 
defined. Also, nine external stakeholder groups: banking institution – providers of 
debt financing; Investors – providers of equity financing; community 
representatives – member of the community; consumers; potential consumers, 
human rights representatives, labour union representatives, media house 
136 | P a g e  
representatives and regulatory authorities were defined. An analysis of the results 
in Table 11 supports the findings in literature that there is no consensus on the 
most acceptable definition of corporate reputation (see for example, Helm, 2007; 
Fombrun et al, 2013). The results show that the most popular definition is the one 
represented by definition 3 by Rayner (2003:11) which is “Corporate reputation is 
a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions, as well as future 
prospects, which describes the firm’s overall appeal to all of its key 
constituents/stakeholders, when compared with other leading rivals” which 
constitutes 21.46% of all stakeholders regardless of the group of affiliation. 
Although definition 3 was chosen the most, definition 4 by Barnett et al (2006:9) 
which is “Corporate reputation is the observers’ collective judgements of a 
corporation based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental 
impacts attributed to the corporation over time” comes a close second as it 
commands a 21.26% in terms of popularity. However, definition 5 by Gotsi and 
Wilson (2001:23) which is “Corporate reputation is public’s effective evaluation of 
a firm’s name relative to other firms” has been the least popular amongst all 
stakeholder groups combined. To examine whether or not there is consensus on 
the most acceptable definition of corporate reputation within individual stakeholder 
groups, an additional analysis (what analysis) was conducted and the results are 
presented in Table 11: 
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Table 11: Definition of Corporate Reputation 
Definition Proportions              
 All 
Stakeholders 
 External 
Stakeholder 
       
 Internal 
Stakeholders 
 
  Employee Senior Exec Supplier Corporate 
Reputation 
Expert 
Banking 
Institution 
Investor Community 
Rep 
Consumer Potential 
Consumer 
Human 
Rights 
grp 
Labour 
Union 
Media 
House 
Regulatory 
Authority 
Definition 
2 
12.45% 10.45% 17.65% 0.00% 18.18% 15.38% 16.67% 15.85% 13.33% 9.41% 15.79% 0.00% 14.29% 20.00% 
Definition 
1 
16.67% 19.40% 23.53% 18.18% 13.64% 30.77% 0.00% 4.88% 18.33% 22.94% 5.26% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 
Definition 
5 
10.54% 2.99% 5.88% 9.09% 0.00% 30.77% 0.00% 9.76% 6.67% 13.53% 10.53% 25.00% 14.29% 20.00% 
Definition 
6 
17.62% 20.90% 35.29% 18.18% 27.27% 0.00% 16.67% 14.63% 26.67% 14.71% 10.53% 8.33% 28.57% 13.33% 
Definition 
4 
21.26% 22.39% 11.76% 18.18% 27.27% 23.08% 33.33% 28.05% 16.67% 20.00% 21.05% 41.67% 28.57% 3.33% 
Definition 
3 
21.46% 23.88% 5.88% 36.36% 13.64% 0.00% 33.33% 26.83% 18.33% 19.41% 36.84% 25.00% 14.29% 23.33% 
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An examination of the findings in Table 11 show variations in what individual 
stakeholder groups view as the most acceptable definition of corporate reputation 
according to their own understanding and interpretation of what it entails. 
However, it is apparent that definitions 3 and 4 were the most popular selections 
from a list of the six possible selections provided in the questionnaire. They were 
ranked number one by the same number of stakeholder groups based on 
proportions observed under each or individual stakeholder groups (that is, each 
definition was ranked number one by five stakeholder groups). This is consistent 
with an analysis based on all stakeholders view (see Table 11) where these two 
definitions were ranked one and two respectively (with a marginal difference of 
0.2%).  
These results also show that the investor-stakeholder group commonly ranked 
both definition 3 and 4 as the most acceptable definitions of corporate reputation. 
In addition to being selected as the most acceptable definition by the investor 
stakeholder group, definition 3 was also ranked as the most acceptable definition 
by employees, human rights organisations, regulators and suppliers whereas 
definition 4 was also considered the most acceptable definition by community 
representatives, Labour Union representatives, media house representative and 
corporate reputation experts. Within the four groups that make up the internal 
stakeholders, it is evident that there exists some differences in terms of what is an 
acceptable definition of corporate reputation. While employees and suppliers 
selected definition 3 as the most acceptable, senior executives and corporate 
reputation experts selected definition 6 more frequently. The observed differences 
in the selections are expected because of the differences in the roles of these two 
groups (management - senior executives and corporate reputation experts relative 
to employees and suppliers) in the industry. While senior executives and corporate 
reputational experts are more involved in managing and advising on the image of 
the company and how it is run, as well as maintaining stakeholder relationships, 
employees and suppliers are the service providers whose nature of engagement 
with the company shapes the image of the company. These findings indicate 
clearly that different stakeholders will define and rate corporate reputation 
differently depending on their experience, impact and direct associations with the 
organisation.   
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After observing that there were differences in terms of what stakeholders regard 
as the most acceptable definition of corporate reputation, a further examination 
was conducted to determine what these various stakeholder groups consider as 
the key components of corporate reputation. The findings from this analysis are 
presented in the following section. 
5.2 Stakeholders’ views on the key components of corporate reputation 
Variations on how stakeholders understand and interpret the term corporate 
reputation could be shaped by what they consider as key constituents of corporate 
reputation. If these components are different, then those observed differences 
could be key to explaining various other aspects or constituents of corporate 
reputation. This section analyses the findings on stakeholder views of what is 
considered in literature as the key components of corporate reputation. The 
stakeholders were presented with nine key components of corporate reputation as 
shown below: 
Component A: Corporate Legitimation is a component of corporate reputation in 
the diamond industry. 
Component B: Corporate Brand is a component of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
Component C: Corporate Identity is a component of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
Component D: Corporate Communications is a component of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry. 
Component E: Corporate Image is a component of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
Component F: Reputation Management is a component of corporate reputation in 
the diamond industry. 
Component G: Corporate Leadership integrity is a component of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry. 
Component H: Ethical Product stewardship is a component of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry. 
Component I: Corporate Social Responsibility is a component in corporate 
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reputation in the diamond industry. 
Individuals in each stakeholder group were asked to indicate their views (based on 
a Likert scale) using a scale ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 representing strongly 
disagree and 7 representing strongly agree. The analysis was conducted on four 
levels, that is, all stakeholders combined, internal and external stakeholders, 
categories, and individual stakeholder groups. The results from these findings are 
presented in Tables 12. 
Initially an analysis was conducted based on all stakeholder views combined. 
Thereafter, stakeholder groups were merged into two categories made up of 
internal and external stakeholders. Stakeholder groups are further split into 
management, financiers, customers and the voices. Subsequent to the breakdown 
indicated above, individual stakeholder groups’ views were analysed based on 
each component separately (that is, 6a to 6i) in order to observe the general trend 
of stakeholders’ views (see, Table 12 for this analysis). Furthermore, a Kruskal 
Wallis test was conducted to check if there were any statistically significant 
differences between stakeholder groups for each of the components. 
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Table 12: Combined stakeholders views on key components of corporate reputation (including categories) 
 All 
Stakeholders 
Internal External Management Financier Clientele Voices Other 
q6a (Legitimation) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
q6b (Brand) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
q6c (Identity) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 
q6d (Communication) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
q6e (Image) 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 
q6f (Reputation 
management) 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
q6g (Leadership integrity) 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 
q6h (Ethical Product 
stewardship) 
6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 
q6i (Social responsibility) 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 
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The findings presented in Table 12 show that all stakeholders combined agreed to 
a certain extent that all the corporate reputation components listed were relevant 
in the diamond industry. All components (6a, corporate legitimation; 6b, corporate 
brand, 6c, corporate identity, 6d, corporate communication, 6e, corporate image, 
6f, reputation management, 6g, corporate leadership integrity, 6h, ethical product 
stewardship and 6i, corporate social responsibility) received an average score of 
above five (slightly agree).  
The average scores range from 5.455 to 5.829. Component 6a (Corporate 
legitimation) received the lowest score of 5.455 while component 6h (Ethical 
product stewardship) received the highest score of 5.829.  
By splitting stakeholder groups into internal and external stakeholder groups, 
interesting differences were observed. The average score for internal stakeholders 
ranges from 5.790 to 6.387 while for external stakeholders the range was from 
5.464 to 5.809. These differences were also observed for each component. The 
findings in Table 12 show that internal stakeholders have consistently higher 
average scores for each component compared to the external stakeholders. 
However, in order to confirm whether these observed difference were significant or 
not, a Kruskal Wallis test was conducted and it was observed that the observed 
differences are statistically significant for all the different components (6a and 6d 
are significant at 5% while the rest are significant at 1%, see the Table 13). 
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Table 13: Kruskal Wallis test (Internal vs External) 
  Statistics 
Component χ2 P 
q6a_(Legitimation) 5.29 0.0214 
q6b_(Brand) 13.48 0.0002 
q6c_(Identity) 7.89 0.005 
q6d_(Communication) 6.39 0.0115 
q6e_(Image) 8.27 0.004 
q6f_(Reputation 
management) 
15.20 0.0001 
q6g_(Leadership integrity) 36.70 0 
q6h_(Ethical Product 
stewardship) 
26.17 0 
q6i_(Social responsibility) 19.00 0 
 
Given the differences observed between internal and external stakeholders, 
further analyses were conducted to examine if there were any differences between 
the categories that fall under internal and external stakeholders groups. To 
examine this difference, stakeholder groups were categorised into: Management 
(senior executives and corporate reputation expert), Financiers (investors and 
banking institutions), Clientele (potential and actual customers), Voices (human 
rights groups, labour unions, media house and regulatory authority) and Other 
(which includes, employees, suppliers and community representatives). The other 
group was classified as such because all the stakeholder groups that fall under it 
have slightly different characteristics or features compared to any of the other 
broader groups discussed above. 
An examination of potential differences for each component was conducted at 
category level followed by a check of any significant statistical differences within 
the categories.  
Firstly, an analysis was conducted to examine whether or not there were any 
differences for each component within the management category. The findings in 
Table 13 showed that the average scores range from 5.949 (question 6a) to 6.538 
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(question 6g and 6h). What is interesting to note is that the average score for each 
component is very high. This shows that the individuals within the management 
category agree on all the components of corporate reputation. This was expected, 
given that this category comprises senior executives and corporate reputation 
experts. This is a category of people who are more knowledgeable regarding what 
comprises corporate reputation; 
Secondly, an examination was conducted for the financiers category and the 
findings showed that the average scores ranged from 5.12 (question 6a) to 5.64 
(question 6f).  While the financier category seemed to agree on some of the 
individual components (see for example, questions 6b, 6f and 6h), they seemed to 
slightly agree on most of the individual components (see for example, 6a, 6c, 6d, 
6e, 6g and 6i); 
Thirdly, an examination of the clientele category showed that the average scores 
ranged from 5.432 (question 6a) to 5.816 (question 6f). Interestingly the clientele 
category seemed to agree on most of the individual components (see for example, 
questions 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, 6f, 6g, 6h and 6i), except on component 6a with which 
they seemed to only slightly agree; 
Fourthly, an analysis of the voices category showed that the average scores 
ranged from 5.646 (question 6a) to 6.069 (question 6g). These findings showed 
that the voices category agree on all the components of corporate reputation. 
These findings were consistent with the findings observed under the management 
category. This was expected given that management tries to align corporate 
strategy and policy with the views of various stakeholder groups, especially the 
views of the powerful stakeholder groups. The individual stakeholder groups within 
the voices category represent this power, in terms of regulation (regulatory 
authority), corporate image (media house), and the lobby groups (human rights 
group and the Labour Union group); and 
Fifthly, the other category showed that the average scores ranged from 5.148 
(question 6a) to 5.667 (question 6i). While the other category seemed to slightly 
agree on most of the individual components (see for example, questions 6a, 6b, 
6c, 6d, 6e, 6f and 6g), they seemed to agree on a few of the individual 
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components (see for example, 6h and 6i). The other category seemed to hold the 
same position as the financiers’ category. Respondents confirmed that 
legitimation, corporate social responsibility,  brand equity, corporate identity, 
corporate image, corporate communication, leadership integrity and ethical 
product stewardship are the key components of corporate reputation. 
In addition to observing the variations in stakeholder views on the various 
components of corporate reputation as key attributes, stakeholder views on the 
key drivers of corporate reputation were also examined. The results from this 
finding are presented in the following section. 
5.3 Stakeholders’ view on the key drivers of corporate reputation 
What is key in managing corporate reputation is an understanding of its 
determinants or what drives it. In order to get an insight into what stakeholders 
perceived as important drivers of corporate reputation, individuals in stakeholder 
groups were presented with a questionnaire with twenty potential determinants of 
corporate reputation, as suggested in the literature. Stakeholders were asked to 
present their views based on a Likert scale with options ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 
representing strongly disagree and 7 representing strongly agree.   
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 14. Table 14 presents the 
findings based on all stakeholders combined, internal and external stakeholders 
and the various categories of stakeholder groups. 
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Table 14: Combined stakeholder views on key determinants of corporate reputation (including categories) needs to be sorted 
according to frequency 
  All 
Stakeholders 
Internal External Management Financier Clientele Voices Other 
q7g_blood diamond, 4.917 5.252 4.922 5.538 5.040 4.757 5.104 4.757 
q7f_conflict diamond 4.974 5.244 4.977 5.410 5.208 4.931 5.083 4.713 
q7p_beneficiation 5.403 5.429 5.400 5.513 4.640 5.470 5.683 5.019 
q7d_profitability 5.468 5.714 5.457 5.795 5.000 5.483 5.683 5.140 
q7a_fair treatment of employees 5.587 6.202 5.589 6.487 5.480 5.397 5.847 5.352 
q7c_community care 5.591 6.076 5.589 6.103 5.720 5.397 5.924 5.352 
q7q_transparency, 5.610 6.025 5.599 5.949 5.720 5.451 5.951 5.352 
q7h_employee care 5.621 5.966 5.620 6.000 5.600 5.539 5.903 5.287 
q7i_innovativeness 5.631 5.622 5.623 5.872 5.240 5.670 5.727 5.426 
q7t_community investment 5.631 5.849 5.612 5.974 5.280 5.521 5.931 5.426 
q7n_environmental protection 5.636 6.126 5.634 6.231 5.040 5.511 5.938 5.426 
q7e_compliance with Best Practice 5.641 6.294 5.625 6.462 5.440 5.521 5.937 5.259 
q7r_brand profile 5.667 6.042 5.654 6.077 5.160 5.654 5.993 5.231 
q7s_clear company vision 5.713 5.899 5.701 6.000 5.480 5.632 5.924 5.556 
q7m_brand presence 5.758 6.109 5.738 6.308 5.600 5.658 6.063 5.407 
q7b_customer care 5.782 6.178 5.770 6.282 5.760 5.711 6.021 5.439 
q7o_quality of leadership 5.794 6.151 5.781 6.282 5.840 5.716 6.007 5.491 
q7l_strong corporate governance 5.797 6.328 5.788 6.385 5.280 5.688 6.132 5.491 
q7j_good relations with stakeholders 5.867 6.378 5.847 6.410 5.560 5.766 6.248 5.444 
q7k_quality of products and services 5.974 6.269 5.970 6.385 5.880 5.996 6.146 5.574 
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The findings in Table 14 show that all stakeholders’ views combined vary between 
slightly agree and agree for all the possible determinants of corporate reputation. 
Those key drivers are as follows: 7a, fair treatment of employees, 7b, customer 
care, 7c, community care, 7d, profitability, 7e, compliance with national and global 
laws, 7f, conflict diamond, 7g, blood diamond, 7h, employee care, 7i, 
innovativeness, 7j, good relations with stakeholders, 7k, quality of products and 
services, 7l, strong adherence to good corporate governance, 7m, brand 
presence, 7n, environmental protection, 7o, quality of leadership, 7p, beneficiation 
of diamonds, 7q, transparency, 7r, brand profile, 7s, clear company vision and 7t, 
community investment.  The findings show that, while stakeholders slightly agree 
with a few of the possible drivers (components 7d profitability), 7f (conflict 
diamonds), 7g (blood diamonds) and 7p (beneficiation of diamonds), they seem to 
agree with the rest of the drivers provided on the list. The average scores range 
from 4.917 (7g (blood diamonds) to 5.974 (7k (quality of products and services).  
The blood diamonds and conflict diamonds scored the lowest. There these two 
drivers were not seen as the key drivers of corporate reputation, while the rest 
were seen as key drivers.  Quality of product and services, good relations with 
stakeholders, strong corporate governance, quality of leadership and customer 
was identified as the top five drivers of corporate reputation by all stakeholders.   
By splitting stakeholder groups into internal and external stakeholder groups, 
interesting differences were observed. The average score for internal stakeholders 
ranges from 5.244 (7f (conflict diamonds) to 6.378 (7j (Good relations with 
stakeholders), while for external stakeholders the range is from 4.922 (7g) to 
5.874 (7j). These differences were also observed for each component. Looking at 
the internal stakeholder category, the findings show that individuals in this group 
on average slightly agreed with just two of the potential drivers (7f and 7g) while 
they agreed with the rest of the listed drivers. The external stakeholder categories 
slightly agreed with four of the potential components (7d, 7f, 7g and 7p), they 
seemed to agree with the rest of the drivers provided on the list. The patterns in 
the means for responses given by the internal and external categories were 
consistent with the pattern observed in the combined stakeholder group. 
Interestingly, both internal and external stakeholder categories seem to slightly 
agree with components 7f and 7g and agree on the rest of the others except 7d 
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and 7p where there is no common view amongst these two categories. 
There are also a few other interesting findings pertaining to the way in which 
categories in the combined stakeholders, internal and external categories rank the 
potential drivers. First, 7d, 7f, 7g and 7p are consistently ranked in the bottom five 
positions for all of the categories. Second, 7b, 7j, 7k and 7l are consistently ranked 
in the top five in all the categories. 
To determine the significance of the differences within the internal and external 
categories with respect to each of the potential drivers analysed, a Kruskal Wallis 
test was performed. The results from this test are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15: Kruskal Wallis tests for Q7 based on internal and external categories 
 
Statistics   
Component χ2 p 
q7a_ fair treatment of employees 17.37 0 
q7b_ customer care 9.53 0.002 
q7c_ community care 11.13 0.0008 
q7d_ profitability, 2.86 0.0905 
q7e_ compliance with national and 
global laws 
39.26 0 
q7f_ conflict diamond, 5.74 0.0166 
q7g_ blood diamond 6.40 0.0114 
q7h_ employee care 6.44 0.0112 
q7i_ innovativeness, 0.16 0.6922 
q7j_ good relations with 
stakeholders 
22.58 0 
q7k_ quality of products and 
services 
5.24 0.0221 
q7l good corporate governance 24.27 0 
q7m_ brand presence 9.38 0.0022 
q7n_ environmental protection 16.14 0.0001 
q7o_ quality of leadership 7.08 0.0078 
q7p_ beneficiation of diamonds 0.08 0.7796 
q7q_ transparency 10.70 0.0011 
q7r_ brand profile 10.12 0.0015 
q7s_ clear company vision 1.91 0.1673 
q7t_ community investment 1.39 0.239 
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According to the findings in Table 15, the results show that the differences 
observed for drivers represented by 7d, 7i, 7p, 7s and 7t are statistically 
insignificant while for the difference observed for the rest of the other drivers are 
statistically significant at 1% (7a, 7b, 7c, 7e, 7j, 7l, 7m, 7n, 7o, 7q and 7r) and 5% 
(7f, 7g, 7h and 7k) respectively.   
Following the differences observed above, an examination of potential differences 
for each driver was further conducted at category level followed by a check of any 
significant statistical differences within the categories using the Kruskal Wallis test: 
Firstly, an examination of the management category showed that the mean scores 
ranged from 5.410 (7f) to 6.487 (7a (fair treatment of employees). An important 
observation was that the management category seemed to agree with all the 
potential drivers listed with the exception of 7f, which they seemed to slightly 
agree with; Secondly, an examination of the financier category showed that 
average scores ranged from 4.640 (7p) to 5.880 (7k -quality of product and 
services). On average, the Individuals in this category slightly agreed with twelve 
of the listed drivers (that is, 7a, 7c, 7d, 7e, 7f, 7g, 7i, 7n, 7p, 7r, 7s and 7t), and 
agreed with the rest of the remaining drivers (that is, 7b, 7h, 7j, 7k, 7l, 7m, 7o and 
7p); 
Thirdly, an examination of the clientele category showed that average scores 
ranged from 4.757 (7g (blood diamonds) to 5.996 (7k). On average, the clientele 
category slightly agreed with 7 of the listed potential drivers (that is, 7a, 7c, 7d, 7f, 
7g, 7p and 7q) and agreed with the rest of the other listed potential drivers; 
Fourthly, an analysis of the voices category showed that the average score 
ranged from 5.083 (7f) to 6.248 (7j). On average, it was interesting to observe that 
the individuals in this category slightly agreed with just two of the responses (that 
is, 7f and 7g) and generally agreed with the rest and fifthly, an examination of the 
other category showed that the average score ranged from 4.713 (7f) to 5.574 
(7k). Contrary to the finding with respect to the voices category, the individuals in 
the other category seemed to agree with only two of the listed drivers (7k and 7s 
(clear company vision and strategic goals) and slightly agreed with the rest of the 
listed potential drivers. 
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An examination of the findings based on individual categories discussed above, 
reveals a few interesting patterns regarding the nature in which drivers are ranked 
by different categories: 
Firstly, the trend in the rankings of the corporate drivers follows a similar pattern to 
that observed under the internal and external stakeholder groups. For example, 
similar to the internal and external stakeholder groups, drivers represented by 7d, 
7f, 7g and 7p were consistently ranked in the bottom five positions for all of the 
categories; and 
Secondly, 7b, 7j, 7k and 7l were consistently ranked in the top five by all 
categories except for the financier category which ranked them 3rd, 8th, 1st and 12th 
respectively. 
As a follow-up on the examination of the key drivers of corporate reputation, 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the diamond industry were investigated and 
analysed. The results from this analysis are presented in the next section. 
5.4 Stakeholders’ perception of the diamond industry 
In recognition of the diversity of stakeholders’ interpretations of the meaning and 
their views concerning the components and what drives corporate reputation, this 
section analyses the possibility of variations in stakeholders’ perceptions about the 
diamond industry. Similar to the preceding sections, the analysis was done at four 
levels as presented in Tables 16 and 17. 
According to the results presented in Table 16, the average scores range from 
3.098 (8e) to 5.714 (8n). On average, the combined stakeholder group shows 
some differences in stakeholder perceptions about the diamond industry. While 
some stakeholders slightly disagreed with perceptions 8a, 8d, 8e and 8h; other 
stakeholders were indifferent (neutral) on the proposed perceptions 8k and 8r. In a 
similar vein, while some stakeholder groups slightly agreed with perceptions 8g, 
8l, 8m, 8o, 8p, 8q and 8s, other stakeholder groups agreed with 8f, 8i, 8j and 8n. 
Despite the differences in views about each of the proposed choices of 
perceptions about the diamond industry, the majority of the proposed perceptions 
were slightly agreed on by the stakeholders combined. In order to discover more 
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about these differences, Table 16 presented the results based on internal and 
external stakeholders. 
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Table 16: Combined stakeholder groups or categories views on key perceptions of the diamond industry 
  
All 
Stakeholders Internal External Management Financier Customer* Voices Other 
q8e_irresponsible 3.098 2.849 3.105 3.103 3.560 3.370 2.848 2.731 
q8d_unethical 3.133 2.849 3.127 3.231 3.840 3.384 2.792 2.850 
q8h_untrustworthy 3.311 3.008 3.301 3.282 3.708 3.585 2.986 3.074 
q8a_non coop 3.336 3.286 3.316 3.949 3.720 3.694 2.890 2.850 
q8k_illicit 3.807 3.210 3.815 3.538 3.960 4.137 3.211 3.935 
q8m_Contributed to human 
degradation 4.055 2.857 4.065 3.282 4.120 4.174 3.650 4.593 
q8r_human rights abuses 4.158 3.176 4.169 3.641 4.320 4.129 3.938 4.667 
q8o_secretive 4.918 4.882 4.909 5.179 5.160 4.833 5.000 4.843 
q8q_caring 4.984 4.782 4.989 4.513 4.760 4.870 5.179 5.185 
q8l_contributesto 
Millennium development goals 5.040 4.840 5.048 4.744 4.880 5.116 4.903 5.206 
q8c_motivated employees 5.075 4.924 5.083 4.795 5.160 5.077 4.951 5.315 
q8s_ethical 5.160 5.269 5.158 4.846 4.800 5.043 5.372 5.324 
q8b_customer orientation 5.191 5.319 5.191 5.385 5.280 5.107 5.469 4.907 
q8p_investment heaven 5.276 4.387 5.304 4.590 4.840 5.657 4.979 5.213 
q8g_good leadership 5.333 5.319 5.334 5.282 5.360 5.205 5.368 5.574 
q8j_respected 5.625 5.731 5.617 5.462 5.320 5.617 5.606 5.802 
q8i_world class 5.630 5.807 5.632 5.513 5.360 5.534 5.881 5.611 
q8f_high quality 5.635 5.756 5.622 5.744 5.600 5.528 5.653 5.813 
q8n_Good for Africa 5.714 6.017 5.706 6.000 5.240 5.715 5.779 5.630 
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Table 17: Combined Individual stakeholder views on key perceptions 
 Employee Senior 
Exec 
Supplier Corporate 
Reputation 
Expert 
Banking 
Institution 
Investor Community 
Rep 
Consumer Potential 
Consumer 
Human 
Rights 
grp 
Labour 
Union 
Media 
House 
Regulatory 
Authority 
q8m_Contributed 
human to 
degradation 
2.507 3.294 3.545 3.273 3.385 4.917 4.711 4.032 4.225 4.870 5.417 4.750 4.323 
q8d_unethical 2.681 2.882 2.545 3.500 3.385 4.333 2.885 3.774 3.241 2.913 2.417 2.125 3.250 
q8e_irresponsible 2.681 3.059 3.000 3.136 3.000 4.167 2.701 3.790 3.220 2.667 2.583 2.375 3.563 
q8h_untrustworthy 2.754 3.353 3.636 3.227 3.385 4.091 3.010 4.000 3.436 2.958 2.750 2.500 3.742 
q8r_human rights 
abuses 
2.884 3.706 3.364 3.591 3.769 4.917 4.814 4.161 4.118 5.167 5.500 4.625 4.531 
q8a_non coop 2.971 4.176 2.909 3.773 3.385 4.083 2.844 3.885 3.626 2.417 2.333 2.625 3.344 
q8k_illicit 2.971 3.647 3.545 3.455 3.231 4.750 3.979 4.048 4.169 3.000 3.167 3.250 3.933 
q8p_investment 
heaven 
4.246 4.059 4.545 5.000 4.615 5.083 5.289 5.672 5.651 5.375 5.833 5.750 5.750 
q8o_secretive 4.667 5.588 5.182 4.864 4.385 6.000 4.804 4.903 4.808 5.875 5.500 4.375 5.031 
q8l_contributes to 
MDG 
4.870 4.412 5.000 5.000 4.846 4.917 5.229 4.867 5.202 5.333 5.000 4.750 4.645 
q8q_caring 4.957 4.765 4.636 4.318 4.769 4.750 5.247 4.667 4.941 5.625 5.583 5.875 5.000 
q8c_motivated 
employees 
5.000 5.176 4.909 4.500 5.231 5.083 5.361 4.803 5.174 5.292 4.667 5.500 4.548 
q8g_good leadership 5.304 4.941 5.545 5.545 5.154 5.583 5.577 5.279 5.179 6.083 5.083 5.625 5.000 
q8b_customer 
orientation 
5.493 5.235 4.000 5.500 5.769 4.750 5.010 5.419 4.994 5.500 5.250 6.250 5.281 
q8s_ethical 5.551 5.059 5.000 4.682 4.538 5.083 5.361 4.823 5.124 5.500 5.833 5.000 4.813 
q8f_high quality 5.812 5.471 5.455 5.955 5.615 5.583 5.854 5.468 5.549 5.565 5.417 5.500 5.500 
q8j_respected 5.841 5.118 6.000 5.727 5.462 5.167 5.779 5.613 5.618 5.652 4.636 5.000 5.548 
q8i_world class 5.971 5.235 5.818 5.727 5.308 5.417 5.588 5.645 5.494 6.182 4.833 6.000 5.844 
q8n_Good for Africa 6.000 5.765 6.182 6.182 4.692 5.833 5.567 5.661 5.734 6.042 5.250 6.125 5.219 
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By splitting stakeholder groups into internal and external stakeholder groups, 
some interesting insights about differences in perceptions were observed. The 
average score for internal stakeholders ranges from 2.849 (8d and 8e) to 6.017 
(8n) while for external stakeholders the range was from 3.105 (8e) to 5.706 (8n). 
The interesting part is that the internal stakeholder group’s average scores on their 
perceptions about the diamond industry have a wider range than those displayed 
by the external stakeholder group. In addition to that, the external stakeholder 
group’s average score range falls within the internal stakeholder average score 
range. Furthermore, there are notable differences displayed between these two 
groups in terms of their views on the individual proposed perceptions as can be 
seen in Table 17.  While internal stakeholders slightly disagree with the proposed 
perceptions 8a, 8d, 8e, 8h, 8k, 8m and 8r; the external stakeholder group slightly 
disagree with propositions 8a, 8d, 8e and 8h. From the above observation, it is 
apparent that these two groups of stakeholders show some similarities in terms of 
what they slightly disagreed on (see above, propositions, 8a, 8d, 8e and 8h).  
Despite some common patterns in terms of what they slightly disagreed with, they 
seemed to be differing in terms of what they are indifferent about. While internal 
stakeholder groups were neutral about perception 8p, the external stakeholder 
group seemed to be neutral about perceptions 8k and 8r. Interestingly there 
seemed to be some common insights in terms of what stakeholders slightly 
agreed on. While internal stakeholders slightly agreed with perceptions 8b, 8c, 8g, 
8l and 8q and 8s, external stakeholders slightly agreed with perceptions 8b, 8c, 
8g, 8l, 8m, 8n, 8o, 8p, 8q and 8s. From the above findings, it is apparent that 
internal stakeholders slightly agreed with all the proposed perceptions that 
external stakeholders slightly agreed with the exception of perceptions 8m, 8n, 8o, 
8p.  
Surprisingly, the findings also show a consensus on the proposed perceptions that 
the two different groups agreed on, they both seem to agree with perceptions 8f, 
8i, 8j and 8 on average. This is surprising in that these are two different groups 
that show different characteristics in what they are and represent.  
These findings indicate a level of agreement among the stakeholders that the 
industry is associated by both positive and negative perceptions.  The positive 
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perceptions dominate the list of top five perceptions which is good leadership, 
motivated employees, caring industry and contribution to the millennium 
development goals.  Secretive was identified as the number five dominant 
perception.  Industry perceptions are dependent of stakeholder groupings and 
they are also linked to stakeholder relations as well at direct association. 
Perceptions relating to industry’s contribution to human degradation, unethical, 
irresponsible industry, untrustworthy, human rights abuses, non-cooperative and 
illicit trading scored the lowest among most respondents. This implies that these 
perceptions do no resonate with different stakeholders as key perceptions. 
In addition to analysing the stakeholder perceptions about the diamond industry, it 
is also necessary to examine stakeholder perceptions about the reputational risks 
or challenges that could affect the reputation of the diamond industry. This 
analysis is presented in the next section. 
5.5 Stakeholders’ perceptions about the current and future reputational 
issues 
Since the diamond industry is susceptible to numerous national and international 
challenges, both currently and in the future, these challenges represent various 
risks that should be managed effectively and efficiently in order for the corporation 
to survive and prosper. Reputational risk is one of the critical risks in the diamond 
industry, given that it involves luxury goods whose image is important in the sense 
that its aesthetic value is significantly greater than its functional value to 
consumers (Lussier, 2014). However, the various challenges and risks that affect 
the reputation of corporations in the diamond industry are perceived differently by 
various stakeholder groups. The findings from this analysis are presented in 
Tables 18 to 21. 
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Table 18: Combined stakeholder views on current and future issues (including categories) 
 
All 
Stakeholders Internal External Management Financier Customer* Voices Other 
q10x_NGO scrutiny 4.568 4.597 4.591 4.744 4.917 4.725 4.292 4.463 
q10n_cautious lending 4.608 5.126 4.617 5.308 4.240 4.603 4.653 4.389 
q10v_tough regulation 4.706 5.303 4.707 5.462 4.400 4.728 4.521 4.704 
q10w_nationalisation 4.741 5.597 4.747 5.667 4.600 4.591 4.799 4.685 
q10p_finance cost 4.775 5.294 4.773 5.128 4.560 4.775 4.819 4.639 
q10g_artisanal mining 4.831 5.218 4.820 4.846 4.280 4.867 4.861 4.833 
q10o_Kimberley process 
collapse 4.841 5.782 4.830 5.359 4.600 4.766 5.069 4.565 
q10f_benefiation 4.846 5.050 4.834 4.949 4.720 4.974 4.573 4.926 
q10q_Forex volatility 4.858 5.588 4.853 5.282 4.520 4.806 5.028 4.667 
q10t_monopoly 4.869 4.790 4.875 4.718 4.760 5.052 4.611 4.898 
q10r_-ve publicity 4.901 5.697 4.915 5.744 4.520 4.841 4.840 4.898 
q10h_reduced gem supply 4.933 5.445 4.922 5.333 4.440 4.983 4.986 4.722 
q10m_Liquidity 4.989 5.445 4.981 5.333 5.200 5.077 4.861 4.796 
q10k_talent retention 5.024 5.454 5.011 5.615 5.000 5.096 4.874 4.861 
q10s_local Contribution 5.039 5.370 5.030 5.179 4.880 5.202 4.944 4.806 
q10y_conflict diamonds 5.126 5.924 5.111 5.795 4.880 5.211 5.146 4.731 
q10l_uncertainty 5.135 5.697 5.122 5.615 5.120 5.202 5.125 4.833 
q10u_political instability 5.145 5.958 5.137 5.615 4.800 5.212 5.134 4.926 
q10e_enviromental(mine 
closure) 5.166 5.655 5.163 5.615 4.840 5.246 5.097 5.000 
q10a_Labour unrest 5.243 5.546 5.244 5.564 5.160 5.498 4.979 4.954 
q10i_human rights 5.250 5.790 5.240 5.846 5.040 5.412 5.118 4.907 
q10j_energy restrictions 5.253 5.840 5.236 5.769 5.000 5.348 5.181 5.019 
q10b_Worker exploitation 5.271 5.336 5.264 5.436 5.840 5.517 4.916 5.019 
q10c_Diamond theft 5.316 5.874 5.316 5.692 5.320 5.522 5.250 4.824 
q10d_Illegal diamond trade 5.495 6.151 5.478 6.026 5.565 5.591 5.448 5.148 
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Table 19: Combined stakeholder views on current and future issues (including categories) continuation 
 
  
All 
Stakeholders Internal External Management Financier Customer* Voices Other 
q10af_China rising 4.305 3.849 4.307 3.590 4.120 4.500 3.979 4.626 
q10aj_recycling diamonds 4.388 4.126 4.378 4.077 4.440 4.628 4.112 4.343 
q10ae_higher demand 4.485 4.126 4.488 3.974 3.920 4.789 4.257 4.454 
q10al_Strict competition laws 4.625 4.613 4.621 4.436 4.200 4.851 4.410 4.602 
Mine rehab 4.687 5.227 4.673 4.897 4.360 4.707 4.727 4.593 
q10ab_affordability 4.697 4.521 4.706 4.667 4.720 5.009 4.347 4.500 
q10am_artificial inflation 4.863 4.941 4.864 4.769 4.640 5.095 4.653 4.731 
q10ai_unemployment 4.876 5.143 4.885 5.026 4.520 5.009 4.743 4.796 
q10ad_synthetics 4.881 5.286 4.862 4.923 4.120 5.113 4.909 4.509 
q10ah_state control 4.884 5.415 4.879 5.359 4.840 4.822 4.958 4.757 
q10ac_exporting diamonds 4.897 5.218 4.902 5.179 4.920 5.122 4.757 4.500 
q10ag_Mineral wars 4.960 5.395 4.959 5.128 4.760 5.052 5.077 4.593 
q10an_greed 4.971 5.067 4.966 5.179 4.880 5.265 4.643 4.722 
q10ao_wealth gap[ 4.987 5.151 4.989 5.000 5.000 5.220 4.776 4.759 
q10ar_cutting costs 5.044 5.261 5.041 5.154 4.800 5.277 4.903 4.750 
q10as_exploitation 5.115 5.445 5.117 5.308 5.200 5.409 4.958 4.611 
q10z_blood diamonds 5.134 5.950 5.129 5.795 5.520 5.113 5.111 4.880 
q10ap_image 5.141 5.647 5.134 5.462 5.040 5.293 5.111 4.759 
q10aq_energy cost 5.165 5.798 5.160 5.590 5.080 5.291 5.160 4.769 
Safety 5.210 5.471 5.211 5.333 5.480 5.519 4.868 4.898 
q10av_crime 5.252 5.765 5.248 5.179 5.280 5.394 5.215 5.019 
q10aa_environmental 5.277 5.966 5.272 5.769 5.160 5.426 5.329 4.741 
q10at_illegal diamonds 5.311 5.966 5.304 5.769 5.040 5.515 5.222 4.889 
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Table 20: Combined stakeholder views on current and future issues (individual) 
  Employee 
Senior 
Exec Supplier 
Corporate 
Reputation 
Expert 
Banking 
Institution Investor 
Community 
Rep Consumer 
Potential 
Consumer 
Human 
Rights 
grp 
Labour 
Union 
Media 
House 
Regulatory 
Authority Other 
q10x_NGO scrutiny 4.551 4.235 4.364 5.136 4.167 5.667 4.474 4.724 4.725 4.375 4.182 4.125 3.750 4.463 
q10t_monopoly 4.797 4.000 5.000 5.273 4.385 5.167 4.887 4.500 5.244 4.583 4.636 3.875 4.406 4.898 
q10n_cautious lending 5.072 5.118 4.818 5.455 4.077 4.417 4.340 4.500 4.640 4.292 4.000 4.875 4.188 4.389 
q10f_benefiation 5.087 5.118 5.182 4.818 4.692 4.750 4.897 4.459 5.158 4.708 4.400 3.625 3.656 4.926 
q10v_tough regulation 5.232 5.000 5.182 5.818 4.077 4.750 4.649 4.367 4.855 4.208 4.273 3.375 3.594 4.704 
q10b_Worker 
exploitation 5.275 4.824 5.364 5.909 5.692 6.000 4.979 5.328 5.585 4.609 4.727 3.750 4.719 5.019 
q10g_artisanal mining 5.319 5.176 5.909 4.591 4.000 4.583 4.711 4.774 4.901 5.083 4.545 4.125 4.000 4.833 
q10k_talent retention 5.333 5.765 5.636 5.500 4.692 5.333 4.773 4.639 5.260 5.167 4.200 4.000 4.094 4.861 
q10p_finance cost 5.362 4.824 5.455 5.364 4.154 5.000 4.546 4.617 4.830 4.583 4.364 4.875 3.969 4.639 
q10a_Labour unrest 5.493 5.000 5.818 6.000 4.923 5.417 4.856 5.250 5.585 4.417 4.364 4.375 4.656 4.954 
q10m_Liquidity 5.493 5.353 5.545 5.318 5.154 5.250 4.711 4.871 5.152 5.042 4.000 3.750 3.938 4.796 
q10s_local Contribution 5.507 4.706 5.182 5.545 4.462 5.333 4.763 4.610 5.408 4.542 4.273 4.000 4.500 4.806 
q10w_nationalisation 5.565 5.647 5.545 5.682 4.308 4.917 4.588 4.600 4.587 4.875 4.545 4.000 3.375 4.685 
q10h_reduced  
gem supply 5.580 5.706 5.000 5.045 4.154 4.750 4.691 4.758 5.064 4.833 4.091 4.500 4.250 4.722 
q10r_-ve publicity 5.725 5.588 5.364 5.864 3.923 5.167 4.845 4.500 4.959 4.500 3.909 4.000 3.719 4.898 
q10e_enviromental(mine 
closure) 5.754 5.353 5.182 5.818 4.615 5.083 4.979 5.113 5.294 4.792 4.909 3.500 4.375 5.000 
q10i_human rights 5.768 5.882 5.727 5.818 4.923 5.167 4.814 5.129 5.515 5.042 4.182 3.625 4.469 4.907 
q10l_uncertainty 5.783 5.588 5.455 5.636 5.000 5.250 4.763 4.903 5.310 5.083 4.000 3.750 4.469 4.833 
q10q_Forex volatility 5.783 4.941 5.455 5.545 4.538 4.500 4.577 4.550 4.895 4.708 4.273 4.875 3.938 4.667 
q10j_energy restrictions 5.841 5.647 6.091 5.864 4.769 5.250 4.897 4.903 5.512 5.083 4.182 4.250 4.406 5.019 
q10c_Diamond theft 6.029 6.059 5.545 5.409 5.462 5.167 4.742 5.323 5.594 4.958 4.364 3.375 4.563 4.824 
q10y_conflict diamond 6.029 5.882 5.727 5.727 4.231 5.583 4.619 5.150 5.233 4.708 4.091 4.125 4.188 4.731 
q10u_political instability 6.059 5.647 6.545 5.591 4.538 5.083 4.742 4.867 5.333 4.458 4.545 4.375 4.032 4.926 
q10o_Kimberley process 
collapse 6.145 5.706 5.000 5.091 4.538 4.667 4.515 4.817 4.749 4.333 4.273 3.625 3.938 4.565 
q10d_Illegal diamond 
trade 6.232 6.353 6.091 5.773 5.500 5.636 5.041 5.322 5.684 4.917 4.818 3.625 4.806 5.148 
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Table 21: Combined stakeholder views on current and future issues (continuation) 
  Employee 
Senior 
Exec Supplier 
Corporate 
Reputation 
Expert 
Banking 
Institution Investor 
Community 
Rep Consumer 
Potential 
Consumer 
Human 
Rights 
grp 
Labour 
Union 
Media 
House 
Regulatory 
Authority Other 
q10af_China rising 3.768 2.941 5.273 4.091 4.154 4.083 4.552 4.350 4.553 4.667 4.455 4.500 3.625 4.626 
q10ae_higher 
demand 4.130 3.000 4.636 4.727 3.692 4.167 4.433 4.467 4.901 4.750 4.455 4.375 4.063 4.454 
q10aj_recycling 
diamonds 4.174 4.118 4.000 4.045 4.462 4.417 4.381 4.533 4.661 4.500 4.300 4.250 3.594 4.343 
q10ab_affordability 4.435 4.294 4.545 4.955 4.923 4.500 4.495 4.593 5.151 4.417 4.727 5.000 3.813 4.500 
q10al_Strict comp 
laws 4.594 3.824 5.364 4.909 4.077 4.333 4.515 4.717 4.899 4.375 4.545 4.375 4.000 4.602 
q10an_greed 4.957 4.471 5.364 5.727 4.769 5.000 4.649 4.733 5.453 4.625 4.545 3.875 4.194 4.722 
q10am_artificial 
inflation 5.000 3.882 5.182 5.455 4.308 5.000 4.680 4.633 5.256 4.708 4.545 3.875 4.094 4.731 
q10ao_wealth gap[ 5.058 5.000 6.273 5.000 4.923 5.083 4.588 4.883 5.337 4.917 4.636 3.625 4.387 4.759 
q10ai_unemployment 5.116 4.706 5.727 5.273 4.385 4.667 4.691 4.783 5.087 4.583 4.636 3.500 4.406 4.796 
q10ac_exporting 
diamonds 5.319 4.882 4.727 5.409 4.769 5.083 4.474 4.883 5.206 4.542 4.818 4.250 3.813 4.500 
Mine rehab 5.333 4.412 5.727 5.273 4.231 4.500 4.464 4.733 4.698 4.458 4.273 4.625 3.774 4.593 
q10ar_cutting costs 5.333 4.882 5.182 5.364 4.462 5.167 4.701 4.850 5.427 4.792 4.455 4.750 4.250 4.750 
q10ad_synthetics 5.406 4.235 5.818 5.455 4.077 4.167 4.361 4.966 5.163 4.625 4.545 4.875 4.161 4.509 
q10ah_State control 5.464 5.471 5.300 5.273 4.923 4.750 4.701 4.583 4.906 4.917 4.545 4.625 4.097 4.757 
q10au safety 5.493 5.706 5.818 5.045 5.385 5.583 4.794 5.117 5.661 4.542 4.182 4.000 4.219 4.898 
q10as_exploitation 5.536 4.941 5.364 5.591 4.769 5.667 4.526 5.000 5.553 4.833 4.364 4.125 4.219 4.611 
q10ag_Mineral wars 5.594 4.765 5.091 5.409 4.769 4.750 4.536 4.533 5.233 5.167 4.545 4.625 4.161 4.593 
q10ap_image 5.812 5.588 5.273 5.364 4.692 5.417 4.701 5.017 5.390 4.875 4.364 3.625 4.406 4.759 
q10aq_energy cost 5.884 5.353 6.000 5.773 5.000 5.167 4.629 4.917 5.424 4.833 4.364 4.875 4.188 4.769 
q10z_blood 
diamonds 5.986 5.882 6.273 5.727 5.308 5.750 4.722 5.068 5.129 4.708 4.364 4.125 4.031 4.880 
q10at_illegal 
diamonds 6.058 6.000 6.091 5.591 4.692 5.417 4.753 5.183 5.632 4.708 4.273 3.875 4.469 4.889 
q10aa_environmental 6.130 5.471 5.636 6.000 4.615 5.750 4.639 5.117 5.535 4.625 4.909 3.875 4.613 4.741 
q10av_crime 6.145 5.176 5.455 5.182 4.923 5.667 4.969 4.967 5.544 4.583 4.273 4.250 4.250 5.019 
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The findings in Table 18 show that all stakeholders had average scores, ranging 
from 4.305 (10af) to 5.495 (10d). These findings suggest that stakeholders agree 
to a certain extent with the proposed risks and challenges that are deemed to be 
facing the diamond industry. Although stakeholders were neutral or indifferent 
about some risks or challenges (see for example, 10ae (higher demand for the 
diamond product), 10af (China to dominate the world markets) and 10aj (rise of 
recycled diamonds)), they slightly agreed with the rest of the other risks (see for 
example, those risks represented by 10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f, 10g, 10h, 10i, 
10j, 10k, 10l, 10m, 10n, 10o, 10p, 10q, 10r, 10s, 10t, 10u, 10v, 10w, 10x, 10y, 10z, 
10aa, 10ab, 10ac, 10ad, 10ag, 10ah, 10ai, 10ak, 10al, 10am, 10an, 10ao, 10ap, 
10aq, 10ar, 10as, 10at, 10au and 10av).  
However, an examination of internal and external stakeholders shows some 
interesting similarities and differences. The findings in Table 20 show that these 
two groups are neutral or indifferent about the same types of risks or challenges 
faced in the diamond industry (that is, these two groups are both neutral on the 
proposed risks represented by 10ae, 10af and 10aj). However, the average score 
ranges are slightly different. The internal stakeholder group had a slightly wider 
average score range, and the average score range for the external stakeholders 
falls within the internal stakeholder average score range. The findings show that 
the internal stakeholder group had average scores ranging from 3.849 (10af) to 
6.151 (10d) whereas that of external stakeholders range from 4.307 (10af) to 
5.478 (10d). However, the minimum average score for these two groups is 
represented by the same type of risk (that is 10af). 
Apart from the similarities shown based on the neutral rank, internal stakeholders 
slightly agree with risks represented by 10b, 10f, 10g, 10h, 10k, 10m, 10n, 10p, 
10s, 10t, 10v, 10x, 10ab, 10ac, 10ad, 10ag, 10ah, 10ai, 10ak, 10al, 10am, 10an, 
10ao, 10ar, 10as, 10au, whereas the external stakeholders slightly agree with the 
risks represented by 10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f, 10g, 10h, 10i, 10j, 10k, 10l, 
10m, 10n, 10o, 10p, 10q, 10r, 10s, 10t, 10u, 10v, 10w, 10x, 10y, 10z, 10aa, 10ab, 
10ac, 10ad, 10ag, 10ah, 10ai, 10ak, 10al, 10am, 10an, 10ao, 10ap, 10aq, 10ar, 
10as, 10at, 10au and 10av. Interestingly, both internal and external stakeholder 
groups show common features in their ranking for the slightly agree ranking. For 
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example, the external stakeholder group slightly agrees with all the risks that have 
been ranked as slightly agree by the internal stakeholders. The only difference 
between these two groups is that while the internal stakeholders agree with risks 
represented by 10a, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10i, 10j, 10l, 10o, 10q, 10r, 10u, 10w, 10y, 
10z, 10aa, 10ap, 10aq, 10at and 10av, external stakeholders seem to only slightly 
agree with these proposed risks. 
These findings confirmed that illegal diamond trade, potential Kimberley process 
collapse, political instability in most of the mining town; conflict diamonds arising 
out of the growing illegal mining trade; higher production costs fuelled by 
increasing energy costs; forex volatility linked to market volatility; regulatory 
uncertainty linked to the pending finalisation of the new Mining Charter Three as 
well as the pending amendments on the Diamond Act of 1998 as amended; high 
levels of un-employment, poverty and inequalities in the mining communities; 
violent labour relation environment, possibility mineral wars where communities 
themselves fight against themselves over employment and business opportunities 
coupled with violent conflicts between mining companies and local community 
groups; and environmental issues relating to mine rehabilitation as a result of mine 
closures and addressing historical rehabilitation and acid water drainage. 
After identifying the risks that affect corporate reputation, further analysis was 
conducted to establish stakeholder views about the statements relating to the 
positive effects of the corporate reputation in the diamond industry. The procedure 
for obtaining stakeholder views and findings are presented in the next section. 
5.6 Examination of stakeholder views on statements relating to the 
positive effects of corporate reputation in the diamond industry 
This analysis is presented in four sub-sections. The first sub-section presents data 
screening. The second sub-section presents factor analysis while the third sub-
section presents the analysis of results followed by discussion. 
5.6.1 Data screening 
The screening of data is done in order to identify the possibility of univariate 
outliers. A Nick Cox’s extremes command (it is a user defined command 
[extremes dv iv] in Stata used to identify cases with the most extreme high and low 
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values) was used to identify the most extreme low and high values. The findings 
from this test showed that ten observations had a total of 184 extreme values over 
the 25 variables. 
5.6.2 The effect of Corporate Reputation on Investor Confidence 
This section examines the effect of corporate reputation on investor confidence. 
The analysis was done using an index. However, before an index could be 
constructed, a factor analysis was computed to identify relevant variables that are 
key for assessing investor confidence. Thereafter, the factor loadings generated 
through factor analysis were used as the weights required to construct the index. 
Factor analysis 
The factorability of the seven effects of positive reputation on investor confidence 
items was examined.  A factorability of correlation criteria was used to identify the 
factors that are relevant and to identify sub-themes that drive the variations in the 
data: 
Firstly, it was observed that all seven variables correlated at least 0.3 with at least 
one other variable, suggesting reasonable factorability (see for example Table 22).  
Table 22: Correlation matrix 
  q11h_ q11k_ q11m_ q11o_ q11q_ q11w_ q11y_ 
q11h_ 1 
      q11k_ 0.5327 1 
     q11m_ 0.4605 0.5879 1 
    q11o_ 0.5056 0.6136 0.6552 1 
   q11q_ 0.4266 0.4505 0.388 0.553 1 
  q11w_ 0.3141 0.4221 0.4135 0.4367 0.4006 1 
 q11y_ 0.0161 0.1415 0.1608 0.166 0.2037 0.4514 1 
 
Secondly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO), which is a measure of sampling 
adequacy, was generated and the results showed a value of 0 .824, which is well 
above the commonly recommended value of 0.6. In a similar vein, all the 
communalities were above 0.3 except for variable 11y which had communality 
value of 0.069. Therefore variable 11y was dropped, leaving six variables in the 
final analysis. After dropping variable 11y, a new KMO measure was generated 
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and it produced a value of 0.853 which is still well above the minimum required. 
The principle component analysis was used to identify and compute indices for 
characteristics underlying the variation in the identified variables. The eigenvalue 
for factor 1 is the only one that has a value above 1 (see the plot label Figure 22 
and Table 22) 
 
 
Figure 22: Scree plot showing eigenvalues after PCA 
 
Factor 1 has a value of 3.865 and explains approximately 55.22% of the variance. 
The solutions were examined using the varimax rotation of the factor loadings. 
The results are shown in Table 23. 
Table 23: Factor loading based on Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation (N=551) 
Variable Factor Loading Communality 
q11h_ 0.3871 0.5112 
q11k_ 0.4382 0.655 
q11m_ 0.4263 0.6199 
q11o_ 0.4588 0.7181 
q11q_ 0.3817 0.4971 
q11w_ 0.3467 0.4101 
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The findings show that all six components have factor loadings above 0.3; hence, 
all shall be used in the construction of the index score. 
Furthermore, the Cronbach Alphas were generated in order to test the internal 
consistency or reliability of the index to be created. The results from the Cronbach 
test show a value of 0.843 which is greater than 0.6 (see for example, Table 24). 
This means that the index that is going to be created will meet the reliability test. 
Table 24: Cronbach’s alpha with and without exclusions 
  
Alpha(no 
exclusions) 0.84 
  Variable 
excluded Alpha 
q11h_ 0.83 
q11k_ 0.80 
q11m_ 0.81 
q11o_ 0.79 
q11q_ 0.83 
q11w_ 0.84 
 
 An analysis of alphas for individual variables for the factors shows that exclusion 
of any one of the variables does not increase the overall Cronbach alpha. As a 
result, all variables should be included. 
Following the tests conducted above, the index was finally generated to examine 
the effect of positive corporate reputation on investor confidence. The index was 
generated using the weighted average of the six variables relating to the effects of 
positive reputation on investor confidence. The factor loadings computed earlier 
using the principle component analysis were used as the weights in the 
constructing of the index. The index was established to measure the extent to 
which stakeholders agree/disagree with the notion that positive reputation 
improves investor confidence in the diamond industry. The index ranges from 0 to 
100, where 0 represents strongly disagree, 50 represents neutral while 100 
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represents strongly agree. Values above 50 represent agree. 
Table 25: Combined stakeholder views on effects of corporate reputation to 
company success 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Shapiro 
Wilks 
 z-stat 
Shapiro 
Wilks  
p-value 
All Stakeholders 532 73.4365 17.8488 -0.7022 3.0731 6.4123 0.0000 
Internal 114 77.7859 14.0572 -0.7221 3.5212 2.9532 0.0016 
External 551 73.3286 17.8446 -0.6681 3.0094 6.3490 0.0000 
Management 37 81.5108 9.8914 0.1269 2.4178 -1.5950 0.9446 
Financier 24 65.9967 20.5911 -0.4310 2.4956 -0.0549 0.5219 
Clientele 225 71.6024 18.4647 -0.7765 3.3305 4.7365 0.0000 
Voices 140 75.9161 16.7097 -0.4962 2.4672 3.5550 0.0002 
Other 106 72.9210 18.3416 -0.4909 2.1828 3.8576 0.0001 
Employee 66 76.5263 14.5446 -0.4876 2.8842 1.0359 0.1501 
Senior Exec 17 77.7067 11.2478 0.6985 2.7179 0.6320 0.2637 
Supplier 11 72.8144 20.4124 -0.7268 2.2471 1.4629 0.0718 
Corporate Reputation 
Expert 20 84.7442 7.4087 0.2891 2.1198 0.1221 0.4514 
Banking Institution 12 52.7692 18.1309 -0.1160 2.5571 -1.8063 0.9646 
Investor 12 79.2241 13.2689 -0.4388 2.3176 -0.2771 0.6092 
Community Rep 95 72.9334 18.2059 -0.4562 2.1662 3.7053 0.0001 
Consumer 59 73.3899 19.3286 -1.2525 4.5100 3.6531 0.0001 
Potential Consumer 166 70.9671 18.1655 -0.5935 2.9189 3.4148 0.0003 
Human Rights grp 23 75.3380 22.9245 -0.5464 1.9826 2.0118 0.0221 
Labour Union 11 71.3463 21.1589 -0.0449 1.2877 1.4080 0.0796 
Media House 8 75.8163 13.5902 -0.2845 2.1012 -1.3733 0.9152 
Regulatory Authority 32 76.6690 15.5005 -0.2876 1.8805 0.8595 0.1950 
 
The findings in Table 25 show that all stakeholders at all levels have mean values 
that are significantly greater than 50% except the banking institutions. This shows 
that other stakeholder groups, except banking institutions, agree that positive 
corporate reputation improves investor confidence. The banking institution has a 
mean of 52.77% which shows that this stakeholder group is relatively neutral. To 
confirm this finding a t-test was conducted and the results from this test showed 
the mean of the banking institution stakeholder was not statistically greater than 
50% (t= 0.529; p= 0.304). 
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To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups agree that positive 
corporate reputation improves investor confidence, the analysis was divided into 
three levels; the first level examines differences between the decision-makers who 
are directly involved with the company (internal stakeholder group) and those who 
are indirectly involved with the company (external stakeholders); at the second 
level, an examination of the differences between management and the providers 
of financing is analysed; the third level examines the differences between senior 
executives and each of the three relevant stakeholder groups namely, corporate 
reputation experts, banking and financial institutions and investors stakeholder 
groups. The analysis starts with the comparison of the means followed by a t-test 
to confirm whether there are any differences between the two means or not. The 
Welch t-test is used in cases where the variances of the two groups are not equal 
but data for both groups are normally distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test is used 
where the data for either group is not normally distributed. The examination 
produced five sets of data and the results from this examination are presented 
separately below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 25 show that internal stakeholders had a mean (77.79) 
greater than the external stakeholders (73.32). The data for both the internal and 
external stakeholder groups were not normally distributed as shown by the 
Shapiro Wilks test in Table 25. Hence the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted and 
the results from this test show that the mean of the internal stakeholder group is 
significantly greater than the internal stakeholder group (χ2 = 6.529, p = 0.011). 
This result shows that the internal stakeholder group agrees more that positive 
corporate reputation improves investor confidence than the external stakeholder 
group; 
Secondly, the findings show that the management stakeholder group has a mean 
(81.51) greater than the financiers stakeholder group (66). The data for both the 
management stakeholder group and the financiers stakeholder group are normally 
distributed, but the variances for the two stakeholder groups are not equal 
(Bartlett’s χ2 = 15.129, p < 0.01) Hence, the Welch t-test was conducted and the 
results from this test show that the management stakeholder group has a mean 
that is statistically greater than the financiers stakeholder group (t = 3.442, p < 
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0.01). This finding confirms that the management stakeholder group agrees more 
than the financiers’ stakeholder group that positive corporate reputation improves 
investor confidence. This finding indicates the level of stubbornness associated 
with financiers like bankers and fund managers when it comes to taking on board 
intangible assets as a main consideration for them in making financing decisions.  
In other words, management or internal stakeholders believe more that positive 
corporate reputation has a positive effect on investor confidence;  
Thirdly, the senior executive stakeholder group has a mean (77.71) smaller than 
the corporate reputation experts stakeholder group (84.74%). The data for both 
the senior executives stakeholder group and the corporate reputation experts 
stakeholder group are normally distributed and the variances for the two 
stakeholder groups are equal (Bartlett’s χ2 = 2.929, p = 0.087) Hence, the student 
t-test was conducted and the results from this test show that the senior executive 
stakeholder group has a mean that is statistically smaller than the corporate 
reputation experts stakeholder group (t = -2.279, p = 0.014). This finding confirms 
that the corporate reputation experts’ stakeholder group agree more than the 
senior executive stakeholder group that positive corporate reputation improves 
investor confidence. This finding indicates that corporate reputation practitioners 
have a higher appreciation of the effects of corporate reputation to investor 
confidence and also to all of the other effects of corporate reputation.  This is 
because corporate reputation is their day to day responsibility and that is why they 
have better appreciation;   
Fourthly, the senior executives group has a mean (77.71) greater than the banking 
institutions group (52.77). The data for both senior executives stakeholder group 
and the banking institutions stakeholder group were normally distributed and the 
variances for the two stakeholder groups are equal (Bartlett’s χ2 = 2.923, p = 
0.087) Hence, the student t-test was conducted and the results from this test show 
that the senior executive stakeholder group has a mean that is statistically greater 
than the banking institutions stakeholder group (t = 4.576, p < 0.01). This finding 
confirms that the senior executives’ stakeholder group agree more that positive 
corporate reputation improves investor confidence than the banking institutions 
group and fifthly, the senior executives group has a mean (77.71) smaller than the 
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investors stakeholder group (79.22). The data for both senior executives 
stakeholder group and the investor stakeholder group are normally distributed and 
the variances for the two stakeholder groups are equal (Bartlett’s χ2 =0.348, p = 
0.555) Hence, the student t-test was conducted and the results from this test show 
that the investors stakeholder group has a mean that is not statistically smaller 
than the investors stakeholder group (t = -0.332, p = 0.371). This finding confirms 
that there is consensus between these two groups about the extent to which 
positive corporate reputation improves investor confidence.  
These findings have indicated that all stakeholders in varying degrees believe that 
positive corporate reputation in the diamond industry contributes positively to 
investor confidence, though the bankers and financiers slightly agree, while 
corporate reputation experts together with executives strongly believe.  This is 
another descriptor indicating Rindova et al (2005) and Tshivase and Kleyn (2016) 
assertion that stakeholder hold differing views about the effect of corporate 
reputation dependent on their experience, perceptions and relationship with the 
firm. 
5.6.3 The Effect of corporate reputation on Employee engagement, talent 
attraction and retention 
Factor Analysis 
The factorability of the seven effects of positive reputation on employee 
engagement, talent attraction and retention items was examined.  A factorability of 
correlation criteria was used to identify the factors that are relevant and to identify 
sub-themes that drive the variation in the data. It was observed that all seven 
variables correlated at least 0.3 with at least one other variable, suggesting 
reasonable factorability (see for example, Table 26).  
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Table 26: Correlation matrix 
  q11a_ q11b_ q11l_ q11n_ q11o_ q11p_ q11w_ 
q11a_ 1 
      q11b_ 0.763 1 
     q11l_ 0.5856 0.61 1 
    q11n_ 0.5636 0.518 0.6404 1 
   q11o_ 0.4668 0.5126 0.5925 0.5504 1 
  q11p_ 0.4438 0.4182 0.5824 0.5444 0.6135 1 
 q11w_ 0.3226 0.3217 0.3795 0.3932 0.432 0.3716 1 
 
Table 27: Factor loading based on Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation (N=556) 
Variable 
Factor 
Loading Communality 
q11a_ 0.39 0.62 
q11b_ 0.39 0.62 
q11l_ 0.41 0.69 
q11n_ 0.39 0.63 
q11o_ 0.38 0.61 
q11p_ 0.36 0.55 
q11w_ 0.28 0.32 
 
Table 28: Cronbach’s alpha 
Alpha (no 
exclusions) 0.8755 
Variable 
excluded Alpha 
q11a_ 0.85 
q11b_ 0.85 
q11l_ 0.84 
q11n_ 0.85 
q11o_ 0.85 
q11p_ 0.85 
q11w_ 0.88 
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According to the results of the principle component analysis, it is evident that the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0 .866, which is 
well above the commonly recommended value of 0.6. The communalities values 
were all above 0.3. The factor loadings are greater than 0.3 for all variables except 
11w (see Table 27) 11w’s inclusion in the model was investigated using 
Cronbach’s alpha which will analyse the effect excluding the one that violates the 
internal consistency test. As seen in Table 28, the internal consistency improves 
when 11w is dropped from the model. 11w is dropped from the model as a result 
of the low factor loading and its adverse effect on the internal consistency. This 
leaves six variables in the final analysis. After dropping variable 11w, a new KMO 
measure was generated and it produced a value of 0.850 which is still well above 
the minimum required. 
In addition, the principle component analysis was used to identify and compute 
indices for characteristics underlying the variation in the identified variables. The 
eigenvalue for factor 1 is the only one that has a value above 1 (see the plot label 
Figure 23). 
 
 
Figure 23: Scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA 
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Factor 1 has an eigenvalue value of 3.808 and explains approximately 63.47% of 
the variance. The solutions were examined using the varimax rotation of the factor 
loadings. The results are shown in Table 29. 
Table 29: Factor loading based on Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation (N=560) 
Variable 
Factor 
Loading Communality 
q11a_ 0.4106 0.6419 
q11b_ 0.412 0.6466 
q11l_ 0.4326 0.7128 
q11n_ 0.4099 0.6399 
q11o_ 0.3996 0.6081 
q11p_ 0.3832 0.5592 
 
The findings show that all six components have factor loadings above 0.3; hence, 
all shall be used in the construction of the index score. 
Furthermore, the Cronbach Alphas were generated in order to test the internal 
consistency or reliability of the index to be created. The results from the Cronbach 
test show a value of 0.883 which is greater than 0.6 (see for example, Table 30). 
This means that the index that is going to be created will satisfy the reliability test. 
Table 30: Cronbach’s alpha with and without exclusions 
 
 Alpha (no 
exclusions) 0.8838 
Variable 
excluded Alpha 
q11a_ 0.86 
q11b_ 0.86 
q11l_ 0.85 
q11n_ 0.86 
q11o_ 0.86 
q11p_ 0.87 
 
 An analysis of alphas for individual variables for Factor 1 shows that exclusion of 
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any one of the variables does not increase the overall Cronbach alpha (see Table 
30). As a result, all variables should be included. 
Following the tests conducted above, the index was finally generated to examine 
the effect of positive corporate reputation on employee engagement, talent 
attraction and retention. The index was generated using the weighted average of 
the six variables relating to the effects of positive reputation on employee 
engagement, talent attraction and retention. The factor loadings computed using 
principle component analysis (see Table 31), were used as the weights in the 
construction of the Index. The index was established to measure the extent to 
which stakeholders agree/disagree with the notion that positive reputation 
improves employee engagement, talent attraction and retention in the diamond 
industry. The index ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 represents strongly disagree, 
50 represents neutral while 100 represents strongly agree. Values above 50 
represent agree. 
Table 31: Stakeholders’ views on the effects of reputation on employee 
engagement, talent attraction and retention 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Shapiro 
Wilks z-
stat 
Shapiro 
Wilks p-
value 
All Stakeholders 541 75.1925 18.7984 -0.7996 2.8873 7.7346 0.0000 
Internal 103 81.7175 11.8522 -0.4014 2.6901 1.5225 0.0639 
External 438 73.6581 19.7861 -0.6855 2.5479 7.2101 0.0000 
Management 37 82.9374 12.5838 -0.5277 2.6151 1.1391 0.1273 
Financier 25 71.2363 21.6925 -0.5433 2.3788 0.8383 0.2009 
Clientele 231 72.4755 20.7938 -0.6213 2.4176 5.5215 0.0000 
Voices 141 78.6125 15.8065 -0.9506 3.2555 5.0764 0.0000 
Other 107 74.7977 17.7568 -0.7041 2.8401 4.3673 0.0000 
Employee 66 81.0336 11.4635 -0.3486 2.7859 0.4785 0.3162 
Senior Exec 17 76.5567 13.7031 0.0957 2.2181 -2.0932 0.9818 
Supplier 11 79.5849 16.8863 -0.9879 2.7596 1.7993 0.0360 
Corporate Reputation 
Expert 20 88.3611 8.6322 -0.4585 3.0513 1.2811 0.1001 
Banking Institution 13 63.4846 23.9368 -0.1418 1.9308 -0.4794 0.6842 
Investor 12 79.6339 15.9274 -0.4569 2.0134 0.1106 0.4560 
Community Rep 96 74.2492 17.8561 -0.6744 2.8492 3.9951 0.0000 
Consumer 61 72.6702 20.3582 -1.1526 4.1228 3.7027 0.0001 
Potential Consumer 170 72.4057 21.0069 -0.4495 1.8937 4.6800 0.0000 
Human Rights grp 23 76.5722 21.0786 -0.7687 2.2363 2.6738 0.0037 
Labour Union 12 71.0449 20.7634 -0.4900 1.7827 1.4892 0.0682 
Media House 8 78.0998 17.2494 -1.0319 2.4533 1.8353 0.0332 
Regulatory Authority 32 78.0516 16.7088 -0.8877 2.6843 2.5254 0.0058 
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The findings in Table 31 show that all stakeholders at all levels have mean scores 
that are greater than 60%. This shows that, on average, all stakeholder groups 
agree that positive stakeholder engagement improves employee engagement, 
talent attraction and retention. 
To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups agree that positive 
corporate reputation improves employee engagement, talent attraction and 
retention, further analysis was conducted after dividing the data into three levels, 
The first level examines differences between the decision-makers who are directly 
involved with the company (internal stakeholder group) and those who are 
indirectly involved with the company (external stakeholders). At the second level, 
an examination of the differences between management and the other category 
(the category that includes employees) is analysed. The third level examines the 
differences between senior executives and each of the two relevant stakeholder 
groups namely, corporate reputation experts and employees stakeholder groups. 
The analysis starts with the comparison of the means followed by a t-test to 
confirm whether or not there are any differences between the two means. The 
Welch t-test is used in cases where the variances of the two groups are not equal 
but data for both groups are normally distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test, a non-
parametric alternative, is used where the data for either group are not normally 
distributed. The examination produced five sets of data and the results from this 
examination are presented separately as below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 31 show that internal stakeholders have a mean 
(81.71) greater than the external stakeholders (73.66). The data for both the 
internal and external stakeholder groups are not normally distributed, as shown by 
the Shapiro Wilks test in Table 31. Hence the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted 
and the results from this test showed that the mean of internal stakeholder group 
was significantly greater than the internal stakeholder group (χ2 =8.535, p <0.01). 
This result showed that the internal stakeholder group agreed more than the 
external stakeholder group that positive corporate reputation improves relations 
with both actual and potential employees.  This finding is attributed to the fact that 
internal stakeholders experience employee engagement, retention and attraction 
more than the external stakeholders who are not directly linked to the day to day 
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developments in the organisation. 
Secondly, the findings show that the management category has a mean (82.94) 
greater than the other category group (74.80). As the Other category is not 
normally distributed, the Kruskal Wallis test was used and the results from this test 
show that management category has a mean that is significantly greater than the 
mean of the other category group (χ2 =5.257, p =0.0217). This finding confirms 
that the management stakeholder group agree more than the Other category that 
positive corporate reputation improves employee relations; Thirdly, the senior 
executive stakeholder group has a mean (76.56) smaller than the corporate 
reputation experts stakeholder group (88.36%). The data for both senior 
executives stakeholder group and the corporate reputation experts stakeholder 
group is normally distributed and the variances for the two stakeholder groups are 
equal (Bartlett’s χ2 = 3.575, p = 0.059). Hence, the student t-test was conducted 
and the results from this test show that the senior executive stakeholder group has 
a mean that is statistically smaller than the corporate reputation experts 
stakeholder group (t = -3.184, p <0.01). This finding confirms that the corporate 
reputation experts’ stakeholder group agree more than the senior executive 
stakeholder group that positive corporate reputation improves employee relations.  
Fourthly, the senior executives’ stakeholder group has a mean (77.71) less than 
the employee stakeholder group (81.03). The data for both senior executives 
stakeholder groups are greater than the employee stakeholder group and the data 
are normally distributed (see Table 31) and the variances for the two stakeholder 
groups are equal (Bartlett’s χ2 = 0.858, p = 0.354). Hence, the student t-test was 
conducted and the results from this test show that the senior executives 
stakeholder group has a mean that is not statistically greater than the employee 
stakeholder group (t = -1.379, p = 0.086). This finding confirms that there is 
consensus between these two groups that positive corporate reputation improves 
employee relations.  The reason corporate reputation experts and senior level 
executives in the diamond industry value more the positive contribution of 
reputation to employee engagement, retention and attraction is because of the 
important stake this outcomes has in their success in terms of productivity and 
business success. 
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5.6.4 The effect of corporate reputation on purchase decisions for 
diamond jewellery 
This section examines the effect of corporate reputation on consumer purchase 
decisions for diamond jewellery. The analysis was done using an index. However, 
before an index could be constructed, a factor analysis was computed to identify 
relevant variables that are key for assessing consumer purchase decisions. 
Thereafter, the factor loadings generated through factor analysis were used as the 
weights required to construct the index. 
Factor analysis 
First, the factorability of the six effects of corporate reputation on the purchasing 
decisions was examined.  A factorability of correlation criteria was used to identify 
the factors that are relevant and to identify possible sub-themes that drive the 
variation in the data. It was observed that all six variables correlated at least 0.3 
with at least one other variable, suggesting reasonable factorability (see for 
example, Table 32).  
Table 32: Correlation matrix 
  q11f_ q11i_ q11j_ q11o_ q11q_ q11r_ 
q11f_ 1 
     q11i_ 0.4815 1 
    q11j_ 0.4496 0.6683 1 
   q11o_ 0.4263 0.5497 0.5723 1 
  q11q_ 0.3799 0.4471 0.4279 0.5536 1 
 q11r_ 0.4019 0.5173 0.5577 0.5912 0.6352 1 
 
Table 33: Factor loading based on Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation (N=555) 
Variable Factor Loading Communality 
q11f_ 0.3495 0.5643 
q11i_ 0.422 0.3646 
q11j_ 0.4246 0.357 
q11o_ 0.4264 0.3515 
q11q_ 0.3937 0.4471 
q11r_ 0.4275 0.3479 
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Principle component analysis was used to identify and compute indexes for 
characteristics underlying the variation in the identified variables. The eigenvalue 
for Factor 1 is the only one that has a value above 1 (see the plot label Figure 24). 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy for the model was 
0 .861, which is well above the commonly recommended value of 0.6.  
 
 
Figure 24: Scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA 
 
Factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 3.567 and explains approximately 59.46% of the 
variance. The factor loadings were generated using the varimax rotation of the 
factor loadings (see Table 33). The communalities values were all above 0.3. The 
findings show that all six components have factor loadings above 0.3; hence, all 
shall be used in the construction of the index score. 
Furthermore, the Cronbach’s alphas were generated in order to test the internal 
consistency or reliability of the index to be created. The results from the 
Cronbach’s test show a value of 0.859 which is greater than 0.6 (see for example, 
Table 34). This means that the index that is going to be created will satisfy the 
reliability test. 
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Table 34: Cronbach’s alpha with and without exclusions 
  Alpha (no 
exclusions) 
0.859 
Variable 
excluded 
Alpha 
q11f_ 0.85 
q11i_ 0.83 
q11j_ 0.83 
q11o_ 0.82 
q11q_ 0.83 
q11r_ 0.82 
 
 An analysis of alphas for individual variables for the factors shows that exclusion 
of any one of the variables does not increase the overall Cronbach alpha. As a 
result, all variables should be included in the index. 
Following the tests conducted above, the index was finally generated to examine 
the effect of corporate reputation on purchasing decisions. The index was 
generated using the weighted average of the six variables relating to the effects of 
corporate reputation on purchasing decisions. The factor loadings computed using 
principle component analysis (see Table 35), were used as the weights in the 
construction of the index. The index was established to measure the extent to 
which stakeholders agree/disagree with the notion that corporate reputation 
affects the purchasing decisions in the diamond industry. The index ranges from 0 
to 100, where 0 represents strongly disagree, 50 represents neutral while 100 
represents strongly agree. Values above 50 represent agree. 
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Table 35: Stakeholder views on reputation effects on purchasing decisions 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Shapiro Wilks 
z-stat 
Shapiro Wilks p-
value 
All Stakeholders 536 75.1505 17.7138 -0.7376 3.1702 6.6317 0.0000 
Internal 103 79.6124 12.2257 -0.2539 2.6289 0.0888 0.4646 
External 433 74.0892 18.6394 -0.6725 2.8973 6.1641 0.0000 
Management 37 81.0448 10.4974 -0.0964 2.7627 -1.5383 0.9380 
Financier 25 69.3492 20.0722 -0.9706 2.9799 2.2750 0.0115 
Clientele 226 74.0096 18.4265 -0.7295 3.1190 4.5699 0.0000 
Voices 141 78.1755 16.4631 -0.6174 2.8184 3.9198 0.0000 
Other 107 72.8913 18.3362 -0.5259 2.6190 3.9317 0.0000 
Employee 66 78.8094 13.1033 -0.2300 2.4273 -0.3576 0.6397 
Senior Exec 17 77.4018 12.1879 0.4160 2.7238 -0.1713 0.5680 
Supplier 11 73.6209 21.3654 -0.5755 1.9485 1.0497 0.1469 
Corporate Reputation Expert 20 84.1414 7.8571 -0.0383 2.6609 -1.1409 0.8731 
Banking Institution 13 59.5752 21.8886 -0.4354 1.8007 1.1618 0.1227 
Investor 12 79.9377 11.0072 -0.5552 2.5447 -0.5821 0.7198 
Community Rep 96 72.8078 18.0838 -0.5203 2.7293 3.8293 0.0001 
Consumer 61 74.3239 17.9900 -0.9976 3.9448 2.7947 0.0026 
Potential Consumer 165 73.8935 18.6378 -0.6400 2.8605 3.5894 0.0002 
Human Rights grp 23 77.4302 24.1293 -0.6859 2.1685 2.7050 0.0034 
Labour Union 12 74.1972 21.8814 -0.2318 1.3973 1.2378 0.1079 
Media House 8 79.8050 15.4419 -0.7254 2.8747 -0.0139 0.5056 
Regulatory Authority 32 78.4882 14.7955 -0.4462 2.1710 1.0236 0.1530 
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Table 35 shows that all stakeholders at all levels have mean values that are 
greater than 70 except for the banking institutions with a mean of 59.58. This 
shows that, on average, just about all the stakeholder groups agree that corporate 
reputation affects the purchasing decisions in the diamond industry. 
To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups agree that corporate 
reputation affects the purchasing decisions, the analysis was divided into three 
levels. The first level examines differences between the decision-makers who are 
directly involved with the company (internal stakeholder group) and those who are 
indirectly involved with the company (external stakeholders). At the second level, 
an examination of the differences between management and the clientele 
category (the category that includes both actual and potential consumers of 
diamonds) is analysed. The third level examines the differences between senior 
executives and each of the three relevant stakeholder groups namely; corporate 
reputation experts, actual consumers and potential consumer stakeholder groups. 
The analysis starts with the comparison of the means followed by a t-test to 
confirm whether or not there are any differences between the two means. The 
Welch t-test is used in cases where the variances of the two groups are not equal 
but data for both groups are normally distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test, a non-
parametric alternative, is used where the data for either group are not normally 
distributed. The examination produced five sets of groupings and the results from 
this examination are presented separately as below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 35 show that internal stakeholders have a mean 
(79.61) greater than the external stakeholders (74.09). The data for the external 
stakeholder groups are not normally distributed, as shown by the Shapiro Wilks 
test in Table 35. Hence the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted and the results from 
this test show that the mean of internal stakeholder group is significantly greater 
than the external stakeholder group (χ2 =4.003, p=0.0454). This result shows that 
the internal stakeholder group agree more that positive corporate reputation 
influences the purchasing decision than the external stakeholder group; 
Secondly, the findings show that the management category has a mean (81.044) 
greater than the clientele category group (74.01). As the clientele category data 
are not normally distributed, the Kruskal Wallis test was used and the results show 
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that management category has a mean that is not significantly greater than the 
mean of the clientele category (χ2 =3.295, p =0.0692). This finding confirms that 
there is a consensus between the management stakeholder group and the 
clientele stakeholder that corporate reputation affects the purchasing decision; 
Thirdly, the senior executive stakeholder group has a mean (77.40) smaller than 
the corporate reputation experts stakeholder group (84.14). The data for both 
senior executives stakeholder group and the corporate reputation experts 
stakeholder group are normally distributed and the variances for the two 
stakeholder groups are equal (Bartlett’s χ2 = 3.232, p = 0.072). Hence, the student 
t-test was conducted and the results from this test show that the senior executive 
stakeholder group has a mean that is statistically smaller than the corporate 
reputation experts stakeholder group (t = -2.029, p =0.025). This finding confirms 
that the corporate reputation experts’ stakeholder group agree more that corporate 
reputation has an effect on the purchasing decision; 
Fourthly, the senior executives group has a mean (77.40) greater than the 
consumer group (74.32). Since the data for the consumer stakeholder group are 
not normally distributed (see Table 35, the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted and 
the results from this test show that senior executives group has a mean that is not 
significantly greater than the mean of the consumer group (χ2 =0.913, p =0.909). 
This finding confirms that there is consensus between these two groups that 
corporate reputation influences the purchasing decisions;  
Fifthly, the senior executives group has a mean (77.40) greater than the potential 
consumer group (73.89). Since the data for the potential consumer stakeholder 
group are not normally distributed (see Table 35), the Kruskal Wallis test was 
conducted and the results from this test show that senior executives group has a 
mean that is not significantly greater than the mean of the potential consumer 
group (χ2 =0.080, p =0.777). This finding confirms that there is consensus 
between these two groups that corporate reputation has an effect on the 
purchasing decisions. These findings indicate that internal stakeholders are more 
optimistic that consumers about the effect of positive corporate reputation in term 
of purchasing decisions.   
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5.6.5 The effect of corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty 
This section examines whether or not corporate reputation impacts negatively or 
positively on customer attraction and loyalty. Similar to prior sections, analysis was 
conducted in stages. However, before final analysis was conducted, various tests 
were carried out in order to establish the correct method for the various analyses 
to be conducted. The various steps in the analyses are discussed in the sections 
below: 
Factor analysis 
The factorability of the seven effects of corporate reputation on customer attraction 
and loyalty was examined. Similar to procedures followed in prior analyses (Table 
36 and 37), the factorability of correlation criteria was used to identify the factors 
that are relevant and to identify possible sub-themes that drove the variation in the 
data. It was observed that all seven variables correlated at least 0.3 with at least 
one other variable, suggesting reasonable factorability (see for example, Table 
49).  
Table 36: Correlation matrix 
  q11c_ q11d_ q11e_ q11f_ q11i_ q11j_ q11o_ 
q11c_ 1 
      q11d_ 0.6862 1 
     q11e_ 0.6356 0.6141 1 
    q11f_ 0.5128 0.4911 0.5435 1 
   q11i_ 0.5819 0.5754 0.6163 0.478 1 
  q11j_ 0.5502 0.6013 0.5957 0.4495 0.6685 1 
 q11o_ 0.4869 0.4468 0.5272 0.4219 0.5496 0.5701 1 
Table 37: Factor loading based on Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation (N=552) 
Variable Factor Loading Communality 
q11c_ 0.3912 0.6625 
q11d_ 0.3881 0.652 
q11e_ 0.3981 0.6861 
q11f_ 0.3352 0.4866 
q11i_ 0.3926 0.6672 
q11j_ 0.3893 0.6561 
q11o_ 0.3462 0.519 
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Principle component analysis was used to identify and compute indexes for 
characteristics underlying the variation in the identified variables. The eigenvalue 
for factor 1 was the only one that had a value above 1 (see the plot label Fig 24). 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy for the model was 
0 .910, which is well above the commonly recommended value of 0.6.  
 
Figure 25: Scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA 
 
Factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 4.330 and explains approximately 61.85% of the 
variance. The factor loadings were generated using the varimax rotation of the 
factor loadings (see Table 37). The communalities values were all above 0.3. The 
findings show that all seven components have factor loadings above 0.3; hence, 
all shall be used in the construction of the index score. Furthermore, the 
Cronbach’s alphas were generated in order to test the internal consistency or 
reliability of the index to be created. The results from the Cronbach’s test show a 
value of 0.894 which is greater than 0.6 (see for example, Table 38). This means 
that the index that is going to be created will satisfy the reliability test. 
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Table 38: Cronbach’s alpha with and without exclusions 
  
Alpha (no 
exclusions) 0.8939 
Variable 
excluded Alpha 
q11c_ 0.8749 
q11d_ 0.8753 
q11e_ 0.8714 
q11f_ 0.8901 
q11i_ 0.874 
q11j_ 0.8754 
q11o_ 0.8872 
 
 An analysis of alphas for individual variables for the factor(s) showed that 
exclusion of any one of the variables does not increase the overall Cronbach 
alpha. As a result, all seven variables should be included in the index. 
Following the tests conducted above, the index was finally generated to examine 
the effect of corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty. The index 
was generated using the weighted average of the six variables relating to the 
effects of corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty. The factor 
loadings computed using principle component analysis (see Table 38), were used 
as the weights in the constructing of the Index. The index was established to 
measure the extent to which stakeholders agree/disagree with the notion that 
corporate reputation impacts negatively or positively on customer attraction and 
loyalty in the diamond industry. Similar to the Indices created before, the values 
for index created for this purpose ranged from 0 to 100, where 0 represents 
strongly disagree, 50 represents neutral while 100 represents strongly agree. 
Values above 50 represent agree. 
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Table 39: Stakeholders’ views on effects of corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro Wilks z-stat Shapiro Wilks p-value 
All Stakeholders 533 76.8041 17.1472 -0.8793 3.4355 7.3045 0.0000 
Internal 103 82.5892 10.9730 -0.3670 2.9665 1.8082 0.0353 
External 430 75.4183 18.0563 -0.7760 3.0653 6.6220 0.0000 
Management 37 82.4936 9.4431 -0.1749 3.0662 -0.2668 0.6052 
Financier 25 73.0463 19.2076 -0.5890 2.2709 1.5446 0.0612 
Customer* 224 75.5744 17.9645 -0.8811 3.5083 5.2667 0.0000 
Voices 140 80.3555 15.3064 -0.8095 2.8829 4.5238 0.0000 
Other 107 73.6422 18.1967 -0.6696 2.9080 3.9680 0.0000 
Employee 66 82.6429 11.8132 -0.4187 2.8055 1.5511 0.0604 
Senior Exec 17 78.5676 10.5738 0.5093 3.2799 0.6572 0.2555 
Supplier 11 73.7344 23.6350 -0.9575 2.4616 1.9701 0.0244 
Corporate Reputation 
Expert 20 85.8308 7.0208 -0.4050 4.1831 0.5489 0.2915 
Banking Institution 13 64.5691 20.1976 -0.2163 1.4987 1.2174 0.1117 
Investor 12 82.2298 13.5272 -0.3814 2.2089 0.3389 0.3673 
Community Rep 96 73.6317 17.6255 -0.5909 2.9240 3.8115 0.0001 
Consumer 60 76.8785 17.2351 -1.3238 5.1633 3.6318 0.0001 
Potential Consumer 164 75.0973 18.2522 -0.7398 3.0649 4.1462 0.0000 
Human Rights grp 22 77.6822 20.3844 -0.5958 1.8109 2.2746 0.0115 
Labour Union 12 71.3237 20.2867 -0.2167 1.7253 -0.4241 0.6643 
Media House 8 81.8565 17.1763 -0.8316 2.4379 0.4908 0.3118 
Regulatory Authority 32 80.4875 14.6757 -0.8340 2.6283 2.2350 0.0127 
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The findings in Table 39 show that all stakeholders at all levels have mean values 
that are greater than 64. This shows that, on average, all the stakeholder groups 
agree that positive stakeholder groups have an impact on customer attraction and 
loyalty.  
To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups agree that corporate 
reputation affects customer attraction and loyalty, the analysis was divided into 
three levels. The first level examines differences between the decision-makers 
who are directly involved with the company (internal stakeholder group) and those 
who are indirectly involved with the company (external stakeholders). At the 
second level, an examination of the differences between management and the 
clientele category (the category that includes both actual and potential consumers 
of diamonds) is analysed. The third level examines the differences between senior 
executives and each of the three relevant stakeholder groups, namely, corporate 
reputation experts, actual consumers and potential consumer stakeholder groups. 
Similar to prior analyses, the analysis for this section also started with the 
comparison of the means followed by a t-test to confirm whether or not there are 
any differences between the two means. The Welch t-test was also used in cases 
where the variances of the two groups were not equal but data for both groups 
were normally distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test, a non-parametric alternative, 
was used where the data for either group were not normally distributed. The 
examination produced five sets of analyses and the results from this examination 
are presented separately as below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 39 show that internal stakeholders have a mean 
(82.59) greater than the external stakeholders (75.42). The data for the external 
stakeholder groups were not normally distributed, as shown by the Shapiro Wilks 
test in Table 39. Hence the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted and the results from 
this test show that the mean of internal stakeholder group is significantly greater 
than the internal stakeholder group (χ2 =8.763, p<0.01). This result shows that the 
internal stakeholder group agrees more than the external stakeholder group that 
corporate reputation impacts positively or negatively on customer attraction and 
loyalty; 
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Secondly, the findings show that the management category has a mean score 
(82.49) greater than the clientele category group (75.57). As the clientele category 
is not normally distributed, the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted and the results 
from this test show that management category has a mean score that is not 
significantly greater than the mean score of the clientele category (χ2 =3.655, p 
=0.056). This finding confirms that there is a consensus between the management 
stakeholder group and the clientele stakeholder group that corporate reputation 
has an effect on customer attraction and loyalty; 
Thirdly, the senior executive stakeholder group has a mean score (78.57) smaller 
than the corporate reputation experts stakeholder group (85.83). The data for both 
senior executives stakeholder group and the corporate reputation experts 
stakeholder group were normally distributed and the variances for the two 
stakeholder groups are equal (Bartlett’s χ2 = 2.819, p = 0.093). Hence, the student 
t-test was conducted and the results from this test show that the senior executive 
stakeholder group has a mean that is statistically smaller than the corporate 
reputation experts stakeholder group (t = -2.495, p <0.01). This finding confirms 
that the corporate reputation experts’ stakeholder group agree more than the 
senior executive group that corporate reputation has an effect on customer 
attraction and loyalty; 
Fourthly, the senior executives group has a mean score (78.57) greater than the 
consumer group (75.57). The data for the consumer stakeholder group were not 
normally distributed (see Table 39), thus the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted 
and the results show that the senior stakeholder group has a mean that is not 
significantly greater than the mean of the consumer group (χ2 =0.207, p =0.649). 
This finding confirms that there is consensus between these two groups about the 
effect of a corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty;  
Fifthly, the senior executives group has a mean (78.57) greater than the potential 
consumer group (75.10). The data for the potential consumer stakeholder group 
were not normally distributed (see Table 39), the Kruskal Wallis test was 
conducted and the results show that senior executive stakeholder group has a 
mean that is not significantly greater than the mean of the potential consumer 
group (χ2 =0.001, p =0.973). This finding confirms that there is consensus 
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between these two groups about the effect of a corporate reputation on customer 
attraction and loyalty.  These findings are similar to a large extent to the findings 
from the previous section on purchasing decisions.  Internal stakeholders are 
more optimistic about the effect of positive corporate reputation to customer 
attraction, retention and loyalty. 
5.6.6 Effect of reputation on government relations and other external 
stakeholders like suppliers, communities, media houses and 
authorities 
 An examination of whether or not corporate reputation has an effect on the 
relationships between the corporate and the government, as well as with other 
external stakeholders, was assessed. Given the nature of the analysis for this 
section, a similar procedure to prior sections was followed in order to investigate 
this relationship. The results from each step are presented and discussed in the 
sections below: 
Factor analysis 
The factorability of the four effects of corporate reputation on external stakeholder 
relations was examined.  A factorability of correlation criteria was used to identify 
the factors that are relevant and to identify possible sub-themes that drive the 
variation in the data. It was observed that all four variables correlated at least 0.3 
with all variables, suggesting reasonable factorability (see for example, Table 40).  
 
Table 40: Correlation matrix 
  q11g_ q11o_ q11s_ q11u_ 
q11g_ 1 
   q11o_ 0.4925 1 
  q11s_ 0.5191 0.6275 1 
 q11u_ 0.5055 0.4896 0.5456 1 
 
Principle component analysis was conducted to identify and compute 
indices/scores for characteristics underlying the variation in the identified 
variables. The eigenvalue for Factor 1 is the only one that has a value above 1 
(see the plot label Figure 26). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
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sampling adequacy for the model was 0 .7935 which is well above the commonly 
recommended value of 0.6.  
 
Figure 26: Scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA 
 
Factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 2.592 and explains approximately 64.80% of the 
variance. The factor loadings were generated using the varimax rotation of the 
factor loadings. The communalities were all above 0.3. The findings show that all 
seven components have factor loadings above 0.3; motivating the use of all 
variables in the construction of the index score. Furthermore, the Cronbach’s 
alphas were generated in order to test the internal consistency or reliability of the 
index to be created. The results from the Cronbach’s test show a value of 0.815 
which is greater than 0.6 (see for example, Table 41). This means that the index 
that is going to be created will satisfy the reliability test. 
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Table 41: Cronbach’s alpha with and without exclusions 
Alpha (no 
exclusions) 0.8149 
  Variable 
excluded Alpha 
q11g_ 0.78 
q11o_ 0.76 
q11s_ 0.74 
q11u_ 0.77 
 
 An analysis of alphas for individual variables for the factor shows that exclusion of 
any one of the variables does not increase the overall Cronbach alpha. As a 
result, all four variables should be included in the index. 
Following the tests conducted above, the index was finally generated to examine 
the effect of positive corporate reputation on customer attraction and loyalty. The 
index was generated using the weighted average of the six variables relating to 
the effects of positive reputation on purchasing decisions. The factor loadings 
computed using principle component analysis (see Table 41), were used as the 
weights in constructing the index. The index was established to measure the 
extent to which stakeholders agree/disagree with the notion that corporate 
reputation impacts positively or negatively on the relationship between the 
corporation and the government as well as with the other external stakeholder 
groups in the diamond industry. The index ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 
represents strongly disagree, 50 represents neutral while 100 represents strongly 
agree. Values above 50 represent agree. 
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Table 42: Stakeholders’ views on effects of reputation on stakeholder relations 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro Wilks z-stat Shapiro Wilks p-value 
All Stakeholders 537 75.1727 17.8698 -0.8119 3.1082 7.2968 0.0000 
Internal 103 81.8629 11.1798 -0.4018 2.8345 1.8203 0.0344 
External 434 73.5849 18.7796 -0.6918 2.7561 6.5752 0.0000 
Management 37 85.3121 9.9471 -0.3307 2.4372 -0.0949 0.5378 
Financier 25 69.3862 21.6528 -0.7248 2.7969 1.3179 0.0938 
Customer* 228 73.8748 18.7613 -0.7973 3.0978 5.2992 0.0000 
Voices 141 77.3171 15.9057 -0.6775 2.6975 3.8558 0.0001 
Other 106 72.9373 18.2116 -0.5594 2.3155 3.7957 0.0001 
Employee 66 79.9293 11.4353 -0.3527 2.8158 0.3891 0.3486 
Senior Exec 17 81.5624 10.1487 0.1687 2.6433 -0.6272 0.7347 
Supplier 11 78.6851 14.6705 -0.1579 1.8050 0.0626 0.4750 
Corporate 
Reputation expert 
20 88.4994 8.8016 -0.7591 3.1627 1.1281 0.1296 
Banking 
Institution 
13 59.5026 22.9253 -0.3698 2.0021 0.7846 0.2164 
Investor 12 80.0935 14.4591 -0.3361 2.0567 -0.4778 0.6836 
Community Rep 95 72.2718 18.5274 -0.5433 2.2316 3.7804 0.0001 
Consumer 61 73.8291 18.5268 -1.1184 4.1887 3.4489 0.0003 
Potential 
Consumer 
167 73.8915 18.9015 -0.6886 2.7344 4.3487 0.0000 
Human Rights grp 
23 75.1468 21.3331 -0.3051 1.7087 0.8859 0.1878 
Labour Union 12 72.5197 20.6857 -0.2104 1.5056 0.5327 0.2971 
Media House 8 78.5842 19.4106 -0.5620 1.9005 0.2809 0.3894 
Regulatory 
Authority 
32 74.9715 16.5963 -0.8525 2.5831 2.6389 0.0042 
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The findings in Table 42 show that the index’s mean of the combined stakeholder 
groups is 75.17 which is moderately high. In addition, the means of all 
stakeholders’ sub-groupings are greater than 69 except for the banking institution 
group which has a mean of 59.50. This shows that on average all the stakeholder 
groups agree that corporate reputation impacts positively or negatively on 
corporate relationships with government and other external stakeholder groups.   
To further determine the extent to which stakeholder groups agree that corporate 
reputation has an effect on corporate relationships with government and other 
external stakeholder groups, the analysis is divided into three levels. At the first 
level, an examination of the differences between the decision- makers who are 
directly involved with the company (internal stakeholder group) and those who are 
indirectly involved with the company (external stakeholders) was undertaken. At 
the second level, an examination of the differences between management and the 
four other categories that are dominated by external stakeholders is analysed. The 
third level examines the differences between senior executives and each of the 
three relevant stakeholder groups, namely, the corporate reputation experts, 
suppliers, banking institutions, investors, community, consumer, potential 
consumers, human rights, Labour Unions, media houses and regulators. The 
analysis starts with the comparison of the means followed by a t-test to confirm 
whether or not there are any differences between the two means. The Welch t-test 
is used in cases where the variances of the two groups are not equal, but data for 
both groups were normally distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test, a non-parametric 
alternative, is used where the data for either group were not normally distributed. 
The examination produced five sets of analyses and the results from this 
examination are presented separately as below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 42 show that the internal stakeholder group has the 
mean (81.86) that is greater than that of the external stakeholder group (73.58). 
The data for both the internal and external stakeholder groups were not normally 
distributed as shown by the Shapiro Wilks test in Table 42. Hence the Kruskal 
Wallis test was conducted and the results from this test show that the mean of 
internal stakeholder group is insignificantly greater than that of the internal 
stakeholder group (χ2 =10.626, p<0.01). This result shows that the internal 
stakeholder group agrees more that than the external stakeholder group that 
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corporate reputation affects external relations; 
Secondly, in order to investigate the differences in the mean of the internal and 
external categories further, the second level of stakeholder category was 
analysed. The mean of the management category is 85.31 is higher than the 
means of the rest of the groups. The means for the four other categories, namely, 
the financier, clientele, voice and the other categories are 69.39, 73.87, 77.32 and 
72.94 respectively. The data from three of the categories (that is the Clientele, 
Voice and Other categories) were not normally distributed, as shown in Table 42 
hence the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted for the analysis regarding these 
categories and the results show that the means for the five groups do not 
significantly differ (χ2 =16.060, p <0.01). This finding shows that there are 
significant differences in the level of agreement with respect to the effects of 
corporate reputation on external relations between at least two of the categories. 
In order to ascertain which of the categories is significantly smaller than the 
management category, the means of the management category and each of the 
other categories was tested using the relevant test. The results of the tests are 
presented in Table 43, they show that the mean of the management category is 
significantly greater than the mean of all the other categories.  
Table 43: Testing the equality of variances and means (categories) 
  
Testing the equality of 
the variances Testing the equality of the means 
  
χ2 
(Bartlett's) p-value 
t 
(welch) 
χ2 (Kruskal 
Wallis) p-value 
Financier 17.23 p<0.01 3.44 
 
p<0.01 
Clientele 
   
11.563 p<0.01 
Voices 
   
7.131 p<0.01 
Other 
   
11.622 p<0.01 
 
Thirdly, to further investigate the differences between the individual stakeholder 
groups, the mean score of the senior executive stakeholder group was compared 
to the mean score of the other twelve stakeholder groups. The mean of the senior 
executive stakeholder group (81.56) is less than the mean of the corporate 
reputation experts (88.50), however it is greater than the mean of the other 
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stakeholder groups namely, Employees (79.93), Supplier (78.69), Banking 
institutions (59.50), Investors (80.09), Community (72.27), Consumer(73.83), 
potential consumer (73.89), Human rights (75.15), Labour Unions (72.52), media 
house (78.58) and the regulator (74.97) stakeholder groups.  Four of the 
stakeholders groups failed to meet the normality assumption (as shown by the 
Shapiro Wilks test in Table 44, hence the Kruskal Wallis test was used to assess if 
the means of all the stakeholder were equal or not and the results show that the 
means of at least two of the groups significantly differ (χ2 =26.337, p <0.01).  
Table 44: Testing of equality of variances and means (individual stakeholders) 
  
 
Testing the equal of 
variances Testing the equality of the means 
  
χ
2 
(Bartlett's) p-value t t (welch) χ
2 
(Kruskal Wallis) p-value 
Employee 0.341 0.559 0.536 
  
0.297 
Supplier 1.661 0.197 0.6151 
  
0.272 
Corporate Rep Experts 0.344 0.558 -2.227 
  
0.016 
Banking Institution 8.539 p<0.01 
 
3.236 
 
p<0.01 
Investor 1.605 0.205 0.322 
  
0.375 
Community Rep 
    
1.8 0.18 
Consumer 
    
1.607 0.205 
Potential Consumer 
    
1.284 0.257 
Human Rights grp 8.562 p<0.01 
 
1.262 
 
0.108 
Labour Union 6.4 0.011 
 
1.4 
 
0.091 
Media House 4.322 0.038 
 
0.409 
 
0.346 
Regulatory Authority 
    
0.399 0.528 
 
The mean score of the senior executive stakeholder group was then compared 
with the mean score of each of the other twelve stakeholder groups using the 
relevant test. The results of the test are presented in Table 44. The findings show 
that the mean of the senior executive stakeholder is significantly different to two of 
the twelve stakeholder groups. The findings show that the mean score for senior 
executive stakeholder group is significantly greater than the mean of the banking 
institution stakeholder group and significantly smaller than the mean score of the 
corporate reputation stakeholder group. However, the mean score of the senior 
executive stakeholder group is insignificantly greater than the mean of the other 
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stakeholder groups, namely the Employees, Supplier, Investors, Community, 
Consumer, potential consumer, Human rights, Labour Unions, media house and 
the Regulator stakeholder groups.  
This research has found a direct correlation between positive corporate reputation 
and investor confidence, purchasing decisions, employee engagement and 
loyalty, customer attraction and retention and stakeholder relationships.  This 
conclusion is supported by all the stakeholders.  Internal stakeholders including 
executives and corporate reputation experts are more optimistic about the positive 
contribution made, while external stakeholders are less optimistic.  Bankers or 
financiers on the other hand in general are least optimistic about the value of 
corporate reputation.   
5.7 Stakeholder perceptions about the importance of complying with 
global best practice principles 
Given that the findings from the effect of positive reputation on corporate 
reputation show that stakeholders value them as important, it is equally plausible 
to examine whether or not stakeholders view compliance with global best practice 
principles as something that is critical and crucial in managing corporate 
reputation. 
Factor analysis 
The factorability of the eight variables linked to the importance of Global Best 
Practice Principles was examined in this section.  A factorability of correlation 
criteria was used to identify the factors that are relevant and to identify possible 
sub-themes that drive the variations in the data. It was observed that all eight 
variables correlated at least 0.3 with at least one other variable, suggesting 
reasonable factorability (see for example Table 45).  
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Table 45: Correlation matrix 
  q9a_ q9b_ q9c_ q9d_ q9e_ q9f_ q9g_ q9h_ 
q9a_ 1 
       q9b_ 0.5959 1 
      q9c_ 0.5361 0.473 1 
     q9d_ 0.4963 0.5708 0.4616 1 
    q9e_ 0.5663 0.5003 0.4438 0.567 1 
   q9f_ 0.4715 0.4794 0.4235 0.5172 0.6859 1 
  q9g_ 0.5319 0.4675 0.4391 0.5001 0.7244 0.694 1 
 q9h_ 0.5444 0.5616 0.4399 0.5193 0.5648 0.574 0.6626 1 
 
Table 46: Factor loading based on Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation (N=555) 
Variable Comp1 Communality 
q9a_ 0.3507 0.5866 
q9b_ 0.343 0.5609 
q9c_ 0.3065 0.4478 
q9d_ 0.3424 0.5589 
q9e_ 0.3786 0.6835 
q9f_ 0.3625 0.6265 
q9g_ 0.3765 0.6761 
q9h_ 0.3629 0.628 
 
Principle component analysis was used to identify and compute indices for 
characteristics underlying the variation in the identified variables. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure (1960) confirmed that one theme was present in the 
data as the eigenvalue for factor 1 is the only one that has a value above 1 (see 
the plot label Figure 27). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy for the model was 0 .907, which is well above the commonly 
recommended value of 0.6.  
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Figure 27: Scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA 
 
Factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 4.768 and explains approximately 61.85% of the 
variance. The factor loadings were generated using the varimax rotation of the 
factor loadings. The commonalities were all above 0.3 (see Table 46). The 
findings in table 46 show that all seven components have factor loadings above 
0.3; hence, all shall be used in the construction of the index score. 
Furthermore, the Cronbach’s alphas were generated in order to test the internal 
consistency or reliability of the index to be created. The results from the 
Cronbach’s test show a value of 0.903 which is greater than 0.6 (see for example, 
Table 47). This means that the index that is going to be created will satisfy the 
reliability test. 
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Table 47: Cronbach’s alpha with and without exclusions 
  
Alpha (no 
exclusions) 0.9025 
Variable 
excluded Alpha 
q9a_ 0.8902 
q9b_ 0.8927 
q9c_ 0.8991 
q9d_ 0.8921 
q9e_ 0.8843 
q9f_ 0.8883 
q9g_ 0.8852 
q9h_ 0.8879 
 
An analysis of alphas for individual variables for the factors shows that exclusion 
of any one of the variables does not increase the overall Cronbach alpha. As a 
result, all seven variables should be included in the index. 
Following the tests conducted above, the factor loadings computed using principle 
component analysis (see Table 48), were used as the weights in the construction 
of the index. The index was established to measure the extent to which 
stakeholders agree/disagree with the notion that Global Best Practice Principles 
are important in the effective management of corporate reputation. The index 
ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 represents strongly disagree, 50 represents neutral 
while 100 represents strongly agree. Values above 50 represent agree. 
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Table 48: Stakeholders’ views on Global Best Practice Principles on reputation management. 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro Wilks z-stat Shapiro Wilks p-value 
All Stakeholders 537 70.0187 18.2685 -0.6025 3.1369 5.9691 0.0000 
Internal 105 72.7032 14.6129 -0.6538 3.4289 1.9837 0.0236 
External 432 69.3662 19.0087 -0.5519 2.9829 5.4847 0.0000 
Management 39 73.6044 17.5047 -0.5275 2.6210 0.3977 0.3454 
Financier 25 67.8803 20.7235 -0.7956 3.8009 1.1977 0.1155 
Clientele 228 70.1863 19.0758 -0.4992 2.9285 3.8883 0.0001 
Voices 139 69.5341 17.3030 -0.8119 3.2960 4.2448 0.0000 
Other 106 69.4787 17.5465 -0.5684 3.1483 2.8344 0.0023 
Employee 66 72.1707 12.7180 -0.9023 4.2077 2.4236 0.0077 
Senior Exec 17 73.1551 12.6099 0.0986 1.7720 0.3482 0.3639 
Supplier 11 67.1528 12.0387 -0.2539 1.6651 0.2044 0.4190 
Corporate Reputation Expert 22 73.9516 20.8092 -0.6233 2.2860 1.0305 0.1514 
Banking Institution 13 68.7540 15.6616 0.3056 2.3490 -0.7424 0.7711 
Investor 12 66.9338 25.8370 -0.9188 3.0832 1.5010 0.0667 
Community Rep 95 69.7480 18.1048 -0.5971 3.0999 2.8360 0.0023 
Consumer 61 66.6561 18.7871 -1.0491 3.5778 3.4936 0.0002 
Potential Consumer 167 71.4758 19.0730 -0.3292 2.5298 3.5586 0.0002 
Human Rights grp 22 70.6414 19.1687 -0.4092 1.9128 1.7467 0.0403 
Labour Union 11 70.8877 22.9893 -0.6097 2.0888 0.8142 0.2078 
Media House 8 63.0054 22.1488 -0.3255 1.9432 -0.7057 0.7598 
Regulatory Authority 32 64.5016 20.2486 -0.6780 2.8780 1.7290 0.0419 
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The mean for the all stakeholders is 70.02, which is moderately high. The findings 
in Table 48 show that mean values lie in a relatively narrow range (maximum 
minus minimum) of approximately 10.95 with the lowest mean being 63.01 (media 
houses) and the highest mean being 73.95 (corporate reputation experts). This 
shows that on average all the stakeholder groups agree that Global Best Practice 
Principles are important in managing corporate reputation. 
To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups value Global Best 
Practice Principles as an effective reputation management tool, the first level 
examines differences between the decision-makers who are directly involved with 
the company (internal stakeholder group) and those who are indirectly involved 
with the company (external stakeholders); the second level examines the 
differences between management and the rest of the other categories (these are 
the financier, clientele, voices and the other category); the third level examines the 
differences between senior executives and each of the stakeholder groups, 
namely, corporate reputation experts, actual consumers and potential consumer 
stakeholder groups. The analysis starts with the comparison of the means 
followed by a t-test to confirm whether or not there are any differences between 
the two means. Similar to other analyses presented earlier, the Welch t-test is 
used in cases where the variances of the two groups are not equal but data for 
both groups were normally distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test, a non-parametric 
alternative, is used where the data for either group is not normally distributed. The 
examination produced five sets of analyses and the results from this examination 
are presented separately below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 48 show that internal stakeholder group has the mean 
of the index (72.70) greater than that of the external stakeholder group (69.37). 
The data for both the internal and external stakeholder groups were not normally 
distributed as shown by the Shapiro Wilks test in Table 48. Hence the Kruskal 
Wallis test was conducted and the results from this test show that the mean of 
internal stakeholder group is insignificantly greater than that of the internal 
stakeholder group (χ2 =1.554, p=0.2126). ). This finding shows that there is 
consensus between these two groups about the importance of Global Best 
Practice Principle in managing corporate reputation; 
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Secondly, in order to investigate the similarities in the mean of the internal and 
external categories further, the second level of stakeholder category was 
analysed. The means for the five categories, namely the management, financier, 
clientele, voice and the other categories are 73.60, 67.88, 70.18, 69.53 and 69.48 
respectively. Data for three of the categories ( the Clientele, Voice and Other 
categories) were not normally distributed as shown in Table 48, hence the Kruskal 
Wallis test was used and the results show that the means for the five groups do 
not significantly differ (χ2 =1.534, p =0.8206). This finding shows that there is a 
consensus between the five categories about the importance of Global Best 
Practice Principles in managing corporate reputation; and 
Thirdly, the thirteen stakeholder groups were evaluated for differences in the 
importance they place on Global Best Practice Principles. The mean value for the 
index ranges from 63.01 (media houses) to 73.95 (corporate reputation experts).  
Five of the stakeholder groups failed to meet the normality assumption (as shown 
by the Shapiro Wilks test in Table 48), hence the Kruskal Wallis test was used and 
the results show that the means for the five groups do not significantly differ (χ2 
=7.692, p =0.809).  This finding shows that there is a consensus between the 
thirteen stakeholder groups about the importance of Global Best in managing 
corporate reputation. 
5.8 Methods stakeholders consider as effective or acceptable in 
managing corporate reputation 
Following a general consensus amongst stakeholder groups that compliance with 
global best practice enhances corporate reputation, it is equally plausible to take a 
closer look at the possibility of other initiatives that could be considered as vital in 
managing corporate reputation by stakeholders. To fulfil this objective, this section 
examines stakeholder views on the effectiveness or acceptability of several 
initiatives that management used in managing corporate reputation. Similar to 
prior sections, a step by step approach is used to conduct the analysis. Each of 
the steps used for this analysis is discussed in detail in the sub-sections below. 
5.9 The effectiveness of diamond industry initiatives in resolving 
reputational issues 
This section examines the effectiveness of fifteen diamond industry initiatives in 
resolving reputational issues around the world.  Those 15 initiatives are: 
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Initiative A: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the voluntarily system 
of warranties for guaranteeing the ethical supply of diamonds. 
Initiative B: The Diamond Development Initiative to assist artisanal miners. 
Initiative C: Beneficiation projects in the Producer Countries. 
Initiative D: Social Investments in the diamond producing countries averaging at 
1% of net profit after tax. 
Initiative E: Implementation of the Diamond Trading Co - Diamond Best Practice 
Principles. 
Initiative F: Win – Win partnerships with Producer Countries Governments. 
Initiative G: Compliance with Rapaport Fair Trade Principles. 
Initiative H: The Council for Responsible Jewellery Practice Code of Practice to 
drive business ethics in the diamond industry. 
Initiative I: The Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) has implemented its 
Certification System that will certify its members for responsible ethical, social and 
environmental practices in the diamond jewellery supply chain. 
Initiative J:. Greater Transparency of diamond companies in terms of payments 
to governments, taxes paid, contracts and credibility with stakeholders through 
their sustainability reports. 
Initiative K: Eradication of corruption initiative in most major diamond producing 
countries. 
Initiative L: Eradication of Human Rights abuses initiative in most major diamond 
producing countries. 
Initiative M:Adherence to world class safety standards. 
Initiative N: Effective risk management systems. 
Initiative O: Effective Community Engagement Programmes with regular 
engagements with community leaders and various authorities. 
 
Similar to other sections discussed earlier, the analysis is done based on an index. 
To start with, a factor analysis was computed in order to identify the variables that 
are appropriate in assessing stakeholders’ views on the effectiveness or 
acceptability of the initiatives that were used by management in managing 
corporate reputation. Thereafter, the factor loadings generated through factor 
analysis were used as the weights that are required for constructing the index. The 
202 | P a g e  
results from this procedure are explained below. 
Factor analysis 
The factorability of the fifteen responses regarding the effectiveness or 
acceptability of the initiatives used by management in diamond mining was 
examined.  A factorability of correlation criteria was used to identify the factors that 
are relevant and to identify sub-themes that drive the variation in the data. It was 
observed that all fifteen variables correlated at least 0.3 with at least one other 
variable, suggesting reasonable factorability (see for example, Table 49). 
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Table 49: Correlation matrix 
  q13a_ q13b_ q13c_ q13d_ q13e_ q13f_ q13g_ q13h_ q13i_ q13j_ q13k_ q13l_ q13m_ q13n_ q13o_ 
q13a_ 1               
q13b_ 0.3614 1              
q13c_ 0.3267 0.4433 1             
q13d_ 0.3486 0.4604 0.4251 1            
q13e_ 0.3517 0.3567 0.402 0.4952 1           
q13f_ 0.3648 0.3963 0.3975 0.477 0.4934 1          
q13g_ 0.31 0.3706 0.3538 0.3611 0.3494 0.3522 1         
q13h_ 0.197 0.2923 0.3439 0.2678 0.3643 0.2741 0.5096 1        
q13i_ 0.2322 0.3063 0.3711 0.2819 0.3602 0.3103 0.4756 0.6211 1       
q13j_ 0.2801 0.3185 0.3235 0.3597 0.3404 0.3828 0.4069 0.3872 0.4502 1      
q13k_ 0.2845 0.3755 0.4346 0.3745 0.3748 0.3133 0.4279 0.4471 0.5166 0.4865 1     
q13l_ 0.3118 0.2956 0.4026 0.3432 0.3049 0.3348 0.3894 0.3748 0.3284 0.504 0.5953 1    
q13m_ 0.3019 0.2738 0.3002 0.3519 0.3933 0.3202 0.3399 0.3448 0.3619 0.3852 0.4576 0.4838 1   
q13n_ 0.3175 0.3507 0.3374 0.3398 0.3326 0.3257 0.3361 0.355 0.3553 0.4564 0.4358 0.5394 0.6171 1  
q13o_ 0.2909 0.2708 0.395 0.3444 0.3325 0.3731 0.3437 0.292 0.3708 0.4296 0.4835 0.5208 0.5622 0.6584 1 
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After running an exploratory factor analysis, it became evident that only one of the 
eigenvalues was above one. It was also evident that there was a discontinuity at 
the fourth factor, see the scree plot in Figure 28. The discontinuity implied three 
sub-themes were present in the data. Factor 1 has a value of 3.865 and explains 
approximately 79.28% of the variance.  Factors 2 and 3 have eigenvalues of 0.797 
and 0.737, explaining 10.78% and 9.96% of the variance respectively. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) which is a measure of sampling adequacy was generated and 
the results showed that it took a value of 0.916, which is well above the commonly 
recommended value of 0.6. In a similar vein, all the commonalities were above 0.3 
except for initiative 13a which had a commonality value of 0.291 (see Figure 28). 
As the commonality is close to 0.3, the value will be kept in the analysis. 
 
Figure 28: Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor analyses 
 
The solutions were examined using the varimax rotation of the factor loadings. 
The results are shown in Table 50. 
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Table 50: Factor loading based on Exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation 
(N=556) 
 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Communality 
q13a_   0.4871   0.2912 
q13b_   0.591   0.3951 
q13c_   0.4738   0.3963 
q13d_   0.7346   0.5166 
q13e_   0.5914   0.4407 
q13f_   0.6665   0.4598 
q13g_     0.482 0.4352 
q13h_     0.8185 0.6114 
q13i_     0.7814 0.6132 
q13j_ 0.3335     0.4156 
q13k_ 0.3647   0.381 0.5205 
q13l_ 0.5954     0.5128 
q13m_ 0.6707     0.5137 
q13n_ 0.8384     0.6582 
q13o_ 0.7915     0.6147 
 
It is observable in Table 50 that the initiative represented by 13k cross-loaded on 
Factor 1 and Factor 3. Since any cross-loadings should be dropped from the 
analysis, initiative 13k (Eradication of corruption initiative in most major diamond 
producing countries) was dropped from the analysis. However, there are no cross- 
loadings that can be observed for the remaining initiatives, hence, these initiatives 
were retained. 
When initiative 13k was dropped, the remaining fourteen responses were 
analysed using exploratory factor analysis yielding results consistent with the initial 
analysis before dropping initiative 13k.  
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Table 51: Factor loading based on Exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation 
(N=557) after dropping 13k. 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Communality 
q13a_ 0.4958     0.2943 
q13b_ 0.603     0.3958 
q13c_ 0.4984     0.3954 
q13d_ 0.7406     0.5176 
q13e_ 0.5934     0.4418 
q13f_ 0.6646     0.4635 
q13g_     0.47 0.4386 
q13h_     0.8577 0.6733 
q13i_     0.7281 0.5828 
q13j_   0.3263   0.4067 
q13l_   0.5653   0.4768 
q13m_   0.6707   0.5186 
q13n_   0.8622   0.698 
q13o_   0.783   0.6162 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor analyses 
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Process Certification Scheme, the voluntarily system of warranties for 
guaranteeing the ethical supply of diamonds) had a commonality value of 0.2912. 
This presents an issue of a border-line case (i.e. value close to the cut-off point --- 
0.2912 relative to 0.3 in this case). In situations like these, the researcher had to 
use discretion whether to include or to exclude (Brown, 2001).In this case, this 
researcher chose to keep the data.  Likewise, three sub-themes are identified. 
Following the tests conducted above (see Table 51 and Figure 29), three indices 
were generated to examine the perceptions about the effectiveness of the 
diamond industry initiatives. The first index was based on the first sub-theme 
(q13a to q13f), the second index was based on the second sub-theme (q13j, q13l 
to q13i). The last index was based the third sub-theme (q13g, q13h and q13i).  
The indices were generated using the weighted average of the variables relating 
to each sub-theme of the effectiveness of the set of diamond mining initiatives. 
The factor loadings computed earlier using exploratory factor analysis were used 
as the weights in constructing the respective Indices. Each index was established 
to measure the extent to which stakeholders perceive the set of initiatives to be 
effective. Each Index ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 represents completely 
ineffective, while 100 represents very effective. 
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Table 52: Effectiveness of various reputation management initiatives (all stakeholder categories) 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro Wilks z-stat Shapiro Wilks p-value 
All Stakeholders 548 62.2290 17.3358 0.1154 3.2545 6.6159 0.0000 
Internal 108 68.4824 16.4579 -0.3372 3.0680 1.1417 0.1268 
External 440 60.6940 17.2181 0.2320 3.5073 6.7223 0.0000 
Management 39 65.2079 20.7005 -0.2996 2.4130 -0.0350 0.5140 
Financier 25 62.5671 13.4930 0.2118 1.5742 1.9791 0.0239 
Customer* 233 56.9119 16.4244 0.3975 4.7693 6.2906 0.0000 
Voices 143 66.2915 16.6932 -0.2603 3.3100 2.3019 0.0107 
Other 108 67.1669 16.6470 0.2398 2.0552 3.3508 0.0004 
Employee 69 70.3332 13.3088 0.2113 2.1887 1.2639 0.1031 
Senior Exec 17 58.6354 19.6364 -0.4852 2.2297 0.3329 0.3696 
Supplier 11 59.6032 10.9158 0.6353 1.8415 1.8292 0.0337 
Corporate Reputation 
Expert 22 70.2866 20.4849 -0.3025 2.2632 0.8443 0.1992 
Banking Institution 13 62.2223 13.2159 0.0834 1.6167 0.2269 0.4102 
Investor 12 62.9406 14.3664 0.3086 1.4926 1.5871 0.0562 
Community Rep 97 68.0246 17.0049 0.1496 2.0044 2.7743 0.0028 
Consumer 61 57.4113 18.4891 0.1246 4.0362 2.2850 0.0112 
Potential Consumer 172 56.7348 15.6820 0.5360 5.1018 5.9537 0.0000 
Human Rights grp 23 65.8331 17.2138 0.3270 2.2761 -0.7828 0.7831 
Labour Union 11 61.5190 21.4873 -1.3290 4.4692 1.6777 0.0467 
Media House 8 55.7958 15.5970 0.4727 2.0494 0.0563 0.4776 
Regulatory Authority 32 62.1707 19.5757 0.0471 2.6165 1.5713 0.0581 
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The first index is composed of initiatives 13a to 13f. The index summary statistics 
and normality tests are shown in Table 52. The findings in Table 52 show that 
stakeholders at all levels have mean values ranging from 55.80 (media house) to 
70.33 (Employee). The combined stakeholder group has a mean of 62.23. Though 
the index shows agreement with the notion that the initiatives were successful, the 
index scores are very close to 50, meaning that the level of agreement is relatively 
low.  This indicates that while most stakeholder agreed that various reputation 
management initiatives were successful, their level of agreement is low. 
To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups perceive the 
effectiveness of diamond industry initiatives to resolve reputational issues, the 
analysis was divided into three levels; the first level examines differences between 
the internal stakeholder group and external stakeholder group. At the second 
level, an examination of the differences between management and the providers 
of financing was analysed. The third level examines the differences between 
senior executives and each of the three relevant stakeholder groups, namely, 
corporate reputation experts, banking and financial institutions and investor 
stakeholder groups. The analysis starts with the comparison of the means 
followed by a t-test to confirm whether or not there are any differences between 
the two means. The Welch t-test is used in cases where the variances of the two 
groups are not equal, but data for both groups were normally distributed. The 
Kruskal Wallis test is used where the data for either group were not normally 
distributed. The results from the various analyses for this section are presented 
separately below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 52 show that internal stakeholders’ index has a mean 
(68.48) greater than the external stakeholders (60.69). The data for the external 
stakeholder groups were not normally distributed as shown by the Shapiro Wilks 
test in Table 52. Hence, the Kruskal Wallis test was conducted and the results 
from this test show that the mean of the internal stakeholder group is significantly 
greater than the external stakeholder group (χ2 =22.759, p < 0.01). This result 
shows that the internal stakeholder group perceive the initiative to be more 
effective than the external stakeholder group; 
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Table 53: Kruskal Wallis test for different stakeholder views on effectiveness of 
various interventions (initiatives 13a to 13f) 
  χ2 (Kruskal Wallis) p-value 
Financier 0.816 0.366 
Clientele 8.439 p<0.01 
Voices 0.019 0.889 
Other 0.056 0.812 
 
Secondly, the findings show that the management stakeholder group has an index 
mean (65.21) greater than the financiers (62.57) and clientele groups (56.91). The 
management category has an index mean smaller that the voices (66.29) and the 
other category (67.17) (see Table 53). In order to assess whether or not these 
differences are significant, further tests were conducted. Data from the four 
categories were not normally distributed, therefore the difference between the 
index mean will be analysed using the Kruskal Wallis test. The results of the tests 
are shown in Table 53. The finding shows that the index mean of the management 
category is significantly smaller than the index mean of the financiers. However, 
there is a consensus in the way that the management and the rest of the 
categories view the effectiveness of initiatives 13a to 13f (see for examples, 
clientele, voices and other);  
Table 54: Tests of the differences of the variances and means between 
stakeholders on effectiveness of various interventions 
  
Testing the equality 
of variances Testing the equality of the means 
  
χ
2 
(Bartlett's) 
p-
value T 
t 
(welch) 
χ
2 
(Kruskal 
Wallis) 
p-
value 
Employee 4.447 0.035   -2.328   0.015 
Supplier 3.564 0.059 0.149     0.441 
Corporate Reputation 
Expert 0.031 0.859 1.793     0.041 
Banking Institution 1.951 0.162 0.567     0.288 
Investor 1.162 0.281 0.646     0.262 
Community Rep         2.255 0.133 
Consumer         0.333 0.564 
Potential Consumer         1.140 0.286 
Human Rights group 0.316 0.574 1.232     0.113 
Labour Union   0.755 0.366     0.359 
Media House 0.459 0.498 0.358     0.362 
Regulatory Authority 0.000 0.989 0.601     0.275 
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And thirdly, the senior executive stakeholder group has an index mean that is 
smaller than most of the other stakeholder groups, namely the Employee (70.33), 
Supplier (59.60), Corporate Reputation Expert (70.29), Banking Institution (62.22), 
Investor (62.94), Community Rep (68.02), Human Rights grp (65.83), Labour 
Union (61.52) and Regulatory Authority (62.17) stakeholder groups (see Table 
54). The senior executive stakeholder group has an index mean score (58.6354) 
that is greater than the index mean score of the Consumer (57.41), Potential 
Consumer (56.73) and the media house stakeholder group (55.7958) (See Table 
54). In order to assess these differences, the relevant tests were conducted and 
these results are shown in Table 54. It is evident from these results that the senior 
executive stakeholder group has an index mean which is significantly smaller than 
the index mean of the Employee and the Corporate Reputation Experts. The 
senior executive stakeholder has an index mean that is not significantly different to 
other stakeholder groups, namely, suppliers, banking institution, investor, 
community representatives, consumer, potential consumer, human rights, Labour 
Unions, media houses and regulatory authority stakeholder groups. These results 
show that the differences observed between senior executives and individual 
stakeholder groups are significant with regard to individual internal stakeholder 
groups and insignificant with regard to individual external stakeholder groups. This 
shows that there is a consensus in the way senior executives and the individual 
stakeholder groups view the effectiveness of initiatives 13a to 13f (sub-themes 
represented by factor 1). Contrary to the consensus observed between senior 
executives and individual external stakeholder groups, there seems to be no 
consensus between senior executive stakeholder group and the individual internal 
stakeholder groups about the effectiveness of initiatives represented by sub-
themes in factor 1. 
 
212 | P a g e  
Table 55: Summary statistics and normality tests for stakeholder views on effectiveness of various interventions 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro Wilks z-stat Shapiro Wilks p-value 
All Stakeholders 546 64.3167 20.2551 0.0303 2.5566 6.2233 0.0000 
Internal 108 72.3240 17.6283 -0.4150 2.4443 2.0499 0.0202 
External 438 62.3423 20.3916 0.1634 2.7075 6.1396 0.0000 
Management 39 73.7664 19.9620 -0.4943 2.0996 2.0415 0.0206 
Financier 25 59.0194 17.5425 0.5668 2.7848 1.4806 0.0694 
Clientele 231 60.1930 19.4932 0.2962 3.0932 5.1137 0.0000 
Voices 143 67.3410 18.3832 -0.1752 2.7136 2.3613 0.0091 
Other 108 66.9462 22.7781 -0.2064 2.3154 2.9250 0.0017 
Employee 69 71.5087 16.2615 -0.4005 2.7506 0.4818 0.3150 
Senior Exec 17 73.5328 19.7454 -0.9164 3.0437 1.1635 0.1223 
Supplier 11 66.9143 22.2747 -0.4638 1.7329 0.8433 0.1995 
Corporate 
Reputation Expert 22 73.9469 20.5895 -0.2146 1.4708 1.1669 0.1216 
Banking Institution 13 56.8817 14.2804 0.1226 2.3040 0.6000 0.2743 
Investor 12 61.3352 20.9216 0.5191 2.2588 0.1862 0.4262 
Community Rep 97 66.9498 22.9480 -0.1828 2.3604 2.9354 0.0017 
Consumer 60 59.7672 21.1333 -0.2753 2.8167 0.4582 0.3234 
Potential Consumer 171 60.3425 18.9476 0.5740 3.1673 5.7547 0.0000 
Human Rights grp 23 70.4987 21.7590 -0.1206 1.7134 0.0904 0.4640 
Labour Union 11 62.9410 24.0573 -1.2042 3.9466 1.6966 0.0449 
Media House 8 58.4109 16.0507 0.9245 2.6715 0.6175 0.2685 
Regulatory Authority 32 59.8297 15.9789 0.9465 3.3854 1.7970 0.0362 
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The second index is composed of initiatives 13j, 13l; 13m, 13n and 13o. The index 
summary statistics and normality tests are shown in Table 55. The findings in 
Table 55 show that stakeholders, at all levels, have mean values ranging from 
58.41 (media house) to 73.95 (corporate reputation experts). The combined 
stakeholder group has a mean of 64.32. This index shows relatively higher levels 
of agreement with the notion that the initiatives were effective. 
To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups perceive the 
effectiveness of the initiatives used by management in the diamond industry to 
resolve reputational issues, the analysis was divided into three levels. The first 
level examines differences between the internal stakeholder group and the 
external stakeholder group. At the second level, there is an examination of the 
differences between management and the providers of financing. The third level 
examines the differences between senior executives and each of the three 
relevant stakeholder groups, namely corporate reputation experts, banking and 
financial institutions and investors stakeholder groups. The analysis starts with the 
comparison of the means followed by a t-test to confirm whether there are any 
differences between the two means or not. The Welch t-test is used in cases 
where the variances of the two groups are not equal but data for both groups were 
normally distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test is used where the data for either 
group were not normally distributed. The examination produced various analyses 
which will be presented separately below: 
Firstly the results in Table 55 show that internal stakeholders index has a mean 
(72.32) greater than the external stakeholders (62.34). The data for both the 
internal and the external stakeholder groups were not normally distributed as 
shown by the Shapiro Wilks test in Table 56. Hence the Kruskal Wallis test was 
conducted and the results from this test show that the mean of internal 
stakeholder group is significantly greater than the external stakeholder group (χ2 
=23.169, p <0.01). This result shows that the internal stakeholder group perceived 
that the initiatives represented by 13j, 13l, 13m, 13n and 13o (factor 2 initiatives) 
were more effective in managing corporate reputation in contrast to the external 
stakeholders’ view. 
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Table 56: Kruskal Wallis tests for different categories of stakeholders views 
on effectiveness of various interventions (Initiatives 13j, 13l, 13m, 13n and 
13o) 
  Testing the equality of the means 
  
χ2 (Kruskal 
Wallis) p-value 
Financier 8.009 0.005 
Clientele 13.580 0.000 
Voices 3.609 0.057 
Other 2.103 0.147 
 
Secondly, the findings show that the management stakeholder group has an index 
mean (73.77) greater than the all the other stakeholder groups, namely the 
financier (59.02), clientele (60.19), voices (67.34) and the other categories. The 
difference between the indices mean scores was further investigated using the 
relevant tests and the results of these tests are shown in Table 56. The findings 
show that the index mean of the management category is significantly greater 
than the index mean of the financier and clientele stakeholder group, but it is 
insignificantly greater than the means of the voices and the other category. The 
findings show that there is no consensus between management and the financier 
and clientele stakeholder groups separately whether or not the initiatives in factor 
2 were effective in managing corporate reputation. Contrary to the absence of a 
consensus between management and the financier and clientele groups 
respectively, the findings further show that there is a consensus between 
management and the voices and the other category respectively that the initiatives 
represented by 13j, 13l, 13m, 13n and 13o (factor 2 initiatives) were effective in 
managing corporate reputation in the diamond industry.  
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Table 57: Tests for different variances and means on effectiveness of various 
interventions (Initiatives 13j, 13l, 13m, 13n and 13o) 
  
Testing the equal of 
variances Testing the equality of the means 
  χ
2 
(Bartlett's) p-value t 
χ
2 
(Kruskal 
 Wallis) p-value 
Employee 1.032 0.310 0.440   0.330 
Supplier 0.175 0.676 0.824   0.209 
Corporate Reputation Expert 0.031 0.861 -0.063   0.475 
Banking Institution 1.326 0.250 2.566   0.008 
Investor 0.042 0.837 1.599   0.061 
Community Rep       0.885 0.347 
Consumer 0.111 0.739 2.404   0.009 
Potential Consumer       6.593 0.010 
Human Rights group 0.168 0.682 0.453   0.327 
Labour Union       1.738 0.187 
Media House 0.374 0.541 1.886   0.036 
Regulatory Authority       5.872 0.015 
Thirdly, the senior executive stakeholder group has an index mean (73.53) greater 
than most of the other stakeholder groups, namely the Employee (71.51), Supplier 
(66.91), Banking Institution (56.88), Investor (61.34), Community Rep (66.95), 
Consumer (59.77), Potential Consumer (60.34) Human Rights group (70.50), 
Labour Union (62.94), Media houses (58.41) and Regulatory Authority (73.95) 
stakeholder groups. The senior executive stakeholder group has a mean (73.53) 
smaller than the index mean of the corporate expert stakeholder group (73.95) 
(see Table 57). 
In order to assess these differences further, relevant tests were conducted and the 
results from these tests are shown in Table 57. The findings in Table 57 show that 
the senior executive stakeholder group has an index mean which is significantly 
greater than the index mean of the banking institutions, consumer, potential 
consumer, media house and the regulatory authority stakeholder groups 
respectively. The index mean scores for the employee, senior executives, 
supplier, corporate reputation expert, investor, community rep, human rights 
group, and Labour Unions did not significantly differ from the index mean of the 
senior executive group. These findings show that there is no consensus between 
the senior executive stakeholder group and the banking institutions, consumer, 
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potential consumer, media house and the regulatory authority stakeholder groups 
that initiatives represented by 13j, 13l, 13m, 13n and 13o (factor 2 initiatives) were 
effective in managing corporate reputation in the diamond industry. Contrary to the 
above, the results further show that there is a consensus about the effectiveness 
of these initiatives between senior executives and the employee, supplier, 
corporate reputation expert, investor, community rep, human rights group, and 
Labour Union stakeholder groups respectively. 
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Table 58: Descriptive statistics based on stakeholder views on effectiveness of various interventions (Test for differences between 
variances and means for initiatives q13g, q13h and q13i) 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro Wilks z-stat Shapiro Wilks p-value 
All Stakeholders 546 61.9369 19.9129 0.3773 2.7711 6.9357 0.0000 
Internal 108 63.6362 22.6132 0.0915 2.5132 2.6137 0.0045 
External 438 61.5179 19.1944 0.4640 2.8365 6.6153 0.0000 
Management 39 61.2457 24.2820 0.0135 2.6916 0.5300 0.2981 
Financier 25 64.2746 19.0063 0.3489 1.7546 2.1630 0.0153 
Clientele 232 58.1267 18.1539 0.6038 3.8585 6.0461 0.0000 
Voices 142 64.8792 20.6084 0.3929 2.2093 3.9405 0.0000 
Other 108 65.9619 19.9336 0.0695 2.1605 0.9241 0.1777 
Employee 69 64.9873 21.6798 0.1991 2.2446 1.7061 0.0440 
Senior Exec 17 54.4126 17.1892 0.1881 2.6111 0.0107 0.4957 
Supplier 11 68.4161 16.4035 0.5099 2.1421 0.5595 0.2879 
Corporate Reputation 
Expert 22 66.5259 27.8351 -0.3756 2.5785 0.4766 0.3168 
Banking Institution 13 63.2643 18.8601 0.0455 1.6375 1.2229 0.1107 
Investor 12 65.3691 19.9401 0.6153 1.7013 1.1652 0.1220 
Community Rep 97 65.6836 20.3489 0.0626 2.1166 0.7896 0.2149 
Consumer 62 60.5438 18.2623 0.3372 2.5952 1.2564 0.1045 
Potential Consumer 170 57.2451 18.0877 0.7083 4.4143 6.0533 0.0000 
Human Rights grp 22 68.1363 21.2932 0.3142 1.5603 1.0339 0.1506 
Labour Union 11 70.1680 20.9967 0.5240 1.7229 -0.3356 0.6314 
Media House 8 53.5173 13.9988 -0.3356 2.8517 0.1163 0.4537 
Regulatory Authority 32 63.4290 18.8191 0.8571 2.2867 1.7484 0.0402 
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The second index is composed of initiatives 13g, q13h and q13i. The index 
summary statistics and normality tests are show in Table 58.  The findings in 
Table 58 show that all stakeholders at all levels have mean values ranging from 
53.52 (media house) to 68.42 (Suppliers). The combined stakeholder group has a 
mean of 61.94. Though the index shows agreement with the notion that the 
initiatives were successful, the index scores are still very close to 50 meaning that 
the level of agreement is relatively low. 
To further explore the extent to which stakeholder groups perceive the 
effectiveness of diamond industry initiatives to resolve reputational issues, the 
analysis was divided into three levels. The first level examines differences 
between the internal stakeholder group and the external stakeholder group. At the 
second level, an examination of the differences between management and the 
providers of financing is analysed. The third level examines the differences 
between senior executives and each of the three relevant stakeholder groups, 
namely, corporate reputation experts, banking and financial institutions and 
investors’ stakeholder groups. The analysis starts with the comparison of the 
means followed by a t-test to confirm whether or not there are any differences 
between the two means. In addition, the Welch t-test is used in cases where the 
variances of the two groups are not equal, but data for both groups were normally 
distributed. The Kruskal Wallis test is used where the data for either group were 
not normally distributed.  The results from the various analyses for this section are 
presented separately below: 
Firstly, the results in Table 58 show that the internal stakeholders index has a 
mean score (63.64) greater than that of the external stakeholders (61.52). The 
data for both the external stakeholder groups were not normally distributed as 
shown by the Shapiro Wilks test in Table 59. Hence the Kruskal Wallis test was 
conducted and the results from this test show that the mean of internal 
stakeholder group is not significantly greater than the external stakeholder group 
(χ2 =0.982, p = 0.322). This result shows that there is a consensus between the 
internal stakeholder group and the external category in their perceptions regarding 
the effectiveness of the initiatives used in the diamond mining industry.  
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Table 59: Tests for equality of variances and means between categories 
  Testing the equality of variances Testing the equality of the means 
  
χ2 
(Bartlett's) p-value T 
χ2 (Kruskal 
Wallis) p-value 
Financier 
  
  0.214 0.643 
Clientele     0.900 0.343 
Voices       0.536 0.464 
Other 2.293 0.130 1.193   0.117 
 
Secondly, the findings show that the management stakeholder group has an index 
mean (61.25) greater than the clientele groups (58.13). The management 
category has an index mean smaller than the financiers (64.27), voices (64.88) 
and other category (65.96) (see Table 59). In order to assess whether or not these 
differences are significant, further tests were conducted. The difference between 
the indices means were analysed using the relevant tests, the results of the tests 
are shown in Table 59. The finding shows that the index mean of the management 
category does not significantly differ from the index means of other categories. 
Therefore, there is a consensus in the way that the management and the rest of 
the other individual categories view the effectiveness of the initiatives represented 
by 13g, 13h and 13i (factor 3). 
Table 60: Tests for equality of variances and means between individual variables 
 
Testing the equality of 
variances 
Testing the equality of the 
means 
  
χ2 
(Bartlett's) p-value t 
χ2 (Kruskal  
Wallis) 
p-value 
Employee       3.184 0.074 
Supplier 0.026 0.873 2.142   0.021 
Corporate Reputation 
Expert 3.800 0.051 1.575   
0.062 
Banking Institution 0.115 0.735 1.340   0.095 
Investor 0.281 0.596 1.583   0.063 
Community Rep 0.705 0.401 2.151   0.017 
Consumer 0.089 0.766 1.241   0.109 
Potential Consumer       0.157 0.692 
Human Rights group 0.789 0.374 2.166   0.018 
Labour Union 0.485 0.486 2.172   0.020 
Media House 0.367 0.544 0.128   0.450 
Regulatory Authority       1.569 0.210 
220 | P a g e  
And, thirdly, the senior executive stakeholder group has an index mean (54.41) 
smaller than most of the other stakeholder groups, namely the Employee (64.99), 
Supplier (68.42), Corporate Reputation Expert (66.53), Banking Institution (63.26), 
Investor (65.37), Community Rep (65.68), Consumer (60.54), Potential Consumer 
(57.25), Human Rights group (68.14), Labour Union (70.17) and Regulatory 
Authority (63.43) stakeholder groups. The senior executive stakeholder has a 
mean greater than the media houses (53.52) (see Table 60). In order to assess 
these differences further, the relevant tests were conducted and the results for 
these tests are shown in Table 60. Based on the results in Table 60, it is evident 
that the senior executive stakeholder group has an index mean significantly 
smaller than the index mean of the supplier, human rights and Labour Union 
stakeholder groups. However, the senior executive stakeholder group has an 
index mean score that is insignificantly smaller that the remaining stakeholder 
groups listed above. Although the findings discussed above show that there is no 
consensus about the effectiveness of the initiatives used to manage corporate 
reputation between senior executives and the supplier, human rights and Labour 
Union stakeholder groups, there seems to be a consensus in the way senior 
executives and the rest of the stakeholder categories view the effectiveness of 
initiatives represented by 13g, 13h and 13i (factor 3). 
These results have shown that there is general consensus on the existence of 
these initiatives, but there is low level of success experienced by most 
stakeholders. 
5.10 Further analysis for the observed differences 
Various industry-specific interventions or initiatives have been implemented to 
manage some of the corporate reputational issues in the diamond industry. Those 
15 initiatives are: 
Initiative A: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the voluntarily system 
of warranties for guaranteeing the ethical supply of diamonds. 
Initiative B: The Diamond Development Initiative to assist artisanal miners. 
Initiative C: Beneficiation projects in the Producer Countries. 
Initiative D: Social Investments in the diamond producing countries averaging at 
1% of net profit after tax. 
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Initiative E: Implementation of the Diamond Trading Co - Diamond Best Practice 
Principles. 
Initiative F: Win – Win partnerships with Producer Countries Governments. 
Initiative G: Compliance with Rapaport Fair Trade Principles. 
Initiative H: The Council for Responsible Jewellery Practice Code of Practice to 
drive business ethics in the diamond industry. 
Initiative I: The Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) has implemented its 
Certification System that will certify its members for responsible ethical, social and 
environmental practices in the diamond jewellery supply chain. 
Initiative J: Greater Transparency of diamond companies in terms of payments to 
governments, taxes paid, contracts and credibility with stakeholders through their 
sustainability reports. 
Initiative K: Eradication of corruption initiative in most major diamond producing 
countries. 
Initiative L: Eradication of Human Rights abuses initiative in most major diamond 
producing countries. 
Initiative M: Adherence to world class safety standards. 
Initiative N: Effective risk management systems. 
Initiative O: Effective Community Engagement Programmes with regular 
engagements with community leaders and various authorities. 
 
These interventions or initiatives are perceived to have had various levels of 
effectiveness. However, it is important for stakeholders to have the knowledge or 
an awareness of these interventions or initiatives and how effective they were in 
managing corporate reputation. This section starts off by analysing the levels of 
stakeholders’ awareness of the interventions or initiatives that the diamond 
industry implemented in managing key reputational issues based on q12 and then 
follows this up by analysing stakeholders’ views on how effective these industry 
initiatives have been in resolving the reputational issues around the world, based 
on their response rates obtained from analysing Q13. Thereafter, regression 
analysis was conducted to analyse the relationship between perceptions of the 
effectiveness and awareness. 
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5.10.1 Examination of the levels of stakeholders’ unawareness 
Below is an analysis of the stakeholder response based on the “I know nothing at 
all” response choice (see Table 61 for these results) in q12. 
Table 61: Stakeholders unawareness of reputation management Initiatives 
  
All 
stakeholders Internal External Management Financier Clientele Voices Other 
q12a_ 32.01% 6.48% 38.20% 10.26% 24.00% 48.31% 27.63% 18.08% 
q12m_ 36.53% 7.41% 43.60% 5.13% 40.00% 57.63% 28.95% 18.08% 
q12n_ 37.07% 11.11% 43.37% 7.69% 28.00% 57.20% 30.26% 20.90% 
q12o_ 37.25% 14.81% 42.70% 10.26% 32.00% 54.66% 34.21% 22.03% 
q12c_ 37.97% 18.52% 42.70% 12.82% 32.00% 55.93% 31.58% 23.16% 
q12f_ 39.78% 15.74% 45.62% 10.26% 32.00% 60.59% 32.89% 22.60% 
q12l_ 40.14% 21.30% 44.72% 20.51% 44.00% 58.90% 26.32% 24.86% 
q12e_ 41.23% 12.04% 48.31% 7.69% 40.00% 61.02% 40.79% 22.60% 
q12k_ 41.23% 25.00% 45.17% 20.51% 44.00% 59.75% 28.95% 25.99% 
q12b_ 41.59% 22.22% 46.29% 12.82% 48.00% 58.90% 36.84% 25.99% 
q12d_ 41.95% 19.44% 47.42% 10.26% 40.00% 61.44% 35.53% 25.99% 
q12j_ 42.68% 18.52% 48.54% 10.26% 44.00% 61.86% 38.16% 25.99% 
q12h_ 44.30% 32.41% 47.19% 25.64% 40.00% 59.32% 36.84% 32.20% 
q12g_ 46.47% 38.89% 48.31% 30.77% 44.00% 61.44% 40.79% 32.77% 
q12i_ 46.65% 44.44% 47.19% 30.77% 48.00% 57.63% 38.16% 38.98% 
Average 40.46% 20.56% 45.29% 15.04% 38.67% 58.31% 33.86% 25.35% 
 
Looking at the combined stakeholder groups, it is evident from Table 61 that the 
proportion of stakeholders who are unaware of the effectiveness of the 
interventions or initiatives in place varies from one measure to the next. The 
proportions range from 32.01% (12a - The Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme, the voluntarily system of warranties for guaranteeing the ethical supply of 
diamonds) to 46.65% (12i - The Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) has 
implemented its Certification System that will certify its members for responsible 
ethical, social and environmental practices in the diamond jewellery supply chain) 
(see Table 61) representing a significant proportion of the stakeholders who are 
unaware of the effectiveness of the initiatives in place. A glance at the internal and 
external categories shows that the internal category has a greater level of 
ignorance of the effectiveness of the interventions in place than the external 
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stakeholder group. In a few cases, the levels of ignorance are comparable (12h, 
12i and 12g), but in most of the cases the levels of ignorance between these two 
groups are more than double. The ignorance level for the internal stakeholder 
group fluctuates around 15% whilst the for the external stakeholder group, the 
ignorance levels fluctuate around 40%.  
In order to explore further the differences in the levels of ignorance noted or 
observed above, an examination of potential differences for each measure was 
conducted at category level. Looking at the five categories listed in Table 61, the 
findings show that the highest level of ignorance is within the clientele category. 
The level of ignorance for this group fluctuates around an average of 58.31% 
followed by the financier group with ignorance levels fluctuating at an average of 
38.67%. The voices category’s ignorance levels fluctuate around the mean of 
33.86%, the other category fluctuates around the mean score of 25.35. The 
management category has the lowest ignorance levels which fluctuate around the 
mean score of 15.04%. The higher levels of ignorance observed in this analysis 
should be a cause for concern especially if stakeholders’ views about the 
effectiveness of the interventions are to be examined.  These results indicate 
significantly low levels of awareness of these initiatives.  The well know initiative is 
the  Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) has implemented its Certification 
System that will certify its members for responsible ethical, social and 
environmental practices in the diamond jewellery supply chain. 
5.10.2 A comparison of stakeholder ignorance and their views on the 
effectiveness of interventions 
In order to test whether or not stakeholders’ ignorance about the interventions in 
place affected their views on the effectiveness of these initiatives in any way, an 
analysis of stakeholders’ knowledge about the effectiveness of the initiatives 
implemented in the diamond industry in resolving the reputational issues was 
undertaken based on the “I don’t know” response choice shown in question 13.  
It is argued that if diamond industry management puts in place some interventions 
to manage corporate reputation in the industry without informing the stakeholders 
about what they are doing, does it actually change stakeholder perceptions about 
the effectiveness of these interventions? In examining this notion, the motive is to 
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check whether or not the level of awareness has had an impact on stakeholders’ 
views on the effectiveness of the initiatives in place. The findings based on this 
analysis are presented in Table 62.  
Table 62: Stakeholder’s ignorance and views on effectiveness of various 
reputational management initiatives 
  All stake-
holders 
Internal External 
Manage 
ment 
Financier Customer* Voices Other 
q13a_ 41.23% 10.08% 49.77% 12.82% 36.00% 57.20% 42.11% 26.55% 
q13m_ 41.59% 15.13% 48.85% 17.95% 48.00% 55.08% 42.11% 27.68% 
q13n_ 43.76% 19.33% 50.46% 20.51% 52.00% 56.78% 47.37% 28.81% 
q13o_ 44.30% 22.69% 50.23% 20.51% 44.00% 57.20% 46.05% 31.64% 
q13l_ 45.03% 31.93% 48.62% 28.21% 56.00% 55.08% 40.79% 35.59% 
q13c_ 46.11% 22.69% 52.53% 15.38% 56.00% 59.75% 46.05% 33.33% 
q13k_ 46.29% 36.13% 49.08% 28.21% 48.00% 55.08% 44.74% 38.98% 
q13d_ 47.74% 29.41% 52.76% 17.95% 48.00% 62.29% 40.79% 37.85% 
q13e_ 48.28% 26.89% 54.15% 30.77% 44.00% 59.75% 53.95% 35.03% 
q13j_ 48.28% 31.09% 53.00% 28.21% 52.00% 58.05% 51.32% 37.85% 
q13f_ 48.46% 23.53% 55.30% 23.08% 44.00% 62.29% 52.63% 34.46% 
q13b_ 51.54% 38.66% 55.07% 25.64% 52.00% 64.83% 46.05% 41.81% 
q13i_ 52.44% 48.74% 53.46% 51.28% 52.00% 57.63% 52.63% 45.76% 
q13h_ 53.35% 47.90% 54.84% 48.72% 48.00% 59.32% 53.95% 46.89% 
q13g_ 53.89% 48.74% 55.30% 43.59% 48.00% 62.29% 55.26% 45.20% 
Average 47.49% 30.20% 52.23% 27.52% 48.53% 58.84% 47.72% 36.50% 
 
The findings in Table 62 show that there is a direct relationship between 
proportion of stakeholders who selected the “I don’t know” answer in Q13 (a 
measures the perception about effectiveness) and the proportion of the 
stakeholders who selected the “Nothing at all” answer in Q12 (a measure about 
level of awareness). Despite the observed direct relationship as explained above, 
it is also evident that the proportions of stakeholders at each level who selected 
the “I don’t know” is higher than the proportion that selected the “Nothing at all” 
option. This implies that some stakeholders who had some knowledge of the 
initiatives were still unable to answer Q13. This shows that knowledge on its own 
was not enough to help stakeholders to make a meaningful decision about the 
effectiveness of the interventions in place in the diamond industry. 
Based on the fact that the levels of ignorance or unawareness identified above are 
higher than the perceived effectiveness of the interventions introduced in the 
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diamond mining industry, it was necessary to perform further tests to confirm 
whether or not awareness had an effect on stakeholders’ views on the 
effectiveness of the interventions in place. 
5.10.3 Further analysis of results based on regression analysis 
To perform the proposed tests above, in addition to the indices created in section 
6.6.9 which examine the perceptions about the effectiveness of the diamond 
industry initiatives, additional indices were created in order to assess the general 
levels of awareness of the initiatives in question. The first awareness index is 
based on the first sub-theme (12a to 12f), the second awareness index is based 
on the second sub-theme (12j, 12l to 12i). The last awareness index is based the 
third sub-theme (12g, 12h and 12i).  The indices were generated using the 
weighted average of the variables relating to each sub-theme of the effectiveness 
of the set of diamond mining initiatives. As explained in the methodology section, 
the factor loadings computed in section 6.6.9using exploratory factor analysis 
were used as the weights in the constructing the respective indices. This ensures 
that the awareness index is relevant to the effectiveness index. Each index was 
established to measure the level of awareness stakeholders have of the initiatives 
collectively. Each index ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 represents completely no 
knowledge of all the initiatives, while 100 represent a great deal of knowledge of 
all the initiatives. 
After the establishment of the necessary indices for the required analysis, various 
tests were performed and the results from these tests are presented in the 
following sections: 
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Table 63: Levels of stakeholder awareness of reputational management initiatives 
(12a to 12f) 
  N Mean SD 
All Stakeholders 535 37.6131 31.6546 
Internal 90 54.1781 27.3403 
External 434 33.7381 31.3071 
Management 38 56.8252 24.4728 
Financier 25 32.3894 24.0582 
Clientele 227 24.4788 29.6218 
Voices 141 46.3990 29.5056 
Other 104 48.6055 31.3950 
Employee 69 55.4989 27.7396 
Senior Exec 17 65.4557 19.6578 
Supplier 11 54.9660 31.0261 
Corporate Reputation Expert 21 49.8386 26.1589 
Banking Institution 13 31.3126 22.0226 
Investor 12 33.5560 27.0350 
Community Rep 93 47.8532 31.5191 
Consumer 58 32.9359 27.8939 
Potential Consumer 169 21.5764 29.7191 
Human Rights group 22 48.4430 30.7052 
Labour Union 11 36.5254 28.4458 
Media House 8 43.0500 24.9110 
Regulatory Authority 31 29.0616 26.4802 
 
The first index is composed of initiatives 12a to 12f. The summary statistics for this 
index are shown in Table 63. The findings in Table 63 show that the mean 
awareness level takes a wide range of values, with a minimum of 24.48 
(customer), and a maximum of 65.46 (senior executives). The combined 
stakeholder group has a relatively low mean of 37.61.  This shows that there are 
relatively low levels of awareness among the stakeholders. There are also wide 
variations within each stakeholder category/group as shown by the large standard 
deviation. This shows the varying levels of awareness across and within the 
stakeholder groups. 
227 | P a g e  
A closer look at the stakeholder categories reveals the following findings: The 
internal stakeholder group has a mean of 54.18 while the external stakeholder 
group has a lower level of awareness shown by a mean of 33.74. This shows that 
internal stakeholders have a relatively higher level of awareness compared to the 
external stakeholder group.  This finding is based on the level of direct interaction 
with these initiatives, it is common that internal stakeholders will have a better 
awareness of these initiative because they have better access to intranet, internal 
communication material and some interact with these initiatives on daily basis; 
Looking at the five categories shown in Table 63, it is evident that only the 
management category has a mean above 50; The voices and the other categories 
have a fair level of awareness with means of 46.40 and 48.61 respectively; The 
financier and the clientele have relatively low levels of awareness with means of 
32.3894 and 24.4788 respectively.  It is evident that financiers and customers 
have the lowest level of awareness.  It is clear that in order to increase their level 
of awareness, active communication should be effected at the same level of focus 
like it is done with internal stakeholders; At an individual stakeholder level, the 
findings show that the senior executives have the highest level of awareness with 
a mean value of 65.4557; The employee, supplier, corporate reputation experts, 
community representative, and the human rights stakeholder groups have 
moderate levels of knowledge with means of 55.4989, 65.4557, 54.966, 49.8386, 
47.8532 and 48.443 respectively; and the rest of the stakeholders have relatively 
low levels of awareness with means below 38. 
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Table 64: Levels of stakeholder awareness of reputational management initiatives 
(12j, 12l to 12o) 
  N Mean SD 
All Stakeholders 547 38.3066 33.0331 
Internal 91 59.3455 29.1250 
External 445 33.7540 32.1702 
Management 39 65.2934 29.2443 
Financier 25 29.4145 21.6818 
Clientele 232 23.3145 28.3863 
Voices 144 48.4897 31.3696 
Other 107 49.3500 32.8871 
Employee 69 59.9190 28.2882 
Senior Exec 17 75.3181 21.8447 
Supplier 11 48.4313 30.5104 
Corporate Reputation Expert 22 57.5470 32.2453 
Banking Institution 13 30.8525 20.7755 
Investor 12 27.8566 23.4463 
Community Rep 96 49.4553 33.2971 
Consumer 61 29.9672 25.3181 
Potential Consumer 171 20.9413 29.1055 
Human Rights group 23 44.7178 30.7003 
Labour Union 12 44.3402 33.0266 
Media House 8 36.6393 32.1268 
Regulatory Authority 32 31.0750 28.9441 
 
The second index is composed of initiatives 12j, 12l to 12o. The summary 
statistics for this index are shown in Table 64. The findings in Table 64 show that 
the mean awareness level takes a wide range of values ranging from 27.8566 
(investor) to 75.3181 (senior executives). The combined stakeholder group has a 
relatively low mean of 38.3066.  This shows that there are relatively low levels of 
awareness amongst the stakeholders. There are also wide variations within each 
stakeholder category/group as shown by the large standard deviation. This shows 
that the level of awareness varies across and within the stakeholder groups.  This 
finding calls for a dedicated programme to educate investors about various 
programmes that are implemented by the industry to manage corporate reputation 
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in the industry. 
Key observations, Firstly, if the diamond industry is to thrive in managing 
reputation, then stakeholder awareness is an important feature; Secondly, 
stakeholders must be well-informed about what is happening in the industry 
through various channels of engagement to ensure a proper feedback on the 
methods of intervention used and other issues facing the industry; Thirdly 
corporate strategy and direction can only yield meaningful results if there is a co-
ordination of efforts between the corporation and its key stakeholders and that is 
only possible if there is common knowledge between the participants in the 
industry; and Fourthly, an alignment of goals between the corporation and its 
stakeholders is only possible if there is a shared view of what is going on in the 
industry.   
5.11 Summary of Chapter 5 
In summary, this chapter presented detailed analyses of various aspects of 
corporate reputation in the South African diamond industry as captured in the 
questionnaire. Each question was statistically examined to elicit the views of 
different stakeholders. While there was convergence in some cases, there were 
divergences in others, pointing to possible expectation gaps.  
To probe the differences further, qualitative individual semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with selected representatives of the various stakeholder groups. 
This is the focus of the next chapter. The summary of the results for both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis is presented in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH RESULTS 
6  
6.1 Introduction 
In parallel with quantitative analyses presented in the previous chapter, individual 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 22 representatives of different 
stakeholder groups, including union representatives, community representatives, 
diamond company representatives, consumers of diamond products, non-
governmental organisations, regulatory authorities and investors, were carried out 
to gain a “thick” description of the meaning of corporate reputation, key 
perceptions of the diamond industry, key challenges, effects of corporate 
reputation and corporate reputation management tools as the primary source for 
data collection.  Interviews were held with stakeholder representatives from 
different stakeholder groups, i.e. corporate and public affairs senior executives (4), 
senior executives employed in the diamond industry (4), private investors (2), 
government regulators (2), union representatives (2), consumers of diamond 
jewellery (4) and community representatives (4). This chapter is divided into 8 
sections aligned with the research questions.  
Comments from the transcribed interviews are used to provide additional insight 
into the research questions. In order to obtain additional information, secondary 
data sources, mainly company reports, diamond industry reports and technical 
documents were consulted. These included The Diamond Insight Report of 2014 
and 2015; Global Scan De Beers Reputation Report of 2007 and 2015; Marikana 
Shootings Report in 2013; Benchmarks Foundation Report on Namaqualand 
2009; De Beers Socio-Economic Assessment Report for Kimberley Mines 2014; 
De Beers Socio-Economic Assessment Report for Venetia Mines 2014; De Beers 
Socio-Economic Assessment Report for Namaqualand Mines 2014; De Beers 
Socio-Economic Assessment Report for Voorspoed Mines 2014; and Centre for 
Environmental Resources Report 2014. In order to bring a detailed youth 
perspective, two-day focus group discussions were held with 41 participants from 
different diamond mining towns including Venetia, Kimberley and Voorspoed (see 
Appendix 10). Quotes taken directly from the transcript and other sources have 
231 | P a g e  
not been edited for grammatical errors.  
Following the order of research questions, the definition of corporate reputation 
within the diamond industry is discussed first, followed by components of 
corporate reputation; key drivers of corporate reputation, reputational perceptions 
of the diamond industry; compliance with national and global best practice 
principles; key reputational risks and challenges; awareness of reputation 
management initiatives and their effectiveness; effects of corporate reputation on 
business success; key considerations for purchasing diamond jewellery and tools 
to measure corporate reputation.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
some general comments by respondents. 
6.2 Research Question One: Definition of corporate reputation  
In order to come up with a definition of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry, the stakeholder representative members were asked what, in their view, 
was the most acceptable definition of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry. Four themes emerged from their responses.  
The first one was a definition that is perception-related, where statements like 
“corporate reputation is all about how the company is perceived by its 
constituencies”; “dynamic conclusions based on stakeholder background” and “it is 
a summation of all the beliefs and attitudes of stakeholders which could be 
accurate or inaccurate”.   
The second theme was a doing-good related statement, like the “moral proposition 
of a company”; “goodwill accorded to the company by its stakeholders”.  The third 
one involved image-related statements like “manifestation of identity through 
actions and past encounters”; corporate reputation is “what people think of the 
company”; corporate reputation is a “brand promise, it is about the image that 
comes and goes with the brand”; and “a view that the consumer has of the brand”.  
The fourth theme is stakeholder assessment-related statements like “stakeholder 
assessment of the company actions and past experiences”; and “assessment of 
the company based on its ability to meet different stakeholder expectations, 
including employment and procurement opportunities and other pressing 
232 | P a g e  
community needs and expectations”. 
The respondents had different interpretations of what corporate reputation means 
with some arguing that a company does not have one reputation but has many 
reputations.  This reaches convergence with what reputation experts, such as 
Fombrun et al (2013), Gotsi and Wilson (2001), and Abiodun et al (2015) have 
claimed for other industries – that there is no single definition that captures all the 
elements in defining corporate reputation in general.  This is because stakeholder 
representative members define reputation from their discipline, perceptual or 
experiential viewpoints, for instance, labour activists base their meaning on 
employee related matters while accountants base their definition on organisational 
performance based on empirical and/or on analysts’ perspective. As such, it is 
clear that there is no single definition of corporate reputation and that different 
stakeholders define corporate reputation differently, depending of the interface 
and experience of the corporation or industry. 
6.3 Key components of corporate reputation in the diamond industry  
The existence of multiple stakeholders dictates that corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry is comprises multiple components. According to the 
respondents, these components include corporate brand, legitimation, 
transparency, trust, image, ethical management and leadership, safety leadership, 
and authenticity. Table 65 provides a summary of the associated statements and 
examples provided during the individual semi-structured in-depth interviews. The 
notable ones are the license to operate linked to legitimation and the highly 
regarded and partner of choice linked to ethical management and leadership.  
Statements like “good standing with communities”, “willingness to engage with all 
stakeholders” and legacy issues are some of the most dominant statements in 
this section. 
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Table 65: Components of corporate reputation and associated items 
Components Associated Illustrative Quotes, items and Examples 
Corporate Brand “Company pays better than its peers”. 
Recognisable brand. 
It has better employee benefits than its peers. 
It is a respectable corporate brand (e.g. De Beers’ 
Diamonds are forever). 
Company contributes to economic growth of countries 
in which it operates. 
Legitimation Accepted by its stakeholders. 
“Has a licence to operate”. 
Compliant to applicable norms and standards including 
regulatory requirements. 
Cares for its communities. 
Strives to partner with its key constituencies. 
Ethical Management and 
Leadership 
It is transparent in its dealings with its stakeholders. 
It is compliant with global best practices. 
Demonstrates honesty and passion for the future. 
Encourages diversity and care in the workplace. 
The company is successful. 
The company has clear vision and direction. 
It outperforms its peers. 
It is innovative and passionate. 
World class company. 
Provides consistent returns to its shareholders. 
Invests in exploration projects. 
Image It is seen as a leader in mining. 
Positive corporate image and culture. 
Good standing with its stakeholders. 
Highly regarded. 
Partner of choice. 
Cares for Africa. 
Trust It demonstrates high level integrity. 
It has an impeccable track record in terms of its 
commitment to global best practices. 
It is willing to engage with its stakeholders. 
Not secretive. 
Transparency Communicates extensively in good and in bad times. 
Open and transparent. 
Demonstrates honesty and respectability. 
Genuine respect for and commitment to human rights. 
Safety Leadership Clean safety record. 
Invests resources in its quest for zero harm to its 
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people. 
Safe working conditions. 
Authenticity  
 
Truthfulness of origin, attributions and commitments. 
Degree to which an organisation is true to its 
personality, character and/or values.  
Has win-win partnerships with its stakeholders 
including governments and unions. 
Responsible as a corporate body. 
It cares for the environment. 
Invests in beneficiation of diamonds in the producer 
countries. 
Invests in community projects. 
Empowers its employees. 
Sensitive to indigenous people’s culture and their 
needs. 
Cares for the artisanal miners. 
Supports the Kimberley Process. 
Legacy issues Historical association of the diamond industry with 
slavery in Africa, conflict diamonds, blood diamonds, 
bad environmental track record. 
Monopoly, greed, artificial inflation of value through the 
manipulation of supply of rough diamonds into the open 
market. 
Historical control of rough diamonds Profits from 
extraction of rough diamonds helps to fund local 
conflict. 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the results of this research) 
In this section, the following components are discussed in detail: corporate brand, 
legitimation, ethical management and leadership, corporate image, transparency, 
authenticity and trust. 
6.3.1 Corporate Brand 
The respondents identified corporate brand as the key component of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry in South Africa. Corporate Brand in the context 
of corporate reputation in the diamond industry is regarded as an organisationally 
valuable asset, intrinsically linked to its internal factors such as company values, 
corporate strategy, culture and competitive positioning.  One respondent (a 
corporate reputation practitioner) said, “It can be attributed to the experiences of 
those that interact with the firm. It is the verbal, visual and behavioural expression 
of an organisationally unique business model”. Catch phrases and advertising by-
lines can encapsulate this experience. For example, “Diamonds are Forever” 
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(Even-Zohar, 2007) and “Diamonds are a Girl’s Best Friend” (Prager, 2014).  
Stakeholders relate to the reputation of the diamond industry on the basis of “it 
deals with diamonds”, people like diamonds and its brand associations like good 
quality, beautiful products and credibility of the diamond brand.  The respondents 
felt that the word “diamond” has a direct link to corporate reputation of the 
diamond industry because of the uniqueness of diamonds and their historical 
association which could be good or bad depending on each stakeholder’s 
experience and association. This highlights the importance of corporate brand as 
component associated with industry reputation which is heavily determined by 
stakeholder experience of the brand. 
6.3.2 Corporate Image 
The respondents identified corporate image as the key component of corporate 
reputation.  Most of the respondents defined corporate image as the sum total of 
the company’s public impressions, brand perceptions, beliefs and expectations of 
an organisation built up in the minds of its stakeholders, both internally and 
externally. According to some respondents (communities and executives),  
corporate image mainly focuses on the external world view of the company, 
represented mainly by community representatives, regulators, customers, 
media and the general public.   
Another respondent (executive) emphasised that corporate image is becoming a 
major component internally. Employees are heavily influenced by the external 
environment, thereby forming their internal impressions and expectations which 
result in defining their views and beliefs about the company. Corporate image is 
one of the components of corporate reputation in the diamond industry. 
6.3.3 Transparency 
Respondents identified transparency as one of the components of corporate 
reputation. Respondents noted a need for transparency in the diamond industry by 
the regulators, media, local communities, investors and general public as a 
fundamental priority more than ever before.  This need is fuelled by the following 
statements that were given by different respondents during the interview sessions 
according to different stakeholder groupings: 
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 Media 
The industry is a closed industry. It is impossible to find information 
especially from the smaller producers and it is even worse in the 
downstream side of the pipeline with cutters, polishers and retailers. 
 Communities 
The diamond industry does not share its corporate responsibility plans in our 
community. 
We know there are diamonds in our community but we cannot access 
information. Even our local government cannot provide us with key statistical 
information on social benefits associated with the diamond industry. 
 Governments and regulators 
Transparency concerns of the diamond industry are fuelled by concerns over 
labour practices and perceptions of monopoly and artificial price inflation, 
followed by concerns of involvement with conflict diamonds. 
 Consumers 
In the past, the only thing I use to hear about the diamond industry is that it 
is a huge monopoly. 
De Beers own all the mines in Africa and they set prices, fixing the market 
with inflated prices for diamonds. 
I think they pretty much control diamond mining in Africa and thus can do 
whatever they wish.  
They are a monopoly in the diamond industry. They control production and 
worldwide distribution of diamonds. 
I understand that they are very forceful in causing possible competitors to 
join them or suffer the consequences. 
 Investors and Bankers 
It is difficult to understand the financial position of the diamond industry 
especially in the midstream and in the downstream of the industry because it 
is dominated by family  
The examples above indicate the importance of transparency as an important 
component in the formulation and maintenance of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
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6.3.4 Authenticity 
Respondents identified authenticity as one of the components of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry. Among the respondents, there was a feeling 
that the industry is not authentic in its operations, including in the trading of 
diamonds. A few respondents pointed out that openness and honesty are 
fundamental considerations for any authentic organisation therefore authenticity is 
a key component in the industry.  This component is very similar to transparency 
considerations as one respondent (executive) noted.  
6.3.5 Trust 
Respondents identified trust as a major component of corporate reputation. 
Respondents defined trust as the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations about another’s behaviour. In other words, if someone trusts 
another, that individual is accepting that, while it is possible they could act to 
disadvantage them, they are not likely to do so.  Trust widely refers both to 
interpersonal and group interactions. According to some respondents, 
organisational or industry-wide opinion formers are the trustees in the 
organisational context, but the trust they extend may relate to a larger entity, such 
as management or the organisation as a whole. For organisations, trust is 
necessary for legitimacy, connectedness, co-operation and communication, and it 
is the foundation for productive relationships. 
According to one of the respondents (investor), trust is about the perception of a 
company’s honesty, reliability and benevolence in the eyes of its constituencies. 
One respondent (corporate reputation practitioner) commented that corporate 
reputation is formed on the back of trust by the organisational constituencies.  
Most respondents noted that trust in the diamond industry is determined by the 
stakeholders’ perceptions relating to the companies’ historical and current actions. 
Issues like the exploitation of workers, human rights issues, harm to the 
environment, neglect of community developmental obligations, negative publicity, 
stewardship of diamonds, conflict diamonds in Zimbabwe (The Marange 
Diamonds in Zimbabwe) and others play a significant role in defining the levels of 
trust.  The trust-related attributes make up a major component of how 
stakeholders relate to the diamond industry. 
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6.3.6 Ethical Management and Leadership 
Respondents claimed that an organisation’s reputation is not only affected by 
external factors or just by its senior management, but by the actions of business 
partners, business units, various departments and employees who come into 
contact with stakeholders. One respondent (consumer) noted,  
Compliance with basic governance is not negotiable; it must form part of the 
day-to-day running of the diamond business. We come from a terrible past 
where diamonds will just disappear. I am informed that the diamond industry 
lost more than 1 million carats every year because of security breaches.   
Another respondent (labour representative) was quoted, saying, “If management is 
not careful, diamonds can easily develop legs and walk out of the mine gate”.  
Most respondents concurred that ethical management is a key requirement and is 
fuelled by increasing scrutiny and activism by stakeholders as well as ethical 
investing.  Accountability placed on CEOs in the diamond industry in terms of 
ethical profitability, corporate citizenship, “community and environmental 
accountability is critical, and severe”, as one respondent (executive) commented.  
“Doing the right things the first time around” and ethical leadership make up a 
significant element of corporate reputation. 
6.3.7 Corporate Legitimation 
Corporate legitimation has also been identified as a key component of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry by all the respondents.  One respondent 
(corporate reputation practitioner) defined corporate legitimation as a form of 
justification and the cognitive validation of the organisation as acceptable, lovable, 
desirable, proper, moral and appropriate in a widely shared system of beliefs. 
Some respondents (communities, labour representative, union and bankers) 
defined it as “a legible partner of choice who is trusted and tested”.  Accordingly, 
these definitions involve acceptance and approval of an organisation by its 
constituents. 
Respondents felt that the meaning of corporate legitimation in the diamond 
industry is a major issue for debate in most producer countries, but especially in 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. There is a wide mistrust between big diamond 
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companies and local communities and, to some extent, even government officials. 
This issue is not just a diamond mining issue but more of a mining industry issue, 
hence the growing debate about resource nationalisation in South Africa. There is 
a belief that most diamond mining companies are not legitimately mining the 
diamond resources in terms of equitable benefits for the producer governments 
and their citizens.  
To sum up, individual semi-structured in-depth interviews have revealed additional 
or new sets of components that did not feature in the literature review.  Those 
diamond industry-specific components are transparency, trust, ethical 
management and leadership, safety leadership, authenticity and legacy issues. 
This section further revealed that components of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry should encapsulate, capture and serve as a basis to express 
company culture, company activities, company status and its embedded corporate 
philosophy or paradigm. Reputation should articulate attributes that inform the way 
the reputation(s) of a company can be formed, compromised and even destroyed 
in terms of what the organisation stands for – its beliefs, dealings and how it goes 
about its business. In the diamond industry, components of corporate reputation 
define the key characteristics of the industry i.e. rarity of diamonds, emotional 
connections, high quality craftsmanship, enduring nature of diamonds, the good 
associated with the product and the “foreverness” nature of the product. It also 
includes the history and past malpractices involved in the development of the 
industry. 
6.4 Key drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry 
The respondents observed that just as its building blocks vary, what drives 
corporate reputation also varies depending on different stakeholder perceptions 
and objectives. There is consensus among the respondents that different people 
will have different views on what is regarded as important and what is not. For 
example, the perspective of investors on what drives reputation will be informed by 
their return on investment, market sentiments and investment climate which is 
primarily driven by financial performance and stability while communities will be 
mainly focused on the good the company does in their communities, including 
social development projects and the provision of employment opportunities. The 
240 | P a g e  
following key drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry were 
identified: product and services; community care; conflict diamonds; public 
perceptions; stakeholder relations; governance; financial performance; 
environmental protection; equitable share of profits with diamond producing 
nations; human rights and compliance with global best practice; beneficiation of 
diamonds inside the producer countries in order to capture jobs; and credibility of 
leadership. 
6.4.1 Equitable Share of Profits with Producing Nations 
An equitable share of profits was raised, mainly by the regulators, union 
representatives and local community respondents.  The following statements were 
used to demonstrate the impetus for equitable sharing of profits with producer 
nations as a key driver of corporate reputation in the diamond industry: 
Fair distribution of profits with producing nations is the main reason there is 
mistrust between mining companies and producer governments.  There is 
wide belief that diamond mining companies are all about themselves and their 
masters in London.  
Another respondent (community) noted that mining companies do not want to 
share equitably with governments, because “they always look hard for loopholes in 
order to dodge paying taxes and royalties”.  Most respondents cited the De 
Beers/Botswana business model as an example of fair and equitable sharing of 
profits between private business and host nations.  The “Debswana” model is 
rated highly as a model that achieves greater equity for the producer nation. One 
respondent (corporate reputation practitioner) noted that, on every R1.00 profit, 
only R0.18c leaves Botswana while the rest benefits the nation in terms of 
employment, infrastructure development and funding of various government 
services for the people of Botswana.  
6.4.2 Stakeholder Relations 
Most respondents identified stakeholder relations as a driver of corporate 
reputation.  One panellist explained: “If you have enemies everywhere, your 
reputation will definitely be in shambles”.  One panellist stated that “quality 
relations with governments, NGOs, media, communities and labour unions are 
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critical in defining and driving your reputation”. Another respondent claimed that 
“pro-active engagement with all stakeholders is fundamental in ensuring that you 
are in the good books with your stakeholders in order to manage your reputation 
and address perceptions”. 
6.4.3 Conflict Diamonds 
Most respondents identified conflict and blood diamonds as a key driver of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry.  Conflict diamonds are seen as a 
driver and also as a key challenge in the industry. Respondents cited the 
exploitation of people in the mining of diamonds in Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, DRC 
and Central African Republic as an example of the reasons that this issue is being 
discussed widely.  One respondent noted the use of diamonds as a currency of 
war in these countries.  Another respondent stated: “Are you buying a product that 
has been used to maim, harm, or exploit people?”  
6.4.4 Community Care 
Respondents identified community care as a major driver of corporate reputation 
in the diamond industry. One respondent cited “Engagement with local 
communities on issues affecting their livelihood systems is central in managing 
cordial relationships with local communities”.  Another respondent claimed that a 
“demonstrable contribution to the society and community where the mines are 
located goes a long way in securing the company’s licence to operate”. Some 
respondents commented on the fact that  
the ANCYL is extremely concerned about the high levels of poverty, 
inequality, racism and unemployment in most mining towns of South Africa 
and, as a result, the ANCYL is calling for nationalisation of mines as a means 
to force more equitable sharing of wealth with rural communities in order to 
eliminate the so-called evil triplets of poverty, inequality and unemployment.  
 
According to the youth group workshop, most young people believe that the South 
African Mining Charter has led to poorer communities than ever before. The youth 
group agrees with the ANCYL belief that South Africa’s economic freedom has 
declined in the last ten years. Another respondent pointed out that South Africa 
has slipped from 42nd to 87th on the economic freedom index according to the 
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Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report of 2011. Most respondents 
together with the Namaqualand SEAT report (2014) concurred that there is a 
widespread outcry of the “terrible state” of communities where diamond mines are 
located i.e. no roads, water, electricity, proper housing with high unemployment 
and poverty.  
6.4.5 Human Rights and Compliance with Global Best Practice 
Many respondents cited human rights and general compliance with world best 
practices as key drivers of corporate reputation. One respondent stated that the 
general adherence to International Labour Organisation (ILO) principles with 
special focus on the eradication of child labour is key in the diamond industry. 
Artisanal miners’ involvement in central Africa paints a bleak picture of the modern 
diamond industry.  Consumers, who have seen pictures of an artisanal operation, 
formulate a negative picture of the whole diamond industry. This is because, in 
these environments, the operations employ young children and do not provide 
protective clothing. One respondent noted that this sector is not regulated and is 
associated with illegal mining activities, especially in Kimberley, in Coleville and, to 
some extent, in Namaqualand and in Bantokoe where more than 10 illegal miners 
were found dead in 2012 (Creamer, 2009; Chamber of Mines, 2016). 
6.4.6 Products and Services 
Respondents identified products and services as a key driver for corporate 
reputation.  One respondent stated, “quality of products and services is a number 
one point of reference especially by the consumers”. Another respondent affirmed 
that “product quality, believe it or not, is quite an important part of corporate 
reputation. People assume something about your company from the way in which 
you make your product”. From a brand reputational perspective, another 
respondent noted, “product that you produce and the quality associated with it is a 
number one consideration. The key elements of the brand they’ll say – the critical 
driver – is your end product”.   
Another respondent stated that a good example of how products and services 
drive corporate reputation can be a new product brand that was launched by De 
Beers in South Africa in March 2012, Forevermark Diamonds, which has a 
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relatively low awareness in the consumer market but draws most of its market 
traction from the De Beers brand.   
6.4.7 Brand Profile 
Brand profile was identified by respondents as a key driver for corporate 
reputation. For example, one respondent stated that “the more well-known the 
product, the more people assume that the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
activity or the way in which you make the product is also better”.  Another stated 
that  
the product is number one driver and the number two driver is the way in 
which you make it and then probably third is your overall awareness level.  
The more well-known you are the more you are assumed to have these issues 
under control.   
Another argued that  
you’ve got to be in the top tiers of quality, so people must believe they’re 
buying a quality product, whether its diamonds or cars.  It’s got to be seen as 
a company that has high ethics and morals that looks after the environment, 
that looks after people’s safety and makes sure people aren’t injured or killed 
in the production of their product.   
6.4.8 Financial Performance 
Delivering solid financial performance was identified as another key driver of 
corporate reputation.  Most respondents regarded this as the “Delivery of 
consistent returns to its shareholders including financial institutions”. Another 
stated that  
any business is in business to make money, let’s not get away from that fact.  
You have got to be financially sound because you can’t actually do things 
responsibly without affecting the environment or the local communities.  You 
can’t actually uplift the community if you are not making a profit.  In the first 
place – business is in business, to make a profit”.   
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Another stated that  
Employees want to be hopeful about the future, prefer to be associated with a 
winning company, a growing company and a company that makes real money 
in order to sustain a positive reputation. 
6.4.9 Leadership credibility 
Respondents stated that leadership credibility accounts for more than 40% of the 
overall company reputation.  They identified leadership credibility as a key driver 
of corporate reputation in South Africa. One respondent referred to it as the 
“quality of leadership teams”.  It is argued that the quality of leadership has a huge 
reputational impact on an organisation. Another respondent emphasised that 
leadership should lead from the top by being  
a responsible corporate citizen, making sure you look after the environment, 
making sure you look after people’s safety, making sure you make a 
contribution to society and the general community through your business and 
personal conduct.  
A youth member described the role of leadership in driving corporate reputation:  
If some crook owns De Beers, I don’t think a lot of people would want to be 
associated with diamonds.  Not even a crook. Take De Beers right now, if you 
were to say tomorrow that Robert Mugabe is the chairman of De Beers – I 
think quite a lot of people would think twice about whether they want to buy 
diamonds or not because they look at the leadership and think do they want to 
be associated with that?  If their answer is no, they will take their money 
somewhere else and go buy something else with their money. 
6.4.10 Environmental Care 
Environmental care was also identified as a key driver of reputation.  It has been a 
major part of reputation in the oil and gas industry for many years.  Exxon Mobil is 
an example of what could affect the reputational capital of an organisation.  One 
respondent stated that, at the moment in the diamond industry, the environmental 
impact issues do not bother the consumers, but it is predicted that they will 
become more critical in the future and start asking questions about this topic.  
Another respondent affirms the current consumer view by saying  
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I think the environmental concerns are not so much from the consumer side, 
it’s more from the government side and the NGO’s side. The consumers are 
not too worried about a big hole in the ground, but the government is.  
6.4.11 Corporate Governance 
Governance issues in the diamond pipeline were also identified as key drivers of 
corporate reputation.  According to one respondent,  
[the] diamond [industry] is known as a fairly secretive industry and it hasn’t 
always had a very good reputation.  I think up until about ten, twelve years 
ago, nobody worried about its reputation but the blood diamond and other 
campaigns really woke the industry up, heightened the interest.  
6.4.12 Public Perceptions 
“Public perceptions, it does not matter whether it is factual or not, could have an 
impact on a company’s reputation”.  Respondents identified public perceptions as 
a key driver of reputation in the diamond industry.  One respondent noted,  
Reputation can be heavily tarnished by negative newspaper articles.  It’s 
definitely about image.  That image can be impacted by negative articles, for 
instance, if you are pumping oil in Nigeria … and you are polluting the river, 
you are not going to get away with it.   
Another stated that  
the public opinion … about the industry remains a key driver of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry.  
According to a respondent:  
The diamond industry is always associated with the Apartheid Regime in 
South Africa, known to be a very controversial, fairly secretive industry and it 
hasn’t always had a very good reputation.  It has always been associated with 
cartel industry, monopoly industry and a belief that it is operated by a few 
mafias, which is an issue for the industry especially for De Beers.  
There are those within and outside the diamond mining sector who believe that 
the Mining Charter has failed to correct the ownership imbalances of the past 
despite the conclusion of many transactions for exactly this purpose. There is also 
a feeling that diamond mining companies can do more to ensure that the socio-
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economic difficulties and inequalities afflicting many South Africans are 
successfully mitigated.  
6.4.13 Beneficiation 
Beneficiation of diamonds in the producer countries was also identified as a key 
driver of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in South Africa, especially in 
the eyes of South African government. One respondent noted the need for 
“Diamond beneficiation to maximise the local benefits of mining in terms of job 
creation and economic emancipation of the local communities and local fiscus”. 
In summary, this section has identified various drivers of corporate reputation that 
did not feature in the literature review. It also noted that there is a clear link 
between components and drivers of corporate reputation. 
6.5 Research Question Two: Key Perceptions of the Diamond Industry 
When asked about their perceptions of the diamond industry, the respondents 
provided views on three interrelated aspects: perceptions of the diamond industry, 
perceptions of De Beers as a major player in the industry and perceptions related 
to the diamond industry’s association with development in host communities. 
6.5.1 Industry Perceptions 
Respondents made it clear that the colonial past in South Africa and the 
association of the mining industry as the epitome of apartheid system in many 
ways including racial discrimination in terms of pay, housing and treatment of 
workers in the workplace, still haunts the diamond industry.  A respondent was 
recorded as saying that  
the diamond industry has, over many years, been associated with perceptions 
of exploitation of local citizens, disregard for ethics, monopoly capital, secrecy, 
and conflicts such that it has always been associated at different times, with 
controversy in one form or the other.  
One respondent recalled that, after the excesses of the late 1860s to the 1900s, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, in the last 15 years or so, the issue of blood diamonds 
heightened the necessity of reputation management in the industry. “There is a 
widespread belief that the diamond industry is a cartel industry, operated by a few 
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conglomerates who behave like a mafia”. This perception runs across the value 
chain of the industry which is dominated by a few big conglomerates. However, in 
Botswana, the diamond industry is highly regarded for the government-De Beers 
partnership, coupled with astute stewardship of the company and its role in 
transforming the country’s economy in partnership with the Botswana government.  
Some of the members of the youth group, together with Kimberley SEAT report 
(2014), highlighted issues relating to the environmental impact of diamond mining, 
particularly the big holes left in places such as Kimberley. However, such scars on 
the landscape, if properly managed, are now heritage sites which can contribute to 
local economic development. There is also a perception that some of the most 
powerful players in the diamond industry stockpile and control the price of rough 
diamonds, thereby artificially inflating the prices.  
6.5.2 Perceptions about De Beers 
Collectively, the respondents made it clear that De Beers’ name is synonymous 
with diamonds and therefore De Beers’ reputation accounts for a major part of the 
diamond industry reputation. According to the youth representative, the unions 
and some community based NGOs, there is a wide belief that De Beers controls 
99% of South African rough diamond production and distribution.  It is believed 
that 100% of these diamonds are exported overseas without any local 
beneficiation to support the ailing cutting and polishing industry (State Diamond 
Trader, 2016) thereby reducing the opportunity for downstream employment 
opportunities. There is also an unsubstantiated perception that De Beers is 
actively exploring and mining rough diamonds in conflict zones such as in 
Zimbabwe with Marange Diamonds and in Sierra Leone. 
According to some respondents, there is a perception that some members of the 
diamond industry control the price of diamonds.  One of the panellists used 
several disputes that De Beers and Transhex has had with the South African 
Precious Metals and Diamonds Regulator (SAPMDR, 2015) as well as the State 
Diamond Trader (SDT, 2015) over the fair market price of rough diamonds in 
2008, 2012 and 2015.  
There is also a perception that De Beers and Alrosa, the world’s two biggest 
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diamond producers, maintain a significant stockpile of diamonds to ensure the 
price stays high as their strategy is to artificially inflate the rough diamond prices.  
This view is mainly held by various opinion formers within the diamond industry. 
Some respondents, especially investors and employee representatives including 
some community representatives, felt that De Beers has been in the forefront of 
transforming the industry over the last decade.  One respondent was cited as 
saying that De Beers was the first mining company in South Africa to publicly 
announce its support for beneficiation in 2006 by its former CEO Gareth Penny, to 
partner with the South African government to start the State Diamond Trader in 
2007, to pioneer HIV treatment in 2001 and to implement Black Economic 
Empowerment legislation in 2006 by establishing Ponohalo as their 26% Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment partner, ahead of the rest of the diamond 
industry and many other mining companies. 
6.5.3 Diamonds and Community Development 
Respondents concurred that the diamond industry does not have a positive 
reputation among the communities living in and around the mines. Community 
representatives felt that the industry has historically taken the communities for 
granted, did not engage appropriately, did not invest in community development, 
and has created serious environmental challenges. One respondent argued that 
the emergence of NGOs such as the “Host Communities Association of South 
Africa” and Benchmarks Foundation shows that host communities are now 
demanding more benefits through partnerships, skills transfer and poverty 
alleviation that positively influence corporate social investment and local economic 
development and foster a healthy economic co-existence.  This perception of lack 
of development in host communities is further exacerbated by the ongoing debate 
in most mining countries regarding resource nationalisation (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2014) calling for active participation of producing countries in their 
mineral wealth.   
Respondents also confirmed that community development facilitators in the 
diamond mining industry do not agree with this perception and have evidence 
demonstrating that diamond companies spend more than 1% of net profit after tax 
on an annual basis on community developmental initiatives. In most diamond 
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producing nations, this annual spend is enforced through local legislation or 
mining law.  For example, in South Africa, all mining companies need to comply 
with the conditions stated on the Social and Labour Plans (SLPs) which are part of 
the Mining Charter and the Diamond Act. 
The youth group believes that the regulators in the diamond industry believe that 
there are those within and outside the diamond mining sector who believe that the 
Mining Development Legislation adopted by many diamond producing nations has 
failed to address the socio-economic challenges faced by the communities 
neighbouring the diamond mines. In South Africa, there is a widespread belief by 
the South African government that the South African diamond industry has failed 
to correct the ownership imbalances of the past, despite the conclusion of many 
transactions devised for this purpose. According to some respondents, “If real 
transformation had taken place there would not be a call for the nationalisation of 
mines.”  
Respondents are widely divided on the perception that large scale, industrial 
mining of diamonds has not generally benefitted the local communities where 
mines are located and that there is limited evidence that those local citizens of a 
producer nation have benefitted. Some of the respondents argued that the debate 
in the producer countries like South Africa, Angola and Zimbabwe regarding 
nationalisation of mines is a reflection of the frustrations that communities are 
experiencing in terms of equitable distribution of mining wealth to citizens. One of 
the respondents quoted Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, a successful businessman, former 
unionist General Secretary and Deputy President of South Africa, in his statement 
following the debate on mine nationalisation in 2013, where he candidly stated 
that  
today we are confronted by political ferment on an issue such as 
nationalisation of mines. We need to sit back and say: Where does this thing 
come from? It comes from a measure of deep frustration by young people, 
who are unemployed, of which … many of them have never worked. They see 
these big corporations raking in a lot of money, and they also see that these 
corporations have not transformed in the way that was agreed on in the Social 
and Labour Plans as well as in the Mining Charter.  
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He further stated, however, that in countries such as Botswana, diamond wealth is 
credited with transforming the economy of the country from one of the poorest to 
one of the richest, suggesting that a lot must be learnt from this 50/50 partnership 
model between De Beers and the Botswana government.  
In summary, various respondents cited a number of statements associated with 
the diamond industry as their opinions on general perceptions by the public. 
These are some of the perceptions shown aligned with the following themes in 
Table 66: 
Table 66: Public Perceptions of the Diamond Industry 
Themes Examples 
Manipulative and anti-
competitive Business 
Control 
 There is a perception that the industry is 
secretive and is controlled by a few (Tshivase & 
Kleyn, 2016).  
 Monopoly industry. 
 Diamond industry is world class. 
Illicit Trading   South African blood diamonds are a problem; not 
knowing who is selling them and how they can get 
to the marketplace is a mystery to the non-jeweller. 
 Artificial price fixing. 
Human Rights Abuses  I am concerned over “slave” or child labour that 
might be abused in the pursuit of diamonds in 
Africa.  
 I saw the movie Blood Diamond and that showed 
children forced into labour in order to mine 
diamonds.  
 It would seem De Beers has no concern for how 
the diamonds are mined or where they come from 
so long as they get the best.  
 I may have a jaded impression of the company 
from watching the movie Blood Diamond.  
The way they treat the people who mine their 
diamonds. 
 They seem like cheapskates when it comes to 
wages for their workers; not paying a fair pay 
scale. 
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Lack of community benefits 
 Benefits from the diamond industry are shared 
among the few.  There is no transparency on 
the payments made to governments and local 
communities. 
 Mining epitomises the historical racial division 
in SA (Pandey, 2012). A perception persists 
that the benefits of SA mining industry are not 
shared equitably and not remaining in SA. 
 Diamond mining companies can do more to 
ensure that the socio-economic difficulties and 
inequalities afflicting many South Africans are 
successfully mitigated.   
 Diamond mining in Kimberley is the backbone 
of the mining industry in South Africa and 
modernism (Even-Zohar, 2007). 
 Community instability as a result of migrant 
labour model.  
 Global leader. 
 World class Private Public Partnership model in 
Botswana. 
 Diamonds are good for Africa. 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the results of this research) 
6.6 Research Question Three: Key Diamond Industry Reputational risks 
and challenges  
The respondents identified a number of key reputational risks and challenges in 
the diamond industry. Most of the respondents agreed that reputational issues and 
risks can be classified into two broad categories: product integrity and production 
integrity. According to some respondents,  
production integrity relates to ethical issues relating to diamond exploration, 
mining and trading of rough diamonds. The risks or challenges could include a 
perception that diamond mining is environmentally destructive, or is 
associated with mass human rights issues, or mining in Africa does not 
contribute equitable share of resources with producer nations, poverty 
eradication. These issues clearly impact on product demand, also impact on 
price and have an added impact on consumer confidence while product 
integrity is very specific to downstream consumer issues and product 
stewardship. 
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6.6.1 Production Integrity 
The following risks and challenges were identified in the diamond industry in 
South Africa: artisanal diamond mining, conflict diamonds, resource nationalism, 
employee value proposition, climate change and carbon tax, increasing production 
costs, regulatory uncertainty, stricter safety and health rules, beneficiation of 
diamonds in the producer countries, developmental price for South African 
strategic minerals, transformation in the diamond industry, mine community 
unrests, job losses in the mining industry, responsible mine closure and 
rehabilitation, industrial relations, youth activism and a high level of youth 
unemployment, illegal mining, access to rough diamonds for small cutters and 
polishers and land claims. 
6.6.1.1 Artisanal Diamond Mining 
Artisanal diamond mining by small companies is associated with poor labour 
conditions, human rights violations and environmental degradation (Bone, 2012). 
These challenges must, however, be managed because the diamond industry 
thrives on a product with glamour, love, purity – all the positive things in life. 
Therefore, if the diamond industry takes a principled stand on human rights abuse 
issues, this will enhance its reputation.  One respondent cited the report by 
International Mining and Metals on Artisanal Mining titled Working Together: How 
large-scale mining companies can engage artisanal and small scale miners 
published in September 2015. This report emphasises the importance of 
embracing the small scale miners and artisanal miners in integrating them into the 
full value chain in order to maximise developmental benefits of the mining 
opportunities and to eradicate key challenges in the industry, namely, 
environmental damage and related health challenges, security threats, gender 
challenges, child labour and the diamond industry reputation. 
6.6.1.2 Conflict Diamonds 
Linked to production integrity is the presence of conflict diamonds that pose a 
major reputational risk to the diamond industry in general. According to one 
respondent, “conflict diamonds risk tarnishing the diamond industry especially with 
consumers”. The case of Sierra Leone, so graphically popularised by the movie 
Blood Diamonds and, more recently, Zimbabwe and Central African Republic 
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(Prager, 2014), further supports their view. In Zimbabwe, a lack of strong 
governance structures created a free-for-all situation, resulting in deaths and 
anarchy at Marange. “Whether this is attributable to the diamond industry or not is 
debatable”, retorted one respondent. Another respondent cited a report by 
Amnesty International, published in September 2015 titled Chains of Abuse: The 
Global Diamond Supply Chain and the Case of the Central African Republic which 
highlights alleged human rights abuses and child labour (Amnesty International, 
2015).  
6.6.1.3 Resource nationalisation 
Given the wide belief by many young people in South Africa, premised on the 
failure of the mining industry to benefit local communities and to create down-line 
beneficiation industries locally, there has been a clamour for nationalising mines 
and a view that the Mining and Petroleum and Precious Metals Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA) is not working for the people in the mining towns 
(Shabangu, 2013). The ANC Youth League, under the leadership of its former 
president, Julius Malema, developed a position paper on the nationalisation of 
mines in preparations for the ANC National General Council in 2010 in Durban.  
Since the expulsion of Julius Malema in 2013, the ANCYL is no longer a vocal 
proponent of the nationalisation of mines. In recent years, the Economic Freedom 
Fighters, under Julius Malema, are once more promoting nationalisation. The 
respondents identified resource nationalisation as a risk in the diamond industry. 
Indeed, one of the respondents candidly stated that  
resource nationalisation has become a contagion impacting the mining and 
metals industry across the globe … The industry needs to become more 
engaged in the evaluation and management of this risk which can place a 
heavy burden on existing operations and influence future decisions on 
whether to invest.  
This resource nationalisation is a phenomenon of mineral-dependent countries in 
Africa and those developed ones such as Australia (Chamber of Mines Report, 
2015).  Ghana doubled its mining royalties, just as South Africa and Australia did. 
Zimbabwe introduced legislation which gave locals 51% ownership, just as in 
Botswana. Document analysis, including the Socio-Economic Assessment Report, 
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De Beers Internal Report on nationalisation and Youth Reports (Appendix 10) 
summarised the key stakeholder objectives, sub-themes and names of 
stakeholders in South Africa who held these views (Table 67). 
Table 67: Factors driving resource nationalisation in South Africa 
Objectives Sub-themes Stakeholders raising the issues 
More contribution of 
mining to socio-
economic 
development and 
poverty alleviation. 
Maximise direct 
contribution of mining to 
economic growth and job 
creation. 
Trevor Manuel (Former Finance Minister) 
Pravin Gordhan (Minister of Finance) 
Susan Shabangu (Former Minister of 
Mines) 
Chamber of Mines 
Encourage the 
development of the 
downstream 
industries. 
Increase the share of 
mining industry value 
creation that is captured 
within South Africa. 
Use mining to create 
broader economic 
development 
interventions like 
beneficiation. 
Ensure security of supply 
of strategic resources 
like coal. 
Sandile Nogxina (Former Director 
General at Department of Mines) 
Gwede Mantashe (Secretary General of 
ANC) 
Julius Malema (Leader of EFF) 
Fred Gona (Former Leader of Portfolio 
Committee responsible for Mineral 
Resources in SA parliament) 
Dipua Peters (Minister of Transport) 
Share the benefits of 
mining more 
equitably. 
Ensure local mining 
communities benefit from 
Mines. 
Manage economic and 
social dependency on 
mining i.e. job instability 
from economic cycles. 
Julius Malema (Leader of EFF) 
Fred Gona (Former Leader of Portfolio 
Committee responsible for Mineral 
Resources in SA parliament) 
France Baleni (Former General 
Secretary of National Union of Mine 
Workers) 
Increase state control 
over mining 
resources 
Fulfil political 
expectations post-
elections campaign 
related to Freedom 
Charter goals that stated 
that all mineral wealth 
shall be transferred to 
the people. 
Facilitate the creation of 
a developmental state 
with greater state control 
over mineral resources. 
Blade Nzimande (Secretary General of 
South Africa Communist Party and 
Minister of Higher Education) 
Susan Shabangu (Minister of Mines) 
Max Sisulu (Member of South African 
Parliament) 
Jeremy Cronin (Deputy Secretary 
General of South African Communist 
Party) 
 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the results of this research) 
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One respondent cited the seven strategic interventions to deliver economic 
freedom to South African people as articulated by the Economic Freedom Fighters 
during its 2014 election manifesto launch in Mangaung, South Africa (EFF 
Manifesto, 2014). These are: 
1. Expropriation of South Africa’s land without compensation for equal 
redistribution in use. 
2. Nationalisation of mines, banks and other strategic sectors of the economy, 
without compensation. 
3. Building state and government capacity, which will lead to the abolishment 
of tenders. 
4. Free quality education, healthcare, houses and sanitation. 
5. Massive protected industrial development to create millions of sustainable 
jobs, including the introduction of minimum wages in order to close the 
wage gap between the rich and the poor, close the apartheid wage gap and 
promote rapid career paths for Africans in the workplace. 
6. Massive development of the African economy and advocating for a move 
from reconciliation to justice in the entire continent. 
7. Open, accountable, corrupt-free government and society without fear of 
victimisation by state agencies. 
These statements further complicate the South African perspective of resource 
nationalisation.  Another respondent commented that  
countries will always impose some kind of tax on very profitable businesses 
and, in particular, on natural resource-based ones; in other words, the country 
feels it has an ownership of the product that is being extracted. The Australian 
super tax concept is based more on a sense that mining companies’ profits 
have risen sharply in recent years because of increased commodity prices 
whilst the government did not receive the same benefit.   
One of the respondents interviewed argued that all things being equal, resource 
nationalisation is seen by long-marginalised communities as being a positive 
intervention, but is regarded as negative by businessman and investors. In South 
Africa, the leadership of the country has distanced itself from resource 
nationalisation but labour and community leaders occasionally clamour for the 
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Botswana model where the government owns some equity in the mines (see 
Appendix 6 on South African Stakeholder Views of Nationalisation of Mines).  
Countries, such as Zimbabwe, have introduced empowerment laws aimed at 
achieving this. In most diamond producing nations like South Africa, Angola, 
Botswana, Namibia, Canada and Russia, beneficiation targets have been set and 
are monitored closely by the regulatory authorities.  
6.6.1.4 Employee Value Proposition 
The respondents identified the employee value proposition as an issue in the 
diamond industry, bearing in mind all the negative perceptions associated with the 
mining industry in South Africa. This perception includes the belief that “the 
diamond industry is a ‘sunset industry’”. This phrase poses a lot of risk in the 
industry particularly when it comes to issues associated with staff retention and 
attraction of top talent. Another respondent stated that  
the diamond industry employees want to work for a company that has a good 
reputation, is sensitive to its environment and its people; a company that looks 
after its people whether financially or in terms of career, that looks after the 
community within which it works, that is seen to be delivering on the country’s 
strategic issues, like transformation, skills development issues, and supplier 
relationship building. If your company is showing its responsibility towards 
those various stakeholders, then people feel more comfortable working for a 
company like that and are therefore rationally and emotionally committed.  
Other respondents, with extensive employee relations experience, indicated that 
most companies in the industry, notably De Beers Consolidated Mines and Petra 
Diamonds, outperform the global benchmark in terms of their performance on 
most of the employee value proposition attributes in the opportunity category, the 
reward category, the work category, the organisation category and the people 
category.  The notable areas of excellence are in respect of health benefits, 
people management, manager quality and recognition.  In terms of future career 
opportunities, stability, compensation and work-life balance, there is more the 
industry could do to improve its employee value proposition (Lotz, 2014). The 
chart below demonstrates De Beers’ employees performance versus other 
industries in terms of employee value proposition (Figure 30) 
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Figure 30: De Beers’ employee performance versus other industries in terms of 
employee value proposition 
(Source: De Beers Report to Society, 2013:24) 
6.6.1.5 Climate Change and Carbon Tax  
Respondents identified climate change as an issue in the medium term in the 
diamond industry.  One of the youth group members argued that if climate 
predictions are right, then there will be higher standards of accountability for the 
ways in which humanity will manage such things as water usage and energy 
consumption. Production costs are therefore likely to rise quite considerably.  One 
respondent argued that post-mining rehabilitation will have to be flexible to allow 
for sustainable post-mining uses. Some respondents cited the proposed carbon 
tax as a major burden to the diamond industry. One respondent said, 
“Scientifically, South Africa’s projected emissions do not support the need for 
imposition of a carbon tax”.  According to the Anglo American Report on Carbon 
Tax (2014), the medium term projections up to 2021, indicate South Africa’s 
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emissions (520Mt) are aligned with the trajectory (SA. Department of Environment, 
2009) required to limit global warming to 2°C.  This report further states that South 
Africa is the only developing country to propose a national cross-sector carbon 
tax. When compared to global carbon pricing policies, the proposed carbon tax put 
the domestic Emissions Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) industry at a distinct 
disadvantage, leading to the risk of the industry relocating elsewhere, or reducing 
future investment in South Africa 
6.6.1.6 Regulatory Uncertainties 
Regulatory uncertainties, stemming from an inability to predict the future 
regulatory regime in South Africa, is a complex issue in the diamond mining 
industry, threatening issues around security of tenure and investment 
predictability.  According to one respondent, this uncertainty is linked to confusing 
statements by the Mineral resources ministers over the Mining Charter targets and 
uncertainty with the time line to finalise the Diamond Amendment Act, as well as 
the MPRDA, which has been to cabinet, to parliament to president and now back 
to parliament.  The issue on changes in the leadership of the DMR political office 
is another concern contributing to regulatory uncertainties. The fact is that, over 
the last three years, South Africa has had three different Ministers with differing 
views on policy direction.  These issues have a direct impact on investment 
decisions, cost of operating mines, among others.  Respondents felt that 
regulatory uncertainty is a major current and future risk in South Africa.  
Respondents were concerned that the anticipated amendments to the Mining 
Charter, Diamond Act and MPRDA pose serious regulatory uncertainty in South 
Africa if they are not managed responsibly.  Another respondent made the point 
that “The constantly changing rules/environment are deterring progress and 
investment in key projects and in the SA mining industry in general.”  One 
respondent said “There is an acknowledgement that the rules should not change 
from one minister to another”. A respondent stated that  
notwithstanding the current declaratory order process and debate on BEE 
ownership between the DMR and the Chamber of Mines, some in government 
feel that such key policy issues should not be left to the courts, and that the 
real thrust of the conversation should be a discussion around the shape of a 
Mining Charter 3. 
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6.6.1.7 Increasing production cost 
Respondents identified an increasing production cost environment as one of the 
major risks in the diamond-mining industry.  According to one respondent, mining 
will face a diverse set of trends and uncertainties that will shape the industry over 
the next few decades. Increasing labour costs, energy costs, water use costs and 
waste stripping costs associated with increased fuel costs (Eskom Annual Report, 
2015) are the main issues affecting the diamond industry. According to most 
respondents, contributing to the production costs will be a limited availability of 
skilled labour, stronger focus on local suppliers, requirements for beneficiation and 
the growing importance of green operations. Coupled to that will be the declining 
resource volumes and ore grades associated with digging deeper, increasing 
resource remoteness and the associated operational complexity and infrastructure 
challenges. In South Africa, the energy crisis is a serious issue, given Eskom’s 
problems with power supply (The Diamond Insight report, 2015). Respondents 
identified energy and water security as major issues in South Africa. One 
respondent stated that South Africa faces a growing gap between water supply 
and demand (estimated at 2.7 billion cubic metres in 2030).  Another respondent 
noted that the increasing operational input costs for all key production expenses 
are alarming. These include replacement of tyres, with each truck using six tyres, 
“a $300,000 cost for a new set of wheels makes me feel a whole lot better about 
what I got charged to replace the tyres on my car during my last roadworthy 
check”. Another respondent stated that electricity costs experienced a 
compounded increase of around 11% annually in both Botswana and Russia over 
the last 4 years while in South Africa, it has increased to a staggering 15% 
(NERSA, 2015). In the period between 2002 and 2014, labour costs saw a 
compound annual growth rate of 14% in Botswana, 19% in Russia and about 20% 
in South Africa.  These rising production costs could result in increased 
mechanisation in the industry, resulting in further job losses, which has a serious 
reputational challenge in South Africa because of the high unemployment, poverty 
and inequality of the population. 
6.6.1.8 Stricter safety and health rules 
The commitment to Zero Harm in the mining industry remains a number one 
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priority for both CEOs and Regulators because of the poor track record of the 
mining companies in managing safety performance in the mining industry 
(Chamber of Mines Report, 2015).  Respondents identified safety management as 
a major risk in the diamond industry affecting the license to operate.  One of the 
respondents cited a Department of Mineral Resources report (SA. Department of 
Mineral Resources, 2013/14) that stated that work-related respiratory problems 
and mine accidents are the biggest causes of death in the South African mining 
industry with serious reputational issues for the mining industry. According to 
some respondents, The Anglo American report (2015) indicates that there are 
more than 16 fatal injuries out of more than 100 000 employees due to work-
related transportation incidents occurring on public roads (see Figure 31).  This 
number indicates the importance of managing this issue as it may cause serious 
reputational issues for the diamond industry in the eyes of consumers. 
 
Figure 31: Anglo American report on Fatal and Lost-time injuries due to 
transportation between 2008 and 2014  
(Source: Anglo American Report, 2015:5) 
6.6.1.9 Beneficiation of diamonds in the producer countries 
Respondents (especially the youth groups and regulators) identified diamond 
beneficiation as a risk facing the diamond industry, especially the diamond 
producing nations that are affected by high youth unemployment. There is a 
perception that most of the beneficiation of diamonds creates employment 
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elsewhere in the world instead of creating employment in the producer nations. 
One of the respondents confirmed that India remains the dominant nation, 
representing about 60% of the global share of diamond cutting and polishing 
business, whilst Botswana remains the biggest producer of rough diamonds by 
volume (see Figure 32). 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Distribution of diamond polishing in the world 
(Source: De Beers Report to Exco, 2013:slide 11) 
 
Respondents cited the cost of cutting diamonds and skills availability as a major 
contributors to this problem.  One of the respondents shared some of the statistics 
that demonstrate the cost of manufacturing and cutting within the world’s major 
cutting centres and the resultant jobs associated with the cutting industry 
worldwide (Table 68). India alone has created 850 000 jobs compared to South 
Africa with just 1800 jobs (De Beers Report to Exco, 2013).  This is of great 
concern to the diamond producing nations especially in South Africa, Botswana 
and Namibia. 
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Table 68: Jobs associated with diamond cutting and polishing in the world 
 
(Source: De Beers Group Report, 2009:9) 
One of the respondents confirmed that the diamond industry has recognised the 
problem and has implemented a number of programmes to redress this 
imbalance.  For example, De Beers has launched the Diamond Trading Initiative in 
all the nations where it has mining operations in partnerships with host 
governments in Botswana (DTCB), South Africa (DBSSA) and Namibia (DTC 
Namibia) where it established diamond trading centres. These initiatives are 
dedicated to increasing local beneficiation of diamonds in the host nations.   
6.6.1.10 Developmental Price for South African Minerals 
The respondents identified developmental pricing as an emerging issue in the 
diamond industry. This realisation was exacerbated by the announcement by the 
Minister of Mineral Resources during the Mining Indaba in 2014 that South Africa 
is considering introducing developmental pricing of its strategic minerals 
(Ramatlhodi, 2014). Respondents felt that developmental pricing will compel the 
mining industry to sell at below market prices to domestic downstream industries 
such as the cutting and polishing industry, and steel and automobile 
manufacturers. One respondent cited a statement made by a senior State 
Diamond Trader official who suggested that the 10% Run of Mine that they are 
buying from the industry is too expensive and that they will lobby the Minister to 
impose a cost plus price for all their allocations. Many respondents, especially 
those representing regulatory authorities, believe that the government objective 
will be to promote beneficiation, localisation and the associated manufacturing 
industries which, it believes, will boost the manufacturing sector and thereby 
create employment. 
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One respondent stated that “the pricing decision for rough diamonds is complex 
and requires a number of considerations before the final price can be decided”. 
Below is an example of the schematic view that is used to set prices, which makes 
rough diamond pricing a complex task (see Figure 33). 
 
 
Figure 33: Key Considerations for pricing rough diamonds 
(Source: De Beers Presentation to Bankers in South Africa, 2015:6) 
Polished Internet Prices (PIP) and Wholesale Polished Prices (WPP) which inform 
the De Beers Polished Analysis report together with Polished outcome 
experiments supported with various modelling analysis reports; input from Key 
Account Managers (KAM); auction prices and the values of polished and rough 
diamonds play a significant role in the determination of final pricing decisions for 
diamonds (De Beers Presentation to Bankers in South Africa, 2015).  
During his results presentation in July 2014, Mark Cutifani, the Chairman of De 
Beers, warned the southern African governments against developmental pricing 
and made the following statements:  
In the interconnected world we now live in, business has no boundaries.  
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Prices are global, not local.  States should not try to impose prices onto a 
producer or to cross-subsidise inefficient industries by distorting prices, as this 
compromises natural competitive advantages and opportunities and embeds 
inefficiency throughout an economy and society.  All prices eventually come 
back to a global value. 
6.6.1.11 Transformation in the Diamond Industry in South Africa 
Respondents concurred that there is a strong belief among the government, 
politicians and various community groups, like youth and church organisations in 
South Africa, that the diamond industry has not embraced the transformational 
agenda as it is stipulated in the Mining Charter and in the Diamond Act.  This is 
probably the biggest reason for the distrust between the diamond companies and 
their local communities. This is in contrast with the latest Chamber of Mines report 
titled Mining Charter Ownership Collation dated March 2015. It purports that the 
Diamond sector has achieved a BEE ownership of 26.0% (5% BEE entrepreneurs, 
10.4% communities and 10.6% ESOPs) based on value. The ownership structure 
has benefited 19% BEE entrepreneurs, 40% communities and 41% ESOPs, and 
an estimated 114 653 individuals. In terms of volumes, the industry has achieved 
a BEE ownership of 26.0% (5.1% BEE entrepreneurs, 10.2% communities and 
10.7% ESOPs). The ownership structure has benefited 20% BEE entrepreneurs, 
39% communities and 41% ESOPs. The diamond sector has a net value of 
between R86 million and R4 229 million representing a change of between -94% 
and 205%.  One respondent said 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) has fallen out of 
favour. The ANC wants to see black economic participation, black 
industrialists and operators, black people owning and/or managing and 
operating the businesses. This further complicates the future transformation 
directive in South Africa. 
Transformation in the mining Industry in South Africa is an emotive issue and has 
different meanings for different stakeholders. One member of the youth 
representatives commented that the DMR, youth organisations, unions and 
various political organisations, including the ANC, the ruling party in South Africa, 
want to see visible change in the mining industry.  These key stakeholders see 
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this issue as a key concern in the diamond industry and in the mining industry in 
general.  One respondent said,  
Transformation that leaves blacks out is not on – if mining companies have 
not recruited sufficiently skilled blacks by now, then they have failed, as 
technical positions were open to all since the late eighties. Mining companies 
are losing too many black graduates to other sectors of the economy.   
He further stated that “the Industry must, however, not put up black faces 
(foreigners) to the exclusion of black South Africans – the ANC is very sensitive to 
this”. Another community representative stated that  
we must not allow BEE parties that are mere speculators (also called fronting), 
speculating in the share prices of empowered entities and selling to make an 
easy windfall. Owning mineral rights must come with responsibilities. Local 
communities and employees should be prioritised in owning the mines 
neighbouring their communities. 
According to another respondent, the mining charter continues to be challenged. 
In a media report by Seccombe (2015), the well-known mining lawyer, Advocate 
Hulme Scholes, and his firm have gone to court to set aside the Mining Charters of 
2004 and 2010. They argue that the mining charter is unconstitutional, vague and 
contradictory, open to different interpretations and is subject to possible abuse by 
the DMR officials and its Minister. 
6.6.1.12 Mine Community Unrests 
Respondents identified extreme mine community unrest as the “biggest risk” in the 
wider mining industry. These unrests are perpetuated by the general belief that 
the mining industry does not take local communities and labour unions seriously.  
Here are some of the key incidents reported in the mining industry almost every 
week in recent times: 
Tukakgomo Community along the R555 between Steelpoort and Roossenekal 
has blocked the roads within the village at the Lanex Mine / Eestergeluk turn-
off, approximately 4km out of Steelpoort. According to sources small groups of 
community members held meetings to review the implementation of the 
promises made at Burgersfort a few months ago. They felt that the mines 
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failed to fulfil their promises to hire 239 local community members from a 
central point. They decided to blockade the village roads using burning tyres, 
large rocks and debris. They are also planning to march to the closest mines. 
Police were called for assistance (Labour Relations Report, dated 12 August 
(2015:1).  
Another Labour Relations Report, dated 31 August (2015:1)  
The Mogalakwena community in Limpopo once again blockaded the road with 
rocks and burning tyres at the Skimming Crossing near the Kgoshi's house 
this morning. PS and police cleared the road during the night (31/8). A 
Bosvark was utilised to transport nine management employees into the mine 
as the N11 is currently clear except the road leading into the mine. Police top 
management reported that corrective action will be taken against the 
commanders who allowed their teams to leave the area while the situation 
remained unresolved last night. Police teams were called in for assistance. 
Another report (Labour Relations Report, dated 12 September 2015:2) stated that 
in the early hours of the morning on the 1st of September 2015, around 3am, a 
fully organised attack was launched by a group of angry residents against the 
contractor’s equipment where a community dam is being built in the 
Sikhukhuneland. According to the LRR, the victim was a contractor building a 
GaMolekane dam wall who had a site right next to the dam where earth-moving 
equipment was stored as well as office space and storerooms. The community set 
alight all the equipment and facilities on this site. It is unknown what the extent of 
the damage is but a lot of earth-moving machines and buildings were destroyed. 
These are some of the cases of community unrest.  Most respondents concurred 
that Limpopo province has experienced serious incidents and that this trend is 
also reported from other mining towns. 
6.6.1.13 Job Losses in the Mining Industry 
Many respondents, including the youth groups, concurred that the shedding of 
jobs in the diamond industry since the global recession 2008 is posing a serious 
reputational risk among local communities, political organisations, labour unions 
and the regulatory authorities in South Africa. One respondent commented that 
the unions, youth organisations, ANC and DMR are deeply concerned about 
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the job losses taking place in the mining industry. They insist that 
retrenchments should not be done clandestinely and that the industry should 
engage them on the challenges being faced. 
According to some respondents, the impact of the restructuring of De Beers mines 
in the Namaqualand region in the Northern Cape, South Africa, has had a 
significant and irreparable impact on the Namaqua people. One respondent said 
that the impact of mine downscaling is felt not only by the retrenched employees 
but also by the entire region, including the local municipalities of Nama Khoi and 
Kamiesberg, due to the outflow of artisans and mining skills to mines outside 
Namaqua. This is exacerbated by the diminishing mine operations at Okiep 
Copper Company (OCC), Alexander Bay, Trans Hex and De Beers Namaqualand 
Mines which are leading to an exodus of artisans in search of employment 
opportunities in mining to the Postmasburg and Kathu areas of the Northern Cape, 
but also to mines elsewhere in South Africa. This migration of economically active 
residents impacts on purchasing power, the local economy and the revenue 
generating capacity of the local municipalities. The lack of employment 
opportunities (Statistics South Africa, 2014) further stimulates youth urbanisation 
with many young people leaving the area in search of a future in Cape Town. 
Early indications are that the average age of Namaqualand’s population is 
increasing over time which will create ghost towns in the near future.   
According to the Labour Relations report (5 October 2015:1), the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) will march from Pieter Roos Park on 7 
October 2015 to PRASA, TELKOM, ESKOM, Nedbank, Absa, Standard Bank, FNB, 
the Department of Labour, Gauteng Premier’s office and the Chamber of Mines to 
protest job losses in the various mining towns. According to its president, Sdumo 
Dlamini, Cosatu is joining millions of workers around the world on 7 October 2015 
which is the “World Day for Decent Work”.  Respondents agreed that job losses in the 
mining industry will remain a serious issue well into the future because of a tough 
economic climate which is forcing most of the affected mines to scale down 
production or put the mines under care and maintenance.   
6.6.1.14 Responsible Mine Closure and Rehabilitation 
Respondents concurred that responsible mine closure and rehabilitation is a major 
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reputational issue in the diamond industry. According to one respondent, the 
objective of responsible mine closure involves a combination of making the site 
safe and stable, returning a beneficial post-mining land use and ensuring that, 
after mine closure, there are no adverse long-term environmental, social and 
economic impacts.  This objective applies to all disturbed sites, including waste 
dumps, tailings of mineral resources, storage facilities, mineral processing plants 
and open pits.  One respondent cited a major concern is the un-rehabilitated and 
unsecured Coleville mine dump close to the local communities that has been raised 
repeatedly in Kimberley, the birth place of the modern diamond mining.  It is stated 
that local communities and local environmental NGOs view the unfenced mine dump 
as a safety risk for children and animals, a hide-out for criminals and an easy access 
for illegal mining by community members.  Although there are generally low levels of 
environmental awareness among local stakeholders, some view this mine dump, 
and others in town, as proof of poor environmental performance by the local 
diamond company, Petra, as they do not see any signs of environmental 
rehabilitation. One local community member explained “De Beers came and took 
whatever it could get out of the area and would leave the unsightly dumps as its 
legacy”.  
According to some respondents, community members from most villages where 
diamond mines have been closed or sold to new owners expressed very strong 
views and emotions concerning what they perceive as their inheritance from De 
Beers.  In areas like Namaqualand and Koffiefontein, communities are comparing 
areas like Kimberley (or even Kathu and Postmasburg) to what Komaggas in 
Namaqualand is today, which evokes bitter feelings. Community members feel 
they, and their families over three generations, directly contributed to diamond 
wealth – “83 years of diamond mining and nothing to show for it”. A number of 
references to employee exploitation in the early days of Namaqualand Mines’ 
mining activity were cited in community focus group discussions (Even-Zohar, 
2007) – narratives being kept alive by the perceived disrespect for workers in the A 
and B salary bands. 
Residents of Komaggas, Buffelsrivier, Steinkopf and Koingnaas understand that 
they are expected to find new and innovative ways to sustain themselves, but 
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explain that this kind of entrepreneurial thinking stands in stark contrast with the 
mind-set inculcated by De Beers over many years. Communities believe that the 
patriarchal nature of De Beers’ employer-employee relationship stripped them of 
development opportunities outside of mining as well as the confidence that they 
can do anything else. Another respondent said that the lack of viable alternatives to 
formal employment in these mining towns contributes to the feeling of 
hopelessness by most community members. Neither small business development, 
nor agricultural initiatives hold much promise as viable solutions for development in 
this remote part of the region. 
6.6.1.15 Industrial Relations 
Industrial relations in the mining industry in South Africa are increasingly becoming 
highly volatile (Levy, 2015; Chamber of Mines Report, 2014). The developments in 
the South African Platinum belt, characterised by the emergence of the more 
militant AMCU and its demand for a greater share of profits for the workers, is a 
good example. This is in spite of the noticeable growth in wages in South Africa 
between 1998 and 2014 as shown below in Figure 34, which are well above the 
CPI. 
 
Figure 34: Average of levels of Wage Settlements over time against CPI 
(Source: Statistics South Africa (SSA)/Levy Employment Publications, 2015:5) 
After a fatal incident in which 34 miners died, South Africa’s longest strike 
followed. This shows that employee and industrial relations were not managed 
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effectively. One respondent recalled that President Jacob Zuma of South Africa 
had to make a national announcement during the State of the Nation Address 
(February 2013) where he pledged that violent protest incidents will be acted 
upon, investigated and prosecuted with special courts allocated for this purpose.  
Some respondents stated that the 2012 strike season was like no other in the 
history of the mining industry in South Africa.  As a result of the Marikana incident, 
the entire mining industry is under intense scrutiny beyond just the labour issues, 
but all the other issues in terms of mining community issues, such as housing, 
unemployment and employee indebtedness as the effectiveness of the current 
collective bargaining framework in which wage-related issues are negotiated, is 
reconsidered. One respondent also noted that at the height of this crisis, the 
former Minister of Mineral Resources made a public statement threatening the 
possibility of her department withdrawing several mining companies’ licences.  
It has been estimated that, in South Africa, during the longest strike in the 
platinum belt, the platinum industry lost billions of Rands because of work 
stoppage.  According to one respondent, the table below summarises the cost of a 
strike in the platinum industry.  Anglo American Platinum CEO stated “we have 
lost an estimated 532,127 platinum ounces (equiv. refined) in total which equates 
to ±R14.360 bn lost revenue, and a total loss of ±R19.983 bn since the start of the 
industrial action”. Ounces lost in ramp-up phase = 107,548 equating to ±R3.066 
bn in lost revenue. Ounces lost during strike = 424,579 Pt ounces (see Table 69) 
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Table 69: Illegal Strike impact on Anglo American Platinum  
(Source: Anglo American Platinum Strike Report, 2015) 
Strike report date:     23 January - 9 March 2014 
Anglo American Platinum 2014 
Strike Impact Return 
Strike period total January February March April 
Own Mines                  127 266  
                   23 
921  
                   78 
929                  24 416                           -    
Rustenburg                    50 369  
                   10 
911  
                   28 
960                  10 499    
Union                    27 328  
                     5 
054  
                   17 
128                    5 147    
Amandelbult                    49 569  
                     7 
956  
                   32 
842                    8 771    
            
JVs & 3rd parties                      1 390  
                         
183  
                         
905                        302                           -    
3rd Parties (Kilken and Pt Mile 
production affected)                      1 390  
                         
183  
                         
905                        302    
            
Total Group                  128 656  
                   24 
104  
                   79 
834                  24 718                           -    
Days on strike                            35  7  23                            5                           -    
Basket price - updated from 
treasury 26 554 25 699 26 542 27 428   
Estimated total revenue lost 3 416 357 190 619 446 136 2 118 955 214 677 955 840 0 
Estimated total fixed costs 1 740 450 873 421 301 173 1 077 697 200 241 452 500 0 
Estimated total loss 5 156 808 062 1 040 747 309 3 196 652 414 919 408 340 0 
            
Revenue lost per day 105 403 987 88 492 305 92 128 488 135 591 168   
Fixed costs incurred / day (nett 
of strike savings) 51 777 594 60 185 882 46 856 400 48 290 500   
Total strike impact per day 157 181 581 148 678 187 138 984 888 183 881 668   
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Respondents agreed that the diamond mining industry in South Africa remains 
relatively unaffected by the wave of illegal wildcat strikes, with negligible 
contractual issues.  Most of the diamond mines are less prone to the illegal wildcat 
strikes at the moment due to the following reasons: 
 Associated Mining and Construction Union (AMCU) has little or no 
representation in diamond mines except in the Petra mines at Koffiefontein 
and Kimberley underground with minor membership at De Beers’ biggest 
operation at Venetia. De Beers has no hostel facilities at any of its 
operations; 
 Most of diamond industry mining operations in South Africa are distant from 
surrounding communities; 
 Management has invested considerable time and effort in fostering 
relationships and building capacity with the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) at operational, regional and national levels; and 
 The current bargaining unit comprises employees from Paterson bands A to 
C lower; mineworkers represent 74% of employees within the bargaining 
unit (A- CL) and 58.7% of total DBCM employees.  
According to most respondents, relational issues between the mines and the 
unions remain a mystery in the industry.  
6.6.1.16 Youth Activism and High levels of youth Unemployment 
Respondents, including youth groups, raised the issue of youth activism and high 
levels of youth unemployment as major issues in the diamond industry.  One 
respondent cited high unemployment, especially among young people, as a major 
risk and the basis of a poor relationship with local communities.  The community 
needs are not being met by the diamond companies (see Figure 35). There is a 
wide gap between community expectations versus company performance and the 
ability to deliver on those expectations. Respondents felt that this gap continues to 
widen the risks to retain a social license.  
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Figure 35: Ever-rising Community expectations versus industry performance 
 
Youth groups raised the issue of local procurement as a major issue in the local 
communities where diamond mining companies operate. One youth member 
explained:  
De Beers Kimberley Mines’ decision to withdraw from Northern Cape 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NOCCI) and its Tender Board which 
informed local businesses of tenders at the mine, is perceived as having led to 
a significant decline in local procurement as local businesses, especially the 
youth and woman owned enterprises, are now not aware of tender 
opportunities.  
Some respondents stated that there is also a sentiment that Zimele Hub 
beneficiaries do not receive sufficient support from De Beers to help them access 
tender opportunities at Venetia Mine. This sentiment was mainly supported by youth 
members.   
According to some respondents, housing projects targeting mine employees and 
other initiatives to enhance home ownership among employees over the years are 
seen as not having achieved the desired results in the mining industry in South 
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Africa. Although the local communities have acknowledged the mine’s contribution 
to housing and living conditions for its employees, there is a sentiment that handing 
over these projects to the municipality has led to problems regarding maintenance 
and poor service delivery.  One respondent said that De Beers’ new 2015 Housing 
and Living Conditions Plan to promote home ownership among semi-skilled 
employees is a bone of contention for organised labour and contributes to tension in 
the relationship between NUM (Kimberley Branch) and Kimberley Mines 
management. Union representatives are concerned about the affordability of 
employees’ bonds, should Kimberley Mines close.  The life of the mine for the De 
Beers historic Kimberley Mines ends in 2018. In line with its Mine Works Plans, 
unless De Beers finds a new owner who can extend the mine beyond 2030 as per 
their blue sky scenario, the mine will be forced to close down in 2018. 
Some respondents, together with youth groups, concurred that visibly poor pay-outs 
and inability to pay out in 2015 from De Beers BEE scheme “Ponahalo”, through its 
Equal allocation Trust that has more than 15 000 beneficiaries, most of whom are 
pensioners, is cited as a huge issue affecting the local communities especially the 
former De Beers employees and widows. According to one respondent,  
The payment was significantly lower than anticipated. In the mining industry, 
local communities and unions, including current employees in the diamond 
industry, especially in the Northern Cape, are acutely aware of Kumba Iron 
Ore’s widely publicised Envision scheme and the sizable pay-outs (about 
R500 000 per employee once-off payment in 2013) and they now have similar 
expectations of the Ponahalo pay-outs and other employee ownership 
schemes.  
On the issue of high unemployment and its effects on the local communities, 
respondents concurred that, following consecutive waves of staff reductions in most 
diamond towns like Kimberley, Namaqualand Mines, Marsfontein, Koffiefontein, 
Jaggersfontein from 2004 to 2013, unemployment escalated in the predominately 
diamond mines’ dependent villages. According to one respondent, “In a number of 
instances, entire families are without an income as more than one generation has 
worked in the diamond industry”. This is confirmed by The Namaqualand SEAT 
report (2015:20) that prolonged unemployment leads to increased levels of poverty 
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and the inability to take care of one’s family. As is always the case, the vulnerable 
members of society – children, the elderly and those chronically ill – are the first to 
feel the brunt. Community Based Organisations (CBOs) caring for the vulnerable, 
especially the elderly with no means to sustain themselves, raised their concerns 
regarding the increase in the number of people they have to attend to and the lack 
of sustainable funding.  Another respondent commented that, apart from the 
obvious economic impact on these villages, large scale unemployment also has 
psychological and social side effects for a community. The SEAT reports noted that, 
according to faith-based leaders, community leaders and social workers, the social 
degeneration in communities is becoming increasingly visible in incidents of 
domestic violence, increased alcohol abuse, the introduction of unlawful means to 
substitute income and associated problems with drug abuse and prostitution. 
6.6.1.17 Illegal Mining 
The Chamber of Mines says illegal mining is surging – it’s a R6 billion Rand a 
year industry due to the troubled socio-economic environment. (Bega Sheree, 
Saturday Star, 10 September 2016) 
This study has identified that illegal mining is a major risk and challenge in the 
diamond industry.  Illegal mining activities have considerably increased since 2011 
in Kimberley and in Namaqualand, according to various police reports and the 
SEAT Report (2014).  According to some respondents, in many communities 
where illegal mining is prevalent, community members across the age spectrum, 
both male and female, consider that this offers a viable way to generate an 
income to sustain themselves and their families. This is also fuelled by the fact 
that mining skills, spanning two to three generations, are the dominant skills in 
most diamond towns. The availability of the skills and the belief that there are 
enough diamonds left to sustain small scale mining by community members, are 
two of the driving forces to participate in illegal mining activities. Retrenched and 
retired former diamond industry employees have a good working knowledge of 
how and where to mine and the large size of the mining area means that access 
can be gained despite fencing and security.  According to another respondent, 
although illegal, these activities are, to an extent, socially endorsed as a decent 
way to earn a living in the absence of other viable alternatives. Some community 
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members are adamant that they are not “fortune seekers” but desperate to earn a 
living (Statistics South Africa, 2013) with the skills they have “on the land God 
gave them”. They are equally clear that they would prefer to sell the diamonds 
through legal means rather than getting involved in the underworld of diamond 
dealings.  According to another respondent, members of illegal mining teams, 
local government officials and community leaders believe that illegal mining must 
be legalised – one community member stated that “a solution should be pursued 
to legalise community small scale mining under some level of supervision to 
ensure adherence to health and safety legislation”. According to these 
stakeholders, this will restore the dignity and self-worth of people who are 
intrinsically linked to illegal mining, it will go a long way towards solving 
unemployment and it will give young people, who do not want to go to the city, an 
option to stay in mining towns. 
6.6.1.18 Access to Rough Diamonds by Small Cutters and Polishers 
Respondents felt that access to rough diamonds for small cutters and polishers is an 
important current dilemma in South Africa.  This issue has culminated in the 
establishment of the State Diamond Trader (SDT) after many small cutters 
complained to the South African government that it was difficult to become a 
sightholder for De Beers. In response, government created a State Diamond Trader 
which, by law, buys up to 10% of Run of Mine from all the diamond producers and off-
sells to the small scale industry (SDT, 2014).  Respondents believe that this initiative 
has not totally resolved the challenge and other means must be established. The 
SDT has been widely criticised as a failure in addressing access challenges. 
According to one respondent, there are three distinct channels to buy diamonds in 
South Africa, either through auction sales at the Diamond Exchange Centre in 
Johannesburg, via the State Diamond Trader or through sightholder systems that De 
Beers is using around the world. One respondent said that the State Diamond Trader 
has completely failed to deliver on this mandate and is not self-sustaining.  According 
to some of the respondents, “the requirements to become a sightholder for De Beers 
remain a major barrier to entry by the small cutters and polishers in South Africa”. 
6.6.1.19 Land Claims 
Respondents concurred that land claims remain a major issue in the diamond 
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mining industry on the same basis as the entire mining and agricultural sector in 
South Africa. One respondent noted:  
People in the six Namaqualand communal areas – Komaggas, Steinkopf, 
Richtersveld, Concordia, Pella and Leliefontein, and in some parts of Limpopo 
where diamond mines operate – feel strongly about the loss of ancestral lands 
to the State.  
White farmers and mining companies operated within a legal system that did not 
recognise their land rights as semi-nomadic pastoralists (Arya & Bassi, 2011; 
Pandey, 2012). According to the some of the respondents, mine communities 
believe that current South African rural land claims cannot be addressed through 
the Land Claims Court process because of the constitutional 1913 cut-off date 
agreed to for land restitution matters. However, judgments by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (March 2003) and the Constitutional Court of South Africa (October 
2003) have challenged this view by ruling that the Richtersveld community is 
entitled to a restitution of land. Most of the mining communities have a special 
history when it comes to attempts to claim land restitution, including a long-
standing dispute over how to justify historical claims to the land. For example, the 
Komaggas-inwonersvereniging (residents association) argues that Komaggas has 
never belonged to the State and that residents have a private group title to the 
land, granted in the mid-nineteenth century by the Governor of the Cape Colony 
and Queen Victoria. No transfer from the State back to the people was therefore 
required and they were strongly opposing the integration of Komaggas into the 
Nama Khoi Local Municipality. Another example is the Hondeklip Bay community 
which also has a land restitution claim (claim no. M1850 submitted on 30 
December 1998), gazetted in May 2008, regarding ten farms, the majority of which 
belong to De Beers. The community is frustrated with what they believe to be the 
deliberate delaying tactics imposed by the Northern Cape Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights. 
In summary, the growing frustration regarding government’s inaction with these land 
claims, De Beers’ exit and the greater Namaqualand assertion that De Beers should 
give back the land to the people, a lack of differentiation between mineral rights and 
surface rights, a lack of clarity about the ownership of De Beers farms, and 
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uncertainty about the future of the mining communities, converge to give the issue of 
land ownership prominence in the Namaqualand district.    
6.6.2 Product-Integrity related risks 
Several product-integrity related risks and challenges were identified by the 
respondents, including the Kimberley Process, money laundering, changing 
consumer preferences, investor confidence, threat of synthetics and recycled 
diamonds, diamond security and technology, and corporate citizenship. 
6.6.2.1 Kimberley Process 
The respondents identified the Kimberley Process (KP) as one of the risks in the 
diamond industry. KP is a certification scheme aimed at curbing illicit diamond 
trading, including that of blood diamonds (Even-Zohar, 2007). Respondents 
argued that, although the process is fundamentally right, it must be strengthened 
in terms of its ability to sanction. For example, one of the respondents said:  
We were talking yesterday about Marange diamonds in Zimbabwe that could 
not be exported because NGOs are not approving the KP certificate for the 
Marange goods. There’s millions of dollars’ worth of goods that are looking for 
legitimacy in Zimbabwe at the moment and it all hangs on a thin thread of 
getting a KP certificate that is reliant on one individual and you then worry that 
influence can be brought to bear and then suddenly the goods are legitimised 
with the stroke of a pen really and that worries me deeply. I think it stands to 
undermine the whole industry. Maybe we’re too close to it; it’s not yet 
something that you can read about in the newspaper as a Joe Average on the 
bus to work in the morning. It worries me deeply and that’s where I’m least 
comfortable. 
Most respondents believe that the biggest risk of KP is possible manipulation by 
the big nations and multinational NGOs to drive their political ambitions. The case 
in Zimbabwe is a good example, according to some of the respondents. Abbey 
Chikane conducted an assessment on behalf of the KP and found that the 
Marange goods were legitimate but his report was not accepted because the 
western countries wanted to drive their agenda of leadership change or for 
Mugabe to step down using KP certification as a basis. One respondent 
commented that KP needs to be strengthened “with more teeth”, so it can stand 
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above politics and enforce more control relating to hygiene issues affecting the 
diamond industry.  
According to one respondent, Amnesty International’s report on Central African 
Republic (CAR) diamond mining and human rights issues pointed out that one of 
the main limitations of the world acclaimed Kimberley Process is that it only 
focuses on conflict diamonds and product stewardship and excludes human rights 
concerns associated with the mining. The report also asserts that KP tackles 
international trade in conflict diamonds and not the internal trade within countries 
and, furthermore, KP does not place any responsibility on companies to check 
their supply chains. 
6.6.2.2 Money Laundering 
Some of the respondents identified money laundering as a major risk in the 
diamond industry linked to conflict or blood diamonds and illicit trade.  The 
respondent explained:  
It is the money laundering type things – goods go into Dubai and come out 
again with 100% value addition when they’ve spent five minutes there and 
nobody’s done anything to them, it’s that sort of thing. That isn’t good.  Is it 
illegal? That’s the debate. 
6.6.2.3 Investor confidence 
The respondents identified investor confidence as one of the major issues 
requiring urgent attention. Some respondents stated that fund managers and 
analysts believe that the management of social and environmental risks has a 
positive impact on a company’s long-term market value and further concluded that 
both fund managers/analysts and Investor Relations Officers (IROs) believe that 
social and environmental considerations will become a significant aspect of 
mainstream investment decisions over the next few years. Another respondent 
stated that the majority of IROs are convinced that the next three years will see 
more legal requirements imposed on companies for social and environmental 
reporting. Indeed, this has already happened for some companies that have been 
charged over environmental and health standards’ violations in South Africa. For 
example, the Silicosis class action which is being debated by lawyers representing 
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the affected mine workers and those representing the mine owners (Van 
Rensberg, 2015:22). According to youth representatives, this case is very similar 
to the one won by the South African human rights lawyer Richard Spoor in 2011 in 
the Constitutional Court where Anglo Gold Ashanti lost the case with costs after a 
very long battle. This case established a legal right for mine workers to sue their 
employers for occupational diseases and related illnesses, including lung 
diseases.   
6.6.2.4 Ethical Consumerism 
Respondents identified ethical consumerism as an emerging challenge in the 
diamond industry. Ethical consumerism describes the way that buyers of products 
are increasingly becoming interested in how they were produced (Lamb, 2009). 
According to the Diamond Insight report (2014), De Beers, Forevermark diamonds 
are marketed by focusing more on the promise that Forevermark diamonds are 
produced responsibly, are cut by the world’s best cutters and are beautiful.  
According to one respondent, this promise is informed by the level of care and 
product stewardship invested in various stages of the value chain which translates 
into concern about bringing the best product and linking it with production integrity.  
6.6.2.5 Corporate Citizenship 
According to one respondent, positive corporate hygiene is achieved through good 
corporate citizenship. This is because most respondents believe that there is a 
positive correlation between the line of sales and a poor reputation. According to 
one respondent, sustainability and green mining are key to protecting the sources 
of raw materials to ensure that they are sustainable. One respondent asserted that 
having a licence to operate means meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to develop and prosper. The issue 
of morality when doing business in Africa was identified as a major issue in the 
diamond industry associated with corporate citizenship. Issues like the protection 
of basic rights for workers, artisanal miners, child labour, communities and 
freedoms that all humans should have – the right to life (employee safety) and 
liberty, freedom of thought and expression, and equality before the law are 
fundamental issues to be taken seriously in doing business in Africa in order to 
ensure cordial relationships with all stakeholders. 
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The youth representatives stated that corporate citizenship and better strategic 
relations with mining companies can be achieved through corporate contributions 
to education, improving community wellbeing in mining areas, both of which play a 
role in the financial success of businesses. While it is true that diamond mining 
historically in South Africa has been associated with some of the worst corporate 
reputation scandals like mass fatalities, racism and disregard of human rights, 
according to most respondents, it is also true that attitudes and practices have 
changed. Therefore, it is essential to manage perceptions so that stakeholders 
can see that corporate attitudes are changing with time. Gone are the times when 
it was perfectly acceptable for Cecil John Rhodes and some of his contemporaries 
to engage in unethical practices to win business concessions and to colonise huge 
areas in pursuit of gold. The perceptions must therefore be managed so that these 
issues, achieved in product success and financial performances, are not 
compromised. Stakeholders are also becoming increasingly activist ensuring that 
corporates are accountable.  
6.6.2.6 Competition from Synthetic Diamonds 
One of the as yet unquantified risks relates to increasing accessibility to luxury 
products other than diamonds. According to Diamond insight report (2014), these 
alternatives include synthetic diamonds and other luxury products including  
recycled diamonds and fake products. One respondent mentioned the shortage of 
diamonds as another variable that may give rise to synthetics in the future as a 
real alternative to natural diamonds. Another respondent (diamond retailer) said,  
If there is a shortage of supply, it will increase prices, so people will have to 
pay more to get the diamond.  The consumer will have a ceiling or a threshold, 
above which they won’t pay unless you are part of the super elite group.  So 
there is a danger if supply becomes too limited that a) the consumer won’t see 
the difference between the natural diamond and the unnatural one or their 
awareness drops, b) the prices become so high that even if they are aware of 
it, they just simply won’t be able to afford to pay for it and then what you are 
doing is leaving a vacuum really for something like a synthetic diamond.   
This situation is similar to the difference between cultured pearls and natural 
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pearls.  If people cannot afford to pay $10 000 for a one carat stone diamond they 
may be able to pay $2 000 for a synthetic diamond. The South African consumer, 
and to some extent, consumers around the world, still look at price as a major 
factor that informs their purchasing decision. A respondent said,  
Okay, I need to buy this product but I can’t afford it because it’s way out of my 
league but let me buy this instead.  You almost price yourself out of the 
market because you become too rare, too expensive, and not mainstream. 
According to one respondent, “synthetic diamonds have the potential to be an 
issue; I don’t think it is at the moment”. One of the respondents said that synthetic 
diamonds can only be an issue in one segment of the diamond jewellery business, 
mainly the low to middle class, but the upper class “will still commit to the 
exclusiveness and will still pursue the genuine good quality diamonds”.  Another 
respondent confirmed the risk associated with synthetics and confirmed that the 
risk remained unchanged, new and proactive messaging from synthetic diamond 
producers stress the negative social and environmental impacts of mining through 
(a) carbon footprint, (b) ecology, and (c) social impact which prompted a 
discussion on the industry communication and risk management strategy. There is 
a mixed reaction on the impact of synthetics among the respondents. 
6.6.2.7 Competition from Recycled Diamonds 
The resale of diamonds also poses a risk to the industry (Lussier, 2014). Some 
respondents identified diamond recycling as a future issue for the diamond 
industry.  According to one respondent,  
the recycling of diamonds may not be good for diamond mining industry 
because it would effectively mean that, yes, we would have diamonds that 
would be recovered from the mines, but we would have significantly more 
diamonds that would be recycled in the industry and it would be cheaper for 
people to buy recycled diamonds at the time than for them to buy diamonds 
that come from the mines.  
Another respondent stated that, according to the Even-Zohar (2009) report on 
recycled diamonds titled The diamond recycling dilemma: Boom or boomerang 
(December 08, 2009:2), it is believed that  
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since ancient times, about 5.2 billion carats have been mined worth around 
$420 billion. That means there are 1.2 to 1.8 billion carats of polished stones 
that have been sold for approximately $900 billion to $1.2 trillion. If a diamond 
is forever, then there are an enormous amount of diamonds out there that 
could be recycled.  
Another report by De Beers Presentation on Recycled Diamonds (2014) explains 
that 1.2 billion carats of polished diamonds have been sold to consumers over the 
last 40 years.  It is believed that about 254 million carats were sold to the US 
market, 69 million carats to the Japanese market, 66 million carats to the Gulf 
market, 22 million to the Italian market, 20 million to the Indian market, 14 million 
carats to the Turkish market, 8 million to the French market, 7 million to the 
Chinese market, 7 million to the Taiwanese market and 3 million carats to the 
Hong Kong market (see Figure 36).  
 
Figure 36: Polished Diamonds sold historically to the world market over the last 40 
years  
(Source: Diamond Insight Report, 2014:18) 
Some respondents felt that the recycling of diamonds is heavily linked to the 
supply and demand future-trends scenarios.  One respondent said,  
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I think the issues of landscape in diamond trading are likely to shift towards 
trade-in of recycled goods. So they will reach a point where there are far more 
goods entering the marketplace that have been pre-owned, rather than new 
goods that are cut.  Ultimately, the reputational issues that are likely to come 
about are probably those to do with the impact of reduced production in 
places like producer countries.   
Another respondent said that the introduction of recycled goods could have 
significant consequences in most of the diamond producing countries.  For 
example, Botswana, a rich, successful country, must diversify because diamond 
mining contributes more than 80% of the country’s GDP (De Beers Group 
Sustainability Report, 2013). The respondents also noted that diamond cutting 
centres in India and elsewhere could collapse in the future due to lack of work, 
especially in places like Surat.   
Many respondents appear to be relatively non-committal with mixed feelings about 
the recycling of diamonds. One respondent who is an expert marketer of polished 
diamonds said,  
I find it difficult to believe that a man would propose marriage or a free spirited 
woman in South Africa or anywhere in the world will celebrate their special 
moment with what is basically a second-hand diamond. Similarly, he is not 
going to celebrate a wedding anniversary, or purchase a special gift for a 
female member of his family with a piece of jewellery that came from an old 
piece of jewellery or maybe from someone who might have passed away.  
6.6.2.8 Cyclical Nature of World Economy and Market dynamics  
In terms of diamond demand, unlike other precious metals, the only source of 
value for diamonds is jewellery, as shown in the following graph (Figure 37). 
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Figure 37: Demand sources for diamonds versus gold and platinum 
(Source: Diamond Insight Report 2014:21) 
 
Most respondents agreed that growth and demand for diamond jewellery is 
strongly correlated to the cyclicality of global micro and macroeconomics. Some 
respondents stated that it appears as though the world is entering another phase 
of consumption. In this environment, there is a rapid growth of the middle classes 
in emerging economies. Forecasts for the growth in numbers of middle class 
homes in India and China are expected to reach around 130 million and 330 
million respectively by 2025 (De Beers Presentation to Bankers in South Africa, 
2015). The purchasing power of around half a billion middle class consumer 
households in these markets will need to be a major factor in the industry’s 
decision-making in the years ahead. 
One respondent stated that the macro-economic environment and trade outlook 
indicate further growth in diamond jewellery sales across all main markets.  
According to another respondent, there is optimism in the US, Chinese and Indian 
markets.  According to The Diamond Insight report (2014), the Chinese market is 
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expected to pick up as the year progresses beyond the Chinese New Year and 
Q1. One respondent noted that the current low oil price and high consumer 
confidence, especially in the US, will continue to boost growth in demand for 
diamond jewellery. 
According to the Diamond Insight report (2015), “2014 saw positive growth in 
consumer demand for diamond jewellery across all of the top five markets, which 
together account for about 75% of global demand”. The growth amounted to 
almost 5% globally (Diamond Insight Report, 2015:12). Growth at current 
exchange rates was 3% due to the US dollar strengthening against the currencies 
of some of the main consumer markets. The US was the fastest growing market 
for diamond jewellery in 2014, up 7%, followed by China, up 6%.  These are some 
of the highlights from the Diamond Insight Report (2014) in relation to different 
markets. 
The United States 
The US diamond jewellery market continued to grow at a robust rate, due to 
strengthening of the economic recovery, growing job numbers, an improving stock 
market and, towards the end of the year, declining oil prices, increasing 
consumers’ spending power. 
China  
China was the second fastest growing diamond market after the US. Whilst this 
was slower than in 2013, it still represented substantial growth given the 
consumption base grew so rapidly in recent years. This slower pace of growth in 
diamond jewellery sales was due largely to the slowing down of the economic 
growth rate. Chinese consumers’ growing preference for travel and luxury 
shopping abroad compensated for some of the domestic slowdown.  
India  
The Indian market returned to positive growth, up 3% in local currency terms, as 
government reforms began to take hold and improving macro-economics boosted 
discretionary spending. However, Rupee depreciation against the US dollar 
pushed the growth rate into slightly negative territory (-1%).  
Japan 
The Japanese market exceeded expectations, achieving positive local currency 
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growth (+2%), driven by the upsurge in Q1 spending prior to the consumption tax 
increase. However, the sharp depreciation of the Yen against the US dollar 
eroded that to negative growth of -11% in US dollars.  
Gulf 
The Gulf region, and particularly the UAE, saw lower tourist numbers and weaker 
spending from key overseas nationalities, such as, Russians and Chinese. 
However, demand from local residents was stable and grew in low single digit 
numbers. 
Some respondents cited the shifting demographics of diamond jewellery demand 
as another challenge facing the diamond industry. According to one respondent, it 
is predicted that China and India will, in time, become the largest global 
consumers of diamond jewellery. Currently, the US is the largest consumer of 
diamond jewellery as depicted below. The US market was 41% in 2008 and is 
predicted to reduce in 2016 to about 37%. 
Respondents agreed that growth in China is further exacerbated by the steep 
growing middle class which cannot be compared to anywhere else in the world.  
One of the respondents cited De Beers’ sales statistics of diamond jewellery in 
1993, 1997, 2000 and 2006 in different cities.  The acquisition rate in Shanghai 
has grown from 0% in 1993 to 62% in 2006 (see Figure 38). 
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Figure 38: Demand Growth for Diamond Engagement Rings in most Chinese cities 
between 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2006  
(Source: Diamond Insight Report 2014:11) 
 
One of the respondents (executive) made the following observation relating to the 
changing demographics of the consumer base of diamonds:  
It’s interesting when you think of the whole ethics base. The world diamond 
demand is moving much more towards China and India in terms of the market 
segmentation rather than dominate reliance on America. It is widely believed 
that Chinese and Indians’ ethical issues are much less important to them, 
which is actually interesting – it’s sort of counter intuitive – while from a 
Western point of view, they were all getting much more interested in 
governance and responsible business, etcetera.  Research shows it hardly 
gets a look, in terms of India and China, they’re not bothered. They are more 
bothered by perceived value for money.  Will that change the whole ethical 
marketing spin? That’s an interesting dynamic. As India and China become 
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bigger consumers, is this a phase? (I would hate to have this played back to 
me because probably one should be burnt at the stake for saying this). You 
could make an argument that this is a reputational focus. Will it plateau or will 
it even diminish as the market moves from the US to the New World?  I don’t 
know, that’s something. I pose that more as a question to your question, 
maybe it’s not as dark and dramatic as that. I suspect there will also be a 
noticeable shift in what makes people buy diamonds. In the US it’s all about 
love and emotion, in China and India it’s an element of love and emotion but 
there’s also a hard-core of value and that sort of enduring value. What is 
going to be the motivation for diamond purchases in five years’ time is 
questionable.  We in the West will still be increasingly more concerned with 
these issues and I think the debate will go fast.  Will it therefore get to such a 
critical mass that it envelops the Chinese consumer, or will there be a dilution 
effect as they become a more dominate consumer? I think that is an 
interesting one to work through, I have no idea what the answer is, to be 
honest.   
This is a clear reflection that growth of demand in China and India may bring new 
dynamics in the consumer debate in the future in terms of consumerism issues 
and consumer trends. 
6.6.2.9 Diamond Security and Technology 
Respondents agreed that diamond security and technology will remain critically 
important to support the whole value chain, including sustaining the supply to 
meet growing demand and in safeguarding the diamond dream from the risk of 
theft and weakening consumer confidence as a result of undisclosed synthetics 
and treatments to natural diamonds. One respondent cited the Diamond Insight 
report (2015) that pointed out that, with the slowly depleting reserves in existing 
mines and the search for new diamond deposits moving to more remote locations, 
the diamond industry will need to sharpen its technological advancement in order 
to navigate more complex environments as well as more complex security 
challenges. According to one respondent (investor), advanced technological 
improvements will have a direct impact on things such as efficiency, safety and 
security, all of which are vitally important when it comes to maintaining a 
sustainable supply of rough diamonds. Improved smart security systems and 
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access control have delivered a more secure environment for diamond mining and 
reduced instances of theft. One particularly impressive example of the use of 
technology in this area is Scannex, a system that allows a safe, full-body, low-
dosage x-ray to ensure that no diamonds illicitly leave mining operations with 
employees (Diamond Insight Report, 2015). 
6.6.3 Production and Product Integrity-Related Risks 
Respondents identified legacy issues of the diamond industry and shortage of 
diamonds because of the lack of new greenfield operations in the recent past.   
6.6.3.1 Legacy of Diamond Industry 
The diamond industry has been around for more than 140 years in Africa and 
consequently has a legacy lasting more than a century (Davenport, 2013). The 
respondents identified the legacy of diamonds as a major current and long-term 
risk in terms of the reputation of the diamond industry. Most of the legacy issues 
identified the industry’s association with monopoly industries, the South African 
Apartheid system, environmental destruction, exploitation of workers, bad safety 
track record, association with civil wars in countries like Sierra Leone, habitat 
destruction, mafia dominated industry, human rights abuses, corruption and child 
labour. One of the respondents (regulator) stated that  
Legacy issues are the things that dominated media in the past which the 
industry needs to manage right now in order to make sure that those things do 
not affect the future of our business.   
One respondent stated  
… for example you wanted to apply for a prospecting right somewhere in the 
Free State and the Premier of the Free State remembers us as the mine that 
left the Jaggersfontein dumps, then the prospect will potentially cause 
problems for us.   
In the Northern Cape, a local NGO, the Greater Kapa Bokone Community Trust 
(2015) comprising young people from the Northern Cape, filed a criminal and civil 
case against De Beers in January 2015. They are suing De Beers for a legacy of 
gross human rights violations, illegal gains and profits acquired through fraud and, 
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among others, are demanding compensation amounting to 1 trillion pounds 
(www.gopetition.com/petitions/greater-kapa-bokone-community-trust-de-beers-
petition.html). In the Namaqualand area, local residents are demanding new 
opportunities beyond De Beers’ existence in the area. The diamond industry 
needs a quick way of dealing with its legacy.  The legacy of mining remains a 
major issue in the diamond industry that requires serious attention.  According to 
one respondent, the issues of the legacy of mining can best be described by a 
letter written to De Beers, dated 30 June 2011, directed to Sakhile Ngcobo and 
copied to the Minister of Mineral Resources, Ms Susan Shabangu and all her 
executive officials, including the Regional Manager of DMR by Benchmarks 
Foundation, relating to the sale of an old De Beers’ mine on the West Coast of 
South Africa, Namaqualand Mines.  The foundation made the following 
observations after the announcement by De Beers that it will sell its Namaqualand 
Mines: 
 Benchmarks Foundation predicted in its report in 2009 that De Beers will 
renege on its environmental and social responsibility through the sale of the 
Mine; 
 Concerns about the socio-economic impacts of Namaqualand region once 
the mine is sold or closes; 
 Concerns about complete consultation with the local communities; 
 Communities to be properly informed about the future of the mine and its 
closure implications; 
 Requirement for greater community participation in the mining activities in 
NM; 
 The “so called AURORA Scenario” be avoided at all costs; and 
 Concerns about the financial guarantees and financial provision for mine 
closure costs. 
Some respondents raised another legacy problem, that of housing in the mining 
industry as a major issue impacting negatively on the employees in the mining 
industry in South Africa.  In South Africa, 61.3% of households surveyed in 2011 
(Statistics South Africa, 2014) owned the homes they were living in. According to 
one respondent, De Beers conducted a survey to look at the housing issues of its 
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workforce. It suggests that there is a significantly lower level of ownership among 
semi-skilled employees, for example, 98% of the De Beers sample live in 
(backyard) shacks. The study (De Beers Employee Engagement Survey, 2013) 
suggested that the projected demand for home ownership among De Beers total 
population of semi-skilled employees is estimated at 730 units – (52 for Kimberley, 
470 for Musina, 208 for Kroonstad).The baseline survey was conducted at 
Venetia, Voorspoed and Kimberley/DTC incorporating a random sample of 236 
(23%), semi-skilled employees (statistical error rate 5.6%). 
6.6.3.2 Shortage of Diamonds 
A respondent identified the shortage of diamonds as a risk in the diamond 
industry. The scarcity of diamonds is caused because of a lack of new diamond 
pipes found in the world. It is anticipated that rough diamonds will be a very scarce 
resource which will push up the price for those who can gain access to them 
financially (Diamond Insight Report, 2014). De Beers has done extensive research 
on this topic. Figure 39 below shows that, after the discovery of Canadian new 
operations, the world has not discovered any new mines except the current 
expansion investment by De Beers of more than R20 billion in its Venetia Mine in 
South Africa which was officially opened by President Jacob Zuma in November 
2013. According to one of the respondents, “No new material production is 
expected to come online in the near future in spite of the significant investment in 
the diamond exploration in South Africa.” According to the Diamond Insight Report 
(2014), since 2010, no new mines have been opened anywhere in the world (see 
Figure 39). 
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Figure 39: Diamond Mines Opening around the world  
(Source: Diamond Insight Report 2014:19) 
 
Another respondent linked the challenge of the shortage of diamonds in the future 
to diamond exploration challenges.  It is estimated that, based on the last 140 
years of exploration, out of 5 000 Kimberlite samples that have been discovered, 
850 of them contain diamond material (diamondiferous) but only 50 of these can 
be mined economically while only three are known to have resulted in major 
mining operations with significant returns to the shareholders (Diamond Insight 
Report, 2015). 
6.7 Research Question Four: Effects of Corporate Reputation in the 
Diamond Industry 
In answering this question, in line with the sub-questions, the focus for identifying 
the effects will be presented from a perspective of investor confidence, employee 
engagement, diamond purchasing decision-making, customer attraction and 
loyalty, community relations and stakeholder management. 
6.7.1 Investor Relations 
There was consensus that a positive corporate reputation has an impact on 
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investor confidence in the diamond industry in South Africa. Respondents stressed 
that local and foreign investors would not invest in a company engaged in 
practices that are below the moral threshold. This view was also echoed by one 
respondent who stated that  
if the business had a bad reputation, I would ask myself about the 
sustainability of this business.  A business with a negative reputation is 
guaranteed to have challenges in the future. If my reputation was terrible as a 
business and I had to go and ask the regulator for something, I know it will be 
extremely difficult for me to get that thing.  Let’s assume that I wanted to grow 
and needed a licence, it will be extremely difficult for me to get this licence. As 
an investor, I would think twice.  I would have a look at the issues and ask 
myself about the sustainability of this business.  If it was a combination of that 
plus bad leadership, I would not look at investing in it.  
Respondents felt that investors will not invest in a highly profitable business 
because of its poor reputation. The evidence for this is difficult to find but clearly 
most investors would shun blood diamonds and would want to be associated with 
good, reputable companies which give them confidence. 
6.7.2 Employee Engagement 
Respondents identified that employee engagement has a positive effect on 
corporate reputation. According to one respondent (executive),  
employee engagement can be defined as the extent to which employees 
commit to something or someone in their organisation and how hard they work 
and how long they stay as a result of that commitment.  
The following diagram illustrates the philosophy of employee engagement based 
on two types of commitment, four focal points of commitment and outputs of 
commitment both in terms of discretionary effort and intent to leave (see Figure 
40).  
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Figure 40: Effects of Employee Commitment to Organisational performance and 
staff retention  
(Source: De Beers Employee Engagement Survey 2013:36) 
A respondent felt that  
If the company’s culture of engagement is visible, obviously people will talk 
about it; will identify with it and they will want to be associated with that type of 
culture but if it’s not there, people will feel disconnected.  
People do not resign from the mining industry due to its reputation, although it 
happens in other sectors. The financial sustainability of a company is, however, a 
cause for resignations. A respondent said that 
diamond industry employees want to work for a company that has a good 
reputation, [is] sensitive to its environment and its people; a company that 
looks after its people whether financially or in terms of career; that looks after 
the community within which it works; and that is seen to be delivering on the 
countries’ strategic issues, like transformation, skills development issues, your 
supplier relationship building. If your company is showing its responsibility 
towards those various stakeholders, then people feel more comfortable 
working for a company like that and are therefore rationally and emotionally 
committed.   
Most respondents believed that highly engaged employees contribute to the 
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overall performance of the organisation.  This assertion is well aligned with Figure 
41 where companies with higher levels of engagement from their employees 
experience higher operating margins. 
 
Figure 41: Employee Engagement Model 
(Source: De Beers Employee Engagement survey, 2013:14) 
6.7.3 Diamond Purchasing Decision-making 
There was a mixed response to the effect of corporate reputation as a 
differentiation strategy with significant impact in influencing consumer behaviour 
during the diamond purchasing decision-making process and on the price of the 
product. 
One of the respondents (consumer) said:  
As a consumer, I don’t think it does have any effect on consumer’s purchasing 
decision. I think things like corporate reputations associated with doing good 
in communities and to the environment are nice to have, but they are not a 
deal breaker. It’s nice to know I’m buying a Forevermark diamond that’s linked 
back to De Beers, which is the company that does projects like build schools, 
and supports hospitals. It’s a nice to have, but that is not a reason not to buy a 
product, nor is it a reason to buy a product. Equally the things you talk around 
– restructuring, whatever, I don’t think consumers are effected by that – 
swayed one way or another. Where I think those things are important is 
297 | P a g e  
around the relationships with other stakeholders, with employees and with 
governments.  It’s very well to target your consumers, but you actually first 
have to work with your employees.  If your employees don’t believe in you, 
your brand or what you are doing, then you will very quickly lose your skills, 
from an employee retention, which will then have an impact.  But from a 
consumer point of view, the key drivers [are] around exploitation, 
environmental issues, government issues, child labour in the factories, best 
practice principles, all those sort of things. 
There was a mixed reaction to the question whether consumers would pay a 
premium price on the products or services from a company with a good reputation. 
According to one respondent (diamond retail), “The high end upper-class 
consumers are likely to be influenced by the reputation of the product”. One of the 
respondents from the low-end consumer segment commented:  
Let me tell you the truth.  Some of the high-end consumers, the answer would 
be yes but me being me right now, the answer is no, I wouldn’t.  If it was 
exactly the same product, then I wouldn’t pay more.  I’m just telling you the 
honest truth, I wouldn’t. So for me, it would go back to the actual product itself, 
its characteristics, especially quality, as a major consideration.  If it was 
exactly the same product, I wouldn’t.  It’s just like me going and buying an LG 
big screen TV – why would I buy it at one shop and pay significantly more 
whereas I can buy it at another credible shop at a slightly lower price. I’m 
telling you the truth now.  
Another respondent (executive) said:  
Personally I would, but it would have to be part of the marketing mix.  It would 
have to be a good quality product, it would have to be part of all that.  For me, 
on its own, it wouldn’t be a reason why I would buy something but … with a 
bad reputation, it would be a good reason why I wouldn’t buy something. 
According to another respondent (consumer):  
Yes.  Paying a premium on the back of doing good makes you feel good, the 
status that comes with it.  If you are talking a Shimansky product – if you know 
the information, how it started, how they designed their products.  If it’s a bad 
company, you don’t want to be associated with it. 
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Respondents also felt that reputation does not affect demand for the product so 
that the impact of the movie Blood Diamond was muted. Consumers do not ask 
questions when they enter the diamond store but they are concerned with 
specifications. Reputation does however affect customer attraction and retention. 
High end consumers are affected by reputation, but not the low end. Nike was 
heavily criticised for using child labour but when high end consumers retreated, 
low end consumers filled the gap so that sales did not decline. Ordinary 
consumers who were dreaming of wearing Nike labels saw an opportunity.   
Some respondents stated that the Kimberley Process (KP) does not affect 
purchasing decision making. According to one respondent (analyst),  
KP only applies when selling rough diamonds, and therefore doesn’t actually 
work through to a polished stone.  Once the stone has been polished then you 
lose its origin because a polished stone looks like any other polished stone.  
Another respondent (regulator) offered the comment that  
the Kimberley Process has done about enough and consumers have shown 
that they are not massively affected by these things, but certainly they add to 
the weight of ethical issues so I think it’s a little more productive to break it 
down into a series of individual ethical issues, none of which are able on their 
own to impact the market, but collectively they might.  
One respondent noted:  
I will tell you about something that I heard about, by the way, when I got to 
Kroonstad first and foremost. When people heard that De Beers are going to 
open up a mine in Kroonstad, a lot of people started applying for jobs and the 
key reason was because of the reputation of De Beers in South Africa.  The 
people looked at De Beers, they saw a future for themselves, and that’s 
actually the reason why a lot of people applied.  
6.7.4 Customer attraction and loyalty 
There was consensus that positive corporate reputation in the diamond industry 
has an influence on customer attraction and retention. The nature of the business 
determines the value of a good reputation. For example, the oil industry has 
299 | P a g e  
reputation issues associated with pollution in areas such as Nigeria, wars in Iraq 
and human rights abuses in some Middle East countries but, because the industry 
is regarded as an essential industry, reputational issues have not affected its 
profitability. According to some respondents, the impact of reputation on the oil 
business is low. However, diamonds are different, they are not a necessity but a 
luxury, a discretionary product and are non-essential to day-to-day life.  
Consumers can very easily leave the category and still be able to continue with 
life. One respondent (practitioner) stated  
In the diamond industry, reputation has a far more direct link to our ability to 
sell our products than it would if we were an oil company. While a lot of people 
complain about BP in the Gulf of Mexico or Texaco in Iran and Iraq, they 
wouldn’t think twice about popping into a Texaco or BP petrol station.  Where 
somebody complained about conflict diamonds in Zimbabwe or De Beers’ 
involvement in Sierra Leone 10 years ago or Liberia, consumers will think 
twice about going to buy a diamond.   
 
Some respondents, who are marketing or brand experts, argue that corporate 
reputation does matter because consumers are attracted by positive images. 
However, the warm glow from marketing must not be confused with the principle 
reason for the purchase. Good reputation also makes it easier to access finance 
and lines of credit from bodies such as the World Bank. One of the respondents 
stated that a good reputation brings trust and confidence as a company does not 
have to go “the extra mile” to impress. This assertion is further supported by The 
Diamond Insight Report (2014) which predicted that brands will become more 
important as a differentiation factor in terms of diamond purchasing going forward.  
According to the Diamond Insight Report (2015), diamond products are generally 
a non-branded category, despite an obvious increase in interest in branded 
products from consumers all over the world. Claimed acquisition of branded 
engagement rings in the US has risen sharply – from just 7% of consumers in 
2002 to three to five times that level in 2011 and 2013, respectively.  It is well 
known in the luxury goods category that brands like LV, Dior and Chanel are 
growing quickly.  In China, traditional branded jewellers, such as Tiffany and 
Cartier, have seen a jump in claimed brand-acquisitions of eight to nine times by 
young middle-class consumers since 2008.  According to one respondent 
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(consumer), De Beers Forevermark has experienced rapidly growing retailer and 
consumer interest since its launch in the US in 2011. 
Most respondents believed that sustainability and competitive advantage can also 
be linked to positive reputation. One respondent gave the following account:  
The main point is that, in the luxury goods sector in particular for diamonds, 
reputation is capable of having a consumer behaviour rather than investor 
behaviour because we are dealing with discretionary products.  For example, 
fur coats are no longer worn in the UK and US because they are seen as 
unethical. The product is directly related to the reputation of that actual 
industry. However, with things like oil and all the rest which are not luxuries, 
people will buy them no matter what they think. 
6.7.5 Community relations 
Respondents concurred that positive corporate reputation leads to better relations 
with local communities. Most respondents agreed that good community relations 
are very important in the life of a mine. One respondent (community 
representative) stated that  
good community relations have a halo effect. If you have good community 
relations in one place, communities elsewhere will be far more likely to work 
with you. But the bottom line is in terms of managing specific community 
relation issues that other communities will always be on a case-by-case basis, 
they will always be ‘what’s in it for me?’ and how does that individual 
community engage with it and, more generally, it’s one of the areas that 
consumers respond to.  If De Beers is mining diamonds and has to kick out a 
big community of Bushmen in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in order to 
do so, that will have a clear negative impact on our ability to do business and 
our ability to write sales.  
6.7.6 Stakeholder Relations 
Respondents concurred that a positive corporate reputation assists significantly in 
building better relations with key stakeholders, including customers, investors, 
communities, NGOs and regulatory authorities.   
Respondents believe that positive relationships with key stakeholders in the South 
African diamond industry can facilitate better chances of business success by: 
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  Enabling easy access to rights for new mining resources; 
  Contract negotiation; 
  Resettlement of indigenous communities; and 
  Faster approval of Environmental and Community impact studies. 
Some respondents stated that companies, in general, are viewed differently by 
governments. One respondent (youth group member) stated that, for example, De 
Beers is viewed differently from other diamond mining companies like Petra and 
Transhex. One respondent who works directly with government said:  
Yes, I can tell you now.  Let me talk about local and provincial government, I 
definitely do get better treatment because I can go to see government officials 
at short notice, I will see anyone in that office immediately. Where else if it 
was somebody else, somebody from other diamond mining companies with 
bad reputation, they wouldn’t.  So yes, I have to say I do get preferential 
treatment.  I think even if I want to speak to Director General, I have his 
number, his home address, I know his family and this is backed by a personal 
relationship that goes a long way.  
Another respondent (investor) felt,  
Yes and no, depending on the nature of your business. In terms of getting 
government relations, in terms of dealings with government as a regulator – 
absolutely it has benefits.  Good reputation is massively important to us in 
terms of import taxes and export taxes.  In terms of a positive reputation – 
government relations with producer partners, it can be a business, a 
disadvantage in that if you take, for example, our partnerships, the fact that 
we have such a beneficial relationship with the Botswana government, it 
means that it’s likely that places like Angola will ask for agreements we have 
with them to be structured in the same way and that may well end up very 
unprofitable.  
Another respondent (investor) argued that  
I’m not sure preferential treatment is probably the right way of saying it. We 
are known to embrace corporate reputation, corporate social responsibility. I 
think that opens doors for us. I think at the end of the day you’re competing on 
an equal business footing. I think it adds to our credentials. Does it give us 
preference? I’m not sure I would put it that way in those words but I think it is 
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important and it does mean quite a lot. I think it enables us to do business at 
the highest level and that can be the highest level in government or in 
corporate and civil society. I’m not sure it gives us preferential treatment or it 
opens doors for us.   
Another respondent recalled that new mining rights may be refused or subjected 
to a delayed response if the relevant mining company has a bad reputation in 
spite of the fact that it is demonstrating adequate compliance with the applicable 
Mining Charter at the time the application is made following a decision to move 
from a prospecting to a mining phase. 
In summary, the respondents agreed that a good corporate reputation is important 
in the diamond industry in order to achieve goals, redress the negative legacy of 
the diamond industry especially on the upstream side, remain competitive and 
prosper. The respondents agreed that a good and positive reputation paves the 
organisational path to acceptance and approval by stakeholders. It also underpins 
competitive advantage by demonstrating distinctive differences from other similar 
organisations. The benefits of a positive corporate reputation are an intangible 
asset contributing most to overall corporate success through the following areas: 
 supports premium pricing (only in the upper or premium segment) and 
product quality; 
 aids staff recruitment; 
 improves access to financial resources and attracts investors; and 
 fosters the continued expansion of excellent companies. 
6.8 Research Question Five: Management Approaches to Corporate 
Reputation Management in the Diamond industry 
The respondents shared the following views regarding the role of 
communications/external affairs/public relations departments as a strategic 
department responsible for co-ordinating corporate reputation management 
actions in the diamond industry in South Africa: 
 CEOs and Board members value external or public relations departments 
as an essential cost of doing business in South Africa and essential to 
business performance, security of licence to operate and organisational 
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performance; 
 Executives and directors do not feel that communication, external affairs or 
PR effectiveness is amenable to precise measurement, being long-term 
and iterative in effect, or being an aid to avoiding surprises or mistakes; 
 Directors do not feel a great need to demonstrate a return on their 
investment in PR in monetary terms except on specific issues relating to the 
cost of not having a mining or export licence; 
 Directors and CEOs felt that PR experts need greater self-confidence in the 
use of available measures but, more importantly, better training and 
preparedness to argue the value of the business and organisational 
contribution they make; 
 CEOs recognise a shortage of talent and expertise among practitioners, 
which – if addressed – would also answer questions about the value of 
public relations practice. The majority of those interviewed referred with 
confidence to their own advisers; 
 CEOs feel that there is under-investment in the practice of public relations; 
 All the directors and executives interviewed, especially CEOs, felt they 
owned corporate reputation – and it is part of their key performance 
requirement by their respective boards and shareholders; and 
 Directors and reputational experts believe that there is a correlation 
between overall corporate reputation and the CEO’s personal reputation. 
The Reputation Institute report (2016) claims that 40% of a company’s 
reputation is linked to its leaders in the form of an executive chairman or 
CEO. 
The respondents acknowledged that diamond companies have realised that there 
is something worse than losing money – and that is losing their reputation, their 
licence to operate, water permit, mining right, goodwill and good relationship with 
stakeholders. A positive reputation reinforces trust with most stakeholders. 
Reputation is valuable and is recognised as an intangible asset; it comes from 
consistency in values which builds trust. This means that a reinforcing argument 
can be applied to the integrity of social groups or companies. If you have the trust 
of stakeholders, you have legitimacy. It is legitimacy that enables a company to 
enjoy a reputation. One can have a highly successful business and make a lot of 
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money without a good reputation, in the short term.  If you want a sustainable 
business, a good reputation is critical. Reputation is critical to sustainability.  A lot 
of people generate small fly-by-night businesses, make a huge amount of money 
in a short time and then disappear, but those are the unethical values and that is 
why they are not sustainable. 
The following tools to manage corporate social impact and general community 
relations as well as government relations were recommended by the respondents: 
 Anglo American Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox Version 3 
(www.angloamerican.com). This toolbox is a well-researched document 
that is recognised by many multi-national NGOs such as Care International, 
Fauna and Flora International and International Alert, to name a few, and 
various South African NGOs and Corporate Reputation practitioners.  It 
comprises seven steps: step one focuses on profiling the operation and 
evaluation of its impacts; step two focuses on profiling the local 
communities and the development of the stakeholder engagement plan; 
step three focuses on an assessment of issues and impacts; step four 
focuses on the recording of grievances and complaints, conflict 
assessments, resettlement planning and contract management; step five 
focuses on identification and recording local procurement opportunities, 
local institutional capacity development, development and implementation 
of micro-credit for local small businesses and support for low-cost housing; 
step six involves tools for developing a social management plan; and step 
seven provides tools for writing a SEAT report and sharing of the results. 
 Anglo American Government Relations handbook 
(www.angloamerican.com).  This toolbox is also another well researched 
document which is extensively used by the Anglo American group of 
companies around the world.  It also has seven steps with 13 tools.  The 
first step focuses on situational analysis and current state; step two on the 
definition of the future state; step three on identification of key objectives; 
step four on identification of milestones and key performance indicators; 
step five on strategies to address key issues; step six focuses on 
production of the action plan; and step seven on finalisation of the 
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government and issues management plan.  The thirteen tools include tool 
A: situation analysis; tool B: identification of issues; tool C: influencer 
mapping; tool D: performance measurement and reporting; tool E: 
processing complex issues; tool F: partner of choice projects; tool G: 
choosing engagement techniques; tool H: communications and government 
relations; tool I: partnerships and memberships; tool J: advocacy through 
third parties; tool K: working with industry partners like the Chamber of 
Mines; tool L: use of lobbyists/political consultants; tool M: preparing a brief 
for CEO/senior manager; and tool N: developing a partnership with NGOs. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
RESULTS 
7  
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to describe various constructs of corporate 
reputation, identify key industry reputational challenges and risks, evaluate key 
effects of corporate reputation and finally to review the effectiveness and 
relevance of the existing corporate reputation management initiatives in the 
diamond industry in South Africa. The previous two chapters of this thesis 
presented both quantitative and qualitative results from the questionnaires and 
individual semi-structured interviews.  
This chapter discusses the results of this research as presented in Chapters 5 and 
6. In Chapter 5, the results of the quantitative component of this study were 
reported and Chapter 6 reported on the results of the qualitative component.  This 
chapter discusses salient points emerging from the previous two chapters as 
captured in line with the research questions. 
7.2 Definition of Corporate Reputation 
The quantitative results in Chapter 5.2 showed that the most popular definition of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry amongst all the respondents is the 
following:  
Corporate reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s past 
actions, as well as future prospects.  
This finding is aligned with the conclusions from many corporate reputation studies 
that state this as the commonly utilised definition (Tracey, 2014).  After conducting 
additional analysis of different stakeholder preferences, it emerged that there are 
some noticeable variations in what different stakeholder groups define as 
corporate reputation.  For example, community representatives, labour unions, 
media houses and corporate reputation experts or practitioners preferred the 
definition which reads:  
Corporate reputation is the observers’ collective judgements of a corporation 
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based on the assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts 
attributed to the corporation over time.  
While other stakeholder groups ranked the following as the most preferred option: 
Corporate reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s past 
actions, as well as future prospects.  
The qualitative results in section 6.2 showed that there is no single common and 
acceptable definition of corporate reputation in the diamond industry instead it 
proposed different themes that best capture the definition from different 
stakeholder groups. Those themes were perception-related, organisational actions 
(doing-good related), image-related and assessment-related.  These are some of 
the examples used by various stakeholders from different perspectives: 
Corporate reputation is the summation of all the beliefs and attitudes that a 
wide group of stakeholders, call it the public to be broad, when one gets into 
the details of who the stakeholders are. It’s the summation of all the beliefs 
and attitudes, they could be accurate, they can be inaccurate.  All those things 
together form up what is the reputation of the company. 
Corporate reputation is the image of the company in the eyes of the public.  
People either believe it’s a good company or a bad company, irrespective of 
the business they are in.  It is more about how they behave. Are they 
responsible corporate citizens, are they seen to be a fair company, do they 
generally improve the world?  That’s what reputation is all about, it’s what 
people think of your company. 
 
Both the quantitative results and qualitative results concluded that different 
stakeholders have different interpretations of what corporate reputation means, 
though there was consensus on the key features and attributes related to the 
definition of corporate reputation. Those features and attributes include 
perceptions, intangible assets for the corporation, admiration, assessment of 
corporation actions over time, stakeholder experiences and relationships with the 
organisation. 
The above variations are consistent with the notion that there is no consensus 
amongst all stakeholder groups on the most suitable definition of corporate 
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reputation as stated by Dowling (2016) and Barnett et al (2006).  These findings 
further confirmed Fombrun et al (2015), Flynn (2006), Wartick (2002) and Feldman 
et al’s (2014) three distinct clusters of the meaning of corporate reputation which is 
to define it as an asset (economic asset and/or intangible asset); as a state of 
awareness (collective representation of past, current and future actions and/or 
aggregate of perceptions); and as an assessment (gauge of the firm’s relative 
attractiveness and/or general firm’s esteem). This confirmation is aligned with 
Dowling’s (2016) definition of corporate reputation as the admiration and respect a 
person holds of an organisation at a point in time. 
This research has also revealed that different groups of people will evaluate 
corporate reputation of an organisation differently as stated in the literature review 
by Barnett et al (2006) and Bromley (2001).  This study concurred with research 
by Satir (2006) that assessed whether corporate reputation can be analysed or not 
and found that corporate reputation cannot be explained by only one experience, 
contact or impression. For example, investors will evaluate corporate reputation 
from a point of view of its investment potential, while communities will evaluate a 
firm’s reputation on the back of companies’ activities in their communities.  
7.3 Key Components of Corporate Reputation in the Diamond Industry 
Quantitative results concluded that all the components, as derived from the 
literature review (Lloyd, 2007; Sequeira et al, 2015; Kaul & Desai, 2015), are also 
relevant in the diamond industry.  Those components are: corporate legitimation, 
corporate brand, corporate identity, corporate communication, corporate image, 
reputation management, corporate leadership integrity, ethical product 
stewardship and corporate social responsibility. 
The qualitative results concurred with quantitative findings that most of the 
identified components are also relevant to the diamond industry but added new 
components such as mine safety leadership, public trust, transparency, corporate 
social responsibility and the legacy issue. 
Qualitative and quantitative results identified corporate legitimation, corporate 
brand, leadership integrity, corporate communication, mine safety leadership, 
public trust, legacy issues, transparency, corporate social responsibility and 
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corporate identity (Figure 42) 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Key Components of Corporate Reputation in the Diamond Industry 
(Source: Researchers own construction, based on the outcomes of this research) 
7.4 Drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in South 
Africa 
Quantitative results concluded that the industry valued fair treatment of 
employees, customer care, community care, profitability, compliance with national 
and global laws, innovativeness, good relations with stakeholders, quality of 
products and services, strong adherence to good corporate governance, brand 
presence, quality of leadership, environmental protection and transparency.   
Qualitative results identified similar key drivers of corporate reputation as with 
quantitative analysis.  The findings from both the quantitative and qualitative 
results concur with the literature review as stated by Schwaiger (2004) and 
Reputation Institute (2016) on corporate governance, environmental care, 
organisational financial performance, quality of product and services, leadership 
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credibility, brand equity, stakeholder relations (acceptance), compliance with 
global best practice principles like human rights principles and Kimberley Process,  
leadership credibility, corporate social responsibility  and public social license to 
operate (general acceptance).  It further gave key examples of stakeholder 
relations that are attributable to these drivers, such as stakeholder relations, the 
quality of relationships with key stakeholders like governments, NGOs, media, 
local communities and labour unions. 
It was clear that different stakeholders will have very different drivers of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry.  For example, for consumers, according to 
several respondents, there are only three critical drivers for corporate reputation 
which are product quality, brand status and corporate social responsibility.  This 
was clearly cited in the following comment from one of the respondents. 
The key driver of your brand reputation is the product that you produce and 
the quality associated with it and that’s pretty crucial. The second thing will be 
more broadly the question of, well that’s what I produce and that’s the most 
important thing, and interestingly, the more well I know the product and the 
higher the quality, the more people assume that the CSR activity, what I call 
the way in which you make the product, is also better. So those whose name 
you are more familiar with, you have less of an issue with them, you associate 
them with also being the way in which they made the product, the community 
impact, etcetera. That then becomes second. So your product is the number 
one driver and the number two driver is the way in which you make it and then 
probably third is your overall awareness level.  The more well-known you are, 
the more you assume to have these issues under control.  
The following model is developed as an outcome of this study with the four critical 
drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry.  Those are leadership and 
performance, product and services, social license to operate and corporate 
citizenship (Figure 43). 
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Figure 43: Four drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry  
(Source: Researchers own creation based on the research findings) 
7.5 Key Perceptions of the Diamond Industry 
Quantitative results highlighted the following key positive and negative stakeholder 
perceptions of the diamond industry in South Africa: an ethical industry, caring, 
investment heaven, secretive environment, operations historically have 
contributed to human degradation and spread of HIV/AIDS because of the hostel 
system, respected industry, contributes to Millennium Development Goals, world 
class, good relationship with stakeholders, motivates its employees, customer 
orientated.  The respondents were neutral on perceptions including non-co-
operative, unethical in its conduct, untrustworthy, associated with illicit diamonds, 
and associated with mass human rights violations. The quantitative results inclined 
more towards the positive perceptions of the diamond industry in South Africa with 
very few negative perceptions, like secrecy and the contribution of its operations 
towards human degradation. The qualitative results, on the other hand, slanted 
more towards the negative side of the reputational capital.  These are some of the 
negative statements: secretive and controlled by a few, monopoly industry, 
involved with artificial price fixing by controlling its London stock pile of rough 
diamonds, lack of transparency on payments that are made to governments, ill 
treatment of mine workers, slave and child labour associated with artisanal mining 
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in the DRC and Zimbabwe, diamond mining epitomises the historical racial 
divisions in South Africa, mining companies not doing enough to develop mine 
communities.  There were also a few positive perceptions like the diamond 
industry is a world class industry, a global corporate leader, has the world’s best 
Private-Public Partnership model in Botswana, Diamonds are good for Africa and 
excellent safety record in South Africa 
These perceptions demonstrate that the diamond industry needs to do more in 
managing its reputation.  This is aligned with industry corporate reputation 
practitioners like Prager (2012) and Lussier (2014) who argue that the diamond 
industry needs to invest in building its reputation holistically.  The issue of lack of 
community benefits remains a critical challenge for the mining companies in 
general.  According to Govindan et al (2014), mining industries receive significant 
global attention due to the nature of their environmental and social responsibilities.  
This research has highlighted the need to manage public perceptions by adopting 
various reputation management actions that are being discussed in this study in 
the reputation management section. 
7.6 Key Reputational Risks and Challenges in the Diamond Industry 
The main challenge for the mining industry is to clearly demonstrate that it 
contributes to the welfare and wellbeing of the current generation, without 
compromising the potential of future generations for a better quality of life. 
(Azapagic, 2004:640). 
 
This research has revealed that the diamond industry in South Africa faces 
significant risks and challenges which puts the corporate reputation of this industry 
at a crossroads. Diamond companies are expected to manage unique South 
African operational complexities coupled with tough legislative requirements and 
the most challenging stakeholder relations while still operating in the context of 
global consumer pressures.  
Quantitative results identified the following key risks in the diamond industry: 
labour unrest, worker exploitation, diamond theft, illegal diamond trade, mine 
closures and associated environmental and social risks and concerns, 
beneficiation, artisanal mining, reduced gem supply, human rights concerns, 
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energy restrictions because of load shedding, policy uncertainty, monopoly, tough 
regulations’ imposition, collapse of the Kimberley Process, increased costs of 
mining diamonds in South Africa, political instability, nationalisation of mines, 
increased NGO scrutiny, negative publicity, blood diamonds, affordability of 
diamonds, synthetics, China overtaking the world markets, mineral wars, wealth 
gaps among community members, illegal mining and high unemployment in many 
rural communities. The quantitative analysis did not see a higher demand for 
diamond jewellery as a major risk, but factored in the rise of China and recycled 
diamonds as potential future risks. 
 
The qualitative results identified the following additional reputational risks in the 
diamond industry: resource nationalisation, investor confidence, ethical 
consumerism, corporate citizenship, regulatory uncertainty, rising production costs 
on the back of the increasing labour costs and double digit increases of electricity 
costs, negative industry perceptions, rise of social media, job security associated 
with the ongoing retrenchments in most mining companies, high inequality in many 
mine communities coupled with high unemployment and high levels of poverty, 
mine health and safety, effectiveness of ESOPS, equity participation and 
Community Trusts, illegal mining, poor access to procurement opportunities by 
woman and youth groups, employee engagement, climate change, carbon tax and 
developmental price, unsatisfactory compliance with mining charter and the legacy 
of the diamond industry, especially in areas where it ceased to operate, as in parts 
of Kimberley, Namaqualand, Koffiefontein, Marsfontein, Jaggersfontein and Oaks 
in Limpopo where there is high unemployment and serious issues relating to mine 
rehabilitation and land degradation. The issue of resource nationalism resonated 
with many respondents during the semi-structured interviews.  One respondent 
said:  
The issue of resource nationalism, it’s a huge issue. It depends from which 
perspective you looking at it. If you look at it purely from a business 
perspective, you will see it as a negative thing.  If I was an investor, I would 
think twice to invest it in a country where I put my resources on the table but I 
must share it with someone who doesn’t put in anything.  Investors could shy 
away from such countries.  If you look at it from a communism perspective, 
then you look at it and say ‘yes, let’s share the resources with the people of 
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that country’.  It can be good or bad depending on which perspective you look 
at it.   
Hilson and Yakovleva (2007) stated that many developing countries like South 
Africa have, over the last two decades, reformed their national mineral policies 
and taxation codes in order to exert better control and to balance national priorities 
including fiscal development. This research has identified this development as a 
major contributor to regulatory uncertainty.  The South African Mining Charter Two 
expired in 2014 and the Department of Mineral Resources, in consultation with key 
stakeholders, is busy finalising several amendments in the so-called Mining 
Charter Three.  
The Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) in the mining industry have 
created more risks and challenges for both employers, DMR and unions in the 
diamond industry.  This study has revealed that employees are concerned that 
these schemes will not provide any benefits for the workers. One of the schemes 
is currently being debated between the unions and the communities. Employees 
are concerned about the non-payment or the size of the pay-out that was received 
in 2014 after waiting for more than eight years.  Figure 44 shows the value of each 
of the units since the inception of the trust.  The workers are concerned about the 
time it takes for these schemes to pay out or to show some economic benefits for 
the employees. Some employees say that “the mining company is waiting for us to 
die before the pay-out can be made so that they can forfeit the money”. The issue 
of ESOPs is problematic in the South African mining industry after the advent of 
the Mining charter but will be used until an acceptable option with a line of sight is 
found. Figure 44 shows an example of a scheme that has not produced the 
anticipated value for the communities which was projected to be about R80 000 
per unit in 2014.  Community members do not want to wait for 10 years to realise 
R6 000 or the possibility that this scheme may be worth nothing in two years’ time.  
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Figure 44: Performance of Community Equity Ownership Scheme between 2006 
and 2014 
(Source: Researchers own calculations) 
In term of equity participation opportunities, this study has revealed that local 
communities are gravely concerned because BEE is only benefiting a few or 
politically connected individuals.  This issue is causing serious reputational 
damage to the diamond industry and the wider mining industry.  
The concern about lack of progress in meeting mining charter expectations with 
special emphasis on Social and Labour Plan (SLP) commitments and local 
preferential procurement, high unemployment and poor access to basic services, 
is aligned with the Ministers of Mines assertions in 2014 and 2015 Mining Indaba 
speeches (Shabangu, 2014; Ramatlhodi, 2014) calling for improved compliance.  
This research also acknowledges that diamond mining companies have made 
significant progress in meeting the mining charter expectations especially on 
equity participation of black empowered companies, women in mining, diamond 
beneficiation, small business development through the De Beers Zimele initiative, 
which was also adopted by Petra Diamonds, and skills development. 
The decline in production and the rise of synthetic diamonds were identified as  
future challenges facing the diamond industry.  This is in line with the conclusion 
by De Beers Sustainability Report (2012) and Cleaver (2016) that, because there 
are no new major finds or new diamond operations streaming in the near future, 
this will pose serious shortages of the product which will have a number of 
implications in terms of price as well as the marketing of the diamonds.  The issue 
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of the decline in production is described by one respondent:  
This is my opinion, not supported by any evidence. I think the depletion of the 
product is becoming evident. We see in various countries where the mines are 
closing down and that comes with reputational issues. 
On the issue of synthetic diamonds, respondents felt that their impact is very 
minimal at this stage, but it could grow in the future depending on how they are 
marketed.  This is in line with Prager’s (2014) conclusion that synthetic diamonds 
have no impact on the diamond industry because consumers still desire real 
diamonds.  Some respondents felt that synthetics are likely to affect the low end 
segment of the jewellery industry and not the high end.  One respondent, when 
asked if synthetics will pose a real challenge in the industry in the next 20 years, 
responded:  
Yes, but only again applies to your low to middle class customers.  The upper 
class will still commit to the exclusiveness and will still pursue the genuine 
good quality diamonds. 
This study concurred with Hilson’s (2002) conclusion in his research on the impact 
of mining on communities.  This study acknowledges that, where communities are 
forced to bear the full brunt of mining impacts, they cannot be assumed, from the 
outset, to be inherently in favour of local mineral development.  According to one 
of the respondents,  
The diamond industry has some very tough challenges.  I divided them up into 
a couple of buckets.  One is they’re driven by the fact that, to begin with, we’re 
a mining company and a mining company, generally, a general impressions 
without any knowledge of consumers, when you talk to them about mining 
they associate it with environmental damage, it just a sort of knee-jerk, 
uninformed perception that the two go hand-in-hand.  So, for a luxury product 
to begin with, it’s rather difficult.  The second and quite pressing problem is 
the issue for us of what are known as conflict diamonds and, while these are 
infinitesimal in their market share, they risk tarnishing your overall image of 
the category and those are continually alive.  In the last decade, it was Sierra 
Leon, this decade it’s Zimbabwe.  It’s a fact of life in the diamond business 
that we have to deal with what is a very complex and challenging risk.  Then 
third, is the whole issue of artisanal diamonds which again is not the formal 
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sector that companies like De Beers or other majors participate in. Clearly, in 
the artisanal sector in developing countries, quite a lot of issues around labour 
conditions and human rights issues that result there.  Now, all of those are a 
challenge to a company’s product in the end. Whose category in the end is 
associated with glamour, love, purity all the positive things in life? 
This research did not confirm the statement in the literature review that fake 
diamonds and conflict diamonds are a real challenge in the diamond industry. 
This research has highlighted the growing anti-mining or anti-business virulence 
that poses new strategic risks for the diamond industry and the rest of the mining 
industry in South Africa. This supports the assertions made by Davis and Franks 
(2014). 
7.7 Effects of Corporate Reputation in the Diamond industry 
Futuregrowth Asset Management, South Africa’s largest specialist fixed-
income money manager, said it has suspended funding to the South African 
coal industry until it develops environmentally sustainable methods of 
operating (Agency Staff September 20, 2016). 
Quantitative and qualitative results revealed that positive corporate reputation has 
a positive effect on investor confidence; improves employee engagement, talent 
attraction and retention; affects consumer purchase decision-making processes; 
improves customer attraction and loyalty; and improves stakeholder relations. It 
also enhances competitive advantage by differentiating the company in the 
marketplace. Good corporate reputation, held by a firm’s stakeholders, is 
understood as reputational capital. This capital is claimed to contribute to reduced 
transaction costs, employee loyalty, easier recruitment and general legitimacy of 
the organisation. The study concurred with Deloitte (2014), Reputation Institute 
(2016), Farooq (2016) and Azapagic’s (2004) findings that positive corporate 
reputation has many benefits including easier access to lenders and insurers, and 
better access to regulators for funding requirements.  
 
 Employee Engagement, Talent Attraction and Key Staff Retention 
This study confirmed that positive corporate reputation will ensure that employees 
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are motivated, hard-working and become better ambassadors of the organisation 
who will speak pro-actively and positively about the organisation. It confirmed 
Dolphin (2004) and Kaul and Desai’s (2015) findings that a favourable reputation 
with employees can help attract better staff, spur productivity and enhance 
profitability. The study confirmed that positive corporate reputation supported by 
effective communication programmes will further strengthen employee morale 
(especially during difficult times), thereby enhancing productivity and, ultimately, 
profitability. These findings are aligned with Coldwell et al (2008) and Einwiller’s 
(2003) findings that a positive corporate reputation will enable employees to be 
fully engaged and to be emotionally attached to the organisation. 
 Customer Attraction, Retention and Loyalty 
This research has confirmed that a positive corporate reputation contributes to the 
attraction and retention of key customers in the diamond retail outlets thereby 
ensuring repeat custom. This is aligned with Farooq’s (2016) findings. It also 
confirmed that a positive corporate reputation fosters positive word-of-mouth 
promotion and improved customer loyalty.  This is in line with Tshivase and Kleyn 
(2016), Sequeira et al (2015), Deloitte (2014) and Dowling’s (2016) conclusions 
during their separate empirical studies in different fields.  The study revealed that 
a positive corporate reputation in the diamond industry will instil consumer 
confidence in such a way that synthetics or unnatural diamonds will not have the 
same emotional and financial value as diamonds because the value of diamonds 
is inextricably linked to how they were naturally formed. It also found that a 
positive corporate reputation increases customer confidence in products and 
services offered, advertising claims and in the buying decision. This is aligned with 
Pfarrer et al (2010), Dowling (1994) and Deloitte (2014) who believe that a positive 
corporate reputation contributes to reduced marketing costs to ensure rapid global 
growth coupled with minimum or zero advertising and a reliance on experience 
based on word-of-mouth. This study found that a positive corporate reputation 
may reduce information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, and allows 
buyers to reduce uncertainty and concerns about their product or service quality. 
During the semi-structured interviews, one respondent was also asked to explain 
whether there was a direct relationship between a positive reputation and 
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customer attraction and customer loyalty. The answer was:  
It’s what I call the ‘warm glow’ of the brand. If you ask the consumer why do 
you buy this brand? They won’t say because they have a good corporate 
reputation.  They will say because of the quality of the stone or its good value 
for money etcetera.  But what they will then say is ‘I like the idea when in the 
communication process it makes me feel good it also has a story I can feel 
proud of’. … So it creates a warm glow which, in marketing terms, is a pretty 
positive thing to create a warm glow about your brand. That’s a positive.  We 
mustn’t confuse the warm glow with the principle reason for purchase and 
that’s why we separate those two things in our mind in terms of marketing but 
then look how we bring them back in an introverted way in communications. 
This study did not confirm that a positive reputation allows diamond companies to 
charge premium price on the back of reputation alone, but agreed with Lussier’s 
(2014) assertion that a positive reputation brings increased sales, but does not 
always enable companies to charge premium prices for the goods or services. In 
order to demonstrate the respondent’s perspective of this correlation, one 
respondent was asked whether consumers pay a premium on the back of 
reputation. The answer was as follows:  
No, at the moment but the reality is if you bundle it together with other things, 
it forms the basis of your brand you get an overall premium but not on a stand-
alone basis. We need to do it together with other attributes which help to 
reinforce that price, as part of the package on a stand-alone basis, our 
research is saying no. 
This research did not confirm Houser and Wooders’ (2000) research which 
provided a solid body of evidence about the value of corporate reputation. They 
analysed auctions of Pentium processors and gold coins, and concluded that, 
during the auctions, there was a significant relationship between corporate 
reputation and the price that consumers were willing to pay. They found that a 
good reputation leads to higher prices and a bad reputation leads to lower prices.  
This thesis could not find this correlation by Houser and Wooders. This research 
instead concurred with Lucking-Reiley et al (2000) in the correlation between 
corporate reputation and the price that consumers are willing to pay and 
concluded that high reputation does not allow sellers to increase the price level.  
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 Stakeholder Relations  
This study found that a positive corporate reputation facilitates better relationships 
with key external stakeholders, i.e. media, analysts, communities, opinion formers 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It found that a positive corporate 
reputation is advantageous in conducting negotiations with stakeholders. The 
qualitative results concurred with the quantitative analysis findings with a few 
riders, for example, many respondents maintained that a positive reputation 
facilitates access to key stakeholders but does not result in regulators granting 
permits without full compliance of regulations.   
 CEO reputation and Business Success 
This study has found that a positive CEO reputation plays a significant role in 
attracting more investors, clients, work applicants and trust in the corporate 
decisions of a diamond company.  This is in line with Prager (2014) and 
Reputation Institute’s (2016) findings that a positive CEO reputation accounts for 
more than 40% of a corporate reputation. A positive CEO reputation enables the 
diamond companies to project their core mission and identity in a more systematic 
and consistent fashion than those with a negative corporate reputation. 
 Investor Confidence 
This study found that a positive corporate reputation facilitates access to capital 
markets, which has a direct impact on decreasing the capital costs and lowering 
procurement rates. This study confirmed that the diamond industry banks, asset 
managers and term assurers are screening their shareholdings in favour of 
companies that demonstrate commitment to social and environmental 
programmes and against those that are associated with activities deemed 
detrimental and unethical to society and to the environment.  
This study disapproved Meyer and Rowan (1977), Staw and Epstein (2000) and 
Inglis et al’s (2006) assertions which claimed that there is no causal relationship 
between a positive corporate reputation and financial performance (in either 
direction), i.e. reputation does not affect financial performance nor does financial 
performance affect reputation. This study concurred with findings from Rose and 
Thomsen (2004), Sequeira et al (2015), Deloitte (2014) and Reputation Institute 
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report’s (2016) empirical research findings that established a causal relationship 
between a positive reputation and corporate financial performance. 
7.8 Management approaches to managing reputational issues in the 
diamond industry 
Digging our heads in the sand will not assist mining companies to address 
community relations’ issues. We need to change attitudes. We need to start 
implementing tangible projects that brings bread to the table (MEC Charlie 
Sekoate, Limpopo September 2016). 
This research has revealed that the South African diamond industry, together with 
the rest of the mining and minerals sector, faces some of the most difficult 
challenges of any industrial sector.  In order to secure and to retain its continued 
social license to operate, the industry must respond decisively to the challenges 
by engaging its diverse, complex, multiple stakeholders and address each of the 
reputational concerns and perceptions. Quantitative results revealed that 
compliance with global best practices (eiti.org/standard/principles) is an ideal 
approach to managing corporate reputation in the diamond industry. Those 
practices include:  
 The diamond industry shares a belief that the prudent use of natural 
resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic 
growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction. 
 The diamond industry recognises that management of natural resource 
wealth for the benefit of a country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign 
governments to be exercised in the interests of their national development. 
 The diamond Industry recognises that the benefits of diamond mining occur 
as revenue streams over many years and can be highly price-dependent. 
 The diamond Industry recognises that a public understanding of 
government revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate 
and inform the choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable 
development. 
 The diamond Industry embraces the importance of transparency by 
governments and companies and the need to enhance public financial 
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management and accountability. 
 The diamond industry recognises the enhanced environment for domestic 
and foreign direct investment that financial transparency may bring. 
 The diamond Industry believes in the principle and practice of accountability 
by government to all citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and 
public expenditure. 
 The diamond industry believes that, in seeking solutions, all stakeholders 
have important and relevant contributions to make. 
This study confirmed the assertions of Bone (2012), Penny (2009) and Lussier 
(2014) that various corporate reputation management initiatives have been 
implemented in order to address various commercial and reputational issues over 
the last 10 years in the diamond industry around the world. Those initiatives are:  
 
 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the voluntarily system of 
warranties for guaranteeing the ethical supply of diamonds. 
 The Diamond Development Initiative to assist artisanal miners. 
 Beneficiation projects in the producer countries. 
 Social investments in the diamond producing countries averaging at 1% of 
net profit after tax. 
 Implementation of the Diamond Trading Co - Diamond Best Practice 
Principles. 
 Win-win partnerships with Producer Countries’ Governments. 
 Compliance with Rapaport Fair Trade Principles. 
 The Council for Responsible Jewellery Practice Code of Practice to drive 
business ethics in the diamond industry. 
 The Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) has implemented its Certification 
System that will certify its members for responsible, ethical, social and 
environmental practices in the diamond jewellery supply chain. 
 Greater transparency of diamond companies in terms of payments to 
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governments, taxes paid, contracts and credibility with stakeholders 
through their sustainability reports. 
 Eradication of corruption initiatives in most major diamond producing 
countries. 
 Eradication of Human Rights abuses in most major diamond producing 
countries. 
 Adherence to world class safety standards. 
 Effective risk management systems. 
 Effective Community Engagement Programmes with regular engagements 
with community leaders and various authorities. 
 
In examining the effectiveness of these corporate reputation management 
initiatives, both the quantitative and qualitative results confirmed that the 
Kimberley Process is effective and that there are high awareness levels by many 
stakeholders. This is in line with Bone (2012) and Lussier (2014) who claimed that 
more than 99.9% of the world diamonds are Kimberley Process certified.  
This study revealed that the diamond development initiative is not well known and 
is not effective in South Africa. 
In terms of beneficiation initiatives, most stakeholders are aware of several 
initiatives by diamond producers including the Department of Mineral Resources’ 
State Diamond Trader (SDT). Most of the external stakeholders including unions, 
community leaders and NGOs believed that these initiatives were not effective and 
were not well known.  Many stakeholders, especially government officials and 
local communities, believe that the industry is not doing enough to promote local 
beneficiation. This assertion is in line with Minister Shabangu’s remarks during her 
budget speech in Cape Town where she was calling for the industry to support 
product beneficiation (DMR, 2013). 
The qualitative and quantitative results revealed that social investment initiatives in 
the diamond producing nations average more than 1% of net profit after tax.  This 
is in line with most of the world’s standards in term of social spending (Bone, 
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2012).  There is a general awareness with clear acceptance by most of the 
stakeholders who participated in this study that these initiatives are effective.  
Community members and youth groups felt the diamond industry should consider 
doubling their investment in the community in order to assist in poverty alleviation, 
unemployment and inequality. 
In the implementation of Diamond Best Practice Principles, there was a general 
consensus 
 on the awareness, with varying views, about its effectiveness;  
 on the win-win partnerships with producer countries, there was good 
awareness with clear appreciation of its effectiveness in Botswana;  
 on compliance with Rapaport Fair Trade Principles, there was minimal level 
of awareness with almost no comments on its effectiveness;  
 on implementation of responsible Jewellery Council principles, there was 
low level of awareness among most stakeholders with minimal appreciation 
of its effectiveness;  
 on transparency initiatives, there was some appreciation with minimal 
knowledge of its effectiveness;  
 on eradication of corruption initiative in most major diamond producing 
nations, there was a low level of appreciation as well as its effectiveness;  
 on adherence to world class safety standards, risk management systems, 
there was a high level of awareness and high appreciation of its 
effectiveness in the diamond industry; and  
 on the effective community engagement programmes with regular 
engagements with community leaders and various authorities, there was a 
general knowledge about various community engagement initiatives 
including monthly community meetings, use of social media and distribution 
of stakeholder reports. Although there were varied views about its 
effectiveness, it was generally accepted, but the youth groups and various 
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community groups felt this area could be improved significantly. 
This research has concurred with Shamma (2012) that corporate reputation 
management in the mining industry has not gained enough attention in the 
corporate reputation literature. In terms of measurement of corporate reputation, 
aligned with Deloitte (2014), Dowling (2016) and Reputation Institute (2016), this 
research has identified critical dimensions for consideration in the measurement of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry. The following dimensions were 
identified as primary pillars: social license to operate, financial performance, 
corporate social responsibility and vision and leadership (see Figure 45). The rest 
were classified as secondary pillars which include: employee engagement, 
financial performance, emotional appeal, vision and leadership, social license to 
operate, quality of product and services, innovation, ethics and integrity, corporate 
social responsibility, safety leadership, stakeholder relations and environmental 
responsibility.   
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Figure 45: Pyramid-based pillars for corporate reputation  
(Source: Adapted from Shamma, 2012:164) 
This study recommends the following model to be used to manage stakeholder 
relations by balancing the stakeholder needs against the business needs. The 
steps are:  
 a detailed scoping, stakeholder identification and classification;  
 a formal engagement with senior leaders to understand the company 
strategy and business priorities;  
 investigate multiple-stakeholder expectations and experiences with the firm 
and the status of their relationships with the organisation;  
 conduct a gap analysis between what the firm is doing versus the 
expectations of the key stakeholders and further evaluate the gaps in the 
firm’s actions versus the required actions;  
 
Innovation 
Ethics and integrity 
Environmental Responsibility 
Safety 
Stakeholder Relations 
Employee Engagement 
Quality of Products and Services 
Vision and Leadership 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Financial Performance 
Social License 
Secondary  
Pillars 
Primary  
Pillars 
327 | P a g e  
 look at balancing the needs of the firm with those of the stakeholders; and  
 measure the behavioural and attitudinal impact of actions taken and revisit 
all stakeholder to assess progress and recommend renewed remedial 
actions. 
 
 
Figure 46: Stakeholder and Business Needs and Expectations balancing Model  
(Source: Adapted from Money, Hillenbrand & Pavelin, 2012) 
This research endorses Hills (2008) eight steps to building effective stakeholder 
relationships :  
1. Develop a stakeholder strategy on communication. 
2. Determine a process for execution of strategies.  
3. Consistently involve, engage and feedback.  
4. Understand each stakeholder, the role they play, know the communication 
tools at hand and identify messages to be filtered through to the various 
mediums. 
 5. Media: Train key spokespeople on dealing with sensitive issues and neuro-
linguistic programming (NLP).  
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investors, suppliers, employees, the media, activists and governments.  
7. Explore ways to enhance relationships with various stakeholders.  
8. Measure, assess and evaluate stakeholder relationship influence – 
implement improvement. 
The development of effective relationships with communities, based on mutual 
respect and trust, is necessary to ensure that communities benefit from business 
activities and are able to engage with diamond mining companies at all times 
(Prno & Slocombe, 2012; Luoma-aho, 2015). This study has found that the 
diamond industry believes that, in seeking solutions, all stakeholders have 
important and relevant contributions to make. This study recommends that mining 
companies should develop community partnership plans (CPP) (Appendix 8) and 
Government Relations Guidelines (Appendix 9).  These plans need to be reviewed 
annually and be repeated every three years.  
Qualitative and quantitative results are advocated for the development of an 
effective risk management protocol in the diamond industry as part of the 
reputation management strategy. This is in line with Lussier (2014) who believes 
that risk management is a key to an effective corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry. This study recommends that each diamond operation needs to monitor 
its risks through a formal risk management tool. The Anglo American Risks 
management toolbox (www.angloamerican.com) is strongly recommended. 
The diamond industry recognises that a public understanding of government 
revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate and inform the 
choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development. This study 
recommends that Government Relations executives in the diamond mining 
industry in South Africa develop effective relationships with governments at all 
levels, in order to ensure current and future smooth-running business activities 
through the delivery of relevant permits. Basic government relations protocols 
should be adopted to deliver effective, co-ordinated and efficient government 
relations. The Anglo American Government Relations Handbook 
(www.angloamerican.com/governmentrelationstoolbox) is recommended to 
facilitate this engagement with clear goals, actions and monitoring protocol.   
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In the development of a corporate reputation management model in the diamond 
industry, based on the literature review as well as the stakeholder views gathered 
as part of this study, it is important to develop a multi-dimensional model which 
emphasises links and connections between components, drivers and effects in 
summarising what corporate reputation is and what it does, if managed 
appropriately. Such a model pays particular attention to key components and 
drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry. Special attention is given 
to organisational image, legitimacy, trust, ethics and transparency as part of the 
key components that override the make-up and key philosophical, behavioural and 
value systems that should guide organisational actions.  Public perception, 
stakeholder relations, equitable share of diamond wealth with producer nations 
and community care are the drivers of corporate reputation and require extensive 
community engagement and effective stakeholder management in order to deliver 
positive reputational outcomes such as stakeholder confidence, good will, licence 
to operate, customer loyalty and profitability. Figure 47 below highlights these key 
attributes in bold. 
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Figure 47: A multi-dimensional approach to corporate reputation 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the research outcomes) 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONTRIBUTION 
TO KNOWLEDGE, FUTURE RESEARCH AND 
LIMITATIONS 
8  
The movie called Blood Diamond highlighted the fact that the civil war in Sierra 
Leone was funded by revenue from the diamond business in the biggest polished 
diamond market in the USA. The Marikana massacre after the long illegal strike 
which resulted in more than 44 people losing their lives in the platinum belt in 
South Africa highlighted the on-going disputes between mining companies and 
mine communities. Negative media frenzy about the illegal mining and consumer 
boycotts around the world over environmental incidents – all have highlighted the 
importance of corporate reputation management in the diamond industry.  
The literature review highlighted that corporate reputation is a strategic asset that 
contributes to business success through the involvement of multiple stakeholders 
(Fombrun et al, 2013). It further demonstrated that corporate reputation is a 
fundamental tangible and intangible asset of a company which must be managed 
with care. Not surprisingly, during the past decades, interest in corporate 
reputation has grown and now covers numerous disciplines, for example, 
marketing, corporate reputation, public relations and strategic management. 
Insights from existing studies underline the fact that an organisation’s corporate 
reputation is simultaneously a tangible and an intangible asset. As such, it is 
critical for a company to identify the components and drivers of its reputation in 
order to manage it successfully (Prager, 2014). However, reputation affects 
businesses differently, depending on the nature of what they do. Businesses that 
deal with necessities like oil and electricity supply are often less likely to be 
affected by reputation when compared to businesses that deal with luxury 
products (Lussier, 2014). Diamonds are a luxury product with no recognisable 
consumer/retail footprint. De Beers, a near 150-year-old company, was 
established in South Africa but primarily operates in the developing world while 
selling its products in the developed world where its reputation has a major impact 
on the entire diamond industry. The diamond industry is worth close to US$150 
billion but it has never been surveyed and analysed by the image barometers.  In 
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fact, the very notion of “diamonds are forever” is the result of a carefully nurtured 
image (Bieri, 2010). Although the industry survived ethical excesses of the late 
19th century, nowadays diamonds are associated with legacy issues such as 
environmental degradation and blood diamonds, among others (Bone, 2012). 
Using stakeholder theory, questionnaire surveys and interviews, this thesis sought 
to explore the meaning, components and drivers of reputation in the diamond 
industry as well as to identify risk factors and possible mitigation strategies 
through effective reputation management tools. The thesis considered responses 
from internal (employees in the diamond industry and senior executives in the 
diamond industry) and external (banking institutions, investors, labour unions, 
community groups, consumers of diamonds, regulatory authorities and media 
houses) stakeholders. It highlighted that, from a stakeholder point of view, 
reputation in the diamond industry is affected by legacy issues, stakeholder 
relations with a special focus on local communities and labour unions, product 
stewardship and customer relations. Other issues which drive reputation and 
competitiveness and must also be managed include social responsibility and 
environmental issues. Therefore, any model for managing reputation in the 
diamond industry must consider the views of multiple stakeholders, and their often 
divergent expectations.  
8.1 Conclusions 
The following paragraphs provide conclusions of this study in line with research 
questions. 
8.1.1 Definition of corporate reputation in the diamond industry: Views 
from different stakeholders 
This study has adopted a multi-faceted definition of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry in line with Rayner’s (2003) definition which highlighted that 
corporate reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions, 
as well as future prospects, which describes the firm’s overall appeal to all its 
stakeholders and Barnett et al’s (2006) definition which highlighted that corporate 
reputation is the observers’ collective judgements of a corporation based on 
assessments of the financial, social and environmental impacts attributed to the 
organisation over time, coupled with themes such as stakeholder perceptions, 
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moral “doing good” perspective, judgement and organisational actions. In coming 
up with a diamond industry specific definition, this research defines it as follows: 
Corporate reputation in the diamond industry is the observers’ collective 
judgement based on perceptual representation of company’s past actions, as 
well as future prospects in terms of its financial, social, product stewardship, 
stakeholder relations and environmental impacts which informs the firms’ 
overall appeal to its stakeholders.   
While this definition captures the findings of this thesis, it can be concluded that 
there is no single alpha definition that captures the total meaning of reputation for 
all stakeholders. This assertion concurs with Sohn and Lariscy (2015), Luoma-aho 
(2015) and Helm’s (2007) stakeholder theory that contends that each stakeholder 
defines reputation from their own position, based on the interface with the 
organisation, experiences, past actions, overall appeal of the organisation and 
various perceptions of the organisation (Dowling, 2016).  Therefore, mining 
communities may define reputation on the back of the good (or bad) that the 
organisation does for them as well as on its relationship with the mine (Davis & 
Franks, 2014), while investors may define reputation on the back of the company 
performance, overall appeal and return on investment. 
8.1.2 Components of corporate reputation in the diamond industry 
This thesis concludes that the following components are critical in terms of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry in South Africa:  
 respectability of the organisation;  
 corporate citizenship which covers social conformity, respect and embraces 
the socio-cultural dynamics and the spirit of leaving a positive legacy in the 
mine communities, by doing good in the communities through targeted 
social development initiatives;  
 building lasting trust, which is about whether local stakeholders trust your 
organisation or not;  
 transparency in terms of day-to-day dealings of the organisation;  
 safety leadership and financial stability;  
 corporate governance;  
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 leadership integrity and credibility; corporate communication; and  
 ethical product stewardship and stakeholder management.  
Sir Ernest Oppenheimer’s statement captures the key component of corporate 
reputation through his inaugural statement where he said the goal of this business 
is to make profit for our shareholders in a way that ensures that we leave a lasting 
social impact on the communities where we mine.  This statement remains 
fundamental as a core value of corporate reputation. 
8.1.3 Key drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry 
This study concurs with Flynn (2006), Rayner (2003), Reputation Institute (2006), 
De Beers Reputation Report (2015), The Economist Intelligence (2005), Pharoah 
(2003), Schwaiger (2004) and Van Riel and Fombrun (2003) who proposed drivers 
of corporate reputation including the following:  
 Financial soundness or financial strength or above average financial 
performance; 
 Community care; 
 Quality of products and services; 
 Satisfaction of customers; 
 Adherence to world class human rights requirements; 
 Employee value proposition and organisational ability to attract and retain 
top talent; 
 Leadership credibility; 
 Strong adherence to good governance practices and adherence to the 
Kimberley Process; 
 Social License to Operate; 
 Quality of stakeholder relations; and 
 Public perceptions. 
Since these are the key drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond industry, it 
needs to devise a strategy to manage each of these issues in order to proactively 
manage the corporate reputation. 
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8.1.4 Stakeholder perceptions of the South African diamond industry 
The perceptions of both internal and external stakeholders were also analysed in 
detail regarding the components and drivers of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. Statistical analyses as well as the qualitative analysis of the 
responses demonstrated the existence of differences in stakeholder perceptions 
about the diamond industry, both positive and negative. It is also noted that there 
are more negative perceptions than positive ones.  Table 70 shows the difference. 
Table 70: Stakeholder Perceptions of the Diamond Industry 
Positive perceptions of the diamond 
industry 
Negative perceptions of the 
diamond industry 
Best employer Benefitted from apartheid government 
Authentic Arrogant and brash 
Development partner Secretive 
Responsible Manipulative 
Industry’s most successful marketing 
campaign of all times “Diamonds are 
Forever” slogan 
Controlled from London – cartel 
 
Has the world’s most successful and 
celebrated private-public partnerships 
Uncaring of the local communities 
during closure or divestment. SLPs are 
not addressing real community issues. 
Leading consumer confidence 
technology 
Not compliant with Mining Charter and 
Land Restitution requirements. 
Caring industry No relationships with youth groups in 
the mining towns. 
World class industry Divesting from South Africa 
 Diamond mining companies owe the 
communities, especially the former 
employees, millions of dollars. 
 Imperialists. 
 Monopolistic industry. 
 
Table 70 shows that the diamond industry is still regarded as a world class 
industry with leading consumer marketing campaigns and world class consumer 
confidence technologies to detect synthetics and other non-diamanteriferous 
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material; an industry which has the world’s most successful and celebrated public 
private partnership through Debswana (De Beers and Government of Botswana 
partnership); a responsible industry; a caring industry; the preferred development 
partner in many parts through its sustainable community projects; and an 
employer of choice. This research has also indicated that the diamond industry 
has many negative perceptions such as being imperialistic, monopolistic, not 
compliant with the Mining Charter, secretive and arrogant. This research has 
disapproved some of the historic perceptions of the diamond industry as 
suggested in the literature review.  Opinions such as illicit trade, dirty industry 
associated with gross human rights violations, child labour, the existence of racial 
discrimination in the mines, blood diamonds and unethical industry run by 
warlords.  These negative sentiments are slowly becoming perceptions of the 
past. This demonstrates that the industry has been successful in implementing 
various interventions to manage its reputation over the past decade.  This study 
shows that initiatives like the Kimberley Process which was initiated in 2002 in 
Kimberley in South Africa, the role out of Responsible Jewellery Council 
certification and the implementation of Best Practice Principles (BPP) among De 
Beers and its client base has played a significant role in improving the perceptions 
of the diamond industry in general.  
8.1.5 Key reputational risks facing the diamond industry 
The literature review has highlighted that the diamond industry, as a luxury goods 
industry, is susceptible to numerous national and international challenges which 
must be sustainably managed. The need to explore the nature of risks affecting 
the diamond industry from a stakeholder point of view is critical. Multiple options 
that include labour unrest, worker exploitation, diamond theft, illegal diamond 
trade, mine closure, beneficiation, artisanal miners’ incorporation into the main 
stream mining practices, supply dynamics, human rights abuses, energy issues 
with Eskom, talent retention, global economic cycles, industry liquidity (especially 
the cutters and polishers), high levels of poverty in the mine communities, youth 
activism, rise of synthetics diamonds, capital flight, fear of possible collapse of the 
Kimberley Process, rising production costs, negative publicity, failure to contribute 
to local economy and political instability, were part of the key findings from the 
literature reviews. Quantitative and qualitative analysis results further confirmed 
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that there are numerous risks which must be managed.  Some of these risks are 
related to production integrity and others are related to product integrity.  This 
report has identified the following key risks and possible management actions from 
each of the stakeholder’s perspectives.   
8.1.5.1 Community-Related Risks 
High unemployment, inequality and high levels of poverty in the communities 
neighbouring the mining towns is major risk affecting the local communities and 
the reputation of the mining industry in South Africa. The researcher believes that, 
in the future, there will be mineral conflicts between mining companies and local 
communities and rivalries between community members for jobs and tenders from 
the mine.  According to Brand (2012), only four out of 10 adults work in South 
Africa. This number is very low compared to other countries around the world with 
similar GDP numbers. This research confirmed that high unemployment and 
poverty which is prevalent among young people in most mining towns, is the major 
contributor to community activism which dominates the mining industry in South 
Africa and includes service delivery protests, illegal strikes and violent stand offs 
between mining companies and local communities.  
The retrenchments in the diamond industry since 2008, as a result of disposal of 
mining assets and/or mine closures, have also contributed to the high 
unemployment and poverty in the affected mining towns like Namaqualand, Oaks 
Mine neighbouring villages, Kimberley, Finch and Marsfontein. This has 
contributed to high levels of unhappiness in these villages and small towns since 
diamond mining was the only source of employment. This confirms the assertion 
by Lussier (2014) and Djordjevic and Djukic (2008) that downsizing has a direct 
impact on the reputation of the corporation, both internally and externally.  These 
issues are posing serious reputational issues among local communities, political 
organisations, labour unions and the regulatory authorities. This research report 
acknowledges that issues of poverty, unemployment and inequality are a major 
issue in South Africa, not only in the diamond industry. 
Mine communities believe that mining companies are bad communicators and are 
not to be trusted. This research concludes that poor communication by mining 
companies and general distrust between local communities and the mining 
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companies is another major risk affecting the diamond industry reputation. This 
further contributes to the poor relationships between mine communities and their 
neighbouring mining companies. As a result, there is conflict between the mining 
companies and the local communities.  Poor communication has resulted in the 
lack of understanding between diamond companies and local communities in 
terms of what are the direct benefits of mining companies to the local 
communities.  Youth in most of these communities feel left out and forgotten. 
 
Another issue affecting the local communities is the social impact of closing mining 
operations, or the sale or transfer of assets, in terms of jobs, local economic 
activity, housing provisions and other service provisions.  
 
The management of diseases such as HIV and other communicable diseases in 
the workforce and associated host communities is an issue affecting local 
communities.  This study confirmed that the diamond industry is regarded as world 
class in partnering with its employees and local communities in addressing health 
issues in the local communities through effective health care and HIV/AIDS 
management programmes. 
 
Land claims were also identified as an issue affecting the local communities in the 
diamond mining industry as well as the mining companies. 
 
Local communities have raised concerns about the impacts of mining activities in 
their communities, especially those that are neighbouring disused mining dumps 
e.g. health, cracked houses, dust, gaseous emissions, water pollution/availability 
and land sterilisation. 
 
Some community members have experienced an influx and proliferation of 
informal settlements in Venetia where De Beers is investing R20 billion to 
construct the Venetia Underground Project.  This investment will provide new jobs 
but there is a chance of possible community conflict over the available limited 
opportunities. 
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8.1.5.2 Employee well-being 
On-going restructuring, selling off of non-core assets and downscaling resulting in 
the shedding of jobs in the mining industry in general is a contributor to the current 
climate of distrust between the mining companies, their employees as well as 
politicians, governments, CBOs and unions. Various stakeholders in the mining 
industry have expressed deep concerns over the current mass retrenchments. 
This adds to the already high numbers of unemployed people in this country.  The 
latest announcement by Mark Cutifani, CEO of Anglo American, on the 2nd of July 
2015, to retrench more than 20% of its employees worldwide, further complicates 
the relationship between employers and employee representatives and local 
communities. These issues contribute to lowering of staff morale, productivity and 
levels of employee engagement.  This study also revealed that the generic 
perception of the industry is associated with it being a “sunset” industry because of 
the short life of mines in most of the mining areas, except in Venetia where De 
Beers has recently announced a R20 billion investment in constructing the 
underground mine which will extend the life of the mine from 2021 to 2043.   
This thesis confirmed that disruption to operations through labour action, including 
sustained legal industrial action and illegal/violent protests and strike actions is a 
major current and future risk in the diamond industry in South Africa. 
 
The Marikana Massacre refers to the wildcat, illegal and fatal strike which resulted 
in 34 miners losing their lives during the South Africa’s longest strike in Marikana 
in the South African platinum belt in 2012.  This study concludes that, as a result 
of the Marikana Massacre, the diamond industry is under intense scrutiny, beyond 
just labour issues, but also on community issues, including employee 
indebtedness, employee living conditions, provision of decent housing in the local 
communities, community relations, illiteracy issues among mine employees, 
unsatisfactory employee working conditions, unresolved conflicts, poor 
communication, poverty issues and also the effectiveness of the current 
bargaining system. 
Respondents concurred that the wage gap between executives and ordinary mine 
workers remains a thorny issue in the diamond industry and in the mining industry 
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in general. Various media reported that Marius Kloppers, CEO of BHP earned a 
R31 million package in one year, Mark Cutifani CEO of Anglo American R16 
million (when he was CEO of Anglo Gold Ashanti in 2012), Cynthia Carol, former 
CEO of Anglo American, took home R24 million, Nick Holland netted R11 million 
in one year.  It has also recently been reported that Mark Cutifani earned R85 
million in one year and Andrew McKenzie, CEO at BHP Billiton earned R89.8 
million. This puts them among the 10 highest paid CEOs in South Africa (Business 
Day, 2013).  These numbers are alarming compared to R5 000/month which is 
paid to the lowest paid worker in the mining industry in South Africa (NUM, 2014). 
While the mine workers have benefitted greatly from unionisation since 1994, 
whereby real wages for unionised workers have risen from as little as R800/month 
in 1994 to about R5 000/month in 2014, the wage gap remains a major source of 
discontent leading to mine strikes, distrust, low productivity and low employee 
engagement. 
The commitment to zero harm and eradication of mine fatalities in the mining 
industry is being cited as the best example of how partnerships between 
employees and unions, communities and mining companies (Tri-partite Alliance) 
can achieve improved working conditions.  This study has revealed that the 
diamond industry has made significant progress in the reduction of fatalities and 
other major incidents in the workplace. While the work-related accidents have 
reduced significantly, transportation incidents outside the workplace are on the 
rise. In 2012 alone, De Beers reported more than six fatal incidents on public 
roads involving its employees and their families (De Beers Group Sustainable 
Report, 2013). 
This study did not find any issues relating to the exploitation of mine workers, child 
labour issues, worker exploitation and non-adherence to global human rights 
regulations.   
8.1.5.3 Governments, Regulators and Authorities 
This thesis concludes that there is a lack of trust between diamond mining 
companies and their stakeholders, especially local communities and various 
regulators, NGOs, local churches and local governments. This raises key barriers 
in terms of stakeholder relations and stakeholder management.  It further confirms 
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that, in South Africa, there is general hostility towards the private sector, the so-
called Anti-Mining Syndrome associated with the apartheid system, since some 
South African black individuals associate mining with exploitation and human 
degradation. There is an historic belief in some quarters that mining companies 
extract South African resources at the expense of South Africans. 
High unemployment, poverty and inequality in the mining towns are the major 
issues that concern the South African Regulators.  The growing wage gap 
between management and miners remains a thorny issue in government circles, 
as well as in the union gatherings. 
Non-compliance with approved social and labour plans, environmental 
management plans, safety standards and mine works plans is another issue 
affecting relationships between mining companies and regulators. This study has 
found that most of the diamond mining companies in South Africa have made 
good progress in complying with DMR provisions. The deviations from most of 
these plans are not always communicated and discussed with the regulator. 
These issues continue to create animosity between mining companies and 
regulators. 
This research concludes that the extent to which diamond companies drive 
economic growth in producer countries through commercial activities, including the 
creation of secondary industries linked to mining through their procurement 
processes in South Africa, is a concern for NGOs, regulators and local 
communities in the diamond industry. There is a call for greater participation of 
local small business owners in the supply chain opportunities.  De Beers Zimele 
enterprise development programme is praised as best practice in South Africa for 
its work in conducting supplier development programmes and for providing vendor 
and equity financing at minimal costs of foreign capital.  These initiatives have 
created thousands of non-mining jobs (www.AngloAmericanZimele.com). 
In spite of all the initiatives that diamond companies are implementing, 
governments generally believe that extra activities to increase economic 
participation in the value chain in countries of production, so that local citizens can 
add to, and derive benefit from natural resource production remain problematic 
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and unsatisfactory in most producer countries. This study has found that local 
procurement targets are not always met by mining companies.  This is creating a 
serious rift between mining companies and their stakeholders. 
Diamond beneficiation in the producer nations, including in South Africa, is a major 
issue affecting most role players in the diamond industry.  It is understood that 
India remains the dominant nation responsible for cutting and polishing about 58% 
of the world’s diamonds, followed by Thailand/China which is responsible for about 
13% of cutting and polishing of diamonds.  India is understood to have created 
more than 850 000 jobs while South Africa is struggling to get to at least 1000 jobs 
for the same process. The argument that is put forward by diamond producers is 
that production costs in South Africa are more than a third higher than the 
manufacturing costs in India. It is estimated that it costs $100.00 to cut and polish 
one carat in South Africa while it only costs about $0.30c in India (Prager, 2014).  
In response to this, the South African government has developed a beneficiation 
strategy calling for mining companies to beneficiate their mining products.  The 
Diamond Act requires the large producers to sell more than 40% of the production 
by value to local beneficiaries.  This study has revealed that De Beers, Petra and 
Transhex have implemented a number of beneficiation initiatives in South Africa, 
including supporting the establishment of the State Diamond Trader (SDT) and 
selling more than 40% of its rough diamonds by value to local beneficiaries. These 
South African cutting and polishing companies need to have a valid beneficiaries’ 
licence and must manufacture more than 80% of what they purchase in South 
Africa in line with the prescripts of the Export Levy Act of the Diamond Act.  It is 
believed that this will maintain a steady cutting and polishing industry in South 
Africa.  This study found that SDT has not made any significant impact in 
encouraging local beneficiation in South Africa.  It remains a cost centre which is 
not sustainable and has very little chance of become self-sustaining using the 
current run of mine purchasing arrangements with diamond producers.  A different 
model incorporating elements of the sightholder system, coupled with the 
abandoned De Beers Diamdel method, may revive SDT in the future. 
DMR and other role players in South Africa, including various youth groups and 
unions, believe that diamond companies have not fully embraced the spirit of the 
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transformation agenda, as outlined in the Mining Charter.  This is one of the 
reasons there is mistrust between the mining companies and local authorities.  
This distrust manifested itself during the launch of the Mining Charter report (May 
2015) by the Minister of Mineral Resources which is in contrast to the Chamber of 
Mines Mining Charter Report.  This study reveals that the transformation in the 
diamond industry is an emotive issue.  DMR and other stakeholders are 
concerned about what they call “fronting” and the “Blacks for Hire” syndrome.  This 
assertion is directed to the BEE partners that are known to be spectators and not 
directly involved in the day-to-day running of the business. 
This study has found that diamond theft from some of the mining operations 
throughout the value chain and their distribution to market, is impacting negatively 
on profitability and reducing diamond revenues to government and other 
stakeholders. The association of diamonds with criminality and illegal mining is 
another concern of the diamond industry. 
8.1.5.4 Investors’ issues 
The study showed that South Africa remains an attractive investment destination 
and is regarded as one of the most prospective destinations for diamond mining in 
the world.   
Regulatory uncertainty is a major issue among the investors and mine owners in 
South Africa. The major causes for this uncertainty are fuelled by the proposed 
amendments of the Mining Petroleum Regulations Development Act (MPRDA), 
Mining Charter and the Diamond Act of 2004; uncertainty about the future of the 
State Diamond Trader, linking it to developmental pricing and “cherry picking” 
instead of 10% of “Run of Mine” as per the current regulations. 
This study found that investors are concerned that the ever-increasing costs and 
DMR expectations in conducting exploration investments in South Africa coupled 
with complex regulatory requirements in terms of funding historical disturbances, 
closure requirements and the time it takes to secure reconnaissance and 
prospecting permits.  Investors have also raised a concern in term of general 
interpretation of mining regulations in South Africa which is open to different 
interpretations from one region to the next. 
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Investors are perturbed by what they describe as the “combustible” industrial 
relations environment in South Africa, following the platinum industry illegal strike 
which was long and violent. They are concerned about the long-term impact of 
these strikes in terms of stability in the mining industry in South Africa.  They have 
a fear that the South African government in unable to curb these strikes and 
maintain peace and order. They are also worried by the so-called “3 Mr Js”, Mr 
Julius Malema, the Commander in Chief for EFF, Mr Joseph Matunjwa the Leader 
of Amcu and Mr Irvin Jim, the General Secretary of Numsa. 
The investors are very concerned about the rising cost of doing business in South 
Africa. These costs manifest themselves in permanently rising labour costs, on an 
average of 10% over the last seven years, which is well above inflation. Labour 
productivity remains a major concern for the investors and mine managers. They 
believe that the rising labour costs do not correlate with productivity levels. The 
other contributing factors are the rising electricity costs and ever-increasing rises 
in business costs. The increased costs in operating mining businesses in South 
Africa are further complicated by the proposed carbon tax which, it is believed, will 
add to the current financial burden. 
Diamond demand and the cyclical nature of the diamond business is another 
issue in the diamond industry affecting investors, as well as marketers. This study 
revealed that diamond jewellery demand is the only source of value for the 
diamond business, unlike the other precious metals that have other sources of 
use. According to Prager (2015), 99% of the total market for diamonds by value, is 
diamond jewellery. Demand for diamond jewellery continues to rise, following the 
serious dip during the world recession in 2008 and several supply/demand 
challenges in 2014. This study has shown that the rapid growth of middle classes 
coupled with the alarming increasing interest in luxury goods in the emerging 
economies, notably in India and in China, widens the demand for diamond 
jewellery and branded goods in general. According to Lussier (2015), the 
forecasted numbers of middle class homes in China and India are expected to 
reach around 130 million and 330 million respectively in 2025.  In Shanghai and 
the other two big cities in China alone, a recent research report has shown that 
engagement ring demand is growing fast because more than 11 million weddings 
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take place there almost every year.  
This study also revealed that the changing demographics of the diamond 
consumer base may come with other new dynamics in terms of various factors 
influencing the purchasing decisions of the diamond jewellery, i.e. ethics, size of 
the diamond and price.  In terms of size, large sized diamonds are popular in 
America while the Chinese market demands quality and volume; on ethics, 
Chinese consumers will not ask about the origin of diamonds including issues of 
child labour and environmental stewardship while the European market is 
concerned about ethics and product stewardship, lastly, regarding diamond prices, 
the emerging markets tend to use price as a major point of purchasing decisions, 
especially in South Africa and Brazil, while in the US and Japan, price is only one 
of the considerations, which include, size and other attributes which are more 
important. This study has found that price is only one of the key considerations in 
the diamond purchasing decision by many South Africans. 
8.1.5.5 Environmentalists, NGOs and Community-Based Organisations 
While most of the issues above are cross-cutting for most stakeholders, the legacy 
of the diamond mines remains a long-term concern affecting the diamond industry. 
This study has noted that there are a number of diamond mines that have been 
closed, such as Oaks Mine, historic Kimberley Mines and various abandoned 
mining dumps scattered around Kimberley. These continue to raise serious 
concerns among the local communities, CBOs, NGOs and various environmental 
groups, including relevant authorities like the DMR, the Department of Water 
Affairs and Sanitation and the Department of Environmental Affairs. 
There is a belief among these groups that diamond mining companies may 
abandon these mines without comprehensive rehabilitation as per the South 
African regulations as part of the Environmental Management Plans. As a result, 
DMR is not issuing closure certificates. 
8.1.5.6 Media Relations  
This study revealed that various media houses in the diamond industry have a 
perception that diamond mining, and mining in general, does not embrace social 
transformation and is a good source for sensationalist media reporting. It was also 
346 | P a g e  
found that some journalists use the mining issues as a means to increase their 
personal profiles.   
8.1.5.7 Customer Relations 
This study revealed that the competition from synthetic diamonds is more of a 
future unquantifiable issue. The study noted that the improved quality of synthetics 
will result in increased competition between diamond jewellery and synthetics. 
This issue is being fuelled by a forecast shortage of diamonds in the near future. 
This study revealed that a shortage of diamonds will spark higher prices and the 
use of alternative jewellery products like synthetics, recycled diamonds and other 
non-diamond luxury products.  Customers who participated in this study were 
sceptical about synthetics. Many of them felt they would not give their partners 
synthetic stones instead of diamonds.  They said their partners would be very 
disappointed because they expect the “real” thing.   
This study also asserted that undisclosed synthetic diamonds integrated within the 
natural diamond value chain at natural diamond prices could also undermine 
consumer confidence in reliability and quality of diamonds. The diamond industry 
is commended for using technology to prevent synthetic diamonds from entering 
the market undetected through the diamond sure technology. 
In terms of recycled diamonds, potential and current diamond consumers who 
participated in the study felt that recycled diamonds are not a threat to the 
diamond industry at this stage because of the low demand for recycled diamonds. 
The study found that more than a 1bn diamonds have been produced and sold to 
the market over the last 100 years. The study asserted that most of these 
diamonds are in the USA and Japan.   
8.1.5.8 Trans-stakeholder issues  
This study has identified resource nationalisation and nationalisation of mines as a 
complex multifaceted issue affecting the diamond industry in South Africa.  This 
issue is not, however, just a South African issue, but is a world-wide phenomenon 
affecting all the countries endowed with mineral resources. This study concludes 
that resource nationalisation represents various expectations (Appendix 3) by 
various stakeholders in the mining industry in South Africa with the following key 
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expectations:  The stakeholder requires that diamond mining should be conducted 
in a way that maximises the direct contribution of mining to economic growth and 
job creation. South Africa should capture more of the mining industry value for 
South Africa and its citizens by creating broader economic development through 
local procurement and beneficiation of minerals in order to start new downstream 
industries. It also calls for more state participation in the mining industry through 
its State Mining Company that is being formed in South Africa and the 
implementation of legislation that ensures that the mining industry benefits its 
citizens in a meaningful manner. This study confirms that there is a wide belief that 
the Kimberley Process assures consumers that 99% of the world’s diamonds are 
conflict free.  However, it also cautions that the KP is slowly starting to lose its 
strategic significance in South Africa. This is associated with serious debates. In 
one of the KP meetings, NGOs forced the KP committee not to issue the KP 
certificate to the Zimbabwe goods even though a thorough report by former CEO 
of the State Diamond Trader in 2012 recommended approval. This was endorsed 
by all the member countries, except some NGOs and a US representative 
because of their bilateral political issues against Zimbabwe, not because the 
goods were not legitimate. This is a serious weakness of the KP process which 
needs to be addressed. 
This study does not fully agree that talent retention in the diamond industry is a 
major issue.  This is because the industry is shrinking in South Africa and cannot 
absorb all the available talent; instead it is shedding jobs and thereby losing talent 
to other sectors. 
The blood diamond or conflict diamond issue is also not regarded as a major issue 
as stated in the literature review. This research concluded that blood diamonds 
and conflict diamonds are not an issue in South Africa but may be a concern in the 
future in volatile countries such as Angola, Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
Mineral wars are issues of the past; this research did not regard this as a major 
risk in the diamond industry in South Africa. It is believed that the mineral war 
debate is being fought through various policy debates among the relevant 
stakeholders and not through arms, as it happened in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. 
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This study asserts that if community relations are not resolved in the short term, 
the mining industry in South Africa may experience a different kind of mineral war 
but this time it will be community groupings against mining companies. This 
phenomenon is slowly picking up in Limpopo where community members have set 
alight buses, trucks carrying mining material as well as the recent burning of the 
school that was funded by a mining company, Anglo American Platinum, over the 
dispute of the relocation of the school. This study concludes that unemployed 
youth members will lead this battle. The trigger will be who benefits in the 
communities from the ESOPs or community trust, who manages the trusts and 
who allocates resources. Communities will demand royalties and peace bonuses. 
Currently, the policy that royalties must be paid to the national fiscus is not 
sustainable, local communities want to see real opportunities for themselves. 
Artisanal mining is a major issue in Africa because it is not properly organised and 
is linked to illegal mining and serious human rights abuses including child labour.  
This study did not find evidence that this was a major problem in the South African 
diamond industry.  On the other hand, this study found illegal mining to be an 
concern ravaging the rest of the mining industry. 
Employee exploitation and neglect of human rights’ treaties may be an issue 
elsewhere in Africa as was widely reported in Marange diamond diggings in 
Zimbabwe in 2013. This study did not regard this as a major issue in South Africa. 
This study demonstrated that the mining charter and employment equity policies 
have gone a long way to correct most of the wrongdoings in the industry that were 
once major issues in the 1980s and 1990s in the diamond industry in South Africa. 
In summary, this study has found that stakeholders from all levels of society, 
regulators, customers, financiers, employees and host communities, now demand 
more transparency and accountability from diamond mining companies. In 
particular, diamond mining communities, such as those in the Northern Cape, are 
forming benefit organisations to demand more from diamond mining companies 
and they require them to address historical legacies. Mining must also contribute 
to long-term sustainability as enshrined in local and international standards of best 
practice. The issue of beneficiation and post-mining economic activity is also 
critical and must be addressed.  
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8.1.6 Effects of Corporate Reputation 
Earthlife Africa Johannesburg has applied to the High Court in Pretoria to 
revoke the Environmental authorisation granted to the Thabatsi coal-fired 
power station (a potential 1,200MW project) near Lephalale (Mathews, 
September 2016) 
In terms of the examination of stakeholder views on statements relating to positive 
effects of corporate reputation in the diamond industry, it was important to 
understand stakeholder views relating to this. It was clear that, within variations, 
good corporate reputation was associated with many benefits such as increased 
investor confidence. Furthermore, as postulated in the literature, good corporate 
reputation confers positive benefits to a company in areas such as customer 
loyalty, government relations, community relations, employee engagement, 
purchasing decisions, media relations and investor relations. Indeed, the literature 
review and the quantitative and qualitative analyses carried out for the purposes of 
this thesis, reached the same conclusion. Good reputation appeals to different 
stakeholders from various positions: investors, financiers, customers, regulatory 
authorities and communities. As such, a company cannot manage reputation for 
just one group. Rather an all-inclusive stakeholder engagement approach is 
essential for corporate reputation in the diamond industry. Therefore, positive 
corporate reputation is essential for business survival. 
This study confirmed that a strong and positive corporate reputation could result in 
positive effects. In terms of talent and employee engagement, this study confirmed 
that a positive corporate reputation will enable the firm to win the war for talent 
attraction, foster employee retention, reduce employee absenteeism and enhance 
full employee engagement. This conclusion was supported by the internal 
stakeholders (81.71%) compared to external stakeholders (73.66%).  The internal 
stakeholders value the effect of corporate reputation more than the external 
stakeholders because of the level of exposure that the internal stakeholders have 
on the key initiatives that are being implemented to bolster positive reputation of 
the employer as encapsulated in the employment value proposition, i.e. availability 
of career opportunities, compensation of employees, social responsibility and 
empowerment, among others.  
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In terms of diamond purchasing decisions, this study concurred with the results of 
the literature review that a positive corporate reputation has an effect of driving the 
purchasing decisions of consumers, but It also found that it is not only corporate 
reputation that drives consumer confidence and purchasing decision making. 
Collective aspects such as price, diamond jewellery store ambience, brand 
promise and continuity of diamond jewellery pieces must also be considered. 
In terms of customer confidence in the products and services of a reputable firm, 
this study confirmed the literature assertion that a positive corporate reputation will 
lead to increased customer confidence in products and services, advertising 
claims and in the buying decisions, thereby promoting better customer attraction 
and customer loyalty.  
This study concurs with Lussier’s (2014) assertion that consumers of diamonds 
buy diamonds as a luxury product, not a necessity like other precious metals in the 
luxury goods industry. People buy brand promise which is more important than 
diamond jewellery’s functional value to customers, therefore corporate reputation 
in the diamond industry is the single most critical intangible asset that requires the 
greatest care. 
In terms of stakeholder relations, this study maintains that a positive reputation will 
attract and retain key stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, top employees, community 
members and suppliers, and build solid long-term strategic relations.  In line with 
Puncheva-Michelotti and Michelotti’s (2010) assertion, this study revealed that a 
positive corporate reputation will provide advantages in conducting negotiations 
with stakeholders and provide access, which is an important attribute in 
relationship management and in negotiating licences as part of permission 
requirements in both the exploration and mining side of the diamond industry.  It 
can also strengthen the company’s strategic position in the competition for mining 
rights especially during the adjudication of mining permits. It can also facilitate 
better relationships with key external stakeholders, i.e. media, analysts, 
communities, opinion formers and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 
study also acknowledges that a positive reputation alone will not guarantee 
quicker and positive permitting decisions, but can provide a better chance to be 
heard and to be given the benefit of the doubt. 
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This study further confirms that a positive reputation increases organisational 
attractiveness to investors and other funding institutions.  In terms of crisis 
management, this study has found that a positive reputation provides a buffer 
zone of reputational capital to insulate against unintentional failures, i.e. economic 
crisis, safety incidents or disasters, community protests and during industrial 
relations challenges. 
This study further believes that corporate reputation is a significant aspect of 
mainstream investment decisions over the entire value chain in the diamond 
industry.  This study revealed that investors will not invest money in companies 
with bad reputations in spite of all the positive financial attributes such as an IRR 
of 50% and attractive ROCE if the reputational issue cannot be resolved. While all 
the stakeholders interviewed felt that corporate reputation contributes to investor 
confidence, the bankers were neutral on this point, but after a further qualitative 
interview, they confirmed that corporate reputation is one of the criteria they 
consider before making any financial decisions. This study further confirmed that 
adhering to best practice in terms of corporate reputation is now a legal 
requirement in many countries and is not negotiable.  
Finally, a positive reputation is not an invitation to take short cuts in terms of 
investing in marketing, working daily on managing stakeholder relations, doing 
good in communities and continuing to comply with all the applicable laws and 
regulations.   
The study also found that the development of a corporate reputation can be very 
costly and time-consuming and may not, in the short-term, bring a direct a return 
on investment. Lastly, this study found no direct relationship between positive or 
high reputation and price. In other words, this study could not prove whether or not 
consumers will pay a premium price for a product because of a good corporate 
reputation alone but other attributes were also critical in the purchasing decision. 
8.1.7 Corporate Reputation Management in the Diamond Industry 
Given the ever-increasing globalisation and connectivity between different world 
areas, companies can no longer afford to ignore global standards of best 
practices. According to this study, consumers are now increasingly shunning 
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products that are produced by child labour and are associated with other unethical 
practices. In the case of diamonds, the movie Blood Diamond exposed unethical 
conditions in which diamonds from conflict areas were extracted and this has 
precipitated the formation of standards of conduct, such as the Kimberley Process, 
which are meant to ensure that diamonds come from ethical sources (Bieri, 2010). 
This study revealed that the Blood Diamond movie did not have any impact on the 
demand for diamond jewellery whatsoever.  Instead, the movie was a “wake-up 
call” to the rest of the industry in terms of the diamond reputation and the potential 
impacts it has on the industry.   
However, this study indicated that there is no stakeholder consensus on the level 
of awareness and effectiveness of these initiatives used to manage corporate 
reputation risks and challenges in the diamond industry. These interventions or 
initiatives are not well known by many stakeholders, especially external 
stakeholders like local communities, NGOs and Regulators. These initiatives are 
perceived by internal stakeholders and various industry experts to have had 
various levels of effectiveness and success. Our analyses revealed that, on the 
whole, internal stakeholders including employees, executives and mine managers 
are certain about the effectiveness of the interventions in place and have a high 
level of awareness when compared to the external stakeholder group. The 
customers are least aware of these initiatives or their effectiveness. Corporate 
reputation practitioners cited the Botswana/De Beers partnership in the ownership 
of diamond mines in Botswana as a model to ensure shared benefits between 
governments, private businesses and local citizens.  They explained that almost 
all diamond companies in South Africa have a Social and Labour Plan worth more 
than 1.5% of net profit after tax which is already well above the world 
recommended 1%. The same level of awareness was very limited for the external 
stakeholders. On the whole, there is a positive association between the 
awareness levels and the stakeholder views on the effectiveness of the initiatives 
used. This implies that, for most stakeholder groups, knowledge has a positive 
effect on stakeholder perceptions on the effectiveness of interventions used in 
diamond mining.  This study believes that the industry needs to improve its 
communication about the positive measures it takes.  
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The main outcome of this study is that different stakeholders have different 
expectations of a company or organisation. The expectations of employees, 
labour unions, customers, regulatory authorities and financiers all differ although 
they reach convergence in a few cases. Corporate reputation management cannot 
afford to only focus on only one stakeholder group to the exclusion of others. Even 
if one component, such as legitimacy, is not managed, the reputation will be 
affected. A good example is that of blood diamonds which were coming from a few 
areas and yet NGOs managed to create an awareness which threatened to 
seriously affect the industry. Similarly, industrial action over pay can affect share 
prices and business sustainability, as shown in the case of the AMCU strike in the 
platinum belt. Failure to comply with environmental regulations precipitated a clash 
between Coal of Africa and NGOs interested in heritage and the environment. The 
result was that the share price of the company fell, resulting in a loss of value. 
Corporate reputation management must be holistic, emphasising all aspects of 
corporate reputation equally, otherwise it will be a wasted effort. Mining must also 
benefit local communities otherwise serious legacy issues are created. Similarly, 
rehabilitation of mines should cater for post-mine closure. 
8.2 Recommendations for implementation in practice 
The overall recommendation from this research is the call for individual diamond 
mining companies to fully subscribe to the African Mining Vision which reads as 
follows:  
A transparent and inclusive mining sector that is environmentally and socially 
responsible…which provides lasting benefits to the community and pursues 
an integrated view of the rights of various stakeholders … is essential to 
addressing the adverse impacts of the mining sector and to avoid conflicts 
induced by mineral exploitation. Public participation in assessing the 
environmental and social impacts and the enforcement of impact assessment 
requirements is important in tackling these challenges.  
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In line with the literature review, findings and conclusions of this study, the 
following eight recommendations are made:  
 
1. South African diamond mining companies must appreciate that the 
definition, meaning and interpretation of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry is informed by different stakeholders’ perceptions, 
hearsay, past experiences and past corporate events and actions. There is 
not one reputation but there are many reputations, depending on who you 
talk to.  It is recommended that senior managers, including Chief Executive 
Officers responsible for corporate reputation management, continuously 
scan, document and analyse the stakeholder perceptions, experiences, 
grievances through a formalised stakeholder issues monitoring programme 
like media monitoring and grievance management mechanisms.  The 
Community Partnership Plan is recommended as a tool to facilitate 
mine/community relationships (Appendix 8) 
2. Corporate reputation is deeply embedded in the leadership of the 
organisation, some researchers claim that up to 40% of the company’s 
reputation is influenced by the CEO (Reputation Institute, 2006), the 
corporation’s legitimacy to its stakeholders and brand loyalty. This research 
recommends that it is important to appoint a CEO who has a full 
appreciation of corporate reputation, its components and key drivers of 
corporate reputation, and its significance in the diamond industry as a key 
recruitment criterion to the industry.  
 
3. The perceptions of the diamond industry remain a key challenge for the 
industry, negative statements like cartel, monopoly industry, among others, 
continue to affect the reputation of the diamond industry in South Africa. It 
is recommended that the diamond industry needs to actively manage its 
perceptions by introducing dedicated perception analysis, monitoring and 
management solutions to eradicate negative perceptions and to grow the 
positive perceptions. This study recommends that the industry requires a 
reputational facelift where it repositions its reputation among its 
stakeholders, focusing on neighbouring communities with a special focus 
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on youth groups, consumers and various international NGOs like Amnesty 
International and local NGOs like Benchmarks Foundation.   
4. A number of risks and challenges were identified as part of this study. This 
study advocates for the development of effective management responses 
and actions for each of these challenges and risks and the following 
recommendations for a number of key risks and challenges have been 
singled out:  
 In terms of addressing poverty and unemployment in the neighbouring mine 
communities, this study recommends that diamond mining companies need 
to support sustainable local economies and communities, through effective 
social investment programmes aligned with SLPs: infrastructure 
development, employee indebtedness programmes, employee housing 
development programmes, focus on creating local employment 
opportunities, facilitating preferential procurement and enterprise 
development in the local communities. It is recommended that the diamond 
mining companies need to partner with local government, provincial 
government, its suppliers and other local stakeholders to combine 
resources in addressing poverty and unemployment issues. The Socio-
Economic Assessment Toolbox presents various tools that could be used to 
facilitate these proposals. 
 On the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) concerns, it 
is recommended that the diamond industry, through the Chamber of Mines 
Diamond Producers forum, engage Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR) pro-actively in the development of the Mining Charter Three or the 
proposed amended mining charter.  Care must be taken to recommend a 
better funding model for the BEE transactions.  Appendix 7 provides an 
example of key lessons learned since 2006 and provides a comparative 
analysis of different transactions.  There is no single solution in resolving 
the challenges associated with BEE transactions in the mining industry 
since they are affected by many variables, most of which are uncontrollable 
like market price and exchange rate. 
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 In terms of Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs), it is recommended 
that the South African government, in partnership with mining companies, 
must develop BBBEE or Mining Charter guidelines to guide the formation of 
future ESOPs or the revision of the current ones.  A clear line of sight must 
be formed and these ESOPs should mature after a maximum of five years. 
There must be a lock-in mechanism in order to ensure continuous BBBEE 
or Mining Charter compliance. These ESOPs must be linked to 
organisational profitability and productivity. 
 On effectiveness of the current Mining Charter target that requires 26% 
Black ownership without clear guidelines on who should make up this 26%, 
this research recommends a combination of community participation with a 
special focus on youth, Black employee participation and selected 
industrialists (woman and people with disabilities) to form part of the 26% 
black ownership recommended.  The selected individuals must be 
committed and they must be actively involved in the day-to-day running of 
the business.   
 On the dividend policy, this study recommends that a trickle dividend policy 
must be incorporated in all future BEE transaction to ensure that some 
financial benefits flow through at least on an annual basis provided that the 
company is profitable and can afford this. 
 On employee engagement, this study recommends that mining companies 
must consider creating an employee volunteer programme which will 
enable its employees to be encouraged to do community service.  This will 
address the issues relating to the distrust between mine employees and the 
rest of the local community and the segregation between those employed 
and those unemployed in the same community. Employees must be 
encouraged to identify community projects where they, together with the 
company, could get involved.  De Beers has a good case study on this 
through its Saturday schooling project where a number of its employees 
volunteer their time to teach local youth in maths and science.  There are 
other cases where mining companies second their employees to local 
government to assist with service delivery back-locks and challenges by 
availing their technical personnel to local government 
 On the Kimberley Process (KP), this study recommends that the current KP 
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needs to be strengthened in order to incorporate issues of human rights 
abuses, intra-country trade issues as well as the requirement for KP to 
place more responsibility on the diamond companies to monitor their supply 
chain. The De Beers Best Practice Principles should be incorporated into 
the KP.  
 On environmental stewardship and responsible mine closure and 
rehabilitation, diamond mining companies are encouraged to implement 
programmes aimed at making a lasting contribution to sustainable 
development and post-closure legacy for future generations in local 
communities. It is recommended that a book by Georgina Pearman (2009) 
entitled “101 Things to do with a hole in the ground” be used as a guide in 
terms of various options to be considered as a post-mining use of “the hole 
in the ground” or the mine dumps. 
5. It is recommended that DMR must include a Community Partnership Plan 
(CPP) (Appendix 8) and a Small Business Development model (Appendix 
12) which has been developed as part of this research in the anticipated 
Mining Charter Three.  As stated in Appendix 8, the CPP must require 
mining companies to develop a comprehensive community partnership plan 
outlining the list of stakeholders in the community, community needs, 
community interventions focusing on education, rural development, housing 
development, sports and recreation, community health issues and a youth 
development plan. The Small Business Development model must require 
mining companies to invest about 3% of their mining profits to support small 
businesses in their local communities, focusing on women and youth-
owned businesses.  A special focus must be given to Local Procurement 
and Supply Chain development.  These plans must be developed together 
with local communities and be approved by DMR as part of the normal 
permission process. The Small Business Development model (see 
Appendix 12) together with the well-publicised Anglo American Zimele 
Enterprise Development Model is recommended. 
6. In terms of delivering equitable benefits for the local mine communities, this 
study recommends that the South African government must consider 
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investing at least 30% of the mining royalty payments into the mining towns.  
7. On the media relations front, this study recommends a pro-active approach 
in managing media house relations; calls for Public Relations practitioners 
to invest in building strong relations with both Tier 1 (well experienced 
journalists and editors) and Tier 2 (junior and inexperienced journalists and 
editors); expose the media to the industry by organising media visits, 
launches of insight reports and by supplying the right information; develop a 
media relations plan; show transparency in oversight of strategic decision-
making within the business and public disclosure of payments to 
governments through taxes, royalties and charges. 
8. Lastly, in terms of the level of awareness and the effectiveness of various 
diamond industry initiatives aligned with world best practice principles to 
manage corporate reputation and other commercial success, this study 
recommends that the diamond industry corporate reputation practitioners 
must put in place tools to evaluate the success of these initiatives and 
implement an aggressive promotion or marketing plan in order to 
communicate these initiatives to all stakeholders with a special focus on 
consumers, local communities, DMR and media houses. 
8.3 Contributions to knowledge made by this study 
 
The major contributions made by this study can be divided into three major 
implications, which are managerial, policy and theoretical implications. 
The managerial contributions are various tools for the identification of key 
reputational issues backed by real life examples, as well as the management tools 
and various approaches to managing corporate reputation in the diamond industry 
and in the wider mining industry in South Africa.  
On the empirical contributions, this study provides an acceptable definition of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry in South Africa, identifies key 
components of corporate reputation and key drivers of corporate reputation, as 
well as key risks facing the diamond industry, including perceptions. It determines 
the effects of corporate reputation and concludes by making several 
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recommendations and management actions to manage corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry in South Africa. 
On the theoretical side, it is widely acknowledged that corporate reputation and 
public relations scholars have periodically expressed frustrations with the difficulty 
of describing and measuring the effects of corporate reputation in the mining 
industry (Benchmark Foundation, 2009; Davis & Franks, 2014; Lussier, 2014).  
Many scholars have written extensively about the growing concerns among mine 
communities, governments and other stakeholders regarding the adverse social 
and environmental impacts as a result of mining activities in the sub-Saharan 
countries and the need for mining companies to obtain social license to operate 
(Parsons et al, 2014; Owen & Kemp, 2013).  This thesis has examined the 
meaning of corporate reputation in the diamond industry from a multi-stakeholder 
perspective including key components, drivers and various perceptions of the 
diamond industry. This study has resulted in the development of a number of 
theoretical models and guidelines that will go a long way in guiding Public 
Relations practitioners, academics and other stakeholders to understand the 
diamond industry’s corporate reputation in South Africa.  Key theoretical 
contributions to the corporate reputation literature include: definition of corporate 
reputation, key components of corporate reputation and various key drivers, 
current and future reputational risks and challenges, effects of corporate 
reputation and various recommendations for corporate reputation management. In 
terms of practical tools and models, those contributions include the recommended 
key considerations in funding BEE mining transactions to ensure immediate and 
equitable benefits for the BEE companies (Appendix 7); community partnership 
plans to assist mining companies in improving their engagements with local 
communities (Appendix 8); the government relations framework to guide effective 
and win-win engagement between mining companies and all their key 
stakeholders (Appendix 9); and lastly the small business development framework 
which is informed by the extensive experience in assisting neighbouring 
communities in starting small businesses (Appendix 12).  
This study is making a number of policy proposals both for the diamond 
companies and the South African government authorities.  For diamond mining 
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companies, it is stated that community relations’ policies need to be adjusted to 
reflect the clear involvement of youth groups and community based organisations 
including informal leaders.  It is also important to introduce ongoing stakeholder 
surveys.  The Social Labour Plans need to incorporate enterprise development 
programmes and the localisation of procurement spending. For the department of 
mineral resources, the mining policy of South Africa needs to revisit the provisions 
of the mining charter to expand on enterprise development and prevention of 
fronting by requiring black industrialists to actively participate in the day-to-day 
running of the mining operations.  The SLPs must emphasise a requirement for 
on-going stakeholder engagement and on-going monitoring of SLPs to ascertain 
compliance. 
In addition to the above contributions, the overall contribution to knowledge is to 
highlight the different stakeholder perspectives in the definition of corporate 
reputation and its constructs in terms of reputational components and drivers of 
corporate reputation, key perceptions of the diamond industry and its implications 
to the reputation management; to highlight key socio-economic and political 
challenges affecting the industry involving ethical governance issues, community 
wellbeing, transparency and accountability; and various management actions to 
manage the industry reputation.  These issues have highlighted the significance of 
the social license to operate theory in the diamond industry as emphasised by 
Owen and Kemp (2013) and Parsons et al (2014). This research advocates that 
obtaining and maintaining the social license to operate is a fundamental step to 
achieve corporate success in the diamond industry. 
 
This research has showed that stakeholder theory may help corporate reputation 
practitioners in the management of corporate reputation in the diamond industry.  
The combination of different approaches for the identification and classification of 
stakeholders through an informed salience (power, legitimacy, urgency, proximity 
and whether they are hateholders or faithholders), as proposed by Neville et al 
(2004) and Luoma-aho (2015), offers a more relevant, robust and useful tool for 
stakeholder management in the corporate reputation management in the diamond 
industry in South Africa. 
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8.4 Areas for Future Research 
This study focused mainly on the wider stakeholder perspectives of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry. It did not focus in detail on some of the key 
effects of positive or negative impacts of reputation. It is recommended that future 
research should focus on quantitative and qualitative impacts of reputation.  
This study did not look at the economic impacts of corporate reputation. It is 
recommended that future research should evaluate the relationship between 
positive or high reputation and the price that consumers are willing to pay.   
The cost of building corporate reputation capital for the organisation was not 
explored in this study.  This study recommends that future research should review 
the costs of building reputation in the diamond industry with special emphasis on 
promotional costs and marketing initiatives. 
More research is recommended to better understand the effects of synthetic gem 
quality as well as the recycled diamonds. 
More research is recommended to understand the anti-mining movement in South 
Africa from most of the local NGOs and several community-based organisations, 
especially youth-based organisations or various youth formations. 
More research is recommended to understand why Marikana took place in 2013, 
the occurrence of violent and sometimes brutal illegal strikes as well as the call for 
resource nationalisation in South Africa.  This study believes that not enough 
empirical research has been undertaken to better understand these issues in 
detail. 
More research is recommended to understand the community expectations and to 
review the current community development and community engagement initiatives 
including the SEAT toolbox, Social Way and Government Relations Handbook. 
More research is recommended to understand the legislative and economic 
rationale for why India dominates the cutting and polishing industry. 
More research is recommended to understand the reasons for the failure of most 
of the BEE transactions that were implemented between 2006 and 2014. 
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8.5 Weaknesses and Limitations of the study 
The main limitation relates to the fact that the data was generated using a non-
random sampling technique, which provides limited generalisability of the results 
obtained from the sample, However, the use of a mixed method approach via an 
extensive questionnaire supported by the in-depth interviews, document analysis 
and focus group workshop ameliorate this limitation and therefore is not likely to 
have an impact on the findings.   
Another limitation is that the study is conducted in a single country, South Africa, 
therefore it does not account for possible cross-cultural variations in the 
understanding of corporate reputation in the diamond industry since South Africa 
only accounts for only 5% of the diamond industry’s rough diamond production. It 
is believed that the in-depth semi-structured interviews with global experts in the 
diamond industry, goes a long way to address this limitation. 
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Appendix 1 
Historical Milestones of De Beers Consolidated Mines 
and the South African Diamond Industry  
 
Year Key Event or Development 
1871 The De Beers diamond mine was discovered in May on a farm owned 
by the De Beer brothers, and the Kimberley diamond mine in July. The 
latter would become the world’s richest mine for nearly a century. 
1887 Cecil Rhodes and Barney Barnato on an acquisition of several diamond 
mines in Kimberley. Each buying claims and shares in nearby mines. 
Each had intentions to take over all the diamond assets. In the process 
to out compete each other, they flooded the market causing diamond 
prices to plummet. A merger became the only solution to maintain 
steady demand and steady production. 
1888 The famous De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited was established on 
12 March 1888. Cecil Rhodes was named founding chairman. 
1902 The Premier Mine now called Cullinan Diamond mine Near Pretoria was 
discovered. It ultimately produced a higher number of large gem 
diamonds than any other mine. 
1905 The Cullinan diamond is discovered at the Premier Mine. At 3 106 
carats it is the largest rough diamond ever found. 
1914 The outbreak of world war causes the suspension of all mining at De 
Beers’ operations. 
1917 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer founded Anglo American Corporation initially to 
develop gold mining in South Africa as part of De Beers divestment 
strategy to other mining opportunities. 
1926 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer was knighted for his wartime effort, elected to 
the De Beers board after Anglo American, becomes a major 
shareholder.  
1928 De Beers open its first African cutting factory in Kimberley. This marked 
the beginning of diamond beneficiation in South Africa. 
1929 Sir Ernest would becomes Chairman of De Beers Consolidate Mines. 
1929 The Central Selling Organisation, as a single channel sales mechanism 
which soon took responsibility for more than 90% of the world’s rough 
diamonds. This systems was supply driven, led to the establishment of a 
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stock pile, based on centric or cartel approach, very hierarchical and 
had serious competition and legal issues. 
1932 The Great Depression deepens, demand for diamonds dried up.  De 
Beers responded by closing all its mines. 
1934 Harry Oppenheimer, son of Sir Ernest, joins the De Beers board. 
1940 World War II engulfs Europe, all De Beers mines closed for the duration.  
1940 Dr John Williamson, a Canadian geologists establishes The Williamson 
Diamond Mine, later famous for its fine pink diamonds. 
1947 Ädiamond is Forever” slogan is coined by a young copywriter at the N W 
Ayer advertising agency by the name of Frances Gerety.  This timeless 
lifetime world aclaimed slogan was recognised by Ad Age as the 
greatest advertising slogan of the 20
th
 century. 
1947 King George VI and Queen Elisabeth, and the Princesses Elisabeth and 
Margaret visited De Beers Kimberley mines and were generously 
showered with several significant diamond gifts. 
1957 Harry Oppenheimer succeeds his father as chairman of De Beers 
following the sad passing of his father. 
1966 Kimberlite, the diamond – bearing ore body, is discovered by De Beers’ 
prospectors in Northern Botswana. 
1967 Orapa Kimberlite pipe is discovered a year after Botswana gains it 
independence from Britain. Orapa pipe was the second largest pipe in 
the world covering 262 acres at the surface. 
1969 Debswana is formed. De Beers joins with the Republic of Botswana to 
establish Debswana, a 50/50 partnership to develop Orapa.  
1971 Orapa diamond mine begins its production. 
1972 Jwaneng kimberlite pipe which was hidden 150 metres underground is 
discovered by a De Beers geologists. Jwaneng soon became the 
world’s richest diamond mine. 
1982 Production begins at Jwaneng Mine in Botswana. 
1992 Venetia Mine opens in Limpopo, South Africa. It became South Africa’s 
largest diamond mine and richest diamond operation. 
1994 De Beers joins with the newly independent Republic of Namibia to form 
Namdeb – 50/50 joint venture partnership to mine the country’s 
diamond. 
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1998 Nicky Oppenheimer became Chairman of De Beers.  
1998 De Beers begin the development of diamond inscribing technology that 
would end up used in Forevermark. 
2001 De Beers Diamond Jewellers company is formed as a 50/50 joint 
partnership between De Beers and a luxury group LVMH Moet 
Hennessy Louis Vuitton.  
2002 Gary Rafle, CEO of De Beers spear-head the process to abandon the 
single selling channel selling mechanism to replace it with a demand 
driven selling strategy aligned with fair trading and legal alignement with 
competition issues. 
2003 De Beers helps establish the Kimberley process Certificate Scheme to 
stem the flow of conflict diamond. It is estimated that 100 % of De Beers’ 
diamonds are certified conflict free. 
2006 In partnership with the Government of the Republic of Botswana , De 
Beers establishes Diamopnd Trading Company short for DTC 
Botswana, a company to sort and value all Debswana production and 
support local diamond manufacturing and 99.9% of world’s diamonds. 
2006 De BeersConsolidated Mines concludes its landmark BEE transaction 
by selling its 26% shares to broadbased BEE partner Ponohalo. 
2008 Forevermark is launched in select countries with focus in the United 
States.  This brand is premised on the assertion that its diamond 
jewellery range is Rare, beautiful and responsibly sourced. 
2009 De Beers invest in a Mining Vessel called Peace in Africa and later sells 
this vessel to Namdeb. 
2011 Anglo American a majority shareholder in De Beers since 1926 , and the 
Oppenheimer family announce an agreement for Anglo American to 
acquire the family 40% share in De Beers. 
2012 De Beers becomes a subsidiary of the Anglo American group.  Anglo 
American concludes its acquisition to increase its interest in De Beers to 
85%. 
2013 De Beers Consolidated Mines sells most its mines to Petra Diamonds. 
2016 De Beers sells its Kimberley diamond mine and all its properties to 
Ekapa consortium. 
(Source: De Beers Sustainability Presentation. Internal Document, 2013) 
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Appendix 2 
Research Questionnaires 
1. General Information 
Company:  
Country:  
Email Address:  
 
2. Please choose the occupation that best describes your 
association with the Diamond Industry. 
Banking Institution 
Community Representative 
(including CBOs) 
Consumer of Diamond 
Jewelry 
Corporate Reputation 
expert 
Employee in the Diamond 
Industry 
Human Rights and other 
lobby groups 
Investor and/orBanking 
Institutions 
Labour Union 
Media House 
Potential Consumer of 
Diamonds 
Regulatory Authority 
Senior Executive in 
diamond industry 
Supplier to the Diamond 
Company 
3. Choose one statement that best describes the meaning of 
corporate reputation in the diamond industry. 
1) Corporate reputation is an overall estimation of a corporation by its 
stakeholders, which is expressed by the net effect of the reactions from 
customers, investors, employees, and the general public. 
 
2) Corporate reputation is a stakeholder’s overall evaluation of a company over 
time. This evaluation is based on the stakeholder’s direct experience with the 
company, any other form of communication and symbolism that provides 
information about the firm’s action and/or a comparison with other leading rivals. 
 
3) Corporate reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s past 
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actions, as well as future prospects, which describes the firm’s overall appeal to all 
of its key constituents/stakeholders, when compared with other leading rivals. 
 
4) Corporate reputation is the observers’ collective judgments of a corporation 
based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts 
attributed to the corporation over time. 
 
5) Corporate Reputation is public’s effective evaluation of a firm’s name relative to 
other firms. 
 
6) Corporate reputation can be defined in terms of a number of attributes that form 
a stakeholder’s perception as to whether a company is well-known, good or bad, 
reliable, trustworthy; reputable and believable. 
 
4. Listed below are the components of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry, please indicate to what extent you agree or 
disagree with the statements by circling the appropriate response. 
 
a) Corporate Legitimation is a component of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry. 
 
b) Corporate Brand is a component of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry. 
 
c) Corporate Identity is a component of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry. 
 
d) Corporate Communications is a component of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
 
e) Corporate Image is a corporate reputation in the diamond industry. 
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f) Reputation Management is a component of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
 
g) Corporate Leadership integrity is a component of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
 
h) Ethical Product stewardship is a component of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
 
i) Corporate Social Responsibility is a component in corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry. 
 
 
5. Listed below are the DRIVERS of corporate reputation in the 
diamond industry, please indicate to what extent you agree or 
disagree with the statements by circling the appropriate response. 
 
a) Fair treatment of employees is a driver of corporate reputation.b) Customer 
care is a driver of corporate reputation. 
c) Community care is a driver of corporate reputation. 
d) Profitability is a driver for corporate reputation. 
e) Compliance with National and Global Laws is a driver of corporate reputation. 
f) Conflict diamond is a driver of corporate reputation. 
g) Blood diamond is a driver of corporate reputation. 
h) Employee care is a driver of corporate reputation. 
i) Innovativeness is a driver of corporate reputation. 
j) Good relations with stakeholders is a driver of corporate reputation. 
k) Quality of product and services is a driver of corporate reputation. 
l) Strong adherence to good governance practices is a driver of corporate 
reputation. 
m) Brand presence is a driver of corporate reputation. 
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n) Environmental protection is a driver of corporate reputation. 
o) Quality of the leadership team is a key driver of corporate reputation. 
p) Beneficiation of diamonds in the producer countries is a driver of corporate 
reputation. 
q) Transparency as reflected by producing annual sustainability reports and 
financial reports is a driver to corporate reputation. 
r) Brand Profile is a driver of corporate reputation. 
s) Clear company vision and strategic goals are the drivers of corporate 
reputation. 
t) Community investment is a driver of corporate reputation. 
 
6. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the 
following perceptions of the diamond industry.  
 
a) Non-co-operative 
b) Customer orientated 
c) Highly motivated employees 
d) Unethical 
e) Irresponsible 
f) High quality standards 
g) Good leadership 
h) Untrustworthy 
i) World Class industry 
j) Internationally respected 
k) Illicit industry 
l) Contributes to millennium goals 
m) Associated with mass human degradation 
n) Good for Africa's Growth 
o) Secretive industry 
p) Investment heaven 
q) Caring industry 
r) Contributes to human rights abuses 
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s) Ethical 
7. Compliance with Global Best-Practice principles and criteria is 
important in managing corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with 
the following statements in the diamond industry by circling the 
appropriate response. 
a) The diamond industry shares a belief that the prudent use of natural 
resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic 
growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty 
reduction. 
 
b) The diamond industry recognizes that management of natural resource 
wealth for the benefit of a country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign 
governments to be exercised in the interests of their national 
development. 
c) The diamond Industry recognizes that the benefits of diamond mining 
occur as revenue streams over many years and can be highly price-
dependent. 
d) The diamond Industry recognizes that a public understanding of 
government revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate 
and inform choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable 
development. 
e) The diamond Industry embraces the importance of transparency by 
governments and companies and the need to enhance public financial 
management and accountability. 
f) The diamond industry recognizes the enhanced environment for domestic 
and foreign direct investment that financial transparency may bring. 
g) The diamond Industry believes in the principle and practice of 
accountability by government to all citizens for the stewardship of revenue 
streams and public expenditure. 
h) The diamond industry believes that, in seeking solutions, all stakeholders 
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have important and relevant contributions to make. 
 
8. Listed below are the key current and future global reputational 
risks or challenges in the diamond industry that could affect the 
reputation of the diamond industry, please indicate to what extent 
you agree or disagree with the key risks as stated by circling the 
appropriate response. 
 
1. Labour unrest is an important risk. 
2. Perceived Worker exploitation is an important risk. 
3. Diamond theft is an important risk. 
4. Rise of illegal diamond trade is an important risk. 
5. Mine closures leading to adverse impacts to rural communities and environment is an 
important risk. 
6. Lack of beneficiation in the producer countries is an important risk. 
7. Increase of artisanal mining is an important risk. 
8. Reduced supply of global gem quality diamonds because profitable reserves are being 
depleted with little progress in finding new viable diamond mines is an  
important risk. 
9 Human rights abuses is an important risk. 
10. Restricted supply of energy is an important risk. 
 
11. Retention of talent in the diamond industry is an important risk. 
12. Continued uncertainty about the resilience of global economy is an important risk. 
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13. Industry liquidity – the debt levels in the cutting centres are still much higher than the 
norm is an important risk. 
14. Cautious lending by the banks and other investors is an important risk. 
15. Collapse of the Kimberley Process is an important risk. 
16. Expected increase in the cost of financing the diamond industry is an important risk. 
17. Foreign exchange rate volatility – the large fluctuations of Southern African. 
currencies vs US$, the commonly used unit of sale in the industry, is an important  
risk. 
18. Negative Publicity through media pressure is an important risk. 
19. Lack of contribution to local economies is an important risk. 
20. Rise of Monopoly players is an important risk. 
21. Political instability within the producer countries is an important risk. 
22. Tough regulatory regimes regulating the diamond trade and mining including  
retail is an important risk. 
23. Nationalisation of diamond mines by the producer countries is an important risk. 
24. Increased NGO scrutiny of the diamond pipeline is an important risk. 
25. Conflict diamonds is an important risk. 
26. Blood diamonds is an important risk. 
27. Environmental destruction is an important risk. 
28. Affordability of diamonds is an important risk. 
 
29. Problems in exporting diamonds from producer countries is an important risk. 
30. The rise of synthetics as an acceptable alternative to natural diamonds is an 
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important  
risk. 
31. Increased demand base globally is an important risk. 
32 China becoming the biggest market for diamonds in the world by 2015 is an 
important  
risk. 
33. Several African countries affected with Mineral Wars is an important risk. 
34. Increased state control in the producer countries is an important risk. 
35. Increasing unemployment within the value chain of the diamond industry is an  
important risk. 
36. Introduction of the recycling of diamonds because of shortage is an important risk. 
37. Rehabilitation of Mines is an important risk. 
38. Strict competition Laws is an important risk. 
39. Artificial inflation of diamond value is an important risk. 
40. Increased greediness is an important risk. 
41. Increase in the gap between those who have and the have-nots where diamonds 
are mined is an important risk. 
42. The diamond industry’stainted public image is an important risk. 
43. Increased cost of water is an important risk. 
44. Increased manufacturing costs within the major cutting centres is an important risk. 
45. Exploitation of the 3rd world is an important risk. 
46. Illegal diamond mining and trading is an important risk. 
47. Violent crime is an important risk. 
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48. Worsening safety incidents is an important risk. 
 
 
9. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the 
following statements relating to the positive effects of corporate 
reputation in the diamond industry by circling the appropriate 
response 
 
a) Positive corporate reputation will ensure that employees get motivated, 
hard working and become better ambassadors of the organisation who will 
speak proactively andpositively about the organisation. 
 
b) Positive corporate reputation will enable employees to be fully engaged and 
to be emotional attached to the organisation. 
 
c) Positive corporate reputation contributes to attraction and retention of 
customers in the diamond retail outlets thereby ensuring repeat custom. 
 
d) Positive corporate reputation fosters positive word-of-mouth promotion and 
improved customer loyalty. 
 
e) Positive corporate reputation has many benefits for the firm, such as 
increased consumer loyalty, enhanced firm reputation, reduced price 
elasticity, lower cost of future transactions, and higher employee efficiency 
and loyalty. 
 
f) Positive corporate reputation will instil consumer confidence in such a way 
that synthetics or un-natural diamonds will not have the same emotional 
and financial value as diamonds because the value of diamonds is 
inextricably linked to how they were naturally formed billions of years ago. 
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g) Positive corporate reputation provides advantages in conducting 
negotiations with stakeholders. 
 
h) Positive CEO reputation plays a significant role in attracting more investors, 
clients, work applicants and trust in the corporate decisions of a diamond 
company. 
 
i) Positive corporate reputation helps enhance competitive advantage, by 
differentiating the company in the marketplace. 
 
j) Positive corporate reputation increases customer confidence in products 
and services, advertising claims and in the buying decision. 
 
k) Positive corporate reputation facilitate better access to capital markets, 
which has a direct impact on decreasing the capital cost and lowering 
procurement rates. 
 
l) Positive corporate reputation with effective communication programmes will 
Strengthen employee morale (especially during difficult times), thereby 
enhancing productivity and ultimately profitability. 
 
m) Banks, asset managers and term assurers are screening their 
shareholdings in favour of companies that demonstrate commitment to 
social and environmental programmes, and against those that are 
associated with activities deemed detrimental and unethical to society and 
to the environment. 
 
n) A favourable reputation with employees can help attract better staff, spur 
productivity and enhance profitability. 
 
o) Good corporate reputation held by a firm’s stakeholders is understood as 
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reputational capital. This capital is claimed to contribute to reduced 
transaction costs, employee loyalty, easier recruitment and general 
legitimacy of the organisation 
 
p) Positive reputation can establish, protect and enhance competitive position, 
while a tarnished reputation can set an enterprise on a cycle of decline 
through high labour turnover and lower morale 
 
q) Positive reputation will allow seller organisations to charge higher 
premiums. In other words, the high corporate reputation of an exchange 
partner will result in the ability to command premium price during the 
transaction. 
 
r) Positive corporate reputation reduces information asymmetries between 
buyers and sellers, and thereby allows buyers to reduce uncertainty and 
concerns about their product or service quality. 
 
s) Positive corporate reputation enables the diamond companies to project 
their core mission and identity in a more systematic and consistent fashion 
than those with negative corporate reputation. 
 
t) Positive corporate reputation leads to higher prices during the auctioning of 
diamond jewellery. 
 
u) Positive corporate reputation facilitates better relationships with key 
external stakeholders, i.e. media, analysts, communities, opinion formers, 
non-governmental organisations (NGO’s). 
 
v) Positive corporate reputation contributes to reduced marketing costs to 
ensure rapid global growth coupled with zero advertising with reliance on 
experience based on word of mouth. 
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w) Positive corporate reputation provides a buffer zone of reputational capital 
to insulate against unintentional failures, i.e. economic crisis; 
retrenchments; etc. 
 
x) Positive reputation brings increased sales, but does not always enable 
companies to charge premium prices for the goods or services. 
 
y) Positive corporate reputation does not affect financial performance nor does 
financial performance affect reputation, as a result there is no causal 
relationship between corporate reputation and financial performance (in either 
direction). 
 
10. Listed below are the key programmes or interventions that the 
diamond industry has implemented in managing key reputational 
issues in the diamond industry. Please indicate the level of your 
awareness of the following programmes or interventions by circling 
the appropriate response (whether a great deal, a fair amount, just a 
little or nothing at all)  
 
 
a) The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the voluntarily system of 
warranties for guaranteeing the ethical supply of diamonds. 
 
b) The Diamond Development Initiative to assist artisanal miners. 
 
c) Beneficiation projects in the Producer Countries. 
 
d) Social Investments in the diamond producing countries averaging at 1% of 
net profit after tax. 
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e) Implementation of the Diamond Trading Co - Diamond Best Practice 
Principles. 
 
f) Win – Win partnerships with Producer Countries Governments. 
 
g) Compliance with Rapaport Fair Trade Principles. 
 
h) The Council for Responsible Jewellery Practice Code of Practice to drive 
business ethics in the diamond industry. 
 
i) The Responsible Jewelry Council (RJC) has implemented its Certification 
System that will certify its members for responsible ethical, social and 
environmental practices in the diamond jewellery supply chain. 
 
j) Greater Transparency of diamond companies in terms of payments to 
governments, taxes paid, contracts and credibility with stakeholders 
through their sustainability reports. 
 
k) Eradication of corruption initiative in most major diamond producing 
countries 
l) Eradication of Human Rights abuses initiative in most major diamond 
producing countries. 
 
m) Adherence to world class safety standards. 
 
n) Effective risk management systems. 
 
o) Effective Community Engagement Programmes with regular engagements 
with community leaders and various authorities. 
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11. How effective would you say the following diamond industry 
initiatives are in resolving the reputational issues around the world 
(whether not at all effective, not effective, fairly effective, very 
effective or I don’t know) 
 
a) The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the voluntarily system of 
warranties for guaranteeing the ethical supply of diamonds. 
 
b) The Diamond Development Initiative to assist artisanal miners. 
 
c) Beneficiation projects in the Producer Countries. 
 
d) Social Investments in the diamond producing countries averaging at 1% of 
net profit after tax. 
 
e) Implementation of the Diamond Trading Co - Diamond Best Practice 
Principles. 
 
f) Win – Win partnerships with Producer Countries Governments. 
 
g) Compliance with Rappaport Fair Trade Principles. 
 
h) The Council for Responsible Jewellery Practice Code of Practice to drive 
business ethics in the diamond industry. 
 
i) The Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) has implemented its Certification 
System that will certify its members for responsible ethical, social and 
environmental practices in the diamond jewellery supply chain. 
 
j) Greater Transparency of diamond companies in terms of payments to 
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governments, taxes paid, contracts and credibility with stakeholders 
through their sustainability reports. 
 
k) Eradication of corruption initiative in most major diamond producing 
countries 
l) Eradication of Human Rights abuses initiative in most major diamond 
producing countries. 
 
m) Adherence to world class safety standards. 
 
n) Effective risk management systems. 
 
o) Effective Community Engagement Programmes with regular engagements 
with community leaders and various authorities. 
 
12. Listed below are the key statements demonstrating some key 
considerations that consumers take into account before making a 
purchasing decision for diamond jewellery. Please rank your order 
of preference from priority number 1 to priority number 11 by 
circling the appropriate response.  
 
a) Consumers of diamond jewellery want a high level of assurance that the 
product they buy is associated with community upliftment, compliance with 
human rights and environmental care as a reference point before making a 
purchase. 
 
b) The price of the product is the major reference point for diamond jewellery 
purchasing decisions. 
 
c) Consumers want fewer, better things - things that will last and can be 
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passed on to the younger generation, and are durable. This is a major point 
of reference in making a jewellery purchasing decision. 
 
d) Discovery of something new is the major consideration affecting the 
purchasing decision. 
e) Consumers desire a return to ‘true luxury’ For example, something that is 
handmade, with a personalized level of detail and genuinely exclusive is a 
major point of reference for diamond jewellery purchasing decisions. 
 
f) Rarity of the object is a major point of reference for diamond jewellery 
purchasing decisions. 
 
g) The promise of high quality in terms of technical and functional value is a 
major point of reference for diamond jewellery purchasing decisions. 
 
h) Diamond jewelry consumers are asking for certification and guarantees 
(which) need to be provided by a neutral, respectable third party that comes 
with impeccable credentials.This is a major point of reference for diamond 
jewellery purchasing decisions. 
 
i) Pleasure of the purchase or purchase excitement. 
 
j) Diamond jewellery consumers have a growing interest in the details of the 
story behind their purchase – where the product was sourced and how it 
was made is a major point of reference for diamond jewellery purchasing 
decisions. 
 
k) Emotional value is a point of reference for diamond jewellery purchasing 
decisions. 
 
13. Listed below are the key measures that can be used to measure 
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corporate reputation. Using the following scale, please indicate to 
what extent you agree or disagree with the statements by circling 
the appropriate response 
 
a) Emotional appeal (have a good feeling about the company, admire and 
respect, and trust the company a great deal). 
 
b) The companyhas excellent leadership, has clear vision for its future and it 
recognizes and takes market opportunities. 
 
c) The workplace environment is well managed. The company looks after its 
people. It is a good company to work for and it has good employees). 
d) Product and services. (The company develops innovative products and 
services, offers high value for money and high quality products and 
services). 
 
e) Social and environmental responsibility. (The company supports good 
causes.It is environmentally responsible and it, maintains high standards in 
the way it treats people). 
 
f) Financial performance. (The company has a strong record of profitability, 
strong prospects for growth, and excellent performance against its rivals). 
 
14. Thank you for completing the survey 
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Appendix 3 Lists of Codes 
 
Appendix 3A 
List of Codes and Associated Definition: Definition of Corporate Reputation 
at its Constructs 
CODE TYPE CODE DEFINITION THEME 
Master code  CB Corporate Brand Brand status 
 Sub-
code 
CBE Corporate Brand Equity Brand status 
Master code  CRL Community Relations Community Views 
Master code  CC Corporate Citizenship Doing good in the 
community 
Master code  CI Corporate Identity Identity 
Master code  CIM Corporate Image Image 
Master code  CP Corporate Personality Identity 
Master code  CSR Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
Master code  CL Corporate Legitimation Legitimacy 
Master code  CR Corporate Reputation Reputation 
 Sub-
code 
CR-A Corporate Reputation -
Assessment 
Assessment 
 Sub-
code 
CR-P Corporate Reputation - 
Perceptions 
Perceptions 
 Sub-
code 
CR-I Corporate Reputation - 
Intangible 
Asset 
 Third 
level 
code 
CR-I - R Corporate Reputation – 
Intangible - Resource 
Asset 
Master code  CG Corporate Governance Authenticity 
Master code  EW Employee Well being Employee care 
Master code  FP Financial Performance Profitability 
Master code  QL Quality Leadership Credibility 
Master code  SP Safe Production Safety First 
Master code  SAV Shareholder Activism Confidence 
Master code  SL Social License Acceptance 
 Sub-
code 
SL-O Social License – to 
Operate 
Legitimacy 
Master code  SR Stakeholder Relations Relations 
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Appendix 3B 
List of Codes and Associated Definition: Key Perceptions of the Diamond 
Industry 
CODE TYPE CODE DEFINITION  
Master 
code 
 AP Alternatives Products  Alternatives 
 Sub-
code 
AP-S Alternatives Products - 
Synthetics 
Synthetics 
 Sub-
code 
AP-O Alternatives Products – other 
Luxury Brands 
Branded 
Products 
Master 
code 
 BD Blood Diamond Conflict 
Diamonds 
Master 
code 
 CI Caring Industry Caring or non-
caring 
 Sub-
code 
CI-P Caring Industry-People Show we care 
Third level 
code 
 CI-P-E Caring Industry-People-Earth Nurturing 
Master 
code 
 CC Community Care Community 
Benefits 
Master 
code 
 CMC Compliant with Mining Charter Compliant or 
Non-compliant 
Master 
code 
 ED Environment Degradation  Environmental 
Stewardship 
Master 
code 
 EAS Epitome of Apartheid System Racial 
Discrimination 
Master 
Code 
 HRA Human Rights Abuses Human rights 
 Sub-
code 
HRA-CL Human Rights Abuse – Child 
Labor 
Child Labor 
Master 
code 
 IT Illicit Trading Illicit 
Master 
Code 
 IC Irresponsible Corporate Compliant or 
Non-compliant 
Master 
code 
 CMC  Non-compliant with Mining 
Charter 
Compliant or 
Non-compliant 
Master 
code 
 PC Partner of Choice Partnerships 
Master 
Code 
 PL Poor Leadership Credibility 
Master 
Code 
 RI Responsible Corporate Compliant or 
Non-compliant 
Master  SI Secretive Industry Secretive 
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Code 
Master 
Code 
 SL Strong Leadership Authentic 
Master 
Code 
 TI Transparent Industry Transparent 
Master 
Code 
 GTN Ghost Town Legacy 
 
 
Appendix 3C 
List of Codes and Associated Definition: Key Risks and Challenges 
Affecting the Diamond Industry 
CODE TYPE CODE DEFINITION THEME 
Master 
code 
 ARP Access to Rough 
Production 
Access by prospective 
new entrants to the 
industry 
Master 
code 
 BN Beneficiation Localization 
Master 
code 
 BD Blood Diamonds Association with wars 
and human rights abuses 
Master 
code 
 CT Carbon Tax Green tax 
Master 
code 
 CC Climate Change Climate Change 
Master 
code 
 CI Community impacts Community Benefits from 
the mine activities 
 Sub-code CI-P Community impact-
poverty 
Poverty 
 Third level 
code 
CI-P-U Community impact-
poverty-unemployment 
Un-employment 
 Third level 
code 
CI-P-U-I Community impact-
poverty-unemployment-
inequality 
Inequality 
Master 
Code 
 CR Community Relations Strained relations 
 Sub-code CR-P Community Relations 
Positive 
Positive Relations with 
communities 
 Sub-code CR-N Community Relations 
Negative 
Negative Relations with 
communities 
Master 
code 
 CD Conflict Diamonds Blood Diamonds 
Master 
code 
 CC Consumer Confidence Kimberley Process 
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Master 
code 
 CCZ Corporate Citizenship Doing Good 
Master 
code 
 CSD Competition from 
Synthetic Diamonds 
Rise of synthetics 
Master 
code 
 CR Competition from 
Recycled Diamonds 
Rise of recycled 
diamonds 
Master 
code 
 CP Cutting and Polishing Beneficiation 
 Sub-code CP-B Cutting and Polishing - 
beneficiation 
Beneficiation 
 Third level 
code 
CP-L Cutting and Polishing – 
localization 
Beneficiation 
Master 
code 
 DP Developmental Price Beneficiation 
Master 
code 
 DS Diamond Security Illegal Trade 
Master 
code 
 FT Fronting Transformation 
Master 
code 
 GT Ghost Towns Legacy 
Master 
code 
 GE Global Economic Globalization 
 Sub-code GE-G Global Economic - 
Growth 
Globalization 
 Sub-code GE-D Global Economic - 
Depression 
Economic Recession 
Master 
code 
 ICE Illegal Mining Security  
Master 
code 
 !C Increasing Community 
Expectations 
Un-employment 
Master 
code 
 IM Investor Confidence Confidence 
Master 
code 
 JL Job – Losses Un-employment 
 Sub-code JL-I Job – Losses - Increase Un-employment 
 Third level 
code 
JL-I-U Job – Losses – Increase 
–Un-employment 
Un-employment 
 Third level 
code 
JL-I-U-P Job – Losses – Increase 
– Un-employment - 
Poverty 
Un-employment and 
Poverty 
Master 
code 
 LC Land Claims Community Conflict 
Master  MD Market Dynamics Consumerism 
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code 
 Sub-code MD-C Market Dynamics –Rise 
of China 
Social media 
 Sub-code MD-USA Market Dynamics – 
Reduced Sales in USA 
Globalization 
Master 
code 
 ML Money Laundering Laundering 
Master 
code 
 PI Production Integrity Confidence 
Master 
code 
 RU Regulatory 
Uncertainties 
Unpredictable 
regulatory environment 
Master 
code 
 RN Resource Nationalism Youth Activism 
Master 
code 
 SD Shortage of Diamonds Limited Supply 
Master 
code 
 YA Youth Activism Youth Activism 
 Sub-code YA-V Youth Activism-Violent - Youth involvement 
 Third level 
code 
YA-V-CU Youth Activism-Violent-
Community Unrest 
Youth Activism 
Master 
code 
 WE World Economy Globalization 
Appendix 3D 
List of Codes and Associated Definition: Effects of Reputation 
CODE TYPE CODE DEFINITION  
Master 
Code 
 CE Community Engagement Community 
Involvement 
 Sub-code CE-H Community Engagement - High Community 
Involvement 
 Sub-code CE-L Community Engagement - Low Community 
Involvement 
Master 
code 
 CI Community impacts Community 
Benefits 
 Sub-code CI-P Community impact-poverty Community 
Development 
 Third level 
code 
CI-P-U Community impact-poverty-
unemployment 
Community 
Development 
 Third level 
code 
CI-P-U-I Community impact-poverty-
unemployment-inequality 
Community 
Development 
Master 
Code 
 CR Community Relations Community 
Relationships 
 Sub-code CR-P Community Relations Positive Community 
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Relationships 
 Sub-code CR-N Community Relations Negative Community 
Relationships 
Master 
code 
 CI Consumer impact Consumer 
confidence 
 Sub-code CI-PD Consumer impact-purchasing 
decision  
Purchasing 
Decisions 
 Third level 
code 
CI-PD-N Consumer impact-purchasing 
decision-negative 
Purchasing 
Decisions 
 Third level 
code 
CI-PD-P Consumer impact-purchasing 
decision-positive 
Purchasing 
Decisions 
Master 
Code 
 CR Corporate Reputation Reputation 
capital 
 Sub-code CR-P Corporate Reputation-Positive Reputation 
capital 
 Sub-code CR-N Corporate Reputation-Negative Reputation 
capital 
 Sub-code CR-D Corporate Reputation Damage Reputation 
capital 
 Sub-code CR-R Corporate Reputation-
Responsiveness 
Reputation 
Management 
Master 
Code 
 DE Deep Emotions Trust 
 Sub-code DE-CO Deep Emotional-Connection Trust 
 Third level 
code 
DE-CO-
EX 
Deep Emotional-Connection-
Expression 
Trust 
Master 
code 
 EE Employee engagement Employee 
value 
proposition 
 Sub-code EE-P Employee engagement - 
positive 
Employee 
value 
proposition 
 Sub-code EE-N Employee engagement -
negative 
Employee 
value 
proposition 
Master 
Code 
 EC Ethical Consumerism Brand Equity 
 Sub-code EC-PB Ethical Consumerism –Product 
Boycotts 
Brand Equity 
 Sub-code EC-PP Ethical Consumerism – Product 
Promotion 
Brand Equity 
Master 
code 
 FP Financial Performance Sound 
financial 
performance 
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 Sub-code FP-P Financial Performance - 
Profitability 
Financial 
Success 
 Sub-code FP-L Financial Performance - Loss Financial 
Success 
Master 
code 
 GR Government Relations Engagement 
with regulators 
 Sub-code GR-P Government Relations - Positive Engagement 
with regulators 
 Sub-code GR-N Government Relations –
Negative 
Engagement 
with regulators 
Master 
code 
 IR Industrial Relations Unionism 
 Sub-code IR-C Industrial Relations - 
Challenging 
Unionism 
 Third level 
code 
IR-C-V Industrial Relations – 
Challenging - Violent 
Unionism 
Master 
code 
 IC Investor confidence Investor 
comfort 
 Sub-code IC-M Investor confidence-maintained Investor 
comfort 
 Sub-code IC-S Investor confidence-secured Investor 
comfort 
 Sub-code IC-L Investor confidence-lost Investor dis-
comfort 
Master 
code 
 KP Kimberley Process Product 
stewardship 
 Sub-code KP-A Kimberley Process-Approval Kimberley 
Process 
 Sub-code KP-D Kimberley Process -Disapproval Kimberley 
Process 
Main 
code 
 LR Land Restitution Legacy 
 Sub-code LR- Land Restitution-Redistribution Legacy 
Master 
code 
 LG Luxury Goods Brand equity 
Master 
code 
 LB Luxury Brands Brand equity 
Master 
code 
 MD Market Dynamics Globalization 
 Sub-code MD-C Market Dynamics –Rise of 
China 
China Effect 
 Sub-code MD-USA Market Dynamics – Reduced 
Sales in USA 
China Effect 
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Master 
code 
 MC Mining Charter Compliance 
reviews 
 Sub-code MC-T Mining Charter Target Compliance 
 Third level 
code 
MC-C Mining Charter Compliance Compliance 
 Third level 
code 
MC-NC Mining Charter-Non-
.Compliance 
Compliance 
Master 
code 
 PS Product and Services Product and 
Services 
 Sub-code PS-Q Product and Services - quality Quality  
 Third level 
code 
PS-Q-P Product and Services –quality - 
price 
Prize 
 Third level 
code 
PS-Q-P Product and Services –quality-
price-experience 
Appeal and 
Experience 
Master 
code 
 SL Social License Stakeholder 
approval 
 Sub-code SL-O Social License -to Operate Legitimacy 
 Third level 
code 
SL-OA Social License-to Operate - 
approval 
Acceptance 
 Third level 
code 
SL-OD Social License-to Operate – dis-
approval 
Illegitimacy 
Master 
Code 
 STR Stakeholder Relations Partnering 
 Sub-code STR-N Stakeholder Relations- Negative Engagements 
 Third level 
code 
STR-P Stakeholder Relations-Positive Engagements 
Master 
Code 
 SD Synthetic Diamonds Competition 
 Sub-code SD-G Synthetic Diamonds - Growth Competition 
 Sub-code SD- D Synthetic Diamonds - Decline Competition 
Master 
code 
 YI Youth impact Youth 
involvement 
 Sub-code YI-U Youth impact-unhappiness Youth 
Activism 
Third 
level 
code 
 YI-U-V Youth impact-unhappiness-
violence 
Youth 
Activism 
Third 
level 
code 
 YI-U-V-D Youth impact-unhappiness-
violence-disruptions 
Youth 
Activism 
Third 
level 
code 
 YI-U-V-
D 
Youth impact-unhappiness-
violence-disruptions 
Youth 
Activism 
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Appendix 3E 
List of Codes and Associated Definition: Reputation Management 
CODE TYPE  CODE DEFINITION THEME 
Master 
code 
 BE Brand Equity Brand Awareness 
 Sub-
code 
BEI Brand Equity Impact Brand Status 
Master 
code 
 CA Community Activism Community Action 
Master 
Code 
 CAl Community Appeal Community Action 
Master 
code 
 CE Community Engagement Community 
Engagement 
 Sub-
code 
CEP Community Engagement Plans  
Master 
code 
  Consumer Expectations Purchasing 
Decision 
Master 
code 
 CC Corporate Citizenship Doing Good 
Master 
code 
 CSR Corporate Social Responsibility Review Social and 
Environmental 
Responsibility 
Master 
code 
 CL Corporate Legitimation Social License 
Master 
code 
 CR Corporate Reputation Reputation 
management 
 Sub-
code 
CR-A Corporate Reputation -
Assessment 
Reputation 
management 
 Sub-
code 
CR-P Corporate Reputation - 
Perceptions 
Reputation 
management 
 Sub-
code 
CR-I Corporate Reputation -  Governance 
Master 
code 
 CG Corporate Governance Reputation 
management 
Master 
code 
 CM Crises Management Crises Management 
Master 
code 
 EW Employee Wellbeing Employee Value 
Proposition 
Master 
code 
 FP Financial Performance Financial Review 
Master 
code 
 QL Quality Leadership Leadership 
credibility 
Master  RM Risk Management Risk Management 
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code 
Master 
code 
 SL Social License Acceptance and 
stakeholder 
approval 
 Sub-
code 
SL-O Social License – to Operate Acceptance and 
stakeholder 
approval 
Master 
code 
 SR Stakeholder Relations Stakeholder 
Management 
 Sub-
code 
SRI Stakeholder Relations - 
Identification 
Acceptance and 
stakeholder 
approval 
 Sub-
code 
SRM Stakeholder Relations - Mapping Acceptance and 
stakeholder 
approval 
 Sub-
code 
SRE Stakeholder Relation 
Engagement 
Acceptance and 
stakeholder 
approval 
 Third 
level 
code 
SREP Stakeholder Relations 
Engagement Plan 
Acceptance and 
stakeholder 
approval 
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Appendix 4 
Invitation Letter to potential respondents 
 
Dear Respondent 
 
CORPORATE REPUTATION IN THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY. 
I am conducting an independent study on Corporate Reputation within the 
diamond industry as part of my PhD research. The purpose of this doctoral study, 
conducted under the auspices of the Business School at the University of 
Witwaterand, in South Africa is to describe various constructs of corporate 
reputation, identify key short and long-term reputational risks, evaluate the effects 
of corporate reputation from various stakeholder perspective and recommend 
effective measures that can be used to manage corporate reputation within the 
diamond industry. 
 
Please take a few moments to complete this electronic questionnaire, which 
should not take longer than 40 minutes of your valuable time by not later than 20 
April 2011.  To complete the survey, please click 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5YBPPCB. or alternatively please copy and 
paste this link onto your internet browser. All information you provide will be strictly 
confidential and your privacy will be protected.   
 
Should you wish to receive a summary of the research findings and the 
managerial implications, or be invited to attend a presentation of the findings 
please indicate so by providing your e-mail address in the space provided. 
 
Thank you in advance for your time and willingness to participate. Your valued 
contribution will provide the diamond industry with empirically tested insight on 
how to implement effective corporate reputation programme. 
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Yours regards 
SakhileNgcobo 
Executive Head of External and Corporate Affairs 
De Beers South Africa 
Cell: +27 82 806 1394 
Tell: +2711 – 3747974 
Email: sakhile.ngcobo@debeersgroup.com 
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Appendix 5 
Interview Protocol 
 
Corporate Reputation in the Diamond Industry in South Africa 
 
Details of the respondent 
Name: 
Title: 
Organization: 
Contact details: 
Email Address: 
 
Opening Statement to Respondent  
 
The reputation of the diamond industry is faced with many challenges. Over the 
last few years, it has experienced a number of turbulences world-wide including 
the launch of the Blood Diamond movie, consumer boycotts, introduction of 
synthetic diamonds, restructuring of the diamond operations in South Africa, 
unprecedented mine strikes, several community disruptions, demands by South 
African governments for mining companies to comply with Mining charter targets.   
 
The purpose of this research is to describe various constructs of corporate 
reputation; identify key reputational challenges and risks; evaluate key effects of 
corporate reputation; and finally review the effectiveness and relevance of the 
existing corporate reputation management initiatives in the diamond industry in 
South Africa. 
 
Background question 
 
Provide a short background about the diamond industry, with special focus on 
mining, cutting and retail (luxury status) 
 
Interview questions  
 
What is your definition of corporate reputation in the diamond industry based on 
your experience? 
What are the key components and drivers of corporate reputation in the diamond 
industry? 
What are your perceptions of the diamonds industry? 
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What is the perceived level of compliance of the industry against global industry 
best practices? 
 
What are the key current and future (2030) reputational issues in the diamond 
industry? 
 
Is the industry doing something to address these issues and how effective are 
those interventions? 
 
What are the key effects of corporate reputation in the diamond industry in your 
experience?  
 
 Employee engagement, talent attraction and retention? 
 Purchase decisions for luxury goods? 
 Customer attraction and loyalty? 
 Attracting and retaining investor relations and confidence? 
 Corporate social responsibility or corporate citizenship?  
 
 
 
  
434 | P a g e  
Appendix 6 
South African Stakeholder Views on Nationalisation of 
Mines 
Name  Institution Designation Date Comment Stance 
Susan 
Shabangu 
 
DMR 
 
Minister  
 
Novembe
r 2011 
 
 
“No matter how often our 
government states the obvious, 
that nationalisation is neither 
South African government policy, 
nor is it ANC policy; the 
controversies and potential fears 
do not seem to disappear” 
Against  
Jacob 
Zuma 
Governmen
t 
President October 
2011 
South Africa is committed to a 
free market economy but that in a 
democracy one cannot stifle 
debate 
Against 
Susan 
Shabangu 
DMR Minister October 
2011 
"Based on the feedback from 
various sources, including 
meetings during the road shows 
and promotional activities, there is 
no evidence that there is a trend 
of disinvestment due to the 
nationalisation debate” 
Against 
Kgalema 
Motlanthe 
Governmen
t 
Deputy 
President 
October 
2011 
“When Malema says the mining 
companies are making huge 
profits and if we nationalise them 
these profits will address our 
issues, our plight, the young 
people hear that. That’s the only 
message they hear” 
Against 
Julius 
Malema 
ANCYL President October 
2011 
The impending disciplinary action 
against him would not distract him 
from fighting for the 
nationalisation of mines. 
For 
Matthews 
Phosa 
ANC Secretary 
General 
October 
2011 
"The ideal deal ... would not only 
ensure that profitable companies 
such as yours further expand their 
activities and create jobs, but also 
address the substantial 
challenges faced by government 
to create new jobs and hasten the 
process towards increased social 
cohesion and security." 
For 
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Enoch 
Godongwa
na 
Nationalisat
ion task 
team 
Head Septembe
r 2011 
 In some circumstances national 
interest must prevail over those of 
private companies when it comes 
to exporting minerals. 
For 
Malusi 
Gigaba 
Public 
Enterprises 
Minister Septembe
r 2011 
 
“The privileged will not voluntarily 
and out of magnanimity share 
their privileges, let alone 
surrender them. I am certain that 
you know that. A lot of effort, akin 
to a struggle, is required in order 
to bring about the economic 
transformation that we seek” 
Mixed 
Pravin 
Gordhan 
Treasury Finance 
Minister 
Septembe
r 2011 
“The danger is that the 
nationalisation debate is 
mishandled, which could affect 
sentiment, undermine confidence 
and raise uncertainty regarding 
policy and policy direction” 
 
 The calls for nationalisation stem 
from “frustration at the slow pace 
of economic transformation”. 
Mining companies have “fallen 
short” of commitments to increase 
black participation in the industry. 
Against 
Mathews 
Phosa 
ANC Former 
Treasure 
General 
Septembe
r 2011 
Any policy of nationalisation 
adopted by the government would 
be in the best interests of the 
country as a whole, and the 
government in general was "very 
open" to public-private partnership 
in the mining industry. The party’s 
report on nationalisation, to be 
released next year, would 
represent "a middle road 
somewhere" that would be a "win- 
win for everyone". 
For 
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Sandile 
Nogxina 
Advisor to 
Susan 
Shabangu 
 
Advisor 
 
Septembe
r 
2011 
 
Nationalisation is not policy for 
South Africa and there is no 
government process that is 
formulating a policy on 
nationalisation.” 
 
“The matter will be put to bed by 
July next year when the ruling 
party holds its policy conference 
whereupon the issue will be 
debated, discussed and perhaps 
will be adopted or not.” 
Mixed  
 
Fred Gona Mining 
Committee 
Chairman Septembe
r 2011 
"The industry brought the 
nationalisation debate on itself. It 
is unsustainable that so few 
benefit from the industry” 
For 
Rob 
Davies 
Department 
of Trade 
and 
Industry 
Minister Septembe
r 2011 
An assessment of the impact of 
the nationalisation and 
collectivisation debate depended 
on which investors you were 
talking to. Tata, the Indian 
conglomerate, for example, did 
not “give a fig about a debate on 
nationalisation”. 
Against 
Trevor 
Manuel 
National 
Planning 
Commissio
n 
Head August 
2011 
Concerned that some people 
seemed intent on driving away 
investment 
Against 
Gwede 
Mantashe 
ANC Secretary 
General 
August 
2011 
There are plans to complete a 
study on how South Africa should 
use its vast mineral wealth to fight 
widespread poverty by the end of 
the year 
 
“The fact that there are rich 
deposits of minerals in the country 
but there is poverty, is an ill that 
must be worrying all of us” 
 
"When we take a decision, we will 
take a decision that says: 'What 
they did in Botswana and what 
they did in Brazil will work for us. 
We don't take decisions on the 
basis on emotion” 
For 
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Julius 
Malema 
ANC Youth 
League 
President August 
2011 
"Everyone has the right to benefit 
from wealth in South Africa.  
South Africa is divided as we 
speak, we have two economies in 
one country, two nations in one 
country, and it is nationalisation 
that will unite us." 
For 
Keith 
Khoza 
ANC Spokesman August 
2011  
It was misleading to say that the 
party had agreed to 
nationalisation: “It is not a 
foregone conclusion that there will 
be nationalisation, but we are not 
opposed to nationalisation” 
For 
David 
Masondo 
ANC 
Limpopo 
province 
General 
secretary 
and treasury 
MEC 
August 
2011 
Supports nationalisation based on 
the principles of the freedom 
charter, believes that the state 
should gain revenue from mines 
not only from taxes but also from 
a share of the profits 
For 
Malusi 
Gigaba 
Public 
Enterprises 
Department 
Minister August 
2011 
"We know the harm this 
acrimonious and reckless debate 
about nationalisation is doing to 
investments, to the good image of 
our country”  
Against 
Susan 
Shabangu 
Department 
of Mineral 
Resources 
Minister August 
2011 
Surprised that South Africa was 
grappling with a debate about 
nationalisation while there is a 
real global concern about the 
state of the world economy, with 
all countries chasing investments 
in a bid to drive growth and create 
sustainable jobs. 
Against 
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Pravin 
Gordhan 
Treasury Finance 
Minister 
July 2011 “There are people who don’t know 
South Africa that well and our 
politics that well who could be, 
and I have had bits of information, 
who could be put off or who will 
say let’s just clarify what’s going 
on in the country . Promoting 
certainty and promoting optimism 
in our environment is as important 
as having our debate as well so 
we have got to manage those 
processes.” 
 
“We need investments, we need 
technology to come from outside 
of South Africa and we need to 
partner in the right way with each 
of these people so that we can 
advance our own cause ... We 
have to manage South African 
affairs in a way in which we don’t 
alienate overseas investors and at 
the same time identify the serious 
challenges we face and work 
together to solve those 
challenges.” 
 
Against 
Sandile 
Nogxina  
Adviser to 
Susan 
Shabangu 
Adviser July 2011  Believes the ANCYL’s call is 
partly the result of mining 
companies’ failure to achieve the 
goals they were set, and the 
promised contained in social and 
labour plans, but believes the 
debate should run its course 
 
Mixed 
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Floyd 
Shivambu 
ANC Youth 
League 
Spokesperso
n 
July 2011 “The people as a whole are vividly 
distinguishable from State rentals 
of mineral wealth to big 
corporations, who brutally exploit 
labour and unsustainably exploit 
mineral wealth to make big 
profits.” 
 
“The Freedom Charter is the 
clearest expression of what the 
ANC and alliance partners seek to 
achieve in South Africa and any 
person who is against the Charter 
is against the aims of the ANC 
and the revolutionary alliance”.  
For 
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Julius 
Malema 
ANC Youth 
League  
President June 
2011 
"The wealth must be transferred 
to all the people, the banks and 
mines should be nationalised. 
Land redistribution should be 
speeded up otherwise we will 
have no alternative to take over 
the land without compensation," 
 
“There is greater consensus in the 
ANC on the nationalisation of 
mines and other strategic sectors 
of the economy, but we are still to 
see if the leadership has the 
political will to confront mining 
capitalists. It is the courage and 
the political will of the leadership 
which must inform the militant and 
radical resolutions and policy 
directions to be taken at the 53rd 
National Conference of the ANC 
in December 2012.” 
 
“Our call for mines to be 
nationalised and land to be 
expropriated without 
compensation are currently the 
most important rallying points to 
mobilise society behind the 
visions of the Freedom Charter” 
 
“We need the ANC to declare that 
we are in an economic struggle. 
Once that declaration is made, 
everyone will work towards 
economic emancipation. Our 
focus must be on economic 
freedom.” 
 
“We’re going to war comrades. A 
war for radical policy shift.” 
 
[On Susan Shabangu]:“She 
should prepare the mining sector 
psychologically, otherwise the 
mining sector will be in for a 
shock... .” 
For 
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Ben Turok ANC  MP June 
2011 
The nationalisation of mines in SA 
was impractical, given the need 
for skilled personnel to run the 
mines and a favourable economic 
environment. 
Against 
Gwede 
Mantashe 
ANC Secretary 
General 
June 
2011 
“The ANC is not a stokvel, it is a 
political party. We don’t develop a 
policy on our feet, and we don’t 
just wake up and adopt policies 
just because a group is vocal on 
the nationalisation of mines. It 
does not work that way” 
Against 
Malesela 
Maleka 
SACP Spokesman June 
2011 
The organisation was in alliance 
with the ANC, and not the youth 
league, and therefore the process 
of research into the feasibility of 
mines had to be respected. 
Against 
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Blade 
Nzimande 
SACP Secretary 
General  
June 
2011 
Malema's populist rhetoric divided 
the nation and was becoming a 
threat to the democracy won in 
1994 after decades of white 
minority rule.  “This demagogy 
constitutes the greatest threat not 
just to our electoral performance 
but also to our hard-won 
democratic achievements” 
 
“Malema is part of this populism 
that is sounding left and workerist 
but actually [carries] the hidden 
agenda of acquiring wealth by 
selfish and unlawful means. This 
has happened before. People 
who have devious aims have 
always attacked the SACP for its 
principled stand. So Malema and 
his ilk do not surprise us.” 
 
"We want to make it clear that the 
call [for nationalisation] is not a 
genuine call to actually empower 
the workers and the poor. 
Nationalisation has been 
undertaken by Hitler. "Ten years 
from now there will be a renewed 
call for privatisation." 
 
“The ANCYL wants the state to 
buy mining companies owned by 
black investors that are indebted” 
Against 
Jacob 
Zuma  
ANC President May 2011 ANC Youth League president 
Julius Malema’s utterances on 
nationalisation of land and mines 
were not the policies of the ANC 
or the government 
 
Against 
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Ben Turok Congress 
of 
Democrats 
 
Anti-
apartheid 
activist, Head 
of the 
Congress of 
Democrats 
Feb 2011 “Well it’s a complicated issue 
…the point is that when I wrote 
that charter, the international 
environment was very different 
than today … nationalisation was 
a policy adopted around the world 
… but the main thrust of our 
policy at that time was about 
making public ownership of the 
resources of the country and 
that’s why we talked about the 
minerals, it was not the mines … 
it was a question of restitution.” 
 
Mixed 
Ben Turok Congress 
of 
Democrats 
 
Anti-
apartheid 
activist, Head 
of the 
Congress of 
Democrats 
Feb 2011 “We note that the word 
‘nationalisation’ does not appear 
in the clause headed ‘the people 
shall share in the country’s 
wealth’. What was in our minds at 
the time was to emphasise that 
white economic power had 
usurped the historical legacy of 
the indigenous people whose 
ownership had to be restored. It 
was the colonial aspect that the 
Charter sought to reverse, not 
private ownership of property. It 
has never been the intention of 
the ANC to create a demand 
economy by nationalisation”. 
 
“In my judgement, the case for 
nationalising the mines has yet to 
be made convincingly” 
Against  
Musa 
Zondi 
Department 
of Mineral 
Resources 
Spokesperso
n to DMR 
minister  
Feb 2011 “It is not being investigated by 
government - it is being 
investigated by the ruling party, 
which is a separate thing 
altogether. But government's 
position still remains the same - 
nationalisation is not a policy."  
Against  
Susan 
Shabangu 
Department 
of Mineral 
Resources 
Minister Feb 2011 "I still believe, I feel very strongly, 
that nationalisation would not be 
the option for South Africa."  
Against 
444 | P a g e  
Name  Institution Designation Date Comment Stance 
Susan 
Shabangu 
Department 
of Mineral 
Resources 
Minister Feb 2011 "Is nationalisation going to give us 
jobs? No. We have got to make 
sure that we become responsible 
and we attract more investments, 
because we do need investments 
in South Africa.”  
Against 
Gwede 
Mantashe  
ANC Secretary 
General 
May 2010  “The idea of nationalisation of the 
mines as raised by the ANCYL 
will have to go through the ANC’s 
economic transformation 
committee, the national general 
council, and the policy conference 
before even reaching the national 
conference in 2012” 
 
Mixed 
Julius 
Malema 
ANCYL Leader May 2010 “It is common knowledge that the 
ANCYL has called for the 
nationalisation of the country’s 
mines, which is crucial for 
opening opportunities for all South 
Africans and creating more jobs 
through (the) beneficiation and 
industrialisation of minerals.” 
For 
Floyd 
Shivambu  
ANCYL Spokespers-
on 
May 2010  “Our concern is the reality that the 
colonial features of the South 
African economy are still vivid, 
exporting virtually all natural 
resources and importing finished 
goods and products, but also 
enriching the white minority at the 
expense of the black majority” 
For  
Julius 
Malema 
ANCYL Leader May 2010 The state should ‘not tamper with 
what people own now’ but rather it 
should go ‘find open spaces’ 
For 
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Joel 
Netshite-
nzhe  
 
ANC Veteran 
Policy guru 
May 2010  On the Freedom Charter: “It is 
ahistorical to quote texts from 
some half century ago as 
evidence of an immutable policy 
stance, without an appreciation of 
the obvious changing context” 
 
“This is because state owned 
natural resource companies lend 
themselves to corruption – they 
have high lootability”. 
 
The right question is whether 
state ownership would do more to 
strengthen the ability of the nation 
to deal with poverty and inequality 
than better regulation or different 
forms of taxation. In a nutshell, 
the call for holus bolus 
nationalisation of the mines is not 
supported by strong enough 
evidence” 
 
Against 
Julius 
Malema 
ANCYL Leader As quoted 
by Alistair 
Sparks, 
Mar 2010  
“In his first public address after 
release from prison, former 
president Nelson Mandela said, 
‘Nationalisation of the mines, 
banks and monopoly industry is 
the policy of the ANC and a 
change or modification of our view 
in this regard is inconceivable.’” 
 
For 
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Jacob 
Zuma  
ANC  President of 
South Africa  
March 
2010  
"Let me use this opportunity to 
state that South African law does 
not provide for the nationalisation 
of mineral resources, and there is 
no discussion within government 
about the nationalisation of mines. 
Our Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 
gives effect to the notion of state 
custodianship of mineral rights. 
"The law recognises the mineral 
wealth as a national asset, a 
common heritage that belongs to 
all in South Africa and 
pronounces the state as the 
custodian thereof." 
 
Against  
Jeremy 
Cronin 
SACP Deputy 
General 
Secretary  
 
Feb 2010 “Any progressive call for 
nationalisation needs to be a 
coherent and do-able part of an 
overall democratic programme. 
How we transform the mining 
sector should be located within 
such a broader discussion and 
not be based on one third of a de-
contextualised clause in the 
Freedom Charter”. 
 
Against 
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Susan 
Shabangu  
DMR Head  Feb 2010 “In my lifetime there will be no 
nationalisation. Maybe when I’m 
dead, and rest assured I’m not 
dying next week”. 
 
“Why should we stop young 
people when they want to engage 
in an intellectual debate? If 
Malema flexes his muscles and 
engages in an intellectual and 
academic exercise, why must we 
stop him?” 
 
“If the government wants to be 
involved in mining then it has to 
run these in a competitive way, 
like any other business. Its 
businesses must be run 
professionally and they should be 
able to compete on their own 
locally and globally. 
Nationalisation is about 
everything, and that’s not the 
route we’re taking”. 
 
“Nationalisation is not a 
government policy… and this is 
not the route we are taking.. but if 
Julius Malema wants to flex his 
muscles intellectually, why should 
we stop him?” 
 
Against  
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Julius 
Malema  
ANCYL Leader  Feb 2010  “Our position is that banks are 
going to be nationalised but we 
want to start first with the mines. 
Our position is inspired by the 
Freedom Charter. If there is an 
investor who is afraid of our 
restructuring, they are not 
welcome”. 
 
“If any investor leaves here… 
other investors are going to come. 
Investors must be aware we have 
a strong communist friend 
China… They will invest here, 
they will mine here.” 
 
“We come with the minerals, you 
come with the financial capital” 
For  
Floyd 
Shivambu 
 
ANC Youth 
League 
Spokesperso
n  
Dec 2009 “Our view is that government 
must not pay anything for 
nationalisation. At the end of the 
debate, the law must clearly state 
that companies applying for 
mining rights must accept that the 
government will own 60 percent of 
the profits. Whether we end up 
with nationalisation with or without 
compensation will depend on a 
final model that will be done by 
the ANC.” 
 
For  
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Blade 
Nzimande 
SACP Minister of 
Higher 
Education 
Dec 2009 "The new tendency is 
opportunistically using the 
historical documents and position 
of our movement to try and assert 
its new positions; [for example], 
an opportunistic use of the 
clauses on nationalisation in the 
Freedom Charter, and the 
vulgarisation of the 
characterisation of our revolution 
as seeking to liberate blacks in 
general and Africans in 
particular." 
 
"Together, led by the ANC and its 
broad movement, let us ensure 
that the noble task of black 
emancipation is not captured by a 
faction of parasites who use and 
abuse their political connections 
for their own private 
accumulation.  
 
"Let us defeat javelin throwers 
and 'tenderpreneurs'. Let us 
defeat fronters, go-betweens, 
compradors who parade their 
blackness only in order to 
advance their own private 
interests by doing the bidding of 
their masters - well-entrenched 
monopoly" 
 
For 
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Mr. Pieter 
Groenewal
d (MP) 
Freedom 
Front Plus 
Parliamentar
y 
spokesperso
n on 
Agriculture 
and Land 
Affairs 
Aug 2008 “Cosatu proposes that 
expropriation should be used to 
nationalise key strategic 
industries such as Sasol, Mittal, 
commercial banks and monopoly 
industries. On the other hand, 
Cosatu proposes that 
expropriation should be used, 
should it be in the national 
interest, to nationalise businesses 
which are on the brink of collapse 
in order to prevent workers from 
being fired. Cosatu's proposals 
destroy the ground principles of a 
free-market economy and will 
destroy South Africa" 
 
Against 
 
Bheki 
Khumalo 
 
ANC 
Spokesman 
for the 
Department 
of Minerals 
and Energy 
(DME) 
 
Oct 2008 
"The policy of nationalisation is 
not government policy, it is not an 
option and is not on the table" 
"We have no intention on the side 
of government to nationalise 
anything…only a minority had 
proposed nationalisation.” 
Against 
Jacinto 
Rocha 
ANC Deputy 
Director 
General of 
(then) DME 
Oct 2008 "If there are platinum 
opportunities, we are going to get 
involved, either directly as a miner 
or indirectly as a shareholder"  
 
For 
Nelson 
Mandela  
ANC President of 
the party 
1990 “Nationalisation remained, in 
certain areas, a basic policy of the 
ANC, but the economy at large 
would still be based on private 
enterprise. The entire economy 
will remain intact” 
Against 
Freedom 
charter 
ANC 
document  
 1955  “The mineral wealth beneath the 
soil, the banks and monopoly 
industry shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a 
whole. All other Industry and trade 
shall be controlled to assist the 
wellbeing of the people”. 
 
For 
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Chris 
Malekane 
Cosatu Economist August 
2011 
The team established by the 
ANC to examine the 
nationalisation issue was not 
looking at policy feasibility but 
was exploring the most 
appropriate model to 
implement – nationalisation will 
happen 
 
For 
Policy 
document 
NUM  August 
2011 
The principal objective now 
should be to transform mining 
and mineral-processing 
industries to serve the 
interests of all people 
 
Nationalisation will lead to the 
collapse of the JSE that could 
set off a ‘revolutionary 
backlash’ from large numbers 
of ordinary citizens, mine 
workers and civil servants 
whose retirement investments 
would be lost as a result. 
 
Against 
Nomusa 
Cembi 
South 
African 
Democratic 
Teachers 
Union 
Spokesman  July 
2011 
The union supports the call to 
nationalise mines. Its stand is 
the same as Cosatu’s.  
 
For 
Zwelinzima 
Vavi 
Cosatu General 
Secretary 
July 
2011 
The debate over 
nationalisation started 
"wrongly and in the wrong 
place”; Cosatu was not 
necessarily for nationalisation 
of all the mines in SA. "But we 
do say that we need a state 
that can have a company that 
can intervene in the strategic 
minerals” 
 
“We are strong proponents of 
this clause of the Freedom 
Charter and this places us 
Mixed 
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firmly on the side of the debate 
that would support 
nationalisation of mines, the 
banks and monopoly industry. 
Nationalisation means 
transferring ownership to the 
people as a whole with the 
State representing the people” 
 
Frans 
Baleni 
NUM General 
Secretary 
June 
2011 
"The central committee fully 
supports the Freedom Charter 
clause on nationalisation as 
well as the ANC 2010 NGC 
resolution on the matter. The 
CC supported in particular the 
research and reference group 
mooted by the ANC which 
would culminate in a formal 
policy decision." 
For  
Patrick 
Craven  
Cosatu Spokesman June 
2011 
“Malema was correct to say 
that the nationalisation of 
mines is a requirement of the 
Freedom Charter, because 
according to the Freedom 
Charter the mineral wealth 
should belong to all. The 
problem is that Malema is 
jumping the gun by talking 
about nationalisation when he 
is yet to convince the ANC. He 
has got to take the debate to 
the ANC, which will take place 
during the policy conference 
next year.” 
 
For 
Sasco Sasco Statement Feb 
2010 
“We see nationalisation as 
urgent and necessary to 
transform the South African 
economy” 
 
For 
NUMSA NUMSA Statement Mar 
2010  
"We support the call for 
nationalisation of mines." 
 
For 
453 | P a g e  
UNIONS 
 
Name  Institution Designation  Date Comment Stance  
Madoda 
Sambatha  
NUM Parliamentary 
Officer 
May 
2010 
“Whether Parliament takes a 
decision on nationalisation or 
not, the reality is that any 
decision will ultimately need an 
implementation arm or vehicle. 
Our view as the union is that 
the current debate on 
nationalisation and this public 
hearing (on a state owned 
mining company) should be 
seen as integral and 
reinforcing each other”.  
 
Mixed 
NUM NUM Statement Mar 
2010  
“A state mining company 
should be operationalised and 
used as a government vehicle 
to invest only in strategic 
minerals (such as) platinum, 
coal, uranium, iron ore and 
manganese" 
 
For 
Madoda 
Sambatha  
NUM Parliamentary 
Officer 
August 
2010 
“The country could also 
nationalise iron ore mines and 
Arcelor Mittal SA to mitigate 
and cushion steel prices which 
would be beneficial in South 
Africa's industrialisation 
programme"  
 
"Thus, our preference is that 
our nationalisation model 
should encompass a majority 
shareholding position of 50 
percent plus one and the 
establishment of joint ventures 
or partnerships of 25percent 
equity plus one share"  
 
For  
Numsa Numsa Statement  Dec 
2009 
"Numsa believes the ANC-led 
alliance must now fast-track 
the implementation of a 
framework within which 
nationalisation premised on 
the socialisation of the 
For 
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economic heights of the 
economy can be executed" 
 
Jaco 
Kleynhans 
Solidarity Spokesperson  July 
2009 
"Mining is a long-term 
investment and is built on 
stability, but this type of 
statement discourages 
investors from investing in 
South Africa"  
 
"The statements that are now 
being made and the ANC's 
current support for debate are 
an ominous sign. The 
statements could not have 
come at a worse time. 
Commodity prices have 
dropped sharply and nearly 
35,000 employees in the 
industry have already lost their 
jobs this year. Mining 
companies hate uncertainty 
and serious investors will not 
invest in South African mining"  
 
"There are fixed frameworks, 
consisting of the state, labour 
and the mining companies. 
They need to resolve policy 
issues in a responsible manner 
and it is unnecessary to stir up 
emotions on the sideline. The 
state must focus on long-term 
challenges such as adding 
value, training, combating 
illegal mining activities, and 
mining safety” 
Against  
 
 
 
  
455 | P a g e  
Appendix 7 
Key lessons in funding BEE companies 
(Source: Adapted from various mining companys’ internal reports) 
 Transaction Type 1 Transaction Type 2 
Sustainability  Transaction Type 1 was 
concluded in 2006, and at the 
time, the global finance crisis was 
neither foreseen nor 
contemplated. 
 The material negative effect of 
the global financial crisis on the 
diamond industry and BEE 
company , was severe. 
 With positive action and support 
from Parent company, this mining 
company has withstood this crisis  
Whilst there has been a material 
equity gain for BEE company in 
terms of its shareholding, the 
potential economic gains for BEE 
may be less than were originally 
anticipated. 
 
 The Transaction type 2 transaction has 
been specifically structured to maximize 
cash flows to Empowered company. 
 Whilst there can be no guarantee of 
positive equity returns, Parent company 
and BEE company have conducted 
extensive scenario analyses to ensure 
that BEE company should experience a 
positive economic benefit from their 
ongoing participation. 
The Transaction Type 2 BEE 
transaction has been structured 
‘defensively’ to limit the risk of low 
returns due to low macroeconomic 
declines, poor dividends flows and 
external bank funding. 
BEE Funding  As was the norm in 2006, BEE 
acquired equity based on 
external bank funding and this 
was the case with Transaction 
Type 1 
 With hindsight, this may have 
negatively affected the economic 
benefits to BEE 
 The evolution of BEE in South 
Africa has led to more vendor 
financing arrangements being 
offered, providing flexibility to 
BEE structures and a lessoning 
of the default risk for BEE. 
 
 The empowerement deal will be vendor 
financed by Parent company. 
 No additional debt obligation for BEE 
company. 
 Parent company will bear a material 
portion of the economic cost / dilution 
as a result of the vendor finance. 
 
Funding Equity 
Contribution 
 At the time of the Transaction 
Type 1 transaction, BEE partners 
was required to subscribe for 
equity in the amount of c. R11m 
 BEE partners is not required to 
contribute any further equity. 
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in aggregate 
 Equity investment capital 
contribution from BEE is still a 
standard requirement in BEE 
transactions. 
 
Surbodination  With the Transaction Type 1 
transaction, and the use by BEE 
of external debt, Parent company 
subordinated certain of the 
obligations owed by resultant 
empowered company to Parent 
company to assist BEE partners 
in managing its other debt 
obligations. 
 
 Parent company continues with its 
subordination as per Transaction Type 
1 as has extended this where 
necessary. 
 The Transaction Type 2 structure 
further subordinates payments to the 
greater Parent company in favour of 
BEE. 
  
Trickle 
Dividend 
 Trickle dividends and a flow of 
economic benefits to BEE from 
the commencement of the BEE 
transaction is a relatively new 
concept in BEE structures. 
 The MPRDA now specifically 
requires economic benefits to 
flow from commencement. 
 The Transaction Type 1 
transaction specified that certain 
dividends would flow to BEE 
company from commencement 
which were temporarily halted at 
the time of the financial crisis. 
 
 The trickle dividend has been reinstated 
and increased in an aggregate amount 
of c. R24m per annum, escalating at 
CPI to 2022. 
 This is clearly a direct and immediate 
economic benefit to BEE in line with the 
views of the DMR. 
 
External Bank 
Finance 
 The external debt of BEE 
company is due to be refinanced.  
 
 The cash flows due to Parent company 
from the diamond trading business 
have been specifically structured to 
ensure that sufficient cash is dividend 
out to BEE company for BEE partners 
to optimally renegotiate its external 
bank refinance. 
 Parent company will subordinate 
certain claims to facilitate this refinance 
 Parent company may further facilitate 
the sustainability of BEE company by 
assuming a portion of the external bank 
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finance. 
 
Vendor 
Finance rates 
 With the Transaction Type 
1transaction relying on external 
bank finance, the interest rate is 
set by the bank market as it is 
linked to Prime. 
 This has created certain leakages 
in the returns to BEE. 
 
 The vendor finance rate of the 
acquisition business by BEE company 
has been undertaken on a favorable 
basis.  
 The rate is materially reduced over the 
period that BEE partners external debt 
remains in existence which will facilitate 
the potential equity returns to BEE 
partners and ensure that BEE company 
is deleveraged as soon as economically 
viable. 
 
Discounts  The Transaction Type 
1transaction was undertaken at 
arms’ length on commercial 
terms based on a valuations by 
financial advisors. 
 
 BEE company receives a material 
discount to fair value, of c. [20%].  
This will immediately provide an 
economic uplift in the equity value of 
BEE company shareholding in the 
parent company. 
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Appendix 8 
Community Partnership Plan (CPP) Guidelines 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
• Name of Operations, address and contact details 
• Brief description of the operation including the nature of the operation, life of mine and number of employees 
Regulations and 
requirements 
• Brief description of all the relevant community enagement requirements aligned with local legislation 
• Provide copy of the company policies relating to community engagement 
Definitions 
• Describe all the relevant terms to be used in the CEP 
• Provide  objectives of the Community Engagemnet Plan 
Context and 
background 
• Description of  all community engagement to date, types of information disseminated, the forms this took (oral, brochure, 
report, posters, radio, etc) and the means of dissemination. 
• Key stakeholder groups identified to date, including  the stakeholder profiling or mapping techniques that may have been used. 
 
Community Issues 
• Issues likely to influence relations between the operation and its associated communities  
• Description of the process by which people affected by the operation can bring their grievances to the attention of the 
operation’s management in a culturally appropriate manner for consideration and redress 
Management 
Actions 
• Agreed management actions to resolve community issues and other relevant relational issues  with clear objectives, timelines 
and responsible persons identified 
Monitoring Plan 
• Agree on a monitoring plan to ensure continued engagement and ffective implementation of the plan. 
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Appendix 9 
Government Relations Framework 
 
 
• Situational Analysis 
• Key Issues identification 
• Define Target state 
Establish current 
and future  
situation 
• Identify key stakeholders in all levels 
• Conduct influencer mapping 
Stakeholder 
Mapping 
• Identify core sets of objectives aligned 
with the end or future state 
• Articulate key milestones and actions 
Identify Key 
Objectives 
Produce Action 
Plans 
460 | P a g e  
Appendix 10 
List of Youth Participants in the Focus Group Discussions 
No. 
 Nominated 
by 
Gender Organisation  
1  Venetia Mine Male Musina Municipality 
2  Venetia Mine Male Youth Council 
3  Venetia Mine Female Youth Council 
4  Venetia Mine Male NUM Youth 
5  Venetia Mine Female SRC Eric Louw High School 
6  Venetia Mine Male SRC Musina High 
7  Venetia Mine Female SRC Renaissance High 
8  Venetia Mine Male  SRC Alldays Combined 
9 
 
Venetia Mine Male 
SRC Mathipa Makgate 
Secondary 
10  Venetia Mine Male SRC Thokampe Secondary  
11  Venetia Mine Male Musina Youth in Business Forum  
12 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Male 
Southern African Youth 
Movement (SAYM) 
13 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Male 
Southern African Youth 
Movement (SAYM) 
14 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Female Ngwathe Secondary School 
15 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Female  Ngwathe Secondary School 
16 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Female  Ngwathe Secondary School 
17 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Male Dr Cingo Secondary School 
18 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Female Dr Cingo Secondary School 
19 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Male Dr Cingo Secondary School 
20 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Male Ngwathe Local Mnunicipality 
21 
 Voorspoed 
Mine Male Ngwathe Local Mnunicipality 
22 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Male Isibindi 
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23 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Female Isibindi 
24 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Male FAMSA (Family South Africa) 
25 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Male Rradiragatsa Youth Group 
26 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Female Rradiragatsa Youth Group 
27 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Male Hunger and Thirst 
28 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Female Hunger and Thirst 
29 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Male Mabaleng ANCYL 
30 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Male Zimele Entrepreneur 
31 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Male Zimele Entrepreneur 
32 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Female Northern Cape Youth Chamber  
33 
 Kimberley 
Mines  Female Northern Cape Youth Chamber  
34 
 
CHQ Female Khula Weekend School 
35  CHQ Female Khula Weekend School 
36  CHQ Male UJ 
37  CHQ Male   
38  CHQ Female   
39  CHQ Female   
40  CHQ Male   
41  CHQ Male   
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Appendix 11 
Focus Group programme 
 
De Beers Youth Symposium 
24-26th June 2015 
 
 
Day 1: Wed 24th June 
Time  Activity Description Resources Lead 
15:00 
– 
16:00 
Welcome and 
Registration 
 Registration of all 
delegates 
 
 
 
 
 Welcome and Opening 
by De Beers 
Opening address by key 
De Beers staff member, 
focus on opportunity, 
partnership and learning 
Registration 
system/forms 
Packs (incl. 
pen/paper/promotional 
material 
 
To be confirmed 
De Beers 
 
 
 
 
De Beers 
16:00 
-17:30 
Expectations, 
Values –base  
 Session 1: Ice-breaker 
[15min] 
Getting to know you, 
fun, upbeat 
 Session 2: Introduction 
to session [10 min] 
 Session 3: Expectations 
[30min) 
Self-reflection exercise 
leading to group activity 
using ‘posties’ 
Facilitators work with 
the group to cluster into 
themes. 
Work with priorities, 
maybe include parking 
lot. 
Summaries 
expectations into 4-6 
key areas These will be 
used to guide the 
discussion/questions at 
the CEO’s breakfast 
None 
 
None 
 
Sticky Notes, Kokis, 
space in conference 
room for Expectations 
wall 
 
 
 
 
Flip Chart Paper 
Mark and 
Xolani 
 
 
 
Mark will 
purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
De Beers 
to provide 
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 Session 4: Full Value 
Contract. [20min] 
Whole group 
engagement building a 
commitment to how we 
are going to behave as 
a group.  
17:30 
– 
18:30 
The World of 
De Beers 
 Overview of the De 
Beers business 
tbc De Beers 
Time  Activity Description Resources Lead 
18:30 
– 
19:00 
Team Build  Run 1 team build 
initiative 
None Mark and 
Xolani 
19:00 
– 
20:00 
Dinner  Guest Speaker   
20:00 
– 
21:00 
Prep for CEO 
Breakfast 
 This slot will be an 
option dependant on 
energy level/tiredness 
of group and need in 
terms of ensuring that 
the engagement is 
focussed on building 
partnership and not 
animosity. {DeBeers 
team to make this call 
with input from Mark 
and Xolani} 
Flip Chart paper, Koki’s Mark and 
Xolani 
 
 
Day 2: Thurs 25th June 
Time  Activity Description Resources Lead 
08:30 – 
09:30 
CEO 
Breakfast 
  De Beers 
09-45 – 
12:45 
Modelling 
Exercise – My 
world, my 
reality, my 
future 
Session # 1: Setting the 
theme/reflection [20min] 
Introduction to activity and a 
reflective exercise 
Session # 2: Creating the 
current [40min] 
Groups divided into their 
A1 card 
Play Dough 
Arts and craft 
materials used as 
symbols 
Card cut out, 
human form 
Mark and 
Xolani 
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communities – theme 
question, model your 
community as you see it 
now – including elements 
that demonstrate hope, risk, 
potential and despair. 
Session # 3: Building clarity 
through the 4 archetypes 
[30 min] 
4-archetypes perception 
process used to increase 
awareness of current 
‘reality’ and emergent 
change areas. 
Session # 4: Shaping the 
future [30 min] 
Participants are given time 
to change their model to 
create a vision for their 
communities in the next 5 
years. 
Session # 5: Feedback for 
learning [40 min] 
Each group present their 
model 
Group session drawing 
common threads of vision, 
need and mechanism. 
Individual reflection: What 
will I do – on the day that I 
get home, in the 
subsequent week, over the 
subsequent month and 
year. Info shared in groups 
of 4. 
 
Time  Activity Description Resources Lead 
12:45 – 
13:45 
Lunch    
13:45 – 
15:00 
Resource 
Mapping 
Building a resource map 
for each community 
Session #1 Introduction 
String,sosatie 
sticks, paper flags, 
koki’s, prestick, 
Mark and 
Xolani 
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to Activity [5min] 
Session # 2 Mapping 
current resources [20 
min] 
Using the models from 
the previous session 
resources are flagged 
and linked 
Session # 3 Mapping the 
Resource GAP [20 min] 
Similar to session # 2, 
but placement and linking 
of resources that are 
needed. 
Session # 4 Discussion 
on accessing resources, 
leveraging current 
resources to reduce GAP 
and possibly some 
dialogue on mind-set [30 
min] 
Session # 5: Close 
session with human web 
activity [15min] 
 
balloons 
15:10 – 
15:30 
Tea    
15:30 – 
17:00 
De Beers 
Presentation  
De Beers to present their 
strategy on community 
development, SMME 
development, Youth 
Development 
Allow for Q&A 
De Beers to 
confirm 
De Beers 
17:00 – 
18:00 
Free time    
18:00 – 
20:00 
Braai/Social    
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Appendix 12 
Small Business Development Model 
 
 
(Source: Researcher’s construction based on this research and experience in 
Enterprise Development) 
 
